mirror of
https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning.git
synced 2024-11-20 02:27:51 +01:00
8949290794
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
529 lines
15 KiB
C
529 lines
15 KiB
C
#include "sphinx.h"
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <ccan/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160.h>
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#include <ccan/crypto/sha256/sha256.h>
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#include <ccan/mem/mem.h>
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#include <err.h>
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#include <sodium/crypto_auth_hmacsha256.h>
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#include <sodium/crypto_stream_chacha20.h>
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#define BLINDING_FACTOR_SIZE 32
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#define SHARED_SECRET_SIZE 32
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#define NUM_STREAM_BYTES (2 * NUM_MAX_HOPS + 2) * SECURITY_PARAMETER
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#define KEY_LEN 32
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struct hop_params {
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u8 secret[SHARED_SECRET_SIZE];
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u8 blind[BLINDING_FACTOR_SIZE];
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secp256k1_pubkey ephemeralkey;
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};
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struct keyset {
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u8 pi[KEY_LEN];
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u8 mu[KEY_LEN];
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u8 rho[KEY_LEN];
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u8 gamma[KEY_LEN];
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};
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/* Small helper to append data to a buffer and update the position
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* into the buffer
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*/
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static void write_buffer(u8 *dst, const void *src, const size_t len, int *pos)
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{
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memcpy(dst + *pos, src, len);
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*pos += len;
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}
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/* Read len bytes from the source at position pos into dst and update
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* the position pos accordingly.
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*/
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static void read_buffer(void *dst, const u8 *src, const size_t len, int *pos)
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{
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memcpy(dst, src + *pos, len);
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*pos += len;
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}
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u8 *serialize_onionpacket(
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const tal_t *ctx,
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const secp256k1_context *secpctx,
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const struct onionpacket *m)
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{
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u8 *dst = tal_arr(ctx, u8, TOTAL_PACKET_SIZE);
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u8 der[33];
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size_t outputlen = 33;
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int p = 0;
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secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(secpctx,
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der,
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&outputlen,
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&m->ephemeralkey,
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SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
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write_buffer(dst, &m->version, 1, &p);
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write_buffer(dst, der, outputlen, &p);
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write_buffer(dst, m->mac, sizeof(m->mac), &p);
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write_buffer(dst, m->routinginfo, ROUTING_INFO_SIZE, &p);
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write_buffer(dst, m->hoppayloads, TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE, &p);
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write_buffer(dst, m->payload, MESSAGE_SIZE, &p);
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return dst;
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}
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struct onionpacket *parse_onionpacket(
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const tal_t *ctx,
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const secp256k1_context *secpctx,
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const void *src,
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const size_t srclen
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)
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{
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struct onionpacket *m;
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int p = 0;
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u8 rawEphemeralkey[33];
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if (srclen != TOTAL_PACKET_SIZE)
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return NULL;
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m = talz(ctx, struct onionpacket);
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read_buffer(&m->version, src, 1, &p);
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if (m->version != 0x01) {
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// FIXME add logging
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return tal_free(m);
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}
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read_buffer(rawEphemeralkey, src, 33, &p);
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if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_parse(secpctx, &m->ephemeralkey, rawEphemeralkey, 33) != 1)
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return tal_free(m);
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read_buffer(&m->mac, src, 20, &p);
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read_buffer(&m->routinginfo, src, ROUTING_INFO_SIZE, &p);
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read_buffer(&m->hoppayloads, src, TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE, &p);
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read_buffer(m->payload, src, MESSAGE_SIZE, &p);
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return m;
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}
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static struct hoppayload *parse_hoppayload(const tal_t *ctx, u8 *src)
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{
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int p = 0;
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struct hoppayload *result = talz(ctx, struct hoppayload);
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read_buffer(&result->realm, src, sizeof(result->realm), &p);
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read_buffer(&result->amount, src, sizeof(result->amount), &p);
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read_buffer(&result->remainder, src, sizeof(result->remainder), &p);
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return result;
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}
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static void serialize_hoppayload(u8 *dst, struct hoppayload *hp)
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{
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int p = 0;
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write_buffer(dst, &hp->realm, sizeof(hp->realm), &p);
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write_buffer(dst, &hp->amount, sizeof(hp->amount), &p);
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write_buffer(dst, &hp->remainder, sizeof(hp->remainder), &p);
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}
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static void xorbytes(uint8_t *d, const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t len)
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{
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size_t i = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
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d[i] = a[i] ^ b[i];
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}
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/*
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* Encrypt a message `m` of length `mlen` with key `key` and store the
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* ciphertext in `c`. `c` must be pre-allocated to at least `mlen` bytes.
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*/
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static void stream_encrypt(void *c, const void *m, const size_t mlen, const u8 *key)
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{
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u8 nonce[8] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
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memcheck(c, mlen);
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crypto_stream_chacha20_xor(c, m, mlen, nonce, key);
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}
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/*
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* Decrypt a ciphertext `c` of length `clen` with key `key` and store the
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* cleartext in `m`. `m` must be pre-allocated to at least `clen` bytes.
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*/
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static void stream_decrypt(void *m, const void *c, const size_t clen, const u8 *key)
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{
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stream_encrypt(m, c, clen, key);
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}
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/*
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* Generate a pseudo-random byte stream of length `dstlen` from key `k` and
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* store it in `dst`. `dst must be at least `dstlen` bytes long.
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*/
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static void generate_cipher_stream(void *dst, const u8 *k, size_t dstlen)
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{
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u8 nonce[8] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
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crypto_stream_chacha20(dst, dstlen, nonce, k);
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}
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static bool compute_hmac(
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void *dst,
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const void *src,
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size_t len,
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const void *key,
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size_t keylen)
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{
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crypto_auth_hmacsha256_state state;
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crypto_auth_hmacsha256_init(&state, key, keylen);
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crypto_auth_hmacsha256_update(&state, memcheck(src, len), len);
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crypto_auth_hmacsha256_final(&state, dst);
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return true;
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}
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static void compute_packet_hmac(struct onionpacket *packet, u8 *mukey, u8 *hmac)
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{
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u8 mactemp[ROUTING_INFO_SIZE + TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE + MESSAGE_SIZE];
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memcpy(mactemp, packet->routinginfo, ROUTING_INFO_SIZE);
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memcpy(mactemp + ROUTING_INFO_SIZE, packet->hoppayloads, TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
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memcpy(mactemp + ROUTING_INFO_SIZE + TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE, packet->payload, sizeof(packet->payload));
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compute_hmac(hmac, mactemp, sizeof(mactemp), mukey, KEY_LEN);
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}
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static bool generate_key(void *k, const char *t, u8 tlen, const u8 *s)
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{
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return compute_hmac(k, s, KEY_LEN, t, tlen);
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}
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static bool generate_header_padding(
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void *dst, size_t dstlen,
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const size_t hopsize,
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const char *keytype,
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size_t keytypelen,
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const u8 numhops,
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struct hop_params *params
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)
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{
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int i;
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u8 cipher_stream[(NUM_MAX_HOPS + 1) * hopsize];
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u8 key[KEY_LEN];
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memset(dst, 0, dstlen);
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for (i = 1; i < numhops; i++) {
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if (!generate_key(&key, keytype, keytypelen, params[i - 1].secret))
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return false;
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generate_cipher_stream(cipher_stream, key, sizeof(cipher_stream));
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int pos = ((NUM_MAX_HOPS - i) + 1) * hopsize;
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xorbytes(dst, dst, cipher_stream + pos, sizeof(cipher_stream) - pos);
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}
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return true;
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}
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static void compute_blinding_factor(secp256k1_context *secpctx,
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secp256k1_pubkey *key,
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u8 sharedsecret[SHARED_SECRET_SIZE],
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u8 res[BLINDING_FACTOR_SIZE])
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{
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struct sha256_ctx ctx;
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u8 der[33];
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size_t outputlen = 33;
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struct sha256 temp;
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secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(secpctx, der, &outputlen, key,
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SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
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sha256_init(&ctx);
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sha256_update(&ctx, der, sizeof(der));
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sha256_update(&ctx, sharedsecret, SHARED_SECRET_SIZE);
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sha256_done(&ctx, &temp);
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memcpy(res, &temp, 32);
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}
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static bool blind_group_element(
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secp256k1_context *secpctx,
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secp256k1_pubkey *blindedelement,
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secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
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u8 blind[BLINDING_FACTOR_SIZE])
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{
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/* tweak_mul is inplace so copy first. */
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if (pubkey != blindedelement)
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memcpy(blindedelement, pubkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey));
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if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(secpctx, blindedelement, blind) != 1)
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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static bool create_shared_secret(
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secp256k1_context *secpctx,
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u8 *secret,
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const secp256k1_pubkey *pubkey,
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const u8 *sessionkey)
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{
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/* Need to copy since tweak is in-place */
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secp256k1_pubkey pkcopy;
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u8 ecres[33];
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memcpy(&pkcopy, pubkey, sizeof(pkcopy));
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if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(secpctx, &pkcopy, sessionkey) != 1)
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return false;
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/* Serialize and strip first byte, this gives us the X coordinate */
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size_t outputlen = 33;
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secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(secpctx, ecres, &outputlen,
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&pkcopy, SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
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struct sha256 h;
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sha256(&h, ecres + 1, sizeof(ecres) - 1);
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memcpy(secret, &h, sizeof(h));
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return true;
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}
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void pubkey_hash160(
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const secp256k1_context *secpctx,
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u8 *dst,
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const struct pubkey *pubkey)
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{
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struct ripemd160 r;
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struct sha256 h;
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u8 der[33];
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size_t outputlen = 33;
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secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(secpctx,
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der,
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&outputlen,
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&pubkey->pubkey,
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SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
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sha256(&h, der, sizeof(der));
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ripemd160(&r, h.u.u8, sizeof(h));
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memcpy(dst, r.u.u8, sizeof(r));
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}
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static void generate_key_set(u8 secret[SHARED_SECRET_SIZE], struct keyset *keys)
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{
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generate_key(keys->rho, "rho", 3, secret);
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generate_key(keys->pi, "pi", 2, secret);
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generate_key(keys->mu, "mu", 2, secret);
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generate_key(keys->gamma, "gamma", 5, secret);
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}
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static struct hop_params *generate_hop_params(
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const tal_t *ctx,
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secp256k1_context *secpctx,
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const u8 *sessionkey,
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struct pubkey path[])
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{
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int i, j, num_hops = tal_count(path);
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secp256k1_pubkey temp;
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u8 blind[BLINDING_FACTOR_SIZE];
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struct hop_params *params = tal_arr(ctx, struct hop_params, num_hops);
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/* Initialize the first hop with the raw information */
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if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(
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secpctx, ¶ms[0].ephemeralkey, sessionkey) != 1)
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return NULL;
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if (!create_shared_secret(
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secpctx, params[0].secret, &path[0].pubkey, sessionkey))
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return NULL;
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compute_blinding_factor(
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secpctx, ¶ms[0].ephemeralkey, params[0].secret,
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params[0].blind);
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/* Recursively compute all following ephemeral public keys,
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* secrets and blinding factors
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*/
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for (i = 1; i < num_hops; i++) {
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if (!blind_group_element(
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secpctx, ¶ms[i].ephemeralkey,
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¶ms[i - 1].ephemeralkey,
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params[i - 1].blind))
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return NULL;
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/* Blind this hop's point with all previous blinding factors
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* Order is indifferent, multiplication is commutative.
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*/
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memcpy(&blind, sessionkey, 32);
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memcpy(&temp, &path[i], sizeof(temp));
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if (!blind_group_element(secpctx, &temp, &temp, blind))
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return NULL;
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for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
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if (!blind_group_element(
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secpctx,
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&temp,
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&temp,
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params[j].blind))
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return NULL;
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/* Now hash temp and store it. This requires us to
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* DER-serialize first and then skip the sign byte.
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*/
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u8 der[33];
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size_t outputlen = 33;
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secp256k1_ec_pubkey_serialize(
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secpctx, der, &outputlen, &temp,
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SECP256K1_EC_COMPRESSED);
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struct sha256 h;
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sha256(&h, der + 1, sizeof(der) - 1);
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memcpy(¶ms[i].secret, &h, sizeof(h));
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compute_blinding_factor(
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secpctx, ¶ms[i].ephemeralkey,
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params[i].secret, params[i].blind);
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}
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return params;
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}
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struct onionpacket *create_onionpacket(
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const tal_t *ctx,
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secp256k1_context *secpctx,
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struct pubkey *path,
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struct hoppayload hoppayloads[],
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const u8 *sessionkey,
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const u8 *message,
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const size_t messagelen
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)
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{
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struct onionpacket *packet = talz(ctx, struct onionpacket);
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int i, num_hops = tal_count(path);
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u8 filler[2 * (num_hops - 1) * SECURITY_PARAMETER];
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u8 hopfiller[(num_hops - 1) * HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
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struct keyset keys;
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u8 nextaddr[20], nexthmac[SECURITY_PARAMETER];
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u8 stream[ROUTING_INFO_SIZE], hopstream[TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
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struct hop_params *params = generate_hop_params(ctx, secpctx, sessionkey, path);
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u8 binhoppayloads[tal_count(path)][HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
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for (i = 0; i < num_hops; i++)
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serialize_hoppayload(binhoppayloads[i], &hoppayloads[i]);
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if (MESSAGE_SIZE > messagelen) {
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memset(&packet->hoppayloads, 0, TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
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#if MESSAGE_SIZE != 0 /* Suppress GCC warning about 0-length memset */
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memset(&packet->payload, 0xFF, MESSAGE_SIZE);
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#endif
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memcpy(&packet->payload, message, messagelen);
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packet->payload[messagelen] = 0x7f;
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}
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if (!params)
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return NULL;
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packet->version = 1;
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memset(nextaddr, 0, 20);
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memset(nexthmac, 0, 20);
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memset(packet->routinginfo, 0, ROUTING_INFO_SIZE);
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generate_header_padding(filler, sizeof(filler), 2 * SECURITY_PARAMETER,
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"rho", 3, num_hops, params);
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generate_header_padding(hopfiller, sizeof(hopfiller), HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
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"gamma", 5, num_hops, params);
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for (i = num_hops - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
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generate_key_set(params[i].secret, &keys);
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generate_cipher_stream(stream, keys.rho, ROUTING_INFO_SIZE);
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/* Rightshift mix-header by 2*SECURITY_PARAMETER */
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memmove(packet->routinginfo + 2 * SECURITY_PARAMETER, packet->routinginfo,
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ROUTING_INFO_SIZE - 2 * SECURITY_PARAMETER);
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memcpy(packet->routinginfo, nextaddr, SECURITY_PARAMETER);
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memcpy(packet->routinginfo + SECURITY_PARAMETER, nexthmac, SECURITY_PARAMETER);
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xorbytes(packet->routinginfo, packet->routinginfo, stream, ROUTING_INFO_SIZE);
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/* Rightshift hop-payloads and obfuscate */
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memmove(packet->hoppayloads + HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE, packet->hoppayloads,
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TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE - HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
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memcpy(packet->hoppayloads, binhoppayloads[i], HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
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generate_cipher_stream(hopstream, keys.gamma, TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
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xorbytes(packet->hoppayloads, packet->hoppayloads, hopstream,
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TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
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if (i == num_hops - 1) {
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size_t len = (NUM_MAX_HOPS - num_hops + 1) * 2 * SECURITY_PARAMETER;
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memcpy(packet->routinginfo + len, filler, sizeof(filler));
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len = (NUM_MAX_HOPS - num_hops + 1) * HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE;
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memcpy(packet->hoppayloads + len, hopfiller, sizeof(hopfiller));
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}
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/* Obfuscate end-to-end payload */
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stream_encrypt(packet->payload, packet->payload, sizeof(packet->payload), keys.pi);
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compute_packet_hmac(packet, keys.mu, nexthmac);
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pubkey_hash160(secpctx, nextaddr, &path[i]);
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}
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memcpy(packet->mac, nexthmac, sizeof(nexthmac));
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memcpy(&packet->ephemeralkey, ¶ms[0].ephemeralkey, sizeof(secp256k1_pubkey));
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return packet;
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}
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/*
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* Given a onionpacket msg extract the information for the current
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* node and unwrap the remainder so that the node can forward it.
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*/
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struct route_step *process_onionpacket(
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const tal_t *ctx,
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secp256k1_context *secpctx,
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struct onionpacket *msg,
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struct privkey *hop_privkey
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)
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{
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struct route_step *step = talz(ctx, struct route_step);
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u8 secret[SHARED_SECRET_SIZE];
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u8 hmac[20];
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struct keyset keys;
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u8 paddedhoppayloads[TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE + HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
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u8 hopstream[TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE + HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
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u8 blind[BLINDING_FACTOR_SIZE];
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u8 stream[NUM_STREAM_BYTES];
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u8 paddedheader[ROUTING_INFO_SIZE + 2 * SECURITY_PARAMETER];
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step->next = talz(step, struct onionpacket);
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step->next->version = msg->version;
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create_shared_secret(secpctx, secret, &msg->ephemeralkey, hop_privkey->secret);
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generate_key_set(secret, &keys);
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compute_packet_hmac(msg, keys.mu, hmac);
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if (memcmp(msg->mac, hmac, sizeof(hmac)) != 0) {
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warnx("Computed MAC does not match expected MAC, the message was modified.");
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return tal_free(step);
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}
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//FIXME:store seen secrets to avoid replay attacks
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generate_cipher_stream(stream, keys.rho, sizeof(stream));
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memset(paddedheader, 0, sizeof(paddedheader));
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memcpy(paddedheader, msg->routinginfo, ROUTING_INFO_SIZE);
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xorbytes(paddedheader, paddedheader, stream, sizeof(stream));
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/* Extract the per-hop payload */
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generate_cipher_stream(hopstream, keys.gamma, sizeof(hopstream));
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memset(paddedhoppayloads, 0, sizeof(paddedhoppayloads));
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memcpy(paddedhoppayloads, msg->hoppayloads, TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
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xorbytes(paddedhoppayloads, paddedhoppayloads, hopstream, sizeof(hopstream));
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step->hoppayload = parse_hoppayload(step, paddedhoppayloads);
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memcpy(&step->next->hoppayloads, paddedhoppayloads + HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
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TOTAL_HOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
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compute_blinding_factor(secpctx, &msg->ephemeralkey, secret, blind);
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if (!blind_group_element(secpctx, &step->next->ephemeralkey, &msg->ephemeralkey, blind))
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return tal_free(step);
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memcpy(&step->next->nexthop, paddedheader, SECURITY_PARAMETER);
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memcpy(&step->next->mac,
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paddedheader + SECURITY_PARAMETER,
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SECURITY_PARAMETER);
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stream_decrypt(step->next->payload, msg->payload, sizeof(msg->payload), keys.pi);
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memcpy(&step->next->routinginfo, paddedheader + 2 * SECURITY_PARAMETER, ROUTING_INFO_SIZE);
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if (memeqzero(step->next->mac, sizeof(step->next->mac))) {
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step->nextcase = ONION_END;
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} else {
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step->nextcase = ONION_FORWARD;
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}
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return step;
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}
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