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To reproduce the next bug, I had to ensure that one node keeps thinking it's disconnected, then the other node reconnects, then the first node realizes it's disconnected. This code does that, adding a '0' dev-disconnect modifier. That means we fork off a process which (due to pipebuf) will accept a little data, but when the dev_disconnect file is truncated (a hacky, but effective, signalling mechanism) will exit, as if the socket finally realized it's not connected any more. The python tests hang waiting for the daemon to terminate if you leave the blackhole around; to give a clue as to what's happening in this case I moved the log dump to before killing the daemon. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
135 lines
4 KiB
C
135 lines
4 KiB
C
#include <assert.h>
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#include <ccan/str/hex/hex.h>
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#include <ccan/tal/str/str.h>
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#include <common/dev_disconnect.h>
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#include <common/status.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <wire/peer_wire.h>
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#include <wire/wire_io.h>
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#undef io_read
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#undef io_write
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static char *read_buf;
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static size_t read_buf_len;
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static void do_read(void *buf, size_t len)
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{
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assert(len <= read_buf_len);
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memcpy(buf, read_buf, len);
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read_buf += len;
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read_buf_len -= len;
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}
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#define io_read(conn, p, len, next, arg) \
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(do_read((p), (len)), (next)((conn), (arg)), NULL)
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static char *write_buf;
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static void do_write(const void *buf, size_t len)
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{
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size_t oldlen = tal_count(write_buf);
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tal_resize(&write_buf, oldlen + len);
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memcpy(write_buf + oldlen, buf, len);
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}
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#define io_write(conn, p, len, next, arg) \
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(do_write((p), (len)), (next)((conn), (arg)), NULL)
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#define status_trace(fmt, ...) \
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printf(fmt "\n", __VA_ARGS__)
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/* AUTOGENERATED MOCKS START */
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/* Generated stub for dev_blackhole_fd */
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void dev_blackhole_fd(int fd UNNEEDED)
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{ fprintf(stderr, "dev_blackhole_fd called!\n"); abort(); }
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/* Generated stub for dev_sabotage_fd */
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void dev_sabotage_fd(int fd UNNEEDED)
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{ fprintf(stderr, "dev_sabotage_fd called!\n"); abort(); }
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/* AUTOGENERATED MOCKS END */
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char dev_disconnect(int pkt_type)
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{
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return DEV_DISCONNECT_NORMAL;
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}
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/* We test what look like unknown messages. */
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#define is_unknown_msg_discardable(x) 0
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#include "../../common/cryptomsg.c"
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const void *trc;
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static struct io_plan *check_msg_write(struct io_conn *conn, struct peer *peer)
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{
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assert(tal_count(write_buf) == 2 + 16 + 5 + 16);
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return NULL;
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}
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static struct io_plan *check_msg_read(struct io_conn *conn, struct peer *peer,
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u8 *msg)
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{
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assert(tal_count(msg) == 5);
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assert(memcmp(msg, "hello", 5) == 0);
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return NULL;
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}
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static struct secret secret_from_hex(const char *hex)
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{
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struct secret secret;
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hex += 2;
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if (!hex_decode(hex, strlen(hex), &secret, sizeof(secret)))
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abort();
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return secret;
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}
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int main(void)
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{
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tal_t *tmpctx = tal_tmpctx(NULL);
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struct peer_crypto_state cs_out, cs_in;
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struct secret sk, rk, ck;
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const void *msg = tal_dup_arr(tmpctx, char, "hello", 5, 0);
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size_t i;
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trc = tal_tmpctx(tmpctx);
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/* BOLT #8:
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*
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* name: transport-initiator successful handshake
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*...
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* # ck,temp_k3=0x919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01,0x981a46c820fb7a241bc8184ba4bb1f01bcdfafb00dde80098cb8c38db9141520
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* # encryptWithAD(0x981a46c820fb7a241bc8184ba4bb1f01bcdfafb00dde80098cb8c38db9141520, 0x000000000000000000000000, 0x5dcb5ea9b4ccc755e0e3456af3990641276e1d5dc9afd82f974d90a47c918660, <empty>)
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* # t=0x8dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba
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* output: 0x00b9e3a702e93e3a9948c2ed6e5fd7590a6e1c3a0344cfc9d5b57357049aa22355361aa02e55a8fc28fef5bd6d71ad0c38228dc68b1c466263b47fdf31e560e139ba
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* # HKDF(0x919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01,zero)
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* output: sk,rk=0x969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9,0xbb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442
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*/
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ck = secret_from_hex("0x919219dbb2920afa8db80f9a51787a840bcf111ed8d588caf9ab4be716e42b01");
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sk = secret_from_hex("0x969ab31b4d288cedf6218839b27a3e2140827047f2c0f01bf5c04435d43511a9");
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rk = secret_from_hex("0xbb9020b8965f4df047e07f955f3c4b88418984aadc5cdb35096b9ea8fa5c3442");
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cs_out.cs.sn = cs_out.cs.rn = cs_in.cs.sn = cs_in.cs.rn = 0;
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cs_out.cs.sk = cs_in.cs.rk = sk;
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cs_out.cs.rk = cs_in.cs.sk = rk;
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cs_out.cs.s_ck = cs_out.cs.r_ck = cs_in.cs.s_ck = cs_in.cs.r_ck = ck;
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init_peer_crypto_state(tmpctx, &cs_in);
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init_peer_crypto_state(tmpctx, &cs_out);
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for (i = 0; i < 1002; i++) {
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write_buf = tal_arr(tmpctx, char, 0);
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peer_write_message(NULL, &cs_out, msg, check_msg_write);
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if ((i % 500) < 2)
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status_trace("output %zu: 0x%s", i,
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tal_hex(tmpctx, write_buf));
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read_buf = write_buf;
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read_buf_len = tal_count(read_buf);
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write_buf = tal_arr(tmpctx, char, 0);
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peer_read_message(NULL, &cs_in, check_msg_read);
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assert(read_buf_len == 0);
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}
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tal_free(tmpctx);
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return 0;
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}
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