mirror of
https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning.git
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f2291c44d6
On testnet I noticed if we can't reach bitcoind for some reason, we'll keep RBFing our penalty tx ("it didn't go in, RBF harder!!"). Makes no sense to grossly exceed the amount needed for next block, so simply cap penalty at 2x "estimatesmartfee 2 CONSERVATIVE". Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
833 lines
24 KiB
C
833 lines
24 KiB
C
#include "config.h"
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#include <bitcoin/feerate.h>
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#include <ccan/tal/str/str.h>
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#include <common/key_derive.h>
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#include <common/type_to_string.h>
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#include <db/exec.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <hsmd/capabilities.h>
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#include <inttypes.h>
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#include <lightningd/chaintopology.h>
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#include <lightningd/channel.h>
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#include <lightningd/channel_control.h>
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#include <lightningd/coin_mvts.h>
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#include <lightningd/hsm_control.h>
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#include <lightningd/onchain_control.h>
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#include <lightningd/peer_control.h>
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#include <lightningd/subd.h>
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#include <onchaind/onchaind_wiregen.h>
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#include <wallet/txfilter.h>
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#include <wally_bip32.h>
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/* We dump all the known preimages when onchaind starts up. */
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static void onchaind_tell_fulfill(struct channel *channel)
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{
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struct htlc_in_map_iter ini;
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struct htlc_in *hin;
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u8 *msg;
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struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
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for (hin = htlc_in_map_first(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini);
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hin;
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hin = htlc_in_map_next(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini)) {
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if (hin->key.channel != channel)
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continue;
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/* BOLT #5:
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*
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* A local node:
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* - if it receives (or already possesses) a payment preimage
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* for an unresolved HTLC output that it has been offered AND
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* for which it has committed to an outgoing HTLC:
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* - MUST *resolve* the output by spending it, using the
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* HTLC-success transaction.
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* - MUST NOT reveal its own preimage when it's not the final recipient...
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* - MUST resolve the output of that HTLC-success transaction.
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* - otherwise:
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* - if the *remote node* is NOT irrevocably committed to
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* the HTLC:
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* - MUST NOT *resolve* the output by spending it.
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*/
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/* We only set preimage once it's irrevocably committed, and
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* we spend even if we don't have an outgoing HTLC (eg. local
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* payment complete) */
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if (!hin->preimage)
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continue;
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msg = towire_onchaind_known_preimage(channel, hin->preimage);
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subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
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}
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}
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/* If we want to know if this HTLC is missing, return depth. */
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static bool tell_if_missing(const struct channel *channel,
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struct htlc_stub *stub,
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bool *tell_immediate)
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{
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struct htlc_out *hout;
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/* Keep valgrind happy. */
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*tell_immediate = false;
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/* Don't care about incoming HTLCs, just ones we offered. */
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if (stub->owner == REMOTE)
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return false;
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/* Might not be a current HTLC. */
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hout = find_htlc_out(&channel->peer->ld->htlcs_out, channel, stub->id);
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if (!hout)
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return false;
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/* BOLT #5:
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*
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* - for any committed HTLC that does NOT have an output in this
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* commitment transaction:
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* - once the commitment transaction has reached reasonable depth:
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* - MUST fail the corresponding incoming HTLC (if any).
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* - if no *valid* commitment transaction contains an output
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* corresponding to the HTLC.
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* - MAY fail the corresponding incoming HTLC sooner.
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*/
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if (hout->hstate >= RCVD_ADD_REVOCATION
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&& hout->hstate < SENT_REMOVE_REVOCATION)
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*tell_immediate = true;
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log_debug(channel->log,
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"We want to know if htlc %"PRIu64" is missing (%s)",
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hout->key.id, *tell_immediate ? "immediate" : "later");
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return true;
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}
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static void handle_onchain_init_reply(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
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{
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struct htlc_stub *stubs;
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u64 commit_num;
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bool *tell, *tell_immediate;
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if (!fromwire_onchaind_init_reply(msg, &commit_num)) {
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channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchaind_init_reply %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
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return;
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}
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/* FIXME: We may already be ONCHAIN state when we implement restart! */
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channel_set_state(channel,
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FUNDING_SPEND_SEEN,
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ONCHAIN,
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REASON_UNKNOWN,
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"Onchain init reply");
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/* Tell it about any relevant HTLCs */
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/* FIXME: Filter by commitnum! */
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stubs = wallet_htlc_stubs(tmpctx, channel->peer->ld->wallet, channel,
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commit_num);
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tell = tal_arr(stubs, bool, tal_count(stubs));
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tell_immediate = tal_arr(stubs, bool, tal_count(stubs));
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for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(stubs); i++) {
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tell[i] = tell_if_missing(channel, &stubs[i],
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&tell_immediate[i]);
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}
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msg = towire_onchaind_htlcs(channel, stubs, tell, tell_immediate);
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subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
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/* Tell it about any preimages we know. */
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onchaind_tell_fulfill(channel);
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}
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/**
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* Notify onchaind about the depth change of the watched tx.
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*/
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static void onchain_tx_depth(struct channel *channel,
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const struct bitcoin_txid *txid,
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unsigned int depth)
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{
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u8 *msg;
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msg = towire_onchaind_depth(channel, txid, depth);
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subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
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}
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/**
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* Entrypoint for the txwatch callback, calls onchain_tx_depth.
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*/
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static enum watch_result onchain_tx_watched(struct lightningd *ld,
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struct channel *channel,
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const struct bitcoin_txid *txid,
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const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
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unsigned int depth)
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{
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u32 blockheight = get_block_height(ld->topology);
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if (tx != NULL) {
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struct bitcoin_txid txid2;
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bitcoin_txid(tx, &txid2);
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if (!bitcoin_txid_eq(txid, &txid2)) {
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channel_internal_error(channel, "Txid for %s is not %s",
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type_to_string(tmpctx,
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struct bitcoin_tx,
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tx),
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type_to_string(tmpctx,
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struct bitcoin_txid,
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txid));
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return DELETE_WATCH;
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}
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}
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if (depth == 0) {
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log_unusual(channel->log, "Chain reorganization!");
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channel_set_owner(channel, NULL);
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/* We will most likely be freed, so this is a noop */
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return KEEP_WATCHING;
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}
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/* Store the channeltx so we can replay later */
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wallet_channeltxs_add(ld->wallet, channel,
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WIRE_ONCHAIND_DEPTH, txid, 0, blockheight);
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onchain_tx_depth(channel, txid, depth);
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return KEEP_WATCHING;
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}
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static void watch_tx_and_outputs(struct channel *channel,
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const struct bitcoin_tx *tx);
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/**
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* Notify onchaind that an output was spent and register new watches.
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*/
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static void onchain_txo_spent(struct channel *channel, const struct bitcoin_tx *tx, size_t input_num, u32 blockheight)
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{
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u8 *msg;
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/* Onchaind needs all inputs, since it uses those to compare
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* with existing spends (which can vary, with feerate changes). */
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struct tx_parts *parts = tx_parts_from_wally_tx(tmpctx, tx->wtx,
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-1, -1);
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watch_tx_and_outputs(channel, tx);
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msg = towire_onchaind_spent(channel, parts, input_num, blockheight);
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subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
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}
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/**
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* Entrypoint for the txowatch callback, stores tx and calls onchain_txo_spent.
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*/
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static enum watch_result onchain_txo_watched(struct channel *channel,
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const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
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size_t input_num,
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const struct block *block)
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{
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struct bitcoin_txid txid;
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bitcoin_txid(tx, &txid);
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/* Store the channeltx so we can replay later */
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wallet_channeltxs_add(channel->peer->ld->wallet, channel,
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WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPENT, &txid, input_num,
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block->height);
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onchain_txo_spent(channel, tx, input_num, block->height);
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/* We don't need to keep watching: If this output is double-spent
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* (reorg), we'll get a zero depth cb to onchain_tx_watched, and
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* restart onchaind. */
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return DELETE_WATCH;
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}
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/* To avoid races, we watch the tx and all outputs. */
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static void watch_tx_and_outputs(struct channel *channel,
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const struct bitcoin_tx *tx)
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{
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struct bitcoin_outpoint outpoint;
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struct txwatch *txw;
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struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
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bitcoin_txid(tx, &outpoint.txid);
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/* Make txwatch a parent of txo watches, so we can unwatch together. */
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txw = watch_tx(channel->owner, ld->topology, channel, tx,
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onchain_tx_watched);
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for (outpoint.n = 0; outpoint.n < tx->wtx->num_outputs; outpoint.n++)
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watch_txo(txw, ld->topology, channel, &outpoint,
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onchain_txo_watched);
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}
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static void handle_onchain_log_coin_move(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
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{
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struct chain_coin_mvt *mvt = tal(NULL, struct chain_coin_mvt);
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if (!fromwire_onchaind_notify_coin_mvt(msg, mvt)) {
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channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchain notify_coin_mvt");
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return;
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}
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/* Any 'ignored' payments get registed to the wallet */
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if (!mvt->account_name)
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mvt->account_name = type_to_string(mvt, struct channel_id,
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&channel->cid);
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else
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mvt->originating_acct = type_to_string(mvt, struct channel_id,
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&channel->cid);
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notify_chain_mvt(channel->peer->ld, mvt);
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tal_free(mvt);
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}
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/** handle_onchain_broadcast_rbf_tx_cb
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*
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* @brief suppresses the rebroadcast of a
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* transaction.
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*
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* @desc when using the `bitcoin_tx` function,
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* if a callback is not given, the transaction
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* will be rebroadcast automatically by
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* chaintopology.
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* However, in the case of an RBF transaction
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* from `onchaind`, `onchaind` will periodically
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* create a new, higher-fee replacement, thus
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* `onchaind` will trigger rebroadcast (with a
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* higher fee) by itself, which the `lightningd`
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* chaintopology should not repeat.
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* This callback exists to suppress the
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* rebroadcast behavior of chaintopology.
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*
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* @param channel - the channel for which the
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* transaction was broadcast.
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* @param success - whether the tx was broadcast.
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* @param err - the error received from the
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* underlying sendrawtx.
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*/
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static void handle_onchain_broadcast_rbf_tx_cb(struct channel *channel,
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bool success,
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const char *err)
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{
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/* Victory is boring. */
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if (success)
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return;
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/* Failure is unusual but not broken: it is possible that just
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* as we were about to broadcast, a new block came in which
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* contains a previous version of the transaction, thus
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* causing the higher-fee replacement to fail broadcast.
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*
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* ...or it could be a bug in onchaind which prevents it from
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* successfully RBFing out the transaction, in which case we
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* should log it for devs to check.
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*/
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log_unusual(channel->log,
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"Broadcast of RBF tx failed, "
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"did a new block just come in? "
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"error: %s",
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err);
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}
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static void handle_onchain_broadcast_tx(struct channel *channel,
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const u8 *msg)
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{
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struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
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struct wallet *w = channel->peer->ld->wallet;
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struct bitcoin_txid txid;
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enum wallet_tx_type type;
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bool is_rbf;
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if (!fromwire_onchaind_broadcast_tx(msg, msg, &tx, &type, &is_rbf)) {
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channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchain_broadcast_tx");
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return;
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}
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tx->chainparams = chainparams;
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bitcoin_txid(tx, &txid);
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wallet_transaction_add(w, tx->wtx, 0, 0);
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wallet_transaction_annotate(w, &txid, type, channel->dbid);
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/* We don't really care if it fails, we'll respond via watch. */
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/* If the onchaind signals this as RBF-able, then we also
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* set allowhighfees, as the transaction may be RBFed into
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* high feerates as protection against the MAD-HTLC attack. */
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broadcast_tx(channel->peer->ld->topology, channel,
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tx, NULL, is_rbf,
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is_rbf ? &handle_onchain_broadcast_rbf_tx_cb : NULL);
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}
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static void handle_onchain_unwatch_tx(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
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{
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struct bitcoin_txid txid;
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struct txwatch *txw;
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if (!fromwire_onchaind_unwatch_tx(msg, &txid)) {
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channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchain_unwatch_tx");
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return;
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}
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/* Frees the txo watches, too: see watch_tx_and_outputs() */
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txw = find_txwatch(channel->peer->ld->topology, &txid, channel);
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if (!txw)
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log_unusual(channel->log, "Can't unwatch txid %s",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid, &txid));
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tal_free(txw);
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}
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static void handle_extracted_preimage(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
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{
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struct preimage preimage;
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if (!fromwire_onchaind_extracted_preimage(msg, &preimage)) {
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channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid extracted_preimage");
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return;
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}
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onchain_fulfilled_htlc(channel, &preimage);
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}
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static void handle_missing_htlc_output(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
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{
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struct htlc_stub htlc;
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if (!fromwire_onchaind_missing_htlc_output(msg, &htlc)) {
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channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid missing_htlc_output");
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return;
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}
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/* We only set tell_if_missing on LOCAL htlcs */
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if (htlc.owner != LOCAL) {
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channel_internal_error(channel,
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"onchaind_missing_htlc_output: htlc %"PRIu64" is not local!",
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htlc.id);
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return;
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}
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/* BOLT #5:
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*
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* - for any committed HTLC that does NOT have an output in this
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* commitment transaction:
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* - once the commitment transaction has reached reasonable depth:
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* - MUST fail the corresponding incoming HTLC (if any).
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* - if no *valid* commitment transaction contains an output
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* corresponding to the HTLC.
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* - MAY fail the corresponding incoming HTLC sooner.
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*/
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onchain_failed_our_htlc(channel, &htlc, "missing in commitment tx", false);
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}
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static void handle_onchain_htlc_timeout(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
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{
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struct htlc_stub htlc;
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if (!fromwire_onchaind_htlc_timeout(msg, &htlc)) {
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channel_internal_error(channel, "Invalid onchain_htlc_timeout");
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return;
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}
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/* It should tell us about timeouts on our LOCAL htlcs */
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if (htlc.owner != LOCAL) {
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channel_internal_error(channel,
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"onchaind_htlc_timeout: htlc %"PRIu64" is not local!",
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htlc.id);
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return;
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}
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/* BOLT #5:
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*
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* - if the commitment transaction HTLC output has *timed out* and
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* hasn't been *resolved*:
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* - MUST *resolve* the output by spending it using the HTLC-timeout
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* transaction.
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*/
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onchain_failed_our_htlc(channel, &htlc, "timed out", true);
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}
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static void handle_irrevocably_resolved(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg UNUSED)
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{
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/* FIXME: Implement check_htlcs to ensure no dangling hout->in ptrs! */
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free_htlcs(channel->peer->ld, channel);
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log_info(channel->log, "onchaind complete, forgetting peer");
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/* This will also free onchaind. */
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delete_channel(channel);
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}
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/**
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* onchain_add_utxo -- onchaind is telling us about an UTXO we own
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*/
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static void onchain_add_utxo(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
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{
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struct chain_coin_mvt *mvt;
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u32 blockheight;
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struct bitcoin_outpoint outpoint;
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u32 csv_lock;
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struct amount_sat amount;
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struct pubkey *commitment_point;
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u8 *scriptPubkey;
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if (!fromwire_onchaind_add_utxo(
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tmpctx, msg, &outpoint, &commitment_point,
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&amount, &blockheight, &scriptPubkey,
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&csv_lock)) {
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log_broken(channel->log,
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"onchaind gave invalid add_utxo message: %s",
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tal_hex(msg, msg));
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return;
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}
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assert(blockheight);
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outpointfilter_add(channel->peer->ld->wallet->owned_outpoints,
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&outpoint);
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log_debug(channel->log, "adding utxo to watch %s, csv %u",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_outpoint, &outpoint),
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csv_lock);
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wallet_add_onchaind_utxo(channel->peer->ld->wallet,
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&outpoint, scriptPubkey,
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blockheight, amount, channel,
|
|
commitment_point,
|
|
csv_lock);
|
|
|
|
mvt = new_coin_wallet_deposit(msg, &outpoint, blockheight,
|
|
amount, DEPOSIT);
|
|
mvt->originating_acct = type_to_string(mvt, struct channel_id,
|
|
&channel->cid);
|
|
|
|
notify_chain_mvt(channel->peer->ld, mvt);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void onchain_annotate_txout(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct bitcoin_outpoint outpoint;
|
|
enum wallet_tx_type type;
|
|
if (!fromwire_onchaind_annotate_txout(msg, &outpoint, &type))
|
|
fatal("onchaind gave invalid onchain_annotate_txout "
|
|
"message: %s",
|
|
tal_hex(msg, msg));
|
|
wallet_annotate_txout(channel->peer->ld->wallet, &outpoint, type,
|
|
channel->dbid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void onchain_annotate_txin(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct bitcoin_txid txid;
|
|
enum wallet_tx_type type;
|
|
u32 innum;
|
|
if (!fromwire_onchaind_annotate_txin(msg, &txid, &innum, &type))
|
|
fatal("onchaind gave invalid onchain_annotate_txin "
|
|
"message: %s",
|
|
tal_hex(msg, msg));
|
|
wallet_annotate_txin(channel->peer->ld->wallet, &txid, innum, type,
|
|
channel->dbid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int onchain_msg(struct subd *sd, const u8 *msg, const int *fds UNUSED)
|
|
{
|
|
enum onchaind_wire t = fromwire_peektype(msg);
|
|
|
|
switch (t) {
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_INIT_REPLY:
|
|
handle_onchain_init_reply(sd->channel, msg);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_BROADCAST_TX:
|
|
handle_onchain_broadcast_tx(sd->channel, msg);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_UNWATCH_TX:
|
|
handle_onchain_unwatch_tx(sd->channel, msg);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_EXTRACTED_PREIMAGE:
|
|
handle_extracted_preimage(sd->channel, msg);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_MISSING_HTLC_OUTPUT:
|
|
handle_missing_htlc_output(sd->channel, msg);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_HTLC_TIMEOUT:
|
|
handle_onchain_htlc_timeout(sd->channel, msg);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_ALL_IRREVOCABLY_RESOLVED:
|
|
handle_irrevocably_resolved(sd->channel, msg);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_ADD_UTXO:
|
|
onchain_add_utxo(sd->channel, msg);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_ANNOTATE_TXIN:
|
|
onchain_annotate_txin(sd->channel, msg);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_ANNOTATE_TXOUT:
|
|
onchain_annotate_txout(sd->channel, msg);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_NOTIFY_COIN_MVT:
|
|
handle_onchain_log_coin_move(sd->channel, msg);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/* We send these, not receive them */
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_INIT:
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPENT:
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_DEPTH:
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_HTLCS:
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_KNOWN_PREIMAGE:
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_DEV_MEMLEAK:
|
|
case WIRE_ONCHAIND_DEV_MEMLEAK_REPLY:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Only error onchaind can get is if it dies. */
|
|
static void onchain_error(struct channel *channel,
|
|
struct peer_fd *pps UNUSED,
|
|
const struct channel_id *channel_id UNUSED,
|
|
const char *desc,
|
|
bool warning UNUSED,
|
|
const u8 *err_for_them UNUSED)
|
|
{
|
|
channel_set_owner(channel, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* This happens on shutdown: fine */
|
|
if (channel->peer->ld->state == LD_STATE_SHUTDOWN)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: re-launch? */
|
|
log_broken(channel->log, "%s", desc);
|
|
channel_set_billboard(channel, true, desc);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* With a reorg, this can get called multiple times; each time we'll kill
|
|
* onchaind (like any other owner), and restart */
|
|
enum watch_result onchaind_funding_spent(struct channel *channel,
|
|
const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
|
|
u32 blockheight)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *msg;
|
|
struct bitcoin_txid our_last_txid;
|
|
struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld;
|
|
struct pubkey final_key;
|
|
int hsmfd;
|
|
u32 feerates[4];
|
|
enum state_change reason;
|
|
|
|
/* use REASON_ONCHAIN or closer's reason, if known */
|
|
reason = REASON_ONCHAIN;
|
|
if (channel->closer != NUM_SIDES)
|
|
reason = REASON_UNKNOWN; /* will use last cause as reason */
|
|
|
|
channel_fail_permanent(channel, reason,
|
|
"Funding transaction spent");
|
|
|
|
/* If we haven't posted the open event yet, post an open */
|
|
if (!channel->scid || !channel->remote_channel_ready) {
|
|
u32 blkh;
|
|
/* Blockheight will be zero if it's not in chain */
|
|
blkh = wallet_transaction_height(channel->peer->ld->wallet,
|
|
&channel->funding.txid);
|
|
channel_record_open(channel, blkh, true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We could come from almost any state. */
|
|
/* NOTE(mschmoock) above comment is wrong, since we failed above! */
|
|
channel_set_state(channel,
|
|
channel->state,
|
|
FUNDING_SPEND_SEEN,
|
|
reason,
|
|
tal_fmt(tmpctx, "Onchain funding spend"));
|
|
|
|
hsmfd = hsm_get_client_fd(ld, &channel->peer->id,
|
|
channel->dbid,
|
|
HSM_CAP_SIGN_ONCHAIN_TX
|
|
| HSM_CAP_COMMITMENT_POINT);
|
|
|
|
channel_set_owner(channel, new_channel_subd(channel, ld,
|
|
"lightning_onchaind",
|
|
channel,
|
|
&channel->peer->id,
|
|
channel->log, false,
|
|
onchaind_wire_name,
|
|
onchain_msg,
|
|
onchain_error,
|
|
channel_set_billboard,
|
|
take(&hsmfd),
|
|
NULL));
|
|
|
|
if (!channel->owner) {
|
|
log_broken(channel->log, "Could not subdaemon onchain: %s",
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
return KEEP_WATCHING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!bip32_pubkey(ld->wallet->bip32_base, &final_key,
|
|
channel->final_key_idx)) {
|
|
log_broken(channel->log, "Could not derive onchain key %"PRIu64,
|
|
channel->final_key_idx);
|
|
return KEEP_WATCHING;
|
|
}
|
|
struct ext_key final_wallet_ext_key;
|
|
if (bip32_key_from_parent(
|
|
ld->wallet->bip32_base,
|
|
channel->final_key_idx,
|
|
BIP32_FLAG_KEY_PUBLIC,
|
|
&final_wallet_ext_key) != WALLY_OK) {
|
|
log_broken(channel->log, "Could not derive final_wallet_ext_key %"PRIu64,
|
|
channel->final_key_idx);
|
|
return KEEP_WATCHING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This could be a mutual close, but it doesn't matter.
|
|
* We don't need this for stub channels as well */
|
|
if (!is_stub_scid(channel->scid))
|
|
bitcoin_txid(channel->last_tx, &our_last_txid);
|
|
else
|
|
/* Dummy txid for stub channel to make valgrind happy. */
|
|
bitcoin_txid_from_hex("80cea306607b708a03a1854520729d"
|
|
"a884e4317b7b51f3d4a622f88176f5e034",
|
|
64,
|
|
&our_last_txid);
|
|
|
|
/* We try to get the feerate for each transaction type, 0 if estimation
|
|
* failed. */
|
|
feerates[0] = delayed_to_us_feerate(ld->topology);
|
|
feerates[1] = htlc_resolution_feerate(ld->topology);
|
|
feerates[2] = penalty_feerate(ld->topology);
|
|
/* We check them separately but there is a high chance that if estimation
|
|
* failed for one, it failed for all.. */
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
|
|
if (!feerates[i]) {
|
|
/* We have at least one data point: the last tx's feerate. */
|
|
struct amount_sat fee = channel->funding_sats;
|
|
for (size_t j = 0;
|
|
j < channel->last_tx->wtx->num_outputs; j++) {
|
|
struct amount_asset asset =
|
|
bitcoin_tx_output_get_amount(channel->last_tx, j);
|
|
struct amount_sat amt;
|
|
assert(amount_asset_is_main(&asset));
|
|
amt = amount_asset_to_sat(&asset);
|
|
if (!amount_sat_sub(&fee, fee, amt)) {
|
|
log_broken(channel->log, "Could not get fee"
|
|
" funding %s tx %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx,
|
|
struct amount_sat,
|
|
&channel->funding_sats),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx,
|
|
struct bitcoin_tx,
|
|
channel->last_tx));
|
|
return KEEP_WATCHING;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
feerates[i] = fee.satoshis / bitcoin_tx_weight(tx); /* Raw: reverse feerate extraction */
|
|
if (feerates[i] < feerate_floor())
|
|
feerates[i] = feerate_floor();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* This is 10x highest bitcoind estimate (depending on dev-max-fee-multiplier),
|
|
* so cap at 2x */
|
|
feerates[3] = feerate_max(ld, NULL) / 5;
|
|
|
|
log_debug(channel->log, "channel->static_remotekey_start[LOCAL] %"PRIu64,
|
|
channel->static_remotekey_start[LOCAL]);
|
|
|
|
msg = towire_onchaind_init(channel,
|
|
&channel->their_shachain.chain,
|
|
chainparams,
|
|
channel->funding_sats,
|
|
channel->our_msat,
|
|
&channel->channel_info.old_remote_per_commit,
|
|
&channel->channel_info.remote_per_commit,
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
* `to_self_delay` is the number of blocks
|
|
* that the other node's to-self outputs
|
|
* must be delayed */
|
|
/* So, these are reversed: they specify ours,
|
|
* we specify theirs. */
|
|
channel->channel_info.their_config.to_self_delay,
|
|
channel->our_config.to_self_delay,
|
|
/* delayed_to_us, htlc, penalty, and penalty_max. */
|
|
feerates[0], feerates[1], feerates[2], feerates[3],
|
|
channel->our_config.dust_limit,
|
|
&our_last_txid,
|
|
channel->shutdown_scriptpubkey[LOCAL],
|
|
channel->shutdown_scriptpubkey[REMOTE],
|
|
channel->final_key_idx,
|
|
&final_wallet_ext_key,
|
|
&final_key,
|
|
channel->opener,
|
|
&channel->local_basepoints,
|
|
&channel->channel_info.theirbase,
|
|
tx_parts_from_wally_tx(tmpctx, tx->wtx, -1, -1),
|
|
tx->wtx->locktime,
|
|
blockheight,
|
|
/* FIXME: config for 'reasonable depth' */
|
|
3,
|
|
channel->last_htlc_sigs,
|
|
channel->min_possible_feerate,
|
|
channel->max_possible_feerate,
|
|
channel->future_per_commitment_point,
|
|
&channel->local_funding_pubkey,
|
|
&channel->channel_info.remote_fundingkey,
|
|
channel->static_remotekey_start[LOCAL],
|
|
channel->static_remotekey_start[REMOTE],
|
|
channel_has(channel, OPT_ANCHOR_OUTPUTS),
|
|
feerate_min(ld, NULL));
|
|
subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg));
|
|
|
|
watch_tx_and_outputs(channel, tx);
|
|
|
|
/* We keep watching until peer finally deleted, for reorgs. */
|
|
return KEEP_WATCHING;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void onchaind_replay_channels(struct lightningd *ld)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 *onchaind_ids;
|
|
struct channeltx *txs;
|
|
struct channel *chan;
|
|
|
|
db_begin_transaction(ld->wallet->db);
|
|
onchaind_ids = wallet_onchaind_channels(ld->wallet, ld);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(onchaind_ids); i++) {
|
|
log_info(ld->log, "Restarting onchaind for channel %d",
|
|
onchaind_ids[i]);
|
|
|
|
txs = wallet_channeltxs_get(ld->wallet, onchaind_ids,
|
|
onchaind_ids[i]);
|
|
chan = channel_by_dbid(ld, onchaind_ids[i]);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t j = 0; j < tal_count(txs); j++) {
|
|
if (txs[j].type == WIRE_ONCHAIND_INIT) {
|
|
onchaind_funding_spent(chan, txs[j].tx,
|
|
txs[j].blockheight);
|
|
|
|
} else if (txs[j].type == WIRE_ONCHAIND_SPENT) {
|
|
onchain_txo_spent(chan, txs[j].tx,
|
|
txs[j].input_num,
|
|
txs[j].blockheight);
|
|
|
|
} else if (txs[j].type == WIRE_ONCHAIND_DEPTH) {
|
|
onchain_tx_depth(chan, &txs[j].txid,
|
|
txs[j].depth);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
fatal("unknown message of type %d during "
|
|
"onchaind replay",
|
|
txs[j].type);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
tal_free(txs);
|
|
}
|
|
tal_free(onchaind_ids);
|
|
|
|
db_commit_transaction(ld->wallet->db);
|
|
}
|