mirror of
https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning.git
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0f97b8cf36
Our handling of SIGPIPE was incoherent and inconsistent, and we had much cut & paste between the daemons. They should *ALL* ignore SIGPIPE, and much of the rest of the boilerplate can be shared, so should be. Reported-by: @ZmnSCPxj Fixes: #528 Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
473 lines
14 KiB
C
473 lines
14 KiB
C
#include <bitcoin/script.h>
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#include <closingd/gen_closing_wire.h>
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#include <common/close_tx.h>
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#include <common/crypto_sync.h>
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#include <common/derive_basepoints.h>
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#include <common/htlc.h>
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#include <common/peer_failed.h>
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#include <common/status.h>
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#include <common/subdaemon.h>
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#include <common/type_to_string.h>
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#include <common/utils.h>
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#include <common/version.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <inttypes.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <wire/peer_wire.h>
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#include <wire/wire_sync.h>
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/* stdin == requests, 3 == peer, 4 = gossip */
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#define REQ_FD STDIN_FILENO
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#define PEER_FD 3
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#define GOSSIP_FD 4
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static struct bitcoin_tx *close_tx(const tal_t *ctx,
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struct crypto_state *cs,
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const struct channel_id *channel_id,
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u8 *scriptpubkey[NUM_SIDES],
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const struct bitcoin_txid *funding_txid,
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unsigned int funding_txout,
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u64 funding_satoshi,
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const u64 satoshi_out[NUM_SIDES],
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enum side funder,
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uint64_t fee,
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uint64_t dust_limit)
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{
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struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
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if (satoshi_out[funder] < fee)
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peer_failed(PEER_FD, cs, channel_id,
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"Funder cannot afford fee %"PRIu64
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" (%"PRIu64" and %"PRIu64")",
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fee, satoshi_out[LOCAL],
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satoshi_out[REMOTE]);
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status_trace("Making close tx at = %"PRIu64"/%"PRIu64" fee %"PRIu64,
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satoshi_out[LOCAL], satoshi_out[REMOTE], fee);
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/* FIXME: We need to allow this! */
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tx = create_close_tx(ctx,
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scriptpubkey[LOCAL], scriptpubkey[REMOTE],
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funding_txid,
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funding_txout,
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funding_satoshi,
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satoshi_out[LOCAL] - (funder == LOCAL ? fee : 0),
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satoshi_out[REMOTE] - (funder == REMOTE ? fee : 0),
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dust_limit);
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if (!tx)
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peer_failed(PEER_FD, cs, channel_id,
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"Both outputs below dust limit:"
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" funding = %"PRIu64
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" fee = %"PRIu64
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" dust_limit = %"PRIu64
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" LOCAL = %"PRIu64
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" REMOTE = %"PRIu64,
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funding_satoshi,
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fee,
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dust_limit,
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satoshi_out[LOCAL],
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satoshi_out[REMOTE]);
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return tx;
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}
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static u64 one_towards(u64 target, u64 value)
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{
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if (value > target)
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return value-1;
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else if (value < target)
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return value+1;
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return value;
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}
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static void do_reconnect(struct crypto_state *cs,
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const struct channel_id *channel_id,
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const u64 next_index[NUM_SIDES],
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u64 revocations_received)
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{
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u8 *msg;
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struct channel_id their_channel_id;
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const tal_t *tmpctx = tal_tmpctx(NULL);
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u64 next_local_commitment_number, next_remote_revocation_number;
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* On reconnection, a node MUST transmit `channel_reestablish` for
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* each channel, and MUST wait for to receive the other node's
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* `channel_reestablish` message before sending any other messages for
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* that channel. The sending node MUST set
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* `next_local_commitment_number` to the commitment number of the next
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* `commitment_signed` it expects to receive, and MUST set
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* `next_remote_revocation_number` to the commitment number of the
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* next `revoke_and_ack` message it expects to receive.
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*/
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msg = towire_channel_reestablish(tmpctx, channel_id,
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next_index[LOCAL],
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revocations_received);
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if (!sync_crypto_write(cs, PEER_FD, take(msg)))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_PEER_IO,
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"Failed writing reestablish: %s", strerror(errno));
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again:
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msg = sync_crypto_read(tmpctx, cs, PEER_FD);
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if (!msg)
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_PEER_IO,
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"Failed reading reestablish: %s", strerror(errno));
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if (is_gossip_msg(msg)) {
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if (!wire_sync_write(GOSSIP_FD, take(msg)))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_GOSSIP_IO, "Writing gossip");
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goto again;
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}
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if (!fromwire_channel_reestablish(msg, NULL, &their_channel_id,
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&next_local_commitment_number,
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&next_remote_revocation_number)) {
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peer_failed(PEER_FD, cs, channel_id,
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"bad reestablish msg: %s %s",
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wire_type_name(fromwire_peektype(msg)),
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tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
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}
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status_trace("Got reestablish commit=%"PRIu64" revoke=%"PRIu64,
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next_local_commitment_number,
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next_remote_revocation_number);
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/* FIXME: Spec says to re-xmit funding_locked here if we haven't
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* done any updates. */
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* On reconnection if the node has sent a previous `closing_signed` it
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* MUST send another `closing_signed`
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*/
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/* Since we always transmit closing_signed immediately, if
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* we're reconnecting we consider ourselves to have transmitted once,
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* and we'll immediately do the retransmit now anyway. */
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tal_free(tmpctx);
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}
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int main(int argc, char *argv[])
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{
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struct crypto_state cs;
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const tal_t *ctx = tal_tmpctx(NULL);
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u8 *msg;
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struct privkey seed;
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struct pubkey funding_pubkey[NUM_SIDES];
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struct bitcoin_txid funding_txid;
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u16 funding_txout;
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u64 funding_satoshi, satoshi_out[NUM_SIDES];
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u64 our_dust_limit;
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u64 minfee, maxfee, sent_fee;
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s64 last_received_fee = -1;
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enum side funder;
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u8 *scriptpubkey[NUM_SIDES], *funding_wscript;
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struct channel_id channel_id;
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struct secrets secrets;
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig;
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bool reconnected;
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u64 next_index[NUM_SIDES], revocations_received;
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u64 gossip_index;
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subdaemon_setup(argc, argv);
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status_setup_sync(REQ_FD);
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msg = wire_sync_read(ctx, REQ_FD);
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if (!fromwire_closing_init(ctx, msg, NULL,
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&cs, &gossip_index, &seed,
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&funding_txid, &funding_txout,
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&funding_satoshi,
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&funding_pubkey[REMOTE],
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&funder,
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&satoshi_out[LOCAL],
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&satoshi_out[REMOTE],
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&our_dust_limit,
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&minfee, &maxfee, &sent_fee,
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&scriptpubkey[LOCAL],
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&scriptpubkey[REMOTE],
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&reconnected,
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&next_index[LOCAL],
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&next_index[REMOTE],
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&revocations_received))
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master_badmsg(WIRE_CLOSING_INIT, msg);
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status_trace("satoshi_out = %"PRIu64"/%"PRIu64,
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satoshi_out[LOCAL], satoshi_out[REMOTE]);
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status_trace("dustlimit = %"PRIu64, our_dust_limit);
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status_trace("fee = %"PRIu64, sent_fee);
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derive_channel_id(&channel_id, &funding_txid, funding_txout);
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derive_basepoints(&seed, &funding_pubkey[LOCAL], NULL,
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&secrets, NULL);
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funding_wscript = bitcoin_redeem_2of2(ctx,
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&funding_pubkey[LOCAL],
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&funding_pubkey[REMOTE]);
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if (reconnected)
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do_reconnect(&cs, &channel_id, next_index, revocations_received);
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* Nodes SHOULD send a `closing_signed` message after `shutdown` has
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* been received and no HTLCs remain in either commitment transaction.
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*/
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* On reconnection, ... if the node has sent a previous
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* `closing_signed` it MUST send another `closing_signed`, otherwise
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* if the node has sent a previous `shutdown` it MUST retransmit it.
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*/
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for (;;) {
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const tal_t *tmpctx = tal_tmpctx(ctx);
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struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
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u64 received_fee, limit_fee, new_fee;
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* The sender MUST set `signature` to the Bitcoin signature of
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* the close transaction as specified in [BOLT
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* #3](03-transactions.md#closing-transaction).
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*/
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tx = close_tx(tmpctx, &cs, &channel_id,
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scriptpubkey,
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&funding_txid,
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funding_txout,
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funding_satoshi,
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satoshi_out, funder, sent_fee, our_dust_limit);
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* ## Closing Transaction
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*...
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* Each node offering a signature... MAY also eliminate its
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* own output.
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*/
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/* (We don't do this). */
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sign_tx_input(tx, 0, NULL, funding_wscript,
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&secrets.funding_privkey,
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&funding_pubkey[LOCAL],
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&sig);
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status_trace("sending fee offer %"PRIu64, sent_fee);
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/* Now send closing offer */
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msg = towire_closing_signed(tmpctx, &channel_id, sent_fee, &sig);
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if (!sync_crypto_write(&cs, PEER_FD, take(msg)))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_PEER_IO,
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"Writing closing_signed");
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/* Did we just agree with them? If so, we're done. */
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if (sent_fee == last_received_fee)
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break;
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again:
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msg = sync_crypto_read(tmpctx, &cs, PEER_FD);
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if (!msg)
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_PEER_IO, "Reading input");
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/* We don't send gossip at this stage, but we can recv it */
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if (is_gossip_msg(msg)) {
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if (!wire_sync_write(GOSSIP_FD, take(msg)))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_GOSSIP_IO,
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"Writing gossip");
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goto again;
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}
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* On reconnection, a node MUST ignore a redundant
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* `funding_locked` if it receives one.
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*/
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/* This should only happen if we've made no commitments, but
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* we don't have to check that: it's their problem. */
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if (fromwire_peektype(msg) == WIRE_FUNDING_LOCKED) {
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tal_free(msg);
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goto again;
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}
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* ...if the node has sent a previous `shutdown` it MUST
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* retransmit it.
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*/
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if (fromwire_peektype(msg) == WIRE_SHUTDOWN) {
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tal_free(msg);
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goto again;
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}
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if (!fromwire_closing_signed(msg, NULL, &channel_id,
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&received_fee, &sig))
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peer_failed(PEER_FD, &cs, &channel_id,
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"Expected closing_signed: %s",
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tal_hex(trc, msg));
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* The receiver MUST check `signature` is valid for either
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* variant of close transaction specified in [BOLT
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* #3](03-transactions.md#closing-transaction), and MUST fail
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* the connection if it is not.
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*/
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tx = close_tx(tmpctx, &cs, &channel_id,
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scriptpubkey,
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&funding_txid,
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funding_txout,
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funding_satoshi,
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satoshi_out, funder, received_fee, our_dust_limit);
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if (!check_tx_sig(tx, 0, NULL, funding_wscript,
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&funding_pubkey[REMOTE], &sig)) {
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/* Trim it by reducing their output to minimum */
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struct bitcoin_tx *trimmed;
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u64 trimming_satoshi_out[NUM_SIDES];
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if (funder == REMOTE)
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trimming_satoshi_out[REMOTE] = received_fee;
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else
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trimming_satoshi_out[REMOTE] = 0;
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trimming_satoshi_out[LOCAL] = satoshi_out[LOCAL];
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* Each node offering a signature MUST subtract the
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* fee given by `fee_satoshis` from the output to the
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* funder; it MUST then remove any output below its
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* own `dust_limit_satoshis`, and MAY also eliminate
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* its own output.
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*/
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trimmed = close_tx(tmpctx, &cs, &channel_id,
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scriptpubkey,
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&funding_txid,
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funding_txout,
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funding_satoshi,
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trimming_satoshi_out,
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funder, received_fee, our_dust_limit);
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if (!trimmed
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|| !check_tx_sig(trimmed, 0, NULL, funding_wscript,
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&funding_pubkey[REMOTE], &sig)) {
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peer_failed(PEER_FD, &cs, &channel_id,
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"Bad closing_signed signature for"
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" %s (and trimmed version %s)",
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type_to_string(tmpctx,
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struct bitcoin_tx,
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tx),
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trimmed ?
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type_to_string(tmpctx,
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struct bitcoin_tx,
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trimmed)
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: "NONE");
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}
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tx = trimmed;
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}
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status_trace("Received fee offer %"PRIu64, received_fee);
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* Otherwise, the recipient MUST fail the connection if
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* `fee_satoshis` is greater than the base fee of the final
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* commitment transaction as calculated in [BOLT #3] */
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if (received_fee > maxfee)
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peer_failed(PEER_FD, &cs, &channel_id,
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"Bad closing_signed fee %"PRIu64" > %"PRIu64,
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received_fee, maxfee);
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/* Is fee reasonable? Tell master. */
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if (received_fee < minfee) {
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status_trace("Fee too low, below %"PRIu64, minfee);
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limit_fee = minfee;
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} else {
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status_trace("Fee accepted.");
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msg = towire_closing_received_signature(tmpctx,
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&sig, tx);
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if (!wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(msg)))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
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"Writing received to master: %s",
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strerror(errno));
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msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, REQ_FD);
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if (!fromwire_closing_received_signature_reply(msg,NULL))
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master_badmsg(WIRE_CLOSING_RECEIVED_SIGNATURE_REPLY,
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msg);
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limit_fee = received_fee;
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}
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* If `fee_satoshis` is equal to its previously sent
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* `fee_satoshis`, the receiver SHOULD sign and broadcast the
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* final closing transaction and MAY close the connection.
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*/
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if (received_fee == sent_fee)
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break;
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* the recipient SHOULD fail the connection if `fee_satoshis`
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* is not strictly between its last-sent `fee_satoshis` and
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* its previously-received `fee_satoshis`, unless it has
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* reconnected since then. */
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if (last_received_fee != -1) {
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bool previous_dir = sent_fee < last_received_fee;
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bool dir = received_fee < last_received_fee;
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bool next_dir = sent_fee < received_fee;
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/* They went away from our offer? */
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if (dir != previous_dir)
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peer_failed(PEER_FD, &cs, &channel_id,
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"Their fee went %"
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PRIu64" to %"PRIu64
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" when ours was %"PRIu64,
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last_received_fee,
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received_fee,
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sent_fee);
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/* They jumped over our offer? */
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if (next_dir != previous_dir)
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peer_failed(PEER_FD, &cs, &channel_id,
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"Their fee jumped %"
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PRIu64" to %"PRIu64
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" when ours was %"PRIu64,
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last_received_fee,
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received_fee,
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sent_fee);
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}
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* ...otherwise it MUST propose a value strictly between the
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* received `fee_satoshis` and its previously-sent
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* `fee_satoshis`.
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*/
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/* We do it by bisection, with twists:
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* 1. Don't go outside limits, or reach them immediately:
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* treat out-of-limit offers as on-limit offers.
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* 2. Round towards the target, otherwise we can't close
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* a final 1-satoshi gap.
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*
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* Note: Overflow impossible here, since fee <= funder amount */
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new_fee = one_towards(limit_fee, limit_fee + sent_fee) / 2;
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/* If we didn't move, give up (we're ~ at min/max). */
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if (new_fee == sent_fee)
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peer_failed(PEER_FD, &cs, &channel_id,
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"Final fee %"PRIu64" vs %"PRIu64
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" at limits %"PRIu64"-%"PRIu64,
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sent_fee, received_fee,
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minfee, maxfee);
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last_received_fee = received_fee;
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sent_fee = new_fee;
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tal_free(tmpctx);
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}
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/* We're done! */
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wire_sync_write(REQ_FD,
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take(towire_closing_complete(ctx, gossip_index)));
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tal_free(ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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