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core-lightning/openingd/dualopend.c
niftynei 7e324177de df-tests: simultaneous openchannel_init (while in progress) 
Reject a peer's request to open a channel while we're already in progress
2021-01-10 13:44:04 +01:00

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/*~ Welcome to the ~nifty~ dual-opening daemon: the other gateway to channels!
*
* This daemon handles a single peer. It's happy to trade gossip with the
* peer until either lightningd asks it to fund a channel, or the peer itself
* asks to fund a channel. Then it goes through with the channel opening
* negotiations. It's important to note that until this negotiation is complete,
* there's nothing permanent about the channel: lightningd will only have to
* commit to the database once dualopend succeeds.
*
* Much like the original opening daemon, openingd, dualopend implements the
* new and improved, two-party opening protocol, which allows bother peers to
* contribute inputs to the transaction
*/
#include <bitcoin/feerate.h>
#include <bitcoin/privkey.h>
#include <bitcoin/script.h>
#include <bitcoin/tx.h>
#include <bitcoin/varint.h>
#include <ccan/ccan/array_size/array_size.h>
#include <ccan/ccan/mem/mem.h>
#include <ccan/ccan/take/take.h>
#include <ccan/ccan/time/time.h>
#include <ccan/fdpass/fdpass.h>
#include <ccan/short_types/short_types.h>
#include <common/amount.h>
#include <common/billboard.h>
#include <common/channel_config.h>
#include <common/channel_id.h>
#include <common/crypto_sync.h>
#include <common/features.h>
#include <common/fee_states.h>
#include <common/gossip_rcvd_filter.h>
#include <common/gossip_store.h>
#include <common/htlc.h>
#include <common/initial_channel.h>
#include <common/memleak.h>
#include <common/peer_billboard.h>
#include <common/peer_failed.h>
#include <common/penalty_base.h>
#include <common/per_peer_state.h>
#include <common/psbt_internal.h>
#include <common/psbt_open.h>
#include <common/read_peer_msg.h>
#include <common/setup.h>
#include <common/status.h>
#include <common/subdaemon.h>
#include <common/tx_roles.h>
#include <common/type_to_string.h>
#include <common/utils.h>
#include <common/version.h>
#include <common/wire_error.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <hsmd/hsmd_wiregen.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <openingd/common.h>
#include <openingd/dualopend_wiregen.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <wire/common_wiregen.h>
#include <wire/peer_wire.h>
#include <wire/wire_sync.h>
/* stdin == lightningd, 3 == peer, 4 == gossipd, 5 = gossip_store, 6 = hsmd */
#define REQ_FD STDIN_FILENO
#define HSM_FD 6
/* tx_add_input, tx_add_output, tx_rm_input, tx_rm_output */
#define NUM_TX_MSGS (TX_RM_OUTPUT + 1)
enum tx_msgs {
TX_ADD_INPUT,
TX_ADD_OUTPUT,
TX_RM_INPUT,
TX_RM_OUTPUT,
};
/*
* BOLT-544bda7144d91b3f51856189b8932610649f9e93 #2:
- MUST NOT send more than 2^12 ... messages
*/
#define MAX_TX_MSG_RCVD (1 << 12)
/* Global state structure. This is only for the one specific peer and channel */
struct state {
struct per_peer_state *pps;
/* Features they offered */
u8 *their_features;
/* Constraints on a channel they open. */
u32 minimum_depth;
u32 min_feerate, max_feerate;
struct amount_msat min_effective_htlc_capacity;
/* Limits on what remote config we accept. */
u32 max_to_self_delay;
/* These are the points lightningd told us to use when accepting or
* opening a channel. */
struct basepoints our_points;
struct pubkey our_funding_pubkey;
struct pubkey their_funding_pubkey;
/* Information we need between funding_start and funding_complete */
struct basepoints their_points;
/* hsmd gives us our first per-commitment point, and peer tells us
* theirs */
struct pubkey first_per_commitment_point[NUM_SIDES];
struct channel_id channel_id;
/* Funding and feerate: set by opening peer. */
struct amount_sat opener_funding;
struct amount_sat accepter_funding;
u32 tx_locktime;
struct sha256 opening_podle_h2;
enum tx_role our_role;
u32 feerate_per_kw_funding;
u32 feerate_per_kw_commitment;
struct bitcoin_txid funding_txid;
u16 funding_txout;
/* If non-NULL, this is the scriptpubkey we/they *must* close with */
u8 *upfront_shutdown_script[NUM_SIDES];
/* This is a cluster of fields in open_channel and accept_channel which
* indicate the restrictions each side places on the channel. */
struct channel_config localconf, remoteconf;
/* The channel structure, as defined in common/initial_channel.h. While
* the structure has room for HTLCs, those routines are
* channeld-specific as initial channels never have HTLCs. */
struct channel *channel;
struct feature_set *our_features;
/* Set of pending changes to send to peer */
struct psbt_changeset *changeset;
/* The serial_id of the funding output */
u64 funding_serial;
/* Track how many of each tx collab msg we receive */
u16 tx_msg_count[NUM_TX_MSGS];
/* Tally of which sides are locked, or not */
bool funding_locked[NUM_SIDES];
/* Have we gotten the peer's tx-sigs yet? */
bool remote_funding_sigs_rcvd;
/* PSBT of the funding tx */
struct wally_psbt *psbt;
/* Are we shutting down? */
bool shutdown_sent[NUM_SIDES];
/* Were we reconnected at start ? */
bool reconnected;
};
/* psbt_changeset_get_next - Get next message to send
*
* This generates the next message to send from a changeset for the
* interactive transaction protocol.
*
* @ctx - allocation context of returned msg
* @cid - channel_id for the message
* @set - changeset to get next update from
*
* Returns a wire message or NULL if no changes.
*/
static u8 *psbt_changeset_get_next(const tal_t *ctx,
struct channel_id *cid,
struct psbt_changeset *set)
{
u64 serial_id;
u8 *msg;
if (tal_count(set->added_ins) != 0) {
const struct input_set *in = &set->added_ins[0];
u8 *script;
if (!psbt_get_serial_id(&in->input.unknowns, &serial_id))
abort();
const u8 *prevtx = linearize_wtx(ctx,
in->input.utxo);
if (in->input.redeem_script_len)
script = tal_dup_arr(ctx, u8,
in->input.redeem_script,
in->input.redeem_script_len, 0);
else
script = NULL;
msg = towire_tx_add_input(ctx, cid, serial_id,
prevtx, in->tx_input.index,
in->tx_input.sequence,
script,
NULL);
tal_arr_remove(&set->added_ins, 0);
return msg;
}
if (tal_count(set->rm_ins) != 0) {
if (!psbt_get_serial_id(&set->rm_ins[0].input.unknowns,
&serial_id))
abort();
msg = towire_tx_remove_input(ctx, cid, serial_id);
tal_arr_remove(&set->rm_ins, 0);
return msg;
}
if (tal_count(set->added_outs) != 0) {
struct amount_sat sats;
struct amount_asset asset_amt;
const struct output_set *out = &set->added_outs[0];
if (!psbt_get_serial_id(&out->output.unknowns, &serial_id))
abort();
asset_amt = wally_tx_output_get_amount(&out->tx_output);
sats = amount_asset_to_sat(&asset_amt);
const u8 *script = wally_tx_output_get_script(ctx,
&out->tx_output);
msg = towire_tx_add_output(ctx, cid, serial_id,
sats.satoshis, /* Raw: wire interface */
script);
tal_arr_remove(&set->added_outs, 0);
return msg;
}
if (tal_count(set->rm_outs) != 0) {
if (!psbt_get_serial_id(&set->rm_outs[0].output.unknowns,
&serial_id))
abort();
msg = towire_tx_remove_output(ctx, cid, serial_id);
/* Is this a kosher way to move the list forward? */
tal_arr_remove(&set->rm_outs, 0);
return msg;
}
return NULL;
}
/*~ If we can't agree on parameters, we fail to open the channel. If we're
* the opener, we need to tell lightningd, otherwise it never really notices. */
static void negotiation_aborted(struct state *state, const char *why)
{
status_debug("aborted opening negotiation: %s", why);
/*~ The "billboard" (exposed as "status" in the JSON listpeers RPC
* call) is a transient per-channel area which indicates important
* information about what is happening. It has a "permanent" area for
* each state, which can be used to indicate what went wrong in that
* state (such as here), and a single transient area for current
* status. */
peer_billboard(true, why);
/* Tell master that funding failed. */
u8 *msg = towire_dualopend_failed(NULL, why);
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(msg));
/* Default is no shutdown_scriptpubkey: free any leftover ones. */
state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL]
= tal_free(state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL]);
state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE]
= tal_free(state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE]);
/*~ Reset state. We keep gossipping with them, even though this open
* failed. */
memset(&state->channel_id, 0, sizeof(state->channel_id));
state->channel = tal_free(state->channel);
state->changeset = tal_free(state->changeset);
for (size_t i = 0; i < NUM_TX_MSGS; i++)
state->tx_msg_count[i] = 0;
}
static void open_error(struct state *state,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
const char *errmsg;
u8 *msg;
va_start(ap, fmt);
errmsg = tal_vfmt(tmpctx, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
msg = towire_errorfmt(NULL, &state->channel_id,
"%s", errmsg);
sync_crypto_write(state->pps, take(msg));
negotiation_aborted(state, errmsg);
}
/*~ For negotiation failures: we tell them the parameter we didn't like. */
static void negotiation_failed(struct state *state,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
const char *errmsg;
va_start(ap, fmt);
errmsg = tal_vfmt(tmpctx, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
open_error(state, "You gave bad parameters: %s", errmsg);
}
static void billboard_update(struct state *state)
{
const char *update = billboard_message(tmpctx, state->funding_locked,
NULL,
state->shutdown_sent,
0, /* Always zero? */
0);
peer_billboard(false, update);
}
static void send_shutdown(struct state *state, const u8 *final_scriptpubkey)
{
u8 *msg;
msg = towire_shutdown(NULL, &state->channel_id,
final_scriptpubkey);
sync_crypto_write(state->pps, take(msg));
state->shutdown_sent[LOCAL] = true;
}
static void handle_peer_shutdown(struct state *state, u8 *msg)
{
u8 *scriptpubkey;
struct channel_id cid;
if (!fromwire_shutdown(tmpctx, msg, &cid, &scriptpubkey))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Bad shutdown %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
if (tal_count(state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE])
&& !memeq(scriptpubkey, tal_count(scriptpubkey),
state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE],
tal_count(state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE])))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"scriptpubkey %s is not as agreed upfront (%s)",
tal_hex(state, scriptpubkey),
tal_hex(state,
state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE]));
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD,
take(towire_dualopend_got_shutdown(NULL,
scriptpubkey)));
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, REQ_FD);
if (!fromwire_dualopend_send_shutdown(tmpctx, msg, &scriptpubkey))
master_badmsg(fromwire_peektype(msg), msg);
state->shutdown_sent[REMOTE] = true;
if (!state->shutdown_sent[LOCAL])
send_shutdown(state, scriptpubkey);
billboard_update(state);
}
static void handle_our_shutdown(struct state *state, u8 *msg)
{
u8 *scriptpubkey;
if (!fromwire_dualopend_send_shutdown(tmpctx, msg, &scriptpubkey))
master_badmsg(fromwire_peektype(msg), msg);
if (!state->shutdown_sent[LOCAL])
send_shutdown(state, scriptpubkey);
billboard_update(state);
}
static void check_channel_id(struct state *state,
struct channel_id *id_in,
struct channel_id *orig_id)
{
/* BOLT #2:
*
* The `temporary_channel_id` MUST be the same as
* the `temporary_channel_id` in the `open_channel` message.
*/
if (!channel_id_eq(id_in, orig_id))
peer_failed(state->pps, id_in,
"channel ids don't match. expected %s, got %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id, orig_id),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id, id_in));
}
static void set_reserve(struct state *state, struct amount_sat funding_total)
{
struct amount_sat reserve;
/* BOLT-fe0351ca2cea3105c4f2eb18c571afca9d21c85b #2
*
* The channel reserve is fixed at 1% of the total channel balance
* rounded down (sum of `funding_satoshis` from `open_channel2`
* and `accept_channel2`) or the `dust_limit_satoshis`, whichever
* is greater.
*/
reserve = amount_sat_div(funding_total, 100);
if (amount_sat_greater(state->remoteconf.dust_limit, reserve))
state->remoteconf.channel_reserve = state->remoteconf.dust_limit;
else
state->remoteconf.channel_reserve = reserve;
if (amount_sat_greater(state->localconf.dust_limit, reserve))
state->localconf.channel_reserve = state->localconf.dust_limit;
else
state->localconf.channel_reserve = reserve;
}
static bool is_openers(const struct wally_map *unknowns)
{
/* BOLT-fe0351ca2cea3105c4f2eb18c571afca9d21c85b #2
* The sending node:
* ...
* - if is the `initiator`:
* - MUST send even `serial_id`s
* - if is the `contributor`:
* ...
* - MUST send odd `serial_id`s
*/
u64 serial_id;
if (!psbt_get_serial_id(unknowns, &serial_id))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"PSBTs must have serial_ids set");
return serial_id % 2 == TX_INITIATOR;
}
static size_t psbt_input_weight(struct wally_psbt *psbt,
size_t in)
{
size_t weight;
/* txid + txout + sequence */
weight = (32 + 4 + 4) * 4;
weight +=
(psbt->inputs[in].redeem_script_len +
(varint_t) varint_size(psbt->inputs[in].redeem_script_len)) * 4;
/* BOLT-78de9a79b491ae9fb84b1fdb4546bacf642dce87 #2
* The minimum witness weight for an input is 110.
*/
weight += 110;
return weight;
}
static size_t psbt_output_weight(struct wally_psbt *psbt,
size_t outnum)
{
return (8 + psbt->tx->outputs[outnum].script_len +
varint_size(psbt->tx->outputs[outnum].script_len)) * 4;
}
static bool find_txout(struct wally_psbt *psbt, const u8 *wscript, u16 *funding_txout)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < psbt->num_outputs; i++) {
if (memeq(wscript, tal_bytelen(wscript), psbt->tx->outputs[i].script,
psbt->tx->outputs[i].script_len)) {
*funding_txout = i;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
static char *check_balances(const tal_t *ctx,
struct state *state,
struct wally_psbt *psbt,
u32 feerate_per_kw_funding)
{
struct amount_sat initiator_inputs, initiator_outs,
accepter_inputs, accepter_outs,
tot_input_amt, tot_output_amt,
initiator_fee, accepter_fee,
initiator_diff, accepter_diff;
bool ok;
u16 funding_outnum = psbt->num_outputs;
size_t accepter_weight = 0;
/* BOLT-78de9a79b491ae9fb84b1fdb4546bacf642dce87 #2:
* The initiator is responsible for paying the fees
* for the following fields, to be referred to as
* the `common fields`.
* - version
* - segwit marker + flag
* - input count
* - output count
* - locktime */
size_t initiator_weight =
bitcoin_tx_core_weight(psbt->num_inputs,
psbt->num_outputs);
u8 *funding_wscript =
bitcoin_redeem_2of2(tmpctx,
&state->our_funding_pubkey,
&state->their_funding_pubkey);
/* Find funding output, check balance */
if (find_txout(psbt,
scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tmpctx, funding_wscript),
&funding_outnum)) {
struct amount_sat output_val, total_funding;
output_val = psbt_output_get_amount(psbt,
funding_outnum);
if (!amount_sat_add(&total_funding,
state->accepter_funding,
state->opener_funding)) {
return "overflow adding desired funding";
}
/* BOLT-78de9a79b491ae9fb84b1fdb4546bacf642dce87 #2:
* The receiving node:
* ...
* - MUST fail the channel if:
* ...
* - the value of the funding output is incorrect
*/
if (!amount_sat_eq(total_funding, output_val)) {
return "total desired funding != "
"funding output";
}
/* BOLT-78de9a79b491ae9fb84b1fdb4546bacf642dce87 #2:
* The receiving node:
* ...
* - MUST fail the channel if:
* ...
* - if the `funding_output` of the resulting
* transaction is less than the `dust_limit`
*/
if (!amount_sat_greater(output_val,
state->remoteconf.dust_limit) ||
!amount_sat_greater(output_val,
state->localconf.dust_limit)) {
return "funding output is dust";
}
} else {
/* BOLT-78de9a79b491ae9fb84b1fdb4546bacf642dce87 #2:
* The receiving node:
* ...
* - MUST fail the channel if:
* - no funding output is received, identified by
* the `script`
*/
return "funding output not present";
}
/* Find the total input and output sums */
tot_input_amt = AMOUNT_SAT(0);
initiator_inputs = AMOUNT_SAT(0);
accepter_inputs = AMOUNT_SAT(0);
for (size_t i = 0; i < psbt->num_inputs; i++) {
struct amount_sat amt =
psbt_input_get_amount(psbt, i);
/* Add to total balance check */
if (!amount_sat_add(&tot_input_amt,
tot_input_amt, amt)) {
return "overflow adding input total";
}
if (is_openers(&psbt->inputs[i].unknowns)) {
/* If the above additon passed,
* this should also */
ok = amount_sat_add(&initiator_inputs,
initiator_inputs, amt);
assert(ok);
initiator_weight +=
psbt_input_weight(psbt, i);
} else {
ok = amount_sat_add(&accepter_inputs,
accepter_inputs, amt);
assert(ok);
accepter_weight +=
psbt_input_weight(psbt, i);
}
}
tot_output_amt = AMOUNT_SAT(0);
initiator_outs = state->opener_funding;
accepter_outs = state->accepter_funding;
for (size_t i = 0; i < psbt->num_outputs; i++) {
struct amount_sat amt =
psbt_output_get_amount(psbt, i);
/* Add to total balance check */
if (!amount_sat_add(&tot_output_amt,
tot_output_amt, amt)) {
return "overflow adding output total";
}
/* BOLT-78de9a79b491ae9fb84b1fdb4546bacf642dce87 #2:
* The sending node:
* - MUST specify a `sats` value greater
* than the dust limit
*/
if (!amount_sat_greater(amt,
state->remoteconf.dust_limit) ||
!amount_sat_greater(amt,
state->localconf.dust_limit)) {
return "output is dust";
}
if (is_openers(&psbt->outputs[i].unknowns)) {
/* Don't add the funding output to
* the amount */
if (i != funding_outnum) {
/* If the above additon passed,
* this should also */
ok = amount_sat_add(&initiator_outs,
initiator_outs,
amt);
assert(ok);
}
initiator_weight +=
psbt_output_weight(psbt, i);
} else {
ok = amount_sat_add(&accepter_outs,
accepter_outs, amt);
assert(ok);
accepter_weight +=
psbt_output_weight(psbt, i);
}
}
/* BOLT-78de9a79b491ae9fb84b1fdb4546bacf642dce87 #2:
* The receiving node: ...
* - MUST fail the channel if:
* ...
* - the total satoshis of the inputs is less than
* the outputs
*/
if (!amount_sat_greater_eq(tot_input_amt, tot_output_amt)) {
return "inputs less than total outputs";
}
/* BOLT-78de9a79b491ae9fb84b1fdb4546bacf642dce87 #2:
* The receiving node: ...
* - MUST fail the channel if:
* ...
* - the peer's paid feerate does not meet or exceed
* the agreed `feerate`, (based on the miminum fee).
* - the `initiator`'s fees do not cover the `common`
* fields
*/
if (!amount_sat_sub(&accepter_diff, accepter_inputs,
accepter_outs)) {
return "accepter inputs less than outputs";
}
if (!amount_sat_sub(&initiator_diff, initiator_inputs,
initiator_outs)) {
return "initiator inputs less than outputs";
}
/* BOLT-78de9a79b491ae9fb84b1fdb4546bacf642dce87 #2:
* Each party to the transaction is responsible for
* paying the fees for their input, output,
* and witness at the agreed `feerate`. */
accepter_fee = amount_tx_fee(feerate_per_kw_funding,
accepter_weight);
initiator_fee = amount_tx_fee(feerate_per_kw_funding,
initiator_weight);
if (!amount_sat_greater_eq(accepter_diff, accepter_fee)) {
return tal_fmt(ctx, "accepter fee not covered"
" (need %s > have %s)",
type_to_string(ctx,
struct amount_sat,
&accepter_fee),
type_to_string(ctx,
struct amount_sat,
&accepter_diff));
}
if (!amount_sat_greater_eq(initiator_diff, initiator_fee)) {
return tal_fmt(ctx,
"initiator fee %s not covered %s",
type_to_string(ctx,
struct amount_sat,
&initiator_fee),
type_to_string(ctx,
struct amount_sat,
&initiator_diff));
}
return NULL;
}
static bool is_segwit_output(struct wally_tx_output *output,
const u8 *redeemscript)
{
const u8 *wit_prog;
if (tal_bytelen(redeemscript) > 0)
wit_prog = redeemscript;
else
wit_prog = wally_tx_output_get_script(tmpctx, output);
return is_p2wsh(wit_prog, NULL) || is_p2wpkh(wit_prog, NULL);
}
/* Memory leak detection is DEVELOPER-only because we go to great lengths to
* record the backtrace when allocations occur: without that, the leak
* detection tends to be useless for diagnosing where the leak came from, but
* it has significant overhead. */
#if DEVELOPER
static void handle_dev_memleak(struct state *state, const u8 *msg)
{
struct htable *memtable;
bool found_leak;
/* Populate a hash table with all our allocations (except msg, which
* is in use right now). */
memtable = memleak_find_allocations(tmpctx, msg, msg);
/* Now delete state and things it has pointers to. */
memleak_remove_region(memtable, state, tal_bytelen(state));
/* If there's anything left, dump it to logs, and return true. */
found_leak = dump_memleak(memtable);
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD,
take(towire_dualopend_dev_memleak_reply(NULL,
found_leak)));
}
/* We were told to send a custommsg to the peer by `lightningd`. All the
* verification is done on the side of `lightningd` so we should be good to
* just forward it here. */
static void dualopend_send_custommsg(struct state *state, const u8 *msg)
{
sync_crypto_write(state->pps, take(msg));
}
#endif
static u8 *psbt_to_tx_sigs_msg(const tal_t *ctx,
struct state *state,
const struct wally_psbt *psbt)
{
const struct witness_stack **ws =
psbt_to_witness_stacks(tmpctx, psbt,
state->our_role);
return towire_tx_signatures(ctx, &state->channel_id,
&state->funding_txid,
ws);
}
static void handle_tx_sigs(struct state *state, const u8 *msg)
{
struct channel_id cid;
struct bitcoin_txid txid;
const struct witness_stack **ws;
size_t j = 0;
enum tx_role their_role = state->our_role == TX_INITIATOR ?
TX_ACCEPTER : TX_INITIATOR;
if (!fromwire_tx_signatures(tmpctx, msg, &cid, &txid,
cast_const3(
struct witness_stack ***,
&ws)))
peer_failed(state->pps,
&state->channel_id,
"Bad tx_signatures %s",
tal_hex(msg, msg));
/* Maybe they didn't get our funding_locked message ? */
if (state->funding_locked[LOCAL] && !state->reconnected) {
status_broken("Got WIRE_TX_SIGNATURES after funding locked "
"for channel %s, ignoring: %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id,
&state->channel_id),
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
return;
}
/* On reconnect, we expect them to resend tx_sigs if they haven't
* gotten our funding_locked yet */
if (state->funding_locked[REMOTE] && !state->reconnected)
peer_failed(state->pps,
&state->channel_id,
"tx_signatures sent after funding_locked %s",
tal_hex(msg, msg));
if (state->remote_funding_sigs_rcvd) {
status_info("Got duplicate WIRE_TX_SIGNATURES, "
"already have their sigs. Ignoring");
return;
}
/* We put the PSBT + sigs all together */
for (size_t i = 0; i < state->psbt->num_inputs; i++) {
struct wally_psbt_input *in =
&state->psbt->inputs[i];
u64 in_serial;
const struct witness_element **elem;
if (!psbt_get_serial_id(&in->unknowns, &in_serial)) {
status_broken("PSBT input %zu missing serial_id %s",
i, type_to_string(tmpctx,
struct wally_psbt,
state->psbt));
return;
}
if (in_serial % 2 != their_role)
continue;
if (j == tal_count(ws))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Mismatch witness stack count %s",
tal_hex(msg, msg));
elem = cast_const2(const struct witness_element **,
ws[j++]->witness_element);
psbt_finalize_input(state->psbt, in, elem);
}
state->remote_funding_sigs_rcvd = true;
/* Send to the controller, who will broadcast the funding_tx
* as soon as we've got our sigs */
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD,
take(towire_dualopend_funding_sigs(NULL, state->psbt)));
}
static void handle_send_tx_sigs(struct state *state, const u8 *msg)
{
struct wally_psbt *psbt;
struct bitcoin_txid txid;
if (!fromwire_dualopend_send_tx_sigs(tmpctx, msg, &psbt))
master_badmsg(WIRE_DUALOPEND_SEND_TX_SIGS, msg);
/* Check that we've got the same / correct PSBT */
psbt_txid(NULL, psbt, &txid, NULL);
if (!bitcoin_txid_eq(&txid, &state->funding_txid))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"TXID for passed in PSBT does not match"
" funding txid for channel. Expected %s, "
"received %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid,
&state->funding_txid),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid,
&txid));
tal_wally_start();
if (wally_psbt_combine(state->psbt, psbt) != WALLY_OK) {
tal_wally_end(tal_free(state->psbt));
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Unable to combine PSBTs. received %s\n"
"local %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct wally_psbt,
psbt),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct wally_psbt,
state->psbt));
}
tal_wally_end(state->psbt);
/* Send our sigs to peer */
msg = psbt_to_tx_sigs_msg(tmpctx, state, state->psbt);
sync_crypto_write(state->pps, take(msg));
/* Notify lightningd that we've sent sigs */
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(towire_dualopend_tx_sigs_sent(NULL)));
}
static struct wally_psbt *
fetch_psbt_changes(struct state *state, const struct wally_psbt *psbt)
{
u8 *msg;
char *err;
struct wally_psbt *updated_psbt;
/* Go ask lightningd what other changes we've got */
msg = towire_dualopend_psbt_changed(NULL, &state->channel_id,
state->funding_serial,
psbt);
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(msg));
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, REQ_FD);
if (fromwire_dualopend_fail(msg, msg, &err)) {
open_error(state, "%s", err);
} else if (fromwire_dualopend_psbt_updated(state, msg, &updated_psbt)) {
return updated_psbt;
#if DEVELOPER
} else if (fromwire_dualopend_dev_memleak(msg)) {
handle_dev_memleak(state, msg);
#endif /* DEVELOPER */
} else
master_badmsg(fromwire_peektype(msg), msg);
return NULL;
}
static bool send_next(struct state *state, struct wally_psbt **psbt)
{
u8 *msg;
bool finished = false;
struct wally_psbt *updated_psbt;
struct psbt_changeset *cs = state->changeset;
/* First we check our cached changes */
msg = psbt_changeset_get_next(tmpctx, &state->channel_id, cs);
if (msg)
goto sendmsg;
/* If we don't have any changes cached, go ask Alice for
* what changes they've got for us */
updated_psbt = fetch_psbt_changes(state, *psbt);
/* We should always get a updated psbt back */
if (!updated_psbt)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Unable to determine next tx update");
state->changeset = tal_free(state->changeset);
state->changeset = psbt_get_changeset(state, *psbt, updated_psbt);
/* We want this old psbt to be cleaned up when the changeset is freed */
tal_steal(state->changeset, *psbt);
*psbt = tal_steal(state, updated_psbt);
msg = psbt_changeset_get_next(tmpctx, &state->channel_id,
state->changeset);
/*
* If there's no more moves, we send tx_complete
* and reply that we're finished */
if (!msg) {
msg = towire_tx_complete(tmpctx, &state->channel_id);
finished = true;
}
sendmsg:
sync_crypto_write(state->pps, msg);
return !finished;
}
static void init_changeset(struct state *state, struct wally_psbt *psbt)
{
/* We need an empty to compare to */
struct wally_psbt *empty_psbt = create_psbt(tmpctx, 0, 0, 0);
state->changeset = psbt_get_changeset(state, empty_psbt, psbt);
}
/*~ Handle random messages we might get during opening negotiation, (eg. gossip)
* returning the first non-handled one, or NULL if we aborted negotiation. */
static u8 *opening_negotiate_msg(const tal_t *ctx, struct state *state)
{
/* This is an event loop of its own. That's generally considered poor
* form, but we use it in a very limited way. */
for (;;) {
u8 *msg;
bool from_gossipd;
char *err;
bool all_channels;
struct channel_id actual;
/* The event loop is responsible for freeing tmpctx, so our
* temporary allocations don't grow unbounded. */
clean_tmpctx();
/* This helper routine polls both the peer and gossipd. */
msg = peer_or_gossip_sync_read(ctx, state->pps, &from_gossipd);
/* Use standard helper for gossip msgs (forwards, if it's an
* error, exits). */
if (from_gossipd) {
handle_gossip_msg(state->pps, take(msg));
continue;
}
/* Some messages go straight to gossipd. */
if (is_msg_for_gossipd(msg)) {
gossip_rcvd_filter_add(state->pps->grf, msg);
wire_sync_write(state->pps->gossip_fd, take(msg));
continue;
}
/* BOLT #1:
*
* A receiving node:
* - upon receiving a message of _odd_, unknown type:
* - MUST ignore the received message.
*/
if (is_unknown_msg_discardable(msg))
continue;
/* Might be a timestamp filter request: handle. */
if (handle_timestamp_filter(state->pps, msg))
continue;
/* A helper which decodes an error. */
if (is_peer_error(tmpctx, msg, &state->channel_id,
&err, &all_channels)) {
/* BOLT #1:
*
* - if no existing channel is referred to by the
* message:
* - MUST ignore the message.
*/
/* In this case, is_peer_error returns true, but sets
* err to NULL */
if (!err) {
tal_free(msg);
continue;
}
/* Close connection on all_channels error. */
if (all_channels) {
msg = towire_dualopend_failed(NULL, err);
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(msg));
peer_failed_received_errmsg(state->pps, err,
NULL, false);
}
negotiation_aborted(state,
tal_fmt(tmpctx, "They sent error %s",
err));
/* Return NULL so caller knows to stop negotiating. */
return NULL;
}
/*~ We do not support multiple "live" channels, though the
* protocol has a "channel_id" field in all non-gossip messages
* so it's possible. Our one-process-one-channel mechanism
* keeps things simple: if we wanted to change this, we would
* probably be best with another daemon to de-multiplex them;
* this could be connectd itself, in fact. */
if (is_wrong_channel(msg, &state->channel_id, &actual)) {
status_debug("Rejecting %s for unknown channel_id %s",
peer_wire_name(fromwire_peektype(msg)),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct channel_id,
&actual));
sync_crypto_write(state->pps,
take(towire_errorfmt(NULL, &actual,
"Multiple channels"
" unsupported")));
tal_free(msg);
continue;
}
/* If we get here, it's an interesting message. */
return msg;
}
}
static bool run_tx_interactive(struct state *state,
struct wally_psbt **orig_psbt,
enum tx_role our_role)
{
/* Opener always sends the first utxo info */
bool we_complete = false, they_complete = false;
u8 *msg;
struct wally_psbt *psbt = *orig_psbt;
while (!(we_complete && they_complete)) {
struct channel_id cid;
enum peer_wire t;
u64 serial_id;
/* Reset their_complete to false every round,
* they have to re-affirm every time */
they_complete = false;
msg = opening_negotiate_msg(tmpctx, state);
if (!msg)
return false;
t = fromwire_peektype(msg);
switch (t) {
case WIRE_TX_ADD_INPUT: {
const u8 *tx_bytes, *redeemscript;
u32 outnum, sequence;
size_t len;
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
struct bitcoin_txid txid;
struct amount_sat amt;
struct tlv_tx_add_input_tlvs *add_tlvs =
tlv_tx_add_input_tlvs_new(tmpctx);
if (!fromwire_tx_add_input(tmpctx, msg, &cid,
&serial_id,
cast_const2(u8 **,
&tx_bytes),
&outnum, &sequence,
cast_const2(u8 **,
&redeemscript),
add_tlvs))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Parsing tx_add_input %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
check_channel_id(state, &cid, &state->channel_id);
/*
* BOLT-544bda7144d91b3f51856189b8932610649f9e93 #2:
* The receiving node:
* - MUST fail the transaction collaboration if:
* - it receives more than 2^12 `tx_add_input`
* messages */
if (++state->tx_msg_count[TX_ADD_INPUT] > MAX_TX_MSG_RCVD)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Too many `tx_add_input`s"
" received");
/*
* BOLT-fe0351ca2cea3105c4f2eb18c571afca9d21c85b #2:
* - if is the `initiator`:
* - MUST send even `serial_id`s
* - MUST fail the transaction collaboration if:
* ...
* - it receives a `serial_id` from the peer
* with the incorrect parity
*/
if (serial_id % 2 == our_role)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Invalid serial_id rcvd. %"PRIu64,
serial_id);
/*
* BOLT-fe0351ca2cea3105c4f2eb18c571afca9d21c85b #2:
* - MUST fail the transaction collaboration if:
* ...
* - it recieves a duplicate `serial_id`
*/
if (psbt_find_serial_input(psbt, serial_id) != -1)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Duplicate serial_id rcvd."
" %"PRIu64, serial_id);
/* Convert tx_bytes to a tx! */
len = tal_bytelen(tx_bytes);
tx = pull_bitcoin_tx(state, &tx_bytes, &len);
if (!tx || len != 0)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Invalid tx sent.");
if (outnum >= tx->wtx->num_outputs)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Invalid tx outnum sent. %u", outnum);
/*
* BOLT-fe0351ca2cea3105c4f2eb18c571afca9d21c85b #2:
* - MUST fail the transaction collaboration if:
* ...
* - it receives an input that would create a
* malleable transaction id (e.g. pre-Segwit)
*/
if (!is_segwit_output(&tx->wtx->outputs[outnum],
redeemscript))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Invalid tx sent. Not SegWit %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx,
struct bitcoin_tx,
tx));
/*
* BOLT-fe0351ca2cea3105c4f2eb18c571afca9d21c85b #2:
* - MUST NOT re-transmit inputs it has already
* received from the peer
* ...
* - MUST fail the transaction collaboration if:
* ...
* - it receives a duplicate input to one it
* sent previously
*/
bitcoin_txid(tx, &txid);
if (psbt_has_input(psbt, &txid, outnum))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Unable to add input - "
"already present");
/*
* BOLT-fe0351ca2cea3105c4f2eb18c571afca9d21c85b #2:
* The receiving node:
* - MUST add all received inputs to the funding
* transaction
*/
struct wally_psbt_input *in =
psbt_append_input(psbt, &txid, outnum,
sequence, NULL,
NULL,
redeemscript);
if (!in)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Unable to add input");
tal_wally_start();
wally_psbt_input_set_utxo(in, tx->wtx);
tal_wally_end(psbt);
if (is_elements(chainparams)) {
struct amount_asset asset;
bitcoin_tx_output_get_amount_sat(tx, outnum,
&amt);
/* FIXME: persist asset tags */
asset = amount_sat_to_asset(&amt,
chainparams->fee_asset_tag);
/* FIXME: persist nonces */
psbt_elements_input_set_asset(psbt,
outnum,
&asset);
}
psbt_input_set_serial_id(psbt, in, serial_id);
/* FIXME: what's in the tlv? */
break;
}
case WIRE_TX_REMOVE_INPUT: {
int input_index;
if (!fromwire_tx_remove_input(msg, &cid, &serial_id))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Parsing tx_remove_input %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
check_channel_id(state, &cid, &state->channel_id);
/*
* BOLT-544bda7144d91b3f51856189b8932610649f9e93 #2:
* The receiving node:
* - MUST fail the transaction collaboration if:
* - it receives more than 2^12 `tx_rm_input`
* messages */
if (++state->tx_msg_count[TX_RM_INPUT] > MAX_TX_MSG_RCVD)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Too many `tx_rm_input`s"
" received");
/* BOLT-fe0351ca2cea3105c4f2eb18c571afca9d21c85b #2
* The sending node:
* - MUST NOT send a `tx_remove_input` for an
* input which is not theirs */
if (serial_id % 2 == our_role)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Invalid serial_id rcvd. %"PRIu64,
serial_id);
input_index = psbt_find_serial_input(psbt, serial_id);
if (input_index == -1)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"No input added with serial_id"
" %"PRIu64, serial_id);
psbt_rm_input(psbt, input_index);
break;
}
case WIRE_TX_ADD_OUTPUT: {
u64 value;
u8 *scriptpubkey;
struct wally_psbt_output *out;
struct amount_sat amt;
if (!fromwire_tx_add_output(tmpctx, msg, &cid,
&serial_id, &value,
&scriptpubkey))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Parsing tx_add_output %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
check_channel_id(state, &cid, &state->channel_id);
/*
* BOLT-544bda7144d91b3f51856189b8932610649f9e93 #2:
* The receiving node:
* - MUST fail the transaction collaboration if:
* - it receives more than 2^12 `tx_add_output`
* messages */
if (++state->tx_msg_count[TX_ADD_OUTPUT] > MAX_TX_MSG_RCVD)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Too many `tx_add_output`s"
" received");
/* BOLT-fe0351ca2cea3105c4f2eb18c571afca9d21c85b #2
* The receiving node:
* ...
* - MUST fail the transaction collaboration if:
* ...
* - it receives a `serial_id` from the peer with the
* incorrect parity */
if (serial_id % 2 == our_role)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Invalid serial_id rcvd. %"PRIu64,
serial_id);
if (psbt_find_serial_output(psbt, serial_id) != -1)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Duplicate serial_id rcvd."
" %"PRIu64, serial_id);
amt = amount_sat(value);
out = psbt_append_output(psbt, scriptpubkey, amt);
psbt_output_set_serial_id(psbt, out, serial_id);
break;
}
case WIRE_TX_REMOVE_OUTPUT: {
int output_index;
if (!fromwire_tx_remove_output(msg, &cid, &serial_id))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Parsing tx_remove_output %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
check_channel_id(state, &cid, &state->channel_id);
/*
* BOLT-544bda7144d91b3f51856189b8932610649f9e93 #2:
* The receiving node:
* - MUST fail the transaction collaboration if:
* - it receives more than 2^12 `tx_rm_output`
* messages */
if (++state->tx_msg_count[TX_RM_OUTPUT] > MAX_TX_MSG_RCVD)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Too many `tx_rm_output`s"
" received");
/* BOLT-fe0351ca2cea3105c4f2eb18c571afca9d21c85b #2
* The sending node:
* - MUST NOT send a `tx_remove_ouput` for an
* input which is not theirs */
if (serial_id % 2 == our_role)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Invalid serial_id rcvd."
" %"PRIu64, serial_id);
output_index = psbt_find_serial_output(psbt, serial_id);
if (output_index == -1)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"No output added with serial_id"
" %"PRIu64, serial_id);
psbt_rm_output(psbt, output_index);
break;
}
case WIRE_TX_COMPLETE:
if (!fromwire_tx_complete(msg, &cid))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Parsing tx_complete %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
check_channel_id(state, &cid, &state->channel_id);
they_complete = true;
break;
case WIRE_INIT:
case WIRE_ERROR:
case WIRE_OPEN_CHANNEL:
case WIRE_ACCEPT_CHANNEL:
case WIRE_FUNDING_CREATED:
case WIRE_FUNDING_SIGNED:
case WIRE_FUNDING_LOCKED:
case WIRE_SHUTDOWN:
case WIRE_CLOSING_SIGNED:
case WIRE_UPDATE_ADD_HTLC:
case WIRE_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC:
case WIRE_UPDATE_FAIL_HTLC:
case WIRE_UPDATE_FAIL_MALFORMED_HTLC:
case WIRE_COMMITMENT_SIGNED:
case WIRE_REVOKE_AND_ACK:
case WIRE_UPDATE_FEE:
case WIRE_CHANNEL_REESTABLISH:
case WIRE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES:
case WIRE_GOSSIP_TIMESTAMP_FILTER:
case WIRE_ONION_MESSAGE:
case WIRE_TX_SIGNATURES:
case WIRE_OPEN_CHANNEL2:
case WIRE_ACCEPT_CHANNEL2:
case WIRE_INIT_RBF:
case WIRE_BLACKLIST_PODLE:
case WIRE_CHANNEL_ANNOUNCEMENT:
case WIRE_CHANNEL_UPDATE:
case WIRE_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT:
case WIRE_QUERY_CHANNEL_RANGE:
case WIRE_REPLY_CHANNEL_RANGE:
case WIRE_QUERY_SHORT_CHANNEL_IDS:
case WIRE_REPLY_SHORT_CHANNEL_IDS_END:
case WIRE_PING:
case WIRE_PONG:
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Unexpected wire message %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
return false;
}
if (!(we_complete && they_complete))
we_complete = !send_next(state, &psbt);
}
/* Sort psbt! */
psbt_sort_by_serial_id(psbt);
/* Return the 'finished' psbt */
*orig_psbt = psbt;
return true;
}
static void accepter_start(struct state *state, const u8 *oc2_msg)
{
struct bitcoin_blkid chain_hash;
struct tlv_opening_tlvs *open_tlv;
u8 channel_flags;
char *err_reason;
const u8 *wscript;
struct channel_id cid;
struct bitcoin_tx *remote_commit, *local_commit;
struct bitcoin_signature remote_sig, local_sig;
struct wally_tx_output *direct_outputs[NUM_SIDES];
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *htlc_sigs;
u8 *msg;
struct penalty_base *pbase;
struct amount_msat our_msats;
struct amount_sat total;
enum dualopend_wire msg_type;
u32 feerate_min, feerate_max, feerate_best;
state->our_role = TX_ACCEPTER;
open_tlv = tlv_opening_tlvs_new(tmpctx);
if (!fromwire_open_channel2(oc2_msg, &chain_hash,
&state->channel_id,
&state->opening_podle_h2,
&feerate_max,
&feerate_min,
&feerate_best,
&state->opener_funding,
&state->remoteconf.dust_limit,
&state->remoteconf.max_htlc_value_in_flight,
&state->remoteconf.htlc_minimum,
&state->feerate_per_kw_commitment,
&state->remoteconf.to_self_delay,
&state->remoteconf.max_accepted_htlcs,
&state->tx_locktime,
&state->their_funding_pubkey,
&state->their_points.revocation,
&state->their_points.payment,
&state->their_points.delayed_payment,
&state->their_points.htlc,
&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
&channel_flags,
open_tlv))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Parsing open_channel2 %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, oc2_msg));
if (open_tlv->option_upfront_shutdown_script) {
state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE] = tal_steal(state,
open_tlv->option_upfront_shutdown_script->shutdown_scriptpubkey);
} else
state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE] = NULL;
/* BOLT #2:
*
* The receiving node MUST fail the channel if:
* - the `chain_hash` value is set to a hash of a chain
* that is unknown to the receiver.
*/
if (!bitcoin_blkid_eq(&chain_hash, &chainparams->genesis_blockhash)) {
negotiation_failed(state, "Unknown chain-hash %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx,
struct bitcoin_blkid,
&chain_hash));
return;
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* The receiving node MUST fail the channel if:
*...
* - `funding_satoshis` is greater than or equal to 2^24 and the receiver does not support
* `option_support_large_channel`. */
/* We choose to require *negotiation*, not just support! */
if (!feature_negotiated(state->our_features, state->their_features,
OPT_LARGE_CHANNELS)
&& amount_sat_greater(state->opener_funding, chainparams->max_funding)) {
negotiation_failed(state,
"opener's funding_satoshis %s too large",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
&state->opener_funding));
return;
}
/* We can figure out the channel id now */
derive_channel_id_v2(&cid,
&state->our_points.revocation,
&state->their_points.revocation);
/* FIXME: pass the podle back also */
msg = towire_dualopend_got_offer(NULL,
&cid,
state->opener_funding,
state->remoteconf.dust_limit,
state->remoteconf.max_htlc_value_in_flight,
state->remoteconf.htlc_minimum,
feerate_max,
feerate_min,
feerate_best,
state->feerate_per_kw_commitment,
state->remoteconf.to_self_delay,
state->remoteconf.max_accepted_htlcs,
channel_flags,
state->tx_locktime,
state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE]);
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(msg));
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, REQ_FD);
if ((msg_type = fromwire_peektype(msg)) == WIRE_DUALOPEND_FAIL) {
if (!fromwire_dualopend_fail(msg, msg, &err_reason))
master_badmsg(msg_type, msg);
open_error(state, "%s", err_reason);
return;
}
if (!fromwire_dualopend_got_offer_reply(state, msg,
&state->accepter_funding,
&state->feerate_per_kw_funding,
&state->psbt,
&state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL]))
master_badmsg(WIRE_DUALOPEND_GOT_OFFER_REPLY, msg);
/* Set the channel id now */
state->channel_id = cid;
if (!state->psbt)
state->psbt = create_psbt(state, 0, 0, state->tx_locktime);
/* Check that total funding doesn't overflow */
if (!amount_sat_add(&total, state->opener_funding,
state->accepter_funding))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Amount overflow. Local sats %s. "
"Remote sats %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
&state->accepter_funding),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
&state->opener_funding));
/* Check that total funding doesn't exceed allowed channel capacity */
/* BOLT #2:
*
* The receiving node MUST fail the channel if:
*...
* - `funding_satoshis` is greater than or equal to 2^24 and the receiver does not support
* `option_support_large_channel`. */
/* We choose to require *negotiation*, not just support! */
if (!feature_negotiated(state->our_features, state->their_features,
OPT_LARGE_CHANNELS)
&& amount_sat_greater(total, chainparams->max_funding)) {
negotiation_failed(state, "total funding_satoshis %s too large",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
&total));
return;
}
/* Add all of our inputs/outputs to the changeset */
init_changeset(state, state->psbt);
/* Now that we know the total of the channel, we can set the reserve */
set_reserve(state, total);
if (!check_config_bounds(tmpctx, total,
state->feerate_per_kw_commitment,
state->max_to_self_delay,
state->min_effective_htlc_capacity,
&state->remoteconf,
&state->localconf,
false,
true, /* v2 means we use anchor outputs */
&err_reason)) {
negotiation_failed(state, "%s", err_reason);
return;
}
/* If we have an upfront shutdown script, send it to our peer */
struct tlv_accept_tlvs *a_tlv = tlv_accept_tlvs_new(state);
if (!state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL])
state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL]
= no_upfront_shutdown_script(state,
state->our_features,
state->their_features);
if (tal_bytelen(state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL])) {
a_tlv->option_upfront_shutdown_script
= tal(a_tlv, struct tlv_accept_tlvs_option_upfront_shutdown_script);
a_tlv->option_upfront_shutdown_script->shutdown_scriptpubkey
= tal_dup_arr(a_tlv, u8,
state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL],
tal_count(state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL]),
0);
}
msg = towire_accept_channel2(tmpctx, &state->channel_id,
state->accepter_funding,
state->feerate_per_kw_funding,
state->localconf.dust_limit,
state->localconf.max_htlc_value_in_flight,
state->localconf.htlc_minimum,
state->minimum_depth,
state->localconf.to_self_delay,
state->localconf.max_accepted_htlcs,
&state->our_funding_pubkey,
&state->our_points.revocation,
&state->our_points.payment,
&state->our_points.delayed_payment,
&state->our_points.htlc,
&state->first_per_commitment_point[LOCAL],
a_tlv);
sync_crypto_write(state->pps, msg);
peer_billboard(false, "channel open: accept sent, waiting for reply");
/* This is unused in this flow. We re-use
* the wire method between accepter + opener, so we set it
* to an invalid number, 1 (initiator sets; valid is even) */
state->funding_serial = 1;
/* Figure out what the funding transaction looks like! */
if (!run_tx_interactive(state, &state->psbt, TX_ACCEPTER))
return;
/* Find the funding transaction txid */
psbt_txid(NULL, state->psbt, &state->funding_txid, NULL);
wscript = bitcoin_redeem_2of2(state,
&state->our_funding_pubkey,
&state->their_funding_pubkey);
/* Figure out the txout */
if (!find_txout(state->psbt,
scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tmpctx, wscript),
&state->funding_txout))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Expected output %s not found on funding tx %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tmpctx, wscript)),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct wally_psbt,
state->psbt));
/* Check tx funds are sane */
err_reason = check_balances(tmpctx, state,
state->psbt,
state->feerate_per_kw_funding);
if (err_reason)
negotiation_failed(state, "Insufficiently funded funding "
"tx, %s. %s",
err_reason,
type_to_string(tmpctx,
struct wally_psbt,
state->psbt));
/* Wait for the peer to send us our commitment tx signature */
msg = opening_negotiate_msg(tmpctx, state);
if (!msg)
return;
remote_sig.sighash_type = SIGHASH_ALL;
if (!fromwire_commitment_signed(tmpctx, msg, &cid,
&remote_sig.s,
&htlc_sigs))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Parsing commitment signed %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
check_channel_id(state, &cid, &state->channel_id);
if (htlc_sigs != NULL)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Must not send HTLCs with first"
" commitment. %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
if (!amount_sat_to_msat(&our_msats, state->accepter_funding))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Overflow converting accepter_funding "
"to msats");
state->channel = new_initial_channel(state,
&state->channel_id,
&state->funding_txid,
state->funding_txout,
state->minimum_depth,
total,
our_msats,
take(new_fee_states(
NULL, REMOTE,
&state->feerate_per_kw_commitment)),
&state->localconf,
&state->remoteconf,
&state->our_points,
&state->their_points,
&state->our_funding_pubkey,
&state->their_funding_pubkey,
true, true,
REMOTE);
local_commit = initial_channel_tx(state, &wscript, state->channel,
&state->first_per_commitment_point[LOCAL],
LOCAL, NULL, &err_reason);
/* This shouldn't happen either, AFAICT. */
if (!local_commit) {
negotiation_failed(state,
"Could not meet our fees and reserve: %s",
err_reason);
return;
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* The recipient:
* - if `signature` is incorrect:
* - MUST fail the channel.
*/
if (!check_tx_sig(local_commit, 0, NULL, wscript,
&state->their_funding_pubkey, &remote_sig)) {
/* BOLT #1:
*
* ### The `error` Message
*...
* - when failure was caused by an invalid signature check:
* - SHOULD include the raw, hex-encoded transaction in reply
* to a `funding_created`, `funding_signed`,
* `closing_signed`, or `commitment_signed` message.
*/
/*~ This verbosity is not only useful for our own testing, but
* a courtesy to other implementaters whose brains may be so
* twisted by coding in Go, Scala and Rust that they can no
* longer read C code. */
peer_failed(state->pps,
&state->channel_id,
"Bad signature %s on tx %s using key %s"
" (funding txid %s, psbt %s)",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_signature,
&remote_sig),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx,
local_commit),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&state->their_funding_pubkey),
/* This is the first place we'd discover
* the funding tx doesn't match up */
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid,
&state->funding_txid),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct wally_psbt,
state->psbt));
}
/* Create commitment tx signatures for remote */
remote_commit = initial_channel_tx(state, &wscript, state->channel,
&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
REMOTE, direct_outputs, &err_reason);
if (!remote_commit) {
negotiation_failed(state, "Could not meet their"
" fees and reserve: %s",
err_reason);
return;
}
/* Make HSM sign it */
msg = towire_hsmd_sign_remote_commitment_tx(NULL,
remote_commit,
&state->channel->funding_pubkey[REMOTE],
&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
true);
wire_sync_write(HSM_FD, take(msg));
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, HSM_FD);
if (!fromwire_hsmd_sign_tx_reply(msg, &local_sig))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"Bad sign_tx_reply %s", tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
assert(local_sig.sighash_type == SIGHASH_ALL);
if (direct_outputs[LOCAL])
pbase = penalty_base_new(tmpctx, 0, remote_commit,
direct_outputs[LOCAL]);
else
pbase = NULL;
/* Send the commitment_signed controller; will save to db,
* then wait to get our sigs back */
msg = towire_dualopend_commit_rcvd(state,
&state->remoteconf,
local_commit,
pbase,
&remote_sig,
state->psbt,
&state->channel_id,
&state->their_points.revocation,
&state->their_points.payment,
&state->their_points.htlc,
&state->their_points.delayed_payment,
&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
&state->their_funding_pubkey,
&state->funding_txid,
state->funding_txout,
total,
state->accepter_funding,
channel_flags,
state->feerate_per_kw_commitment,
state->localconf.channel_reserve,
state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL],
state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE]);
/* Normally we would end dualopend here (and in fact this
* is where openingd ends). However, now we wait for both our peer
* to send us the tx sigs *and* for master to send us the tx sigs. */
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(msg));
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, REQ_FD);
if (fromwire_peektype(msg) != WIRE_DUALOPEND_SEND_TX_SIGS)
master_badmsg(WIRE_DUALOPEND_SEND_TX_SIGS, msg);
/* Send our commitment sigs over now */
sync_crypto_write(state->pps,
take(towire_commitment_signed(NULL,
&state->channel_id,
&local_sig.s, NULL)));
/* Finally, send our funding tx sigs */
handle_send_tx_sigs(state, msg);
}
static void opener_start(struct state *state, u8 *msg)
{
struct tlv_opening_tlvs *open_tlv;
struct tlv_accept_tlvs *a_tlv;
struct channel_id cid;
char *err_reason;
struct amount_sat total;
struct amount_msat our_msats;
struct wally_psbt_output *funding_out;
struct sha256 podle;
struct wally_tx_output *direct_outputs[NUM_SIDES];
struct penalty_base *pbase;
u8 channel_flags;
const u8 *wscript;
struct bitcoin_tx *remote_commit, *local_commit;
struct bitcoin_signature remote_sig, local_sig;
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *htlc_sigs;
u32 feerate_min, feerate_max, feerate_best;
if (!fromwire_dualopend_opener_init(state, msg,
&state->psbt,
&state->opener_funding,
&state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL],
&state->feerate_per_kw_commitment,
&state->feerate_per_kw_funding,
&channel_flags))
master_badmsg(WIRE_DUALOPEND_OPENER_INIT, msg);
state->our_role = TX_INITIATOR;
state->tx_locktime = state->psbt->tx->locktime;
open_tlv = tlv_opening_tlvs_new(tmpctx);
/* Set the channel_id to a temporary id, we'll update
* this as soon as we hear back from accept, but if they
* send us an error in the meantime, we need to be able to
* understand it */
temporary_channel_id(&state->channel_id);
feerate_min = state->min_feerate;
feerate_max = state->max_feerate;
if (state->feerate_per_kw_funding > state->max_feerate) {
status_info("Selected funding feerate %d is greater than"
" current suggested max %d, adjusing max upwards"
" to match.",
state->feerate_per_kw_funding,
state->max_feerate);
feerate_max = state->feerate_per_kw_funding;
}
if (state->feerate_per_kw_funding < state->min_feerate) {
status_info("Selected funding feerate %d is less than"
" current suggested min %d, adjusing min downwards"
" to match.",
state->feerate_per_kw_funding,
state->min_feerate);
feerate_min = state->feerate_per_kw_funding;
}
feerate_best = state->feerate_per_kw_funding;
if (!state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL])
state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL]
= no_upfront_shutdown_script(state,
state->our_features,
state->their_features);
if (tal_bytelen(state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL])) {
open_tlv->option_upfront_shutdown_script =
tal(open_tlv,
struct tlv_opening_tlvs_option_upfront_shutdown_script);
open_tlv->option_upfront_shutdown_script->shutdown_scriptpubkey =
state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL];
}
/* FIXME: actually set the podle */
memset(&podle, 0, sizeof(podle));
msg = towire_open_channel2(NULL,
&chainparams->genesis_blockhash,
&state->channel_id,
&podle, /* FIXME: podle H2! */
feerate_max,
feerate_min,
feerate_best,
state->opener_funding,
state->localconf.dust_limit,
state->localconf.max_htlc_value_in_flight,
state->localconf.htlc_minimum,
state->feerate_per_kw_commitment,
state->localconf.to_self_delay,
state->localconf.max_accepted_htlcs,
state->tx_locktime,
&state->our_funding_pubkey,
&state->our_points.revocation,
&state->our_points.payment,
&state->our_points.delayed_payment,
&state->our_points.htlc,
&state->first_per_commitment_point[LOCAL],
channel_flags,
open_tlv);
sync_crypto_write(state->pps, take(msg));
/* This is usually a very transient state... */
peer_billboard(false, "channel open: offered, waiting for"
" accept_channel2");
/* ... since their reply should be immediate. */
msg = opening_negotiate_msg(tmpctx, state);
if (!msg)
return;
a_tlv = notleak(tlv_accept_tlvs_new(state));
if (!fromwire_accept_channel2(msg, &cid,
&state->accepter_funding,
&state->feerate_per_kw_funding,
&state->remoteconf.dust_limit,
&state->remoteconf.max_htlc_value_in_flight,
&state->remoteconf.htlc_minimum,
&state->minimum_depth,
&state->remoteconf.to_self_delay,
&state->remoteconf.max_accepted_htlcs,
&state->their_funding_pubkey,
&state->their_points.revocation,
&state->their_points.payment,
&state->their_points.delayed_payment,
&state->their_points.htlc,
&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
a_tlv))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Parsing accept_channel2 %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
if (a_tlv->option_upfront_shutdown_script) {
state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE]
= tal_steal(state,
a_tlv->option_upfront_shutdown_script
->shutdown_scriptpubkey);
} else
state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE] = NULL;
/* Now we can set the 'real channel id' */
derive_channel_id_v2(&state->channel_id,
&state->our_points.revocation,
&state->their_points.revocation);
if (!channel_id_eq(&cid, &state->channel_id))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"accept_channel2 ids don't match: "
"expected %s, got %s",
type_to_string(msg, struct channel_id,
&state->channel_id),
type_to_string(msg, struct channel_id, &cid));
/* BOLT-5fcbda56901af9e3b1d057cc41d0c5cfa60a2b94 #2:
* The receiving node:
* - if the `feerate_funding` is less than the `feerate_funding_min`
* or above the `feerate_funding_max`
* - MUST error.
*/
if (feerate_min > state->feerate_per_kw_funding
|| feerate_max < state->feerate_per_kw_funding)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Invalid feerate %d chosen. Valid min %d,"
" valid max %d", state->feerate_per_kw_funding,
feerate_min, feerate_max);
/* Check that total funding doesn't overflow */
if (!amount_sat_add(&total, state->opener_funding,
state->accepter_funding))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Amount overflow. Local sats %s. "
"Remote sats %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
&state->opener_funding),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
&state->accepter_funding));
/* Check that total funding doesn't exceed allowed channel capacity */
/* BOLT #2:
*
* The receiving node MUST fail the channel if:
*...
* - `funding_satoshis` is greater than or equal to 2^24 and
* the receiver does not support `option_support_large_channel`. */
/* We choose to require *negotiation*, not just support! */
if (!feature_negotiated(state->our_features, state->their_features,
OPT_LARGE_CHANNELS)
&& amount_sat_greater(total, chainparams->max_funding)) {
negotiation_failed(state,
"total funding_satoshis %s too large",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
&total));
return;
}
/* BOLT-78de9a79b491ae9fb84b1fdb4546bacf642dce87 #2:
* The sending node:
* - if is the `opener`:
* - MUST send at least one `tx_add_output`, the channel
* funding output.
*/
/* If fails before returning from `send_next`, this will
* be marked as a memleak */
wscript = notleak(bitcoin_redeem_2of2(state,
&state->our_funding_pubkey,
&state->their_funding_pubkey));
funding_out = psbt_append_output(state->psbt,
scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tmpctx,
wscript),
total);
/* Add a serial_id for this output */
state->funding_serial = psbt_new_input_serial(state->psbt,
TX_INITIATOR);
psbt_output_set_serial_id(state->psbt,
funding_out,
state->funding_serial);
/* Add all of our inputs/outputs to the changeset */
init_changeset(state, state->psbt);
/* Now that we know the total of the channel, we can
* set the reserve */
set_reserve(state, total);
if (!check_config_bounds(tmpctx, total,
state->feerate_per_kw_commitment,
state->max_to_self_delay,
state->min_effective_htlc_capacity,
&state->remoteconf,
&state->localconf,
true, true, /* v2 means we use anchor outputs */
&err_reason)) {
negotiation_failed(state, "%s", err_reason);
return;
}
/* Send our first message, we're opener we initiate here */
if (!send_next(state, &state->psbt))
open_error(state, "Peer error, no updates to send");
/* Figure out what the funding transaction looks like! */
if (!run_tx_interactive(state, &state->psbt, TX_INITIATOR))
return;
psbt_txid(NULL, state->psbt, &state->funding_txid, NULL);
/* Figure out the txout */
if (!find_txout(state->psbt, scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tmpctx, wscript),
&state->funding_txout))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Expected output %s not found on funding tx %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tmpctx, wscript)),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct wally_psbt,
state->psbt));
/* Check tx funds are sane */
err_reason = check_balances(tmpctx, state, state->psbt,
state->feerate_per_kw_funding);
if (err_reason)
negotiation_failed(state, "Insufficiently funded funding "
"tx, %s. %s",
err_reason,
type_to_string(tmpctx,
struct wally_psbt,
state->psbt));
if (!amount_sat_to_msat(&our_msats, state->opener_funding))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Rounding error, can't convert opener_funding %s"
" to msats",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
&state->opener_funding));
/* Ok, we're mostly good now? Let's do this */
state->channel = new_initial_channel(state,
&cid,
&state->funding_txid,
state->funding_txout,
state->minimum_depth,
total,
our_msats,
take(new_fee_states(NULL, LOCAL,
&state->feerate_per_kw_commitment)),
&state->localconf,
&state->remoteconf,
&state->our_points,
&state->their_points,
&state->our_funding_pubkey,
&state->their_funding_pubkey,
true, true,
/* Opener is local */
LOCAL);
remote_commit = initial_channel_tx(state, &wscript,
state->channel,
&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
REMOTE, direct_outputs, &err_reason);
if (!remote_commit) {
negotiation_failed(state,
"Could not meet their fees and reserve: %s",
err_reason);
return;
}
/* We ask the HSM to sign their commitment transaction for us: it knows
* our funding key, it just needs the remote funding key to create the
* witness script. It also needs the amount of the funding output,
* as segwit signatures commit to that as well, even though it doesn't
* explicitly appear in the transaction itself. */
msg = towire_hsmd_sign_remote_commitment_tx(NULL,
remote_commit,
&state->channel->funding_pubkey[REMOTE],
&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
true);
wire_sync_write(HSM_FD, take(msg));
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, HSM_FD);
if (!fromwire_hsmd_sign_tx_reply(msg, &local_sig))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO, "Bad sign_tx_reply %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
/* You can tell this has been a problem before, since there's a debug
* message here: */
status_debug("signature %s on tx %s using key %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_signature, &local_sig),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, remote_commit),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&state->our_funding_pubkey));
assert(local_sig.sighash_type == SIGHASH_ALL);
msg = towire_commitment_signed(tmpctx, &state->channel_id,
&local_sig.s,
NULL);
sync_crypto_write(state->pps, msg);
peer_billboard(false, "channel open: commitment sent, waiting for reply");
/* Wait for the peer to send us our commitment tx signature */
msg = opening_negotiate_msg(tmpctx, state);
if (!msg)
return;
remote_sig.sighash_type = SIGHASH_ALL;
if (!fromwire_commitment_signed(tmpctx, msg, &cid,
&remote_sig.s,
&htlc_sigs))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Parsing commitment signed %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
if (htlc_sigs != NULL)
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Must not send HTLCs with first"
" commitment. %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
local_commit = initial_channel_tx(state, &wscript, state->channel,
&state->first_per_commitment_point[LOCAL],
LOCAL, NULL, &err_reason);
/* This shouldn't happen either, AFAICT. */
if (!local_commit) {
negotiation_failed(state,
"Could not meet our fees and reserve: %s",
err_reason);
return;
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* The recipient:
* - if `signature` is incorrect:
* - MUST fail the channel.
*/
if (!check_tx_sig(local_commit, 0, NULL, wscript, &state->their_funding_pubkey,
&remote_sig)) {
/* BOLT #1:
*
* ### The `error` Message
*...
* - when failure was caused by an invalid signature check:
* - SHOULD include the raw, hex-encoded transaction in reply
* to a `funding_created`, `funding_signed`,
* `closing_signed`, or `commitment_signed` message.
*/
/*~ This verbosity is not only useful for our own testing, but
* a courtesy to other implementaters whose brains may be so
* twisted by coding in Go, Scala and Rust that they can no
* longer read C code. */
peer_failed(state->pps,
&state->channel_id,
"Bad signature %s on tx %s using key %s "
"(funding txid %s, psbt %s)",
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_signature,
&remote_sig),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx,
local_commit),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
&state->their_funding_pubkey),
/* This is the first place we'd discover the
* funding tx doesn't match up */
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid,
&state->funding_txid),
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct wally_psbt,
state->psbt));
}
if (direct_outputs[LOCAL])
pbase = penalty_base_new(state, 0, remote_commit,
direct_outputs[LOCAL]);
else
pbase = NULL;
peer_billboard(false, "channel open: commitment received, "
"sending to lightningd to save");
msg = towire_dualopend_commit_rcvd(NULL,
&state->remoteconf,
local_commit,
pbase,
&remote_sig,
state->psbt,
&state->channel_id,
&state->their_points.revocation,
&state->their_points.payment,
&state->their_points.htlc,
&state->their_points.delayed_payment,
&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
&state->their_funding_pubkey,
&state->funding_txid,
state->funding_txout,
total,
state->opener_funding,
channel_flags,
state->feerate_per_kw_commitment,
state->localconf.channel_reserve,
state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL],
state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE]);
/* Normally we would end dualopend here (and in fact this
* is where openingd ends). However, now we wait for both our peer
* to send us the tx sigs *and* for master to send us the tx sigs. */
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(msg));
}
static u8 *handle_funding_locked(struct state *state, u8 *msg)
{
struct channel_id cid;
struct pubkey remote_per_commit;
if (!fromwire_funding_locked(msg, &cid, &remote_per_commit))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Bad funding_locked %s", tal_hex(msg, msg));
if (!channel_id_eq(&cid, &state->channel_id))
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"funding_locked ids don't match: "
"expected %s, got %s",
type_to_string(msg, struct channel_id,
&state->channel_id),
type_to_string(msg, struct channel_id, &cid));
/* If we haven't gotten their tx_sigs yet, this is a protocol error */
if (!state->remote_funding_sigs_rcvd) {
peer_failed(state->pps,
&state->channel_id,
"funding_locked sent before tx_signatures %s",
tal_hex(msg, msg));
}
state->funding_locked[REMOTE] = true;
billboard_update(state);
/* We save when the peer locks, so we do the right
* thing on reconnects */
msg = towire_dualopend_peer_locked(NULL, &remote_per_commit);
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(msg));
if (state->funding_locked[LOCAL])
return towire_dualopend_channel_locked(state, state->pps);
return NULL;
}
static void hsm_per_commitment_point(u64 index, struct pubkey *point)
{
struct secret *s;
const u8 *msg;
msg = towire_hsmd_get_per_commitment_point(NULL, index);
wire_sync_write(HSM_FD, take(msg));
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, HSM_FD);
if (!fromwire_hsmd_get_per_commitment_point_reply(tmpctx, msg,
point, &s))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"Bad per_commitment_point reply %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
}
static void send_funding_locked(struct state *state)
{
u8 *msg;
struct pubkey next_local_per_commit;
/* Figure out the next local commit */
hsm_per_commitment_point(1, &next_local_per_commit);
msg = towire_funding_locked(NULL,
&state->channel_id,
&next_local_per_commit);
sync_crypto_write(state->pps, take(msg));
state->funding_locked[LOCAL] = true;
billboard_update(state);
}
static u8 *handle_funding_depth(struct state *state, u8 *msg)
{
u32 depth;
if (!fromwire_dualopend_depth_reached(msg, &depth))
master_badmsg(WIRE_DUALOPEND_DEPTH_REACHED, msg);
/* Too late, shutting down already */
if (state->shutdown_sent[LOCAL])
return NULL;
/* We check this before we arrive here, but for sanity */
assert(state->minimum_depth <= depth);
send_funding_locked(state);
if (state->funding_locked[REMOTE])
return towire_dualopend_channel_locked(state,
state->pps);
return NULL;
}
/*~ If we see the gossip_fd readable, we read a whole message. Sure, we might
* block, but we trust gossipd. */
static void handle_gossip_in(struct state *state)
{
u8 *msg = wire_sync_read(NULL, state->pps->gossip_fd);
if (!msg)
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_GOSSIP_IO,
"Reading gossip: %s", strerror(errno));
handle_gossip_msg(state->pps, take(msg));
}
static void try_read_gossip_store(struct state *state)
{
u8 *msg = gossip_store_next(tmpctx, state->pps);
if (msg)
sync_crypto_write(state->pps, take(msg));
}
/* Try to handle a custommsg Returns true if it was a custom message and has
* been handled, false if the message was not handled.
*/
static bool dualopend_handle_custommsg(const u8 *msg)
{
#if DEVELOPER
enum peer_wire type = fromwire_peektype(msg);
if (type % 2 == 1 && !peer_wire_is_defined(type)) {
/* The message is not part of the messages we know how to
* handle. Assuming this is a custommsg, we just forward it to the
* master. */
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(towire_custommsg_in(NULL, msg)));
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
#else
return false;
#endif
}
/* BOLT #2:
*
* A receiving node:
* - if `option_static_remotekey` applies to the commitment transaction:
* - if `next_revocation_number` is greater than expected above, AND
* `your_last_per_commitment_secret` is correct for that
* `next_revocation_number` minus 1:
*...
* - otherwise, if it supports `option_data_loss_protect`:
* - if `next_revocation_number` is greater than expected above,
* AND `your_last_per_commitment_secret` is correct for that
* `next_revocation_number` minus 1:
*/
static void
check_future_dataloss_fields(struct state *state,
u64 next_revocation_number,
const struct secret *last_local_per_commit_secret)
{
const u8 *msg;
bool correct;
/* We're always at zero in dualopend */
assert(next_revocation_number > 0);
msg = towire_hsmd_check_future_secret(NULL,
next_revocation_number - 1,
last_local_per_commit_secret);
wire_sync_write(HSM_FD, take(msg));
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, HSM_FD);
if (!fromwire_hsmd_check_future_secret_reply(msg, &correct))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"Bad hsm_check_future_secret_reply: %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
if (!correct)
peer_failed(state->pps,
&state->channel_id,
"bad future last_local_per_commit_secret: %"PRIu64
" vs %d",
next_revocation_number, 0);
/* Oh shit, they really are from the future! */
peer_billboard(true, "They have future commitment number %"PRIu64
" vs our %d. We must wait for them to close!",
next_revocation_number, 0);
/* BOLT #2:
* - MUST NOT broadcast its commitment transaction.
* - SHOULD fail the channel.
*/
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD,
take(towire_dualopend_fail_fallen_behind(NULL)));
/* We have to send them an error to trigger dropping to chain. */
peer_failed(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
"Awaiting unilateral close");
}
static void do_reconnect_dance(struct state *state)
{
u8 *msg;
struct channel_id cid;
/* Note: BOLT #2 uses these names! */
u64 next_commitment_number, next_revocation_number;
struct secret last_local_per_commit_secret,
last_remote_per_commit_secret;
struct pubkey remote_current_per_commit_point;
/* BOLT #2:
* - if `next_revocation_number` equals 0:
* - MUST set `your_last_per_commitment_secret` to all zeroes
*/
/* We always have no revocations in dualopend */
memset(&last_remote_per_commit_secret, 0,
sizeof(last_remote_per_commit_secret));
/* We always send reconnect/reestablish */
msg = towire_channel_reestablish
(NULL, &state->channel_id, 1, 0,
&last_remote_per_commit_secret,
&state->first_per_commitment_point[LOCAL]);
sync_crypto_write(state->pps, take(msg));
peer_billboard(false, "Sent reestablish, waiting for theirs");
bool soft_error = state->funding_locked[REMOTE]
|| state->funding_locked[LOCAL];
/* Read until they say something interesting (don't forward
* gossip *to* them yet: we might try sending channel_update
* before we've reestablished channel). */
do {
clean_tmpctx();
msg = sync_crypto_read(tmpctx, state->pps);
} while (dualopend_handle_custommsg(msg)
|| handle_peer_gossip_or_error(state->pps,
&state->channel_id,
soft_error, msg));
if (!fromwire_channel_reestablish
(msg, &cid,
&next_commitment_number,
&next_revocation_number,
&last_local_per_commit_secret,
&remote_current_per_commit_point))
peer_failed(state->pps,
&state->channel_id,
"Bad reestablish msg: %s %s",
peer_wire_name(fromwire_peektype(msg)),
tal_hex(msg, msg));
check_channel_id(state, &cid, &state->channel_id);
status_debug("Got dualopend reestablish commit=%"PRIu64
" revoke=%"PRIu64,
next_commitment_number,
next_revocation_number);
/* BOLT #2:
* - if it has not sent `revoke_and_ack`, AND
* `next_revocation_number` is not equal to 0:
* - SHOULD fail the channel.
*/
/* It's possible that we've opened an outdated copy of the
* database, and the peer is very much ahead of us.
*/
if (next_revocation_number != 0) {
/* Remote claims it's ahead of us: can it prove it?
* Does not return. */
check_future_dataloss_fields(state,
next_revocation_number,
&last_local_per_commit_secret);
}
if (next_commitment_number != 1)
peer_failed(state->pps,
&state->channel_id,
"bad reestablish commitment_number: %"PRIu64
" vs %d",
next_commitment_number, 1);
/* It's possible we sent our sigs, but they didn't get them.
* Resend our signatures, just in case */
if (psbt_side_finalized(state->psbt, state->our_role)
&& !state->funding_locked[REMOTE]) {
msg = psbt_to_tx_sigs_msg(NULL, state, state->psbt);
sync_crypto_write(state->pps, take(msg));
}
if (state->funding_locked[LOCAL]) {
status_debug("Retransmitting funding_locked for channel %s",
type_to_string(tmpctx,
struct channel_id,
&state->channel_id));
send_funding_locked(state);
}
peer_billboard(true, "Reconnected, and reestablished.");
}
/*~ Is this message of type `error` with the special zero-id
* "fail-everything"? If lightningd asked us to send such a thing, we're
* done. */
static void fail_if_all_error(const u8 *inner)
{
struct channel_id channel_id;
u8 *data;
if (!fromwire_error(tmpctx, inner, &channel_id, &data)
|| !channel_id_is_all(&channel_id)) {
return;
}
status_info("Master said send err: %s",
sanitize_error(tmpctx, inner, NULL));
exit(0);
}
/* Standard lightningd-fd-is-ready-to-read demux code. Again, we could hang
* here, but if we can't trust our parent, who can we trust? */
static u8 *handle_master_in(struct state *state)
{
u8 *msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, REQ_FD);
enum dualopend_wire t = fromwire_peektype(msg);
switch (t) {
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_DEV_MEMLEAK:
#if DEVELOPER
handle_dev_memleak(state, msg);
#endif
return NULL;
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_OPENER_INIT:
opener_start(state, msg);
return NULL;
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_SEND_TX_SIGS:
handle_send_tx_sigs(state, msg);
return NULL;
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_DEPTH_REACHED:
return handle_funding_depth(state, msg);
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_SEND_SHUTDOWN:
handle_our_shutdown(state, msg);
return NULL;
/* Handled inline */
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_INIT:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_REINIT:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_DEV_MEMLEAK_REPLY:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_FAIL:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_PSBT_UPDATED:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_GOT_OFFER_REPLY:
/* Messages we send */
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_GOT_OFFER:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_PSBT_CHANGED:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_COMMIT_RCVD:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_FUNDING_SIGS:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_TX_SIGS_SENT:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_PEER_LOCKED:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_CHANNEL_LOCKED:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_GOT_SHUTDOWN:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_FAIL_FALLEN_BEHIND:
case WIRE_DUALOPEND_FAILED:
break;
}
/* Now handle common messages. */
switch ((enum common_wire)t) {
#if DEVELOPER
case WIRE_CUSTOMMSG_OUT:
dualopend_send_custommsg(state, msg);
#else
return NULL;
case WIRE_CUSTOMMSG_OUT:
#endif
/* We send these. */
case WIRE_CUSTOMMSG_IN:
break;
}
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
"Unknown msg %s", tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
}
/*~ Standard "peer sent a message, handle it" demuxer. Though it really only
* handles a few messages, we use the standard form as principle of least
* surprise. */
static u8 *handle_peer_in(struct state *state)
{
u8 *msg = sync_crypto_read(tmpctx, state->pps);
enum peer_wire t = fromwire_peektype(msg);
struct channel_id channel_id;
if (t == WIRE_OPEN_CHANNEL2) {
if (state->channel) {
status_broken("Unexpected message %s",
peer_wire_name(t));
peer_failed_connection_lost();
}
accepter_start(state, msg);
return NULL;
} else if (t == WIRE_TX_SIGNATURES) {
handle_tx_sigs(state, msg);
return NULL;
} else if (t == WIRE_FUNDING_LOCKED) {
return handle_funding_locked(state, msg);
} else if (t == WIRE_SHUTDOWN) {
handle_peer_shutdown(state, msg);
return NULL;
}
#if DEVELOPER
/* Handle custommsgs */
enum peer_wire type = fromwire_peektype(msg);
if (type % 2 == 1 && !peer_wire_is_defined(type)) {
/* The message is not part of the messages we know how to
* handle. Assuming this is a custommsg, we just
* forward it to master. */
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(towire_custommsg_in(NULL, msg)));
return NULL;
}
#endif
/* Handles standard cases, and legal unknown ones. */
if (handle_peer_gossip_or_error(state->pps,
&state->channel_id, false, msg))
return NULL;
sync_crypto_write(state->pps,
take(towire_errorfmt(NULL,
extract_channel_id(msg,
&channel_id) ?
&channel_id : NULL,
"Unexpected message %s: %s",
peer_wire_name(t),
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg))));
/* FIXME: We don't actually want master to try to send an
* error, since peer is transient. This is a hack.
*/
status_broken("Unexpected message %s", peer_wire_name(t));
peer_failed_connection_lost();
}
static bool shutdown_complete(const struct state *state)
{
return state->shutdown_sent[LOCAL]
&& state->shutdown_sent[REMOTE];
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
common_setup(argv[0]);
struct pollfd pollfd[3];
struct state *state = tal(NULL, struct state);
struct secret *none;
struct fee_states *fee_states;
enum side opener;
u8 *msg, *inner;
struct amount_sat total_funding;
struct amount_msat our_msat;
subdaemon_setup(argc, argv);
/*~ This makes status_failed, status_debug etc work synchronously by
* writing to REQ_FD */
status_setup_sync(REQ_FD);
state->psbt = NULL;
/*~ The very first thing we read from lightningd is our init msg */
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, REQ_FD);
if (fromwire_dualopend_init(state, msg,
&chainparams,
&state->our_features,
&state->their_features,
&state->localconf,
&state->max_to_self_delay,
&state->min_effective_htlc_capacity,
&state->pps,
&state->our_points,
&state->our_funding_pubkey,
&state->minimum_depth,
&state->min_feerate,
&state->max_feerate,
&inner)) {
/*~ Initially we're not associated with a channel, but
* handle_peer_gossip_or_error compares this. */
memset(&state->channel_id, 0, sizeof(state->channel_id));
state->channel = NULL;
state->remote_funding_sigs_rcvd = false;
/*~ We set these to NULL, meaning no requirements on shutdown */
state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL]
= state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE]
= NULL;
/*~ We're not locked or shutting down quite yet */
state->funding_locked[LOCAL]
= state->funding_locked[REMOTE]
= false;
state->shutdown_sent[LOCAL]
= state->shutdown_sent[REMOTE]
= false;
} else if (fromwire_dualopend_reinit(state, msg,
&chainparams,
&state->our_features,
&state->their_features,
&state->localconf,
&state->remoteconf,
&state->channel_id,
&state->max_to_self_delay,
&state->min_effective_htlc_capacity,
&state->pps,
&state->our_points,
&state->our_funding_pubkey,
&state->their_funding_pubkey,
&state->minimum_depth,
&state->min_feerate,
&state->max_feerate,
&state->funding_txid,
&state->funding_txout,
&total_funding,
&our_msat,
&state->their_points,
&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
&state->psbt,
&opener,
&state->funding_locked[LOCAL],
&state->funding_locked[REMOTE],
&state->shutdown_sent[LOCAL],
&state->shutdown_sent[REMOTE],
&state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL],
&state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE],
&state->remote_funding_sigs_rcvd,
&fee_states,
&inner)) {
/*~ We only reconnect on channels that the
* saved the the database (exchanged commitment sigs) */
state->channel = new_initial_channel(state,
&state->channel_id,
&state->funding_txid,
state->funding_txout,
state->minimum_depth,
total_funding,
our_msat,
fee_states,
&state->localconf,
&state->remoteconf,
&state->our_points,
&state->their_points,
&state->our_funding_pubkey,
&state->their_funding_pubkey,
true, true, opener);
if (opener == LOCAL)
state->our_role = TX_INITIATOR;
else
state->our_role = TX_ACCEPTER;
} else
master_badmsg(fromwire_peektype(msg), msg);
/* 3 == peer, 4 == gossipd, 5 = gossip_store, 6 = hsmd */
per_peer_state_set_fds(state->pps, 3, 4, 5);
/*~ If lightningd wanted us to send a msg, do so before we waste time
* doing work. If it's a global error, we'll close immediately. */
if (inner != NULL) {
sync_crypto_write(state->pps, inner);
fail_if_all_error(inner);
tal_free(inner);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < NUM_TX_MSGS; i++)
state->tx_msg_count[i] = 0;
/*~ We need an initial per-commitment point whether we're funding or
* they are, and lightningd has reserved a unique dbid for us already,
* so we might as well get the hsm daemon to generate it now. */
wire_sync_write(HSM_FD,
take(towire_hsmd_get_per_commitment_point(NULL, 0)));
msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, HSM_FD);
if (!fromwire_hsmd_get_per_commitment_point_reply(tmpctx, msg,
&state->first_per_commitment_point[LOCAL],
&none))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO,
"Bad get_per_commitment_point_reply %s",
tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
/*~ The HSM gives us the N-2'th per-commitment secret when we get the
* N'th per-commitment point. But since N=0, it won't give us one. */
assert(none == NULL);
/*~ Turns out this is useful for testing, to make sure we're ready. */
status_debug("Handed peer, entering loop");
/*~ We manually run a little poll() loop here. With only three fds */
pollfd[0].fd = REQ_FD;
pollfd[0].events = POLLIN;
pollfd[1].fd = state->pps->gossip_fd;
pollfd[1].events = POLLIN;
pollfd[2].fd = state->pps->peer_fd;
pollfd[2].events = POLLIN;
/* Do reconnect, if need be */
if (state->channel) {
do_reconnect_dance(state);
state->reconnected = true;
}
/* We exit when we get a conclusion to write to lightningd: either
* opening_funder_reply or opening_fundee. */
msg = NULL;
while (!msg) {
int t;
struct timerel trel;
if (time_to_next_gossip(state->pps, &trel))
t = time_to_msec(trel);
else
t = -1;
/*~ If we get a signal which aborts the poll() call, valgrind
* complains about revents being uninitialized. I'm not sure
* that's correct, but it's easy to be sure. */
pollfd[0].revents = pollfd[1].revents = pollfd[2].revents = 0;
poll(pollfd, ARRAY_SIZE(pollfd), t);
/* Subtle: handle_master_in can do its own poll loop, so
* don't try to service more than one fd per loop. */
/* First priority: messages from lightningd. */
if (pollfd[0].revents & POLLIN)
msg = handle_master_in(state);
/* Second priority: messages from peer. */
else if (pollfd[2].revents & POLLIN)
msg = handle_peer_in(state);
/* Last priority: chit-chat from gossipd. */
else if (pollfd[1].revents & POLLIN)
handle_gossip_in(state);
else
try_read_gossip_store(state);
/* If we've shutdown, we're done */
if (shutdown_complete(state))
msg = towire_dualopend_shutdown_complete(state,
state->pps);
/* Since we're the top-level event loop, we clean up */
clean_tmpctx();
}
/*~ Write message and hand back the peer fd and gossipd fd. This also
* means that if the peer or gossipd wrote us any messages we didn't
* read yet, it will simply be read by the next daemon. */
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, msg);
per_peer_state_fdpass_send(REQ_FD, state->pps);
status_debug("Sent %s with fds",
dualopend_wire_name(fromwire_peektype(msg)));
/* This frees the entire tal tree. */
tal_free(state);
daemon_shutdown();
return 0;
}
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