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https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning.git
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837a095d68
Pubkeys are not not actually DER encoding, but Pieter Wuille corrected me: it's SEC 1 documented encoding. Results from 5 runs, min-max(mean +/- stddev): store_load_msec,vsz_kb,store_rewrite_sec,listnodes_sec,listchannels_sec,routing_sec,peer_write_all_sec 38922-39297(39180.6+/-1.3e+02),2880728,41.040000-41.160000(41.106+/-0.05),2.270000-2.530000(2.338+/-0.097),44.570000-53.980000(49.696+/-3),32.840000-33.080000(32.95+/-0.095),43.060000-44.950000(43.696+/-0.72) Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
244 lines
6.6 KiB
C
244 lines
6.6 KiB
C
#include <bitcoin/script.h>
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#include <bitcoin/tx.h>
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#include <ccan/endian/endian.h>
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#include <common/initial_commit_tx.h>
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#include <common/keyset.h>
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#include <common/permute_tx.h>
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#include <common/status.h>
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#include <common/type_to_string.h>
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#include <common/utils.h>
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#include <inttypes.h>
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* The 48-bit commitment number is obscured by `XOR` with the lower 48 bits of:
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*
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* SHA256(payment_basepoint from open_channel || payment_basepoint from accept_channel)
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*/
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u64 commit_number_obscurer(const struct pubkey *opener_payment_basepoint,
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const struct pubkey *accepter_payment_basepoint)
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{
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u8 ders[PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN * 2];
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struct sha256 sha;
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be64 obscurer = 0;
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pubkey_to_der(ders, opener_payment_basepoint);
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pubkey_to_der(ders + PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN, accepter_payment_basepoint);
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sha256(&sha, ders, sizeof(ders));
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/* Lower 48 bits */
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memcpy((u8 *)&obscurer + 2, sha.u.u8 + sizeof(sha.u.u8) - 6, 6);
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return be64_to_cpu(obscurer);
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}
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bool try_subtract_fee(enum side funder, enum side side,
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struct amount_sat base_fee,
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struct amount_msat *self,
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struct amount_msat *other)
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{
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struct amount_msat *funder_amount;
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if (funder == side)
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funder_amount = self;
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else
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funder_amount = other;
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if (amount_msat_sub_sat(funder_amount, *funder_amount, base_fee))
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return true;
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*funder_amount = AMOUNT_MSAT(0);
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return false;
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}
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u8 *to_self_wscript(const tal_t *ctx,
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u16 to_self_delay,
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const struct keyset *keyset)
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{
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return bitcoin_wscript_to_local(ctx, to_self_delay,
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&keyset->self_revocation_key,
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&keyset->self_delayed_payment_key);
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}
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struct bitcoin_tx *initial_commit_tx(const tal_t *ctx,
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const struct bitcoin_txid *funding_txid,
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unsigned int funding_txout,
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struct amount_sat funding,
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enum side funder,
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u16 to_self_delay,
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const struct keyset *keyset,
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u32 feerate_per_kw,
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struct amount_sat dust_limit,
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struct amount_msat self_pay,
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struct amount_msat other_pay,
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struct amount_sat self_reserve,
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u64 obscured_commitment_number,
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enum side side,
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char** err_reason)
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{
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struct amount_sat base_fee;
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struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
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size_t n, untrimmed;
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struct amount_msat total_pay;
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struct amount_sat amount;
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u32 sequence;
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if (!amount_msat_add(&total_pay, self_pay, other_pay))
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abort();
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assert(!amount_msat_greater_sat(total_pay, funding));
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 1. Calculate which committed HTLCs need to be trimmed (see
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* [Trimmed Outputs](#trimmed-outputs)).
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*/
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untrimmed = 0;
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 2. Calculate the base [commitment transaction
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* fee](#fee-calculation).
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*/
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base_fee = commit_tx_base_fee(feerate_per_kw, untrimmed);
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 3. Subtract this base fee from the funder (either `to_local` or
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* `to_remote`), with a floor of 0 (see [Fee Payment](#fee-payment)).
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*/
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if (!try_subtract_fee(funder, side, base_fee, &self_pay, &other_pay)) {
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* The receiving node MUST fail the channel if:
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*...
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* - it considers `feerate_per_kw` too small for timely
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* processing or unreasonably large.
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*/
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*err_reason = "Funder cannot afford fee on initial commitment transaction";
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status_unusual("Funder cannot afford fee"
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" on initial commitment transaction");
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return NULL;
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}
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/* FIXME, should be in #2:
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*
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* The receiving node MUST fail the channel if:
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*...
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* - both `to_local` and `to_remote` amounts for the initial
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* commitment transaction are less than or equal to
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* `channel_reserve_satoshis`.
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*/
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if (!amount_msat_greater_sat(self_pay, self_reserve)
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&& !amount_msat_greater_sat(other_pay, self_reserve)) {
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*err_reason = "Neither self amount nor other amount exceed reserve on "
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"initial commitment transaction";
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status_unusual("Neither self amount %s"
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" nor other amount %s"
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" exceed reserve %s"
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" on initial commitment transaction",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat,
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&self_pay),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat,
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&other_pay),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
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&self_reserve));
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return NULL;
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}
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/* Worst-case sizing: both to-local and to-remote outputs. */
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tx = bitcoin_tx(ctx, 1, untrimmed + 2);
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/* This could be done in a single loop, but we follow the BOLT
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* literally to make comments in test vectors clearer. */
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n = 0;
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 3. For every offered HTLC, if it is not trimmed, add an
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* [offered HTLC output](#offered-htlc-outputs).
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*/
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 4. For every received HTLC, if it is not trimmed, add an
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* [received HTLC output](#received-htlc-outputs).
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*/
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 5. If the `to_local` amount is greater or equal to
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* `dust_limit_satoshis`, add a [`to_local`
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* output](#to_local-output).
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*/
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if (amount_msat_greater_eq_sat(self_pay, dust_limit)) {
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u8 *wscript = to_self_wscript(tmpctx, to_self_delay, keyset);
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amount = amount_msat_to_sat_round_down(self_pay);
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int pos = bitcoin_tx_add_output(
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tx, scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tx, wscript), &amount);
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assert(pos == n);
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n++;
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}
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 6. If the `to_remote` amount is greater or equal to
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* `dust_limit_satoshis`, add a [`to_remote`
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* output](#to_remote-output).
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*/
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if (amount_msat_greater_eq_sat(other_pay, dust_limit)) {
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* #### `to_remote` Output
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*
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* This output sends funds to the other peer and thus is a simple
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* P2WPKH to `remotepubkey`.
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*/
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amount = amount_msat_to_sat_round_down(other_pay);
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int pos = bitcoin_tx_add_output(
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tx, scriptpubkey_p2wpkh(tx, &keyset->other_payment_key),
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&amount);
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assert(pos == n);
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n++;
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}
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assert(n <= tx->wtx->num_outputs);
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* 7. Sort the outputs into [BIP 69+CLTV
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* order](#transaction-input-and-output-ordering)
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*/
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permute_outputs(tx, NULL, NULL);
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* ## Commitment Transaction
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*
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* * version: 2
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*/
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assert(tx->wtx->version == 2);
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* * locktime: upper 8 bits are 0x20, lower 24 bits are the
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* lower 24 bits of the obscured commitment number
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*/
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tx->wtx->locktime =
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(0x20000000 | (obscured_commitment_number & 0xFFFFFF));
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* * txin count: 1
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* * `txin[0]` outpoint: `txid` and `output_index` from
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* `funding_created` message
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* * `txin[0]` sequence: upper 8 bits are 0x80, lower 24 bits are upper 24 bits of the obscured commitment number
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* * `txin[0]` script bytes: 0
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*/
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sequence = (0x80000000 | ((obscured_commitment_number>>24) & 0xFFFFFF));
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bitcoin_tx_add_input(tx, funding_txid, funding_txout, sequence, &funding, NULL);
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assert(bitcoin_tx_check(tx));
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return tx;
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}
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