mirror of
https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning.git
synced 2024-11-19 09:54:16 +01:00
35e3c1866e
connectd is going to end up using this do demux; make it fast and complete. Fixing this reveals a problem in openingd: it now extracts the channel_id from funding_signed (which is where we transition off the temporary), and gets upset. So fix that. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
98 lines
2.8 KiB
C
98 lines
2.8 KiB
C
#include "config.h"
|
|
#include <bitcoin/pubkey.h>
|
|
#include <bitcoin/tx.h>
|
|
#include <common/channel_id.h>
|
|
#include <common/pseudorand.h>
|
|
#include <common/type_to_string.h>
|
|
#include <wire/wire.h>
|
|
|
|
void derive_channel_id(struct channel_id *channel_id,
|
|
const struct bitcoin_outpoint *outpoint)
|
|
{
|
|
BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(*channel_id) == sizeof(outpoint->txid));
|
|
memcpy(channel_id, &outpoint->txid, sizeof(*channel_id));
|
|
channel_id->id[sizeof(*channel_id)-2] ^= outpoint->n >> 8;
|
|
channel_id->id[sizeof(*channel_id)-1] ^= outpoint->n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void derive_channel_id_v2(struct channel_id *channel_id,
|
|
const struct pubkey *basepoint_1,
|
|
const struct pubkey *basepoint_2)
|
|
{
|
|
/* BOLT-f53ca2301232db780843e894f55d95d512f297f9 #2:
|
|
* `channel_id`, v2
|
|
* For channels established using the v2 protocol, the
|
|
* `channel_id` is the
|
|
* SHA256(lesser-revocation-basepoint ||
|
|
* greater-revocation-basepoint),
|
|
* where the lesser and greater is based off the order of
|
|
* the basepoint. The basepoints are compact
|
|
* DER-encoded public keys.
|
|
*/
|
|
u8 der_keys[PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN * 2];
|
|
struct sha256 sha;
|
|
int offset_1, offset_2;
|
|
|
|
/* basepoint_1 is first? */
|
|
if (pubkey_idx(basepoint_1, basepoint_2) == 0) {
|
|
offset_1 = 0;
|
|
offset_2 = PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN;
|
|
} else {
|
|
offset_1 = PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN;
|
|
offset_2 = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
pubkey_to_der(der_keys + offset_1, basepoint_1);
|
|
pubkey_to_der(der_keys + offset_2, basepoint_2);
|
|
sha256(&sha, der_keys, sizeof(der_keys));
|
|
BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(*channel_id) == sizeof(sha));
|
|
memcpy(channel_id, &sha, sizeof(*channel_id));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void derive_tmp_channel_id(struct channel_id *channel_id,
|
|
const struct pubkey *opener_basepoint)
|
|
{
|
|
struct sha256 sha;
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT-f53ca2301232db780843e894f55d95d512f297f9 #2:
|
|
* If the peer's revocation basepoint is unknown
|
|
* (e.g. `open_channel2`), a temporary `channel_id` should be
|
|
* found by using a zeroed out basepoint for the unknown peer.
|
|
*/
|
|
u8 der_keys[PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN * 2];
|
|
memset(der_keys, 0, PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN);
|
|
pubkey_to_der(der_keys + PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN, opener_basepoint);
|
|
sha256(&sha, der_keys, sizeof(der_keys));
|
|
BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(*channel_id) == sizeof(sha));
|
|
memcpy(channel_id, &sha, sizeof(*channel_id));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #2:
|
|
*
|
|
* The sending node:
|
|
*...
|
|
* - MUST ensure `temporary_channel_id` is unique from any other channel ID
|
|
* with the same peer.
|
|
*/
|
|
void temporary_channel_id(struct channel_id *channel_id)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
/* Randomness FTW. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(*channel_id); i++)
|
|
channel_id->id[i] = pseudorand(256);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void towire_channel_id(u8 **pptr, const struct channel_id *channel_id)
|
|
{
|
|
towire(pptr, channel_id, sizeof(*channel_id));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool fromwire_channel_id(const u8 **cursor, size_t *max,
|
|
struct channel_id *channel_id)
|
|
{
|
|
return fromwire(cursor, max, channel_id, sizeof(*channel_id)) != NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
REGISTER_TYPE_TO_HEXSTR(channel_id);
|