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e0e879c003
This means including <common/utils.h> where it was indirectly included. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
166 lines
5.4 KiB
C
166 lines
5.4 KiB
C
#include "config.h"
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#include <bitcoin/shadouble.h>
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#include <bitcoin/signature.h>
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#include <ccan/tal/str/str.h>
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#include <common/utils.h>
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#include <common/wire_error.h>
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#include <gossipd/sigcheck.h>
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/* Verify the signature of a channel_update message */
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const char *sigcheck_channel_update(const tal_t *ctx,
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const struct node_id *node_id,
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const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *node_sig,
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const u8 *update)
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{
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/* BOLT #7:
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* 1. type: 258 (`channel_update`)
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* 2. data:
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* * [`signature`:`signature`]
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* * [`chain_hash`:`chain_hash`]
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* * [`short_channel_id`:`short_channel_id`]
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* * [`u32`:`timestamp`]
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* * [`byte`:`message_flags`]
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* * [`byte`:`channel_flags`]
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* * [`u16`:`cltv_expiry_delta`]
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* * [`u64`:`htlc_minimum_msat`]
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* * [`u32`:`fee_base_msat`]
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* * [`u32`:`fee_proportional_millionths`]
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* * [`u64`:`htlc_maximum_msat`]
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*/
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/* 2 byte msg type + 64 byte signatures */
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int offset = 66;
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struct sha256_double hash;
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sha256_double(&hash, update + offset, tal_count(update) - offset);
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if (!check_signed_hash_nodeid(&hash, node_sig, node_id))
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return tal_fmt(ctx,
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"Bad signature for %s hash %s"
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" on channel_update %s",
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fmt_secp256k1_ecdsa_signature(tmpctx, node_sig),
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fmt_sha256_double(tmpctx, &hash),
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tal_hex(tmpctx, update));
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return NULL;
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}
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const char *sigcheck_channel_announcement(const tal_t *ctx,
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const struct node_id *node1_id,
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const struct node_id *node2_id,
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const struct pubkey *bitcoin1_key,
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const struct pubkey *bitcoin2_key,
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const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *node1_sig,
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const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *node2_sig,
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const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *bitcoin1_sig,
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const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *bitcoin2_sig,
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const u8 *announcement)
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{
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/* BOLT #7:
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* 1. type: 256 (`channel_announcement`)
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* 2. data:
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* * [`signature`:`node_signature_1`]
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* * [`signature`:`node_signature_2`]
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* * [`signature`:`bitcoin_signature_1`]
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* * [`signature`:`bitcoin_signature_2`]
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* * [`u16`:`len`]
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* * [`len*byte`:`features`]
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* * [`chain_hash`:`chain_hash`]
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* * [`short_channel_id`:`short_channel_id`]
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* * [`point`:`node_id_1`]
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* * [`point`:`node_id_2`]
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* * [`point`:`bitcoin_key_1`]
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* * [`point`:`bitcoin_key_2`]
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*/
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/* 2 byte msg type + 256 byte signatures */
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int offset = 258;
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struct sha256_double hash;
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sha256_double(&hash, announcement + offset,
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tal_count(announcement) - offset);
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if (!check_signed_hash_nodeid(&hash, node1_sig, node1_id)) {
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return tal_fmt(ctx,
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"Bad node_signature_1 %s hash %s"
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" on channel_announcement %s",
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fmt_secp256k1_ecdsa_signature(tmpctx,
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node1_sig),
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fmt_sha256_double(tmpctx, &hash),
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tal_hex(tmpctx, announcement));
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}
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if (!check_signed_hash_nodeid(&hash, node2_sig, node2_id)) {
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return tal_fmt(ctx,
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"Bad node_signature_2 %s hash %s"
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" on channel_announcement %s",
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fmt_secp256k1_ecdsa_signature(tmpctx,
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node2_sig),
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fmt_sha256_double(tmpctx, &hash),
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tal_hex(tmpctx, announcement));
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}
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if (!check_signed_hash(&hash, bitcoin1_sig, bitcoin1_key)) {
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return tal_fmt(ctx,
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"Bad bitcoin_signature_1 %s hash %s"
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" on channel_announcement %s",
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fmt_secp256k1_ecdsa_signature(tmpctx,
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bitcoin1_sig),
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fmt_sha256_double(tmpctx, &hash),
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tal_hex(tmpctx, announcement));
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}
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if (!check_signed_hash(&hash, bitcoin2_sig, bitcoin2_key)) {
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return tal_fmt(ctx,
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"Bad bitcoin_signature_2 %s hash %s"
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" on channel_announcement %s",
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fmt_secp256k1_ecdsa_signature(tmpctx,
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bitcoin2_sig),
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fmt_sha256_double(tmpctx, &hash),
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tal_hex(tmpctx, announcement));
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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/* Returns warning msg if signature wrong, else NULL */
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const char *sigcheck_node_announcement(const tal_t *ctx,
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const struct node_id *node_id,
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const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *signature,
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const u8 *node_announcement)
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{
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/* BOLT #7:
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*
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* 1. type: 257 (`node_announcement`)
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* 2. data:
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* * [`signature`:`signature`]
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* * [`u16`:`flen`]
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* * [`flen*byte`:`features`]
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* * [`u32`:`timestamp`]
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* * [`point`:`node_id`]
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* * [`3*byte`:`rgb_color`]
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* * [`32*byte`:`alias`]
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* * [`u16`:`addrlen`]
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* * [`addrlen*byte`:`addresses`]
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*/
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/* 2 byte msg type + 64 byte signatures */
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int offset = 66;
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struct sha256_double hash;
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sha256_double(&hash, node_announcement + offset, tal_count(node_announcement) - offset);
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/* If node_id is invalid, it fails here */
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if (!check_signed_hash_nodeid(&hash, signature, node_id)) {
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/* BOLT #7:
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*
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* - if `signature` is not a valid signature, using
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* `node_id` of the double-SHA256 of the entire
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* message following the `signature` field
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* (including unknown fields following
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* `fee_proportional_millionths`):
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* - SHOULD send a `warning` and close the connection.
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* - MUST NOT process the message further.
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*/
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return tal_fmt(ctx,
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"Bad signature for %s hash %s"
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" on node_announcement %s",
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fmt_secp256k1_ecdsa_signature(tmpctx,
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signature),
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fmt_sha256_double(tmpctx, &hash),
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tal_hex(tmpctx, node_announcement));
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}
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return NULL;
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}
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