mirror of
https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning.git
synced 2024-11-19 18:11:28 +01:00
32c7c133f4
Still asserts that it's the standard size, but makes it a dynamic member. For simpliciy, changes the parse_onionpacket API (it must be a tal object now, so we might as well allocate it here to catch all the callers). Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
321 lines
8.8 KiB
C
321 lines
8.8 KiB
C
#include "config.h"
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <bitcoin/privkey.h>
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#include <ccan/err/err.h>
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#include <ccan/mem/mem.h>
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#include <ccan/opt/opt.h>
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#include <ccan/str/hex/hex.h>
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#include <ccan/tal/tal.h>
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#include <common/blinding.h>
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#include <common/ecdh.h>
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#include <common/hmac.h>
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#include <common/setup.h>
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#include <common/sphinx.h>
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#include <common/type_to_string.h>
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#include <common/utils.h>
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#include <common/version.h>
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#include <secp256k1.h>
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#include <secp256k1_ecdh.h>
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#include <sodium/crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305.h>
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#include <sodium/crypto_auth_hmacsha256.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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static bool simpleout = false;
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/* Tal wrappers for opt. */
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static void *opt_allocfn(size_t size)
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{
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return tal_arr_label(NULL, char, size, TAL_LABEL("opt_allocfn", ""));
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}
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static void *tal_reallocfn(void *ptr, size_t size)
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{
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if (!ptr)
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return opt_allocfn(size);
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tal_resize_(&ptr, 1, size, false);
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return ptr;
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}
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static void tal_freefn(void *ptr)
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{
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tal_free(ptr);
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}
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/* We don't actually use this, but common/onion needs it */
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void ecdh(const struct pubkey *point, struct secret *ss)
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{
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abort();
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}
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int main(int argc, char **argv)
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{
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bool first = false;
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common_setup(argv[0]);
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opt_set_alloc(opt_allocfn, tal_reallocfn, tal_freefn);
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opt_register_noarg("--help|-h", opt_usage_and_exit,
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"\n\n\tcreate <nodeid>[/<scid>]...\n"
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"\tunwrap <privkey> <onion> <blinding>\n",
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"Show this message");
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opt_register_noarg("--first-node", opt_set_bool, &first,
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"Don't try to tweak key to unwrap onion");
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opt_register_noarg("--simple-output", opt_set_bool, &simpleout,
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"Output values without prefixes, one per line");
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opt_register_version();
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opt_parse(&argc, argv, opt_log_stderr_exit);
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if (argc < 2)
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errx(1, "You must specify create or unwrap");
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if (streq(argv[1], "create")) {
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struct privkey e;
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struct pubkey *pk_e, *b, *nodes;
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struct short_channel_id **scids;
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struct secret *rho;
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size_t num = argc - 2;
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if (argc < 3)
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errx(1, "create requires at least one nodeid");
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/* P(i) */
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nodes = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct pubkey, num);
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/* E(i) */
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pk_e = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct pubkey, num);
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/* B(i) */
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b = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct pubkey, num);
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/* rho(i) */
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rho = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct secret, num);
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scids = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id *, num);
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/* Randomness, chosen with a fair dice roll! */
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memset(&e, 6, sizeof(e));
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if (!pubkey_from_privkey(&e, &pk_e[0]))
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abort();
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for (size_t i = 0; i < num; i++) {
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struct secret ss;
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struct secret hmac;
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struct sha256 h;
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const char *slash;
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if (!pubkey_from_hexstr(argv[2+i],
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strcspn(argv[2+i], "/"),
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&nodes[i]))
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errx(1, "%s not a valid pubkey", argv[2+i]);
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slash = strchr(argv[2+i], '/');
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if (slash) {
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scids[i] = tal(scids, struct short_channel_id);
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if (!short_channel_id_from_str(slash+1,
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strlen(slash+1),
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scids[i]))
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errx(1, "%s is not a valid scids",
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slash + 1);
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} else
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scids[i] = NULL;
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if (secp256k1_ecdh(secp256k1_ctx, ss.data,
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&nodes[i].pubkey, e.secret.data, NULL, NULL) != 1)
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abort();
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subkey_from_hmac("blinded_node_id", &ss, &hmac);
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b[i] = nodes[i];
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if (i != 0) {
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if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(secp256k1_ctx,
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&b[i].pubkey, hmac.data) != 1)
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abort();
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}
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subkey_from_hmac("rho", &ss, &rho[i]);
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blinding_hash_e_and_ss(&pk_e[i], &ss, &h);
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if (i != num-1)
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blinding_next_pubkey(&pk_e[i], &h,
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&pk_e[i+1]);
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blinding_next_privkey(&e, &h, &e);
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}
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/* Print initial blinding factor */
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if (simpleout)
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printf("%s\n",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &pk_e[0]));
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else
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printf("Blinding: %s\n",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &pk_e[0]));
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for (size_t i = 0; i < num - 1; i++) {
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u8 *p;
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u8 buf[BIGSIZE_MAX_LEN];
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const unsigned char npub[crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_NPUBBYTES] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
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struct tlv_onionmsg_payload *outer;
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struct tlv_encmsg_tlvs *inner;
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int ret;
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/* Inner is encrypted */
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inner = tlv_encmsg_tlvs_new(tmpctx);
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/* Use scid if they provided one */
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if (scids[i]) {
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inner->next_short_channel_id
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= tal_dup(inner, struct short_channel_id,
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scids[i]);
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} else {
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inner->next_node_id
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= tal_dup(inner, struct pubkey, &nodes[i+1]);
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}
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p = tal_arr(tmpctx, u8, 0);
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towire_encmsg_tlvs(&p, inner);
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outer = tlv_onionmsg_payload_new(tmpctx);
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outer->enctlv = tal_arr(outer, u8, tal_count(p)
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+ crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_ABYTES);
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ret = crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_encrypt(outer->enctlv, NULL,
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p,
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tal_bytelen(p),
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NULL, 0,
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NULL, npub,
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rho[i].data);
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assert(ret == 0);
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p = tal_arr(tmpctx, u8, 0);
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towire_onionmsg_payload(&p, outer);
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ret = bigsize_put(buf, tal_bytelen(p));
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if (simpleout) {
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printf("%s\n%s\n",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
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&b[i]),
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tal_hex(tmpctx, outer->enctlv));
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} else {
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/* devtools/onion wants length explicitly prepended */
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printf("%s/%.*s%s ",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
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&b[i]),
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ret * 2,
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tal_hexstr(tmpctx, buf, ret),
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tal_hex(tmpctx, p));
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}
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}
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/* No payload for last node */
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if (simpleout)
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printf("%s\n",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &b[num-1]));
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else
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printf("%s/00\n",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &b[num-1]));
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} else if (streq(argv[1], "unwrap")) {
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struct privkey privkey;
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struct pubkey blinding;
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u8 onion[TOTAL_PACKET_SIZE(ROUTING_INFO_SIZE)], *dec;
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struct onionpacket *op;
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struct secret ss, onion_ss;
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struct secret hmac, rho;
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struct route_step *rs;
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const u8 *cursor;
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struct tlv_onionmsg_payload *outer;
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size_t max, len;
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struct pubkey res;
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struct sha256 h;
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int ret;
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enum onion_wire failcode;
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const unsigned char npub[crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_NPUBBYTES] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
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if (argc != 5)
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errx(1, "unwrap requires privkey, onion and blinding");
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if (!hex_decode(argv[2], strlen(argv[2]), &privkey,
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sizeof(privkey)))
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errx(1, "Invalid private key hex '%s'", argv[2]);
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if (!hex_decode(argv[3], strlen(argv[3]), onion,
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sizeof(onion)))
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errx(1, "Invalid onion %s", argv[3]);
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if (!pubkey_from_hexstr(argv[4], strlen(argv[4]), &blinding))
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errx(1, "Invalid blinding %s", argv[4]);
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op = parse_onionpacket(tmpctx, onion, sizeof(onion), &failcode);
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if (!op)
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errx(1, "Unparsable onion");
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/* ss(r) = H(k(r) * E(r)) */
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if (secp256k1_ecdh(secp256k1_ctx, ss.data, &blinding.pubkey,
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privkey.secret.data, NULL, NULL) != 1)
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abort();
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subkey_from_hmac("rho", &ss, &rho);
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/* b(i) = HMAC256("blinded_node_id", ss(i)) * k(i) */
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subkey_from_hmac("blinded_node_id", &ss, &hmac);
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/* We instead tweak the *ephemeral* key from the onion
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* and use our raw privkey: this models how lightningd
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* will do it, since hsmd knows only how to ECDH with
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* our real key */
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res = op->ephemeralkey;
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if (!first) {
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if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(secp256k1_ctx,
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&res.pubkey,
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hmac.data) != 1)
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abort();
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}
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if (secp256k1_ecdh(secp256k1_ctx, onion_ss.data,
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&res.pubkey,
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privkey.secret.data, NULL, NULL) != 1)
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abort();
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rs = process_onionpacket(tmpctx, op, &onion_ss, NULL, 0, false);
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if (!rs)
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errx(1, "Could not process onionpacket");
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cursor = rs->raw_payload;
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max = tal_bytelen(cursor);
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len = fromwire_bigsize(&cursor, &max);
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/* Always true since we're non-legacy */
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assert(len == max);
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outer = tlv_onionmsg_payload_new(tmpctx);
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if (!fromwire_onionmsg_payload(&cursor, &max, outer))
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errx(1, "Invalid payload %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, rs->raw_payload));
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if (rs->nextcase == ONION_END) {
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printf("TERMINAL\n");
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return 0;
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}
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/* Look for enctlv */
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if (!outer->enctlv)
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errx(1, "No enctlv field");
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if (tal_bytelen(outer->enctlv)
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< crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_ABYTES)
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errx(1, "enctlv field too short");
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dec = tal_arr(tmpctx, u8,
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tal_bytelen(outer->enctlv)
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- crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_ABYTES);
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ret = crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt(dec, NULL,
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NULL,
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outer->enctlv,
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tal_bytelen(outer->enctlv),
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NULL, 0,
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npub,
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rho.data);
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if (ret != 0)
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errx(1, "Failed to decrypt enctlv field");
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printf("Contents: %s\n", tal_hex(tmpctx, dec));
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/* E(i-1) = H(E(i) || ss(i)) * E(i) */
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blinding_hash_e_and_ss(&blinding, &ss, &h);
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blinding_next_pubkey(&blinding, &h, &res);
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printf("Next blinding: %s\n",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &res));
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printf("Next onion: %s\n", tal_hex(tmpctx, serialize_onionpacket(tmpctx, rs->next)));
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} else
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errx(1, "Either create or unwrap!");
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common_shutdown();
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}
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