core-lightning/test-cli/check-commit-sig.c
Rusty Russell a663dc322c Remove signature leaking.
Alpha has segregated witnesses, so txid doesn't include the inputs.
That means we can create the first commit transaction before we sign
the anchor tx.

Bitcoin will need to do this differently: presumbly via new sipops
(a OP_CHECKSIG2VERIFY I imagine).

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
2015-07-03 14:00:54 +09:30

109 lines
3.3 KiB
C

#include <ccan/crypto/shachain/shachain.h>
#include <ccan/short_types/short_types.h>
#include <ccan/tal/tal.h>
#include <ccan/opt/opt.h>
#include <ccan/str/hex/hex.h>
#include <ccan/err/err.h>
#include "lightning.pb-c.h"
#include "anchor.h"
#include "bitcoin/base58.h"
#include "pkt.h"
#include "bitcoin/script.h"
#include "permute_tx.h"
#include "bitcoin/signature.h"
#include "commit_tx.h"
#include "bitcoin/pubkey.h"
#include "bitcoin/privkey.h"
#include "protobuf_convert.h"
#include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
const tal_t *ctx = tal_arr(NULL, char, 0);
OpenChannel *o1, *o2;
OpenCommitSig *cs2;
struct bitcoin_tx *anchor, *commit;
struct sha256_double txid;
u8 *subscript;
size_t *inmap, *outmap;
struct pubkey pubkey1, pubkey2;
struct bitcoin_signature sig1, sig2;
struct privkey privkey;
bool testnet;
struct sha256 rhash;
err_set_progname(argv[0]);
opt_register_noarg("--help|-h", opt_usage_and_exit,
"<open-channel-file1> <open-channel-file2> <commit-sig-2> <commit-key1>\n"
"Output the commitment transaction if both signatures are valid",
"Print this message.");
opt_parse(&argc, argv, opt_log_stderr_exit);
if (argc != 5)
opt_usage_exit_fail("Expected 4 arguments");
o1 = pkt_from_file(argv[1], PKT__PKT_OPEN)->open;
o2 = pkt_from_file(argv[2], PKT__PKT_OPEN)->open;
cs2 = pkt_from_file(argv[3], PKT__PKT_OPEN_COMMIT_SIG)->open_commit_sig;
if (!key_from_base58(argv[4], strlen(argv[4]), &testnet, &privkey, &pubkey1))
errx(1, "Invalid private key '%s'", argv[4]);
if (!testnet)
errx(1, "Private key '%s' not on testnet!", argv[4]);
/* Pubkey well-formed? */
if (!proto_to_pubkey(o2->anchor->pubkey, &pubkey2))
errx(1, "Invalid anchor-2 key");
/* Get the transaction ID of the anchor. */
anchor = anchor_tx_create(ctx, o1, o2, &inmap, &outmap);
if (!anchor)
errx(1, "Failed transaction merge");
anchor_txid(anchor, &txid);
/* Now create our commitment tx. */
proto_to_sha256(o1->revocation_hash, &rhash);
commit = create_commit_tx(ctx, o1, o2, &rhash, 0, &txid, outmap[0]);
/* If contributions don't exceed fees, this fails. */
if (!commit)
errx(1, "Contributions %llu & %llu vs fees %llu & %llu",
(long long)o1->anchor->total,
(long long)o2->anchor->total,
(long long)o1->commitment_fee,
(long long)o2->commitment_fee);
/* FIXME: Creating out signature just to check the script we create
* is overkill: if their signature and pubkey signed the commit txin,
* we're happy. */
sig1.stype = SIGHASH_ALL;
subscript = bitcoin_redeem_2of2(ctx, &pubkey1, &pubkey2);
sign_tx_input(ctx, commit, 0, subscript, tal_count(subscript),
&privkey, &pubkey1, &sig1.sig);
/* Signatures well-formed? */
if (!proto_to_signature(cs2->sig, &sig2.sig))
errx(1, "Invalid commit-sig-2");
sig2.stype = SIGHASH_ALL;
/* Combined signatures must validate correctly. */
if (!check_2of2_sig(commit, 0, subscript, tal_count(subscript),
&pubkey1, &pubkey2, &sig1, &sig2))
errx(1, "Signature failed");
/* Create p2sh input for commit */
commit->input[0].script = scriptsig_p2sh_2of2(commit, &sig1, &sig2,
&pubkey1, &pubkey2);
commit->input[0].script_length = tal_count(commit->input[0].script);
/* Print it out in hex. */
if (!bitcoin_tx_write(STDOUT_FILENO, commit))
err(1, "Writing out transaction");
tal_free(ctx);
return 0;
}