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20392ae526
I removed these prematurely: we *haven't* had a release since
introducing them!
This consists of reverting d15d629b8b
"plugins/fetchinvoice: remove obsolete string-based API." and
plugins/fetchinvoice: remove obsolete string-based
API. "onion_messages: remove obs2 support."
Some minor changes due to updated fromwire_tlv API since they
were removed, but not much.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Changelog-EXPERIMENTAL: REVERT: Removed backwards compat with onion messages from v0.10.1.
346 lines
9.6 KiB
C
346 lines
9.6 KiB
C
/*~ This contains all the code to handle onion messages. */
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#include "config.h"
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#include <ccan/cast/cast.h>
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#include <common/blindedpath.h>
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#include <common/blinding.h>
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#include <common/daemon_conn.h>
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#include <common/ecdh_hsmd.h>
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#include <common/features.h>
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#include <common/sphinx.h>
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#include <common/status.h>
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#include <common/type_to_string.h>
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#include <common/wire_error.h>
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#include <connectd/connectd.h>
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#include <connectd/connectd_wiregen.h>
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#include <connectd/multiplex.h>
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#include <connectd/onion_message.h>
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#include <wire/peer_wire.h>
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/* Peer sends obsolete onion msg. */
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void handle_obs2_onion_message(struct daemon *daemon,
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struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
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{
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enum onion_wire badreason;
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struct onionpacket *op;
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struct pubkey blinding, ephemeral;
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struct route_step *rs;
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u8 *onion;
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struct tlv_obs2_onionmsg_payload *om;
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struct secret ss, onion_ss;
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const u8 *cursor;
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size_t max, maxlen;
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/* Ignore unless explicitly turned on. */
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if (!feature_offered(daemon->our_features->bits[NODE_ANNOUNCE_FEATURE],
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OPT_ONION_MESSAGES))
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return;
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/* FIXME: ratelimit! */
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if (!fromwire_obs2_onion_message(msg, msg, &blinding, &onion)) {
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inject_peer_msg(peer,
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towire_warningfmt(NULL, NULL,
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"Bad onion_message"));
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return;
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}
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/* We unwrap the onion now. */
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op = parse_onionpacket(tmpctx, onion, tal_bytelen(onion), &badreason);
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if (!op) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id, "onion msg: can't parse onionpacket: %s",
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onion_wire_name(badreason));
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return;
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}
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ephemeral = op->ephemeralkey;
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if (!unblind_onion(&blinding, ecdh, &ephemeral, &ss)) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id, "onion msg: can't unblind onionpacket");
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return;
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}
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/* Now get onion shared secret and parse it. */
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ecdh(&ephemeral, &onion_ss);
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rs = process_onionpacket(tmpctx, op, &onion_ss, NULL, 0, false);
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if (!rs) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id,
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"onion msg: can't process onionpacket ss=%s",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct secret, &onion_ss));
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return;
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}
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/* The raw payload is prepended with length in the modern onion. */
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cursor = rs->raw_payload;
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max = tal_bytelen(rs->raw_payload);
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maxlen = fromwire_bigsize(&cursor, &max);
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if (!cursor) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id, "onion msg: Invalid hop payload %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, rs->raw_payload));
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return;
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}
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if (maxlen > max) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id, "onion msg: overlong hop payload %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, rs->raw_payload));
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return;
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}
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om = fromwire_tlv_obs2_onionmsg_payload(msg, &cursor, &maxlen);
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if (!om) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id, "onion msg: invalid onionmsg_payload %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, rs->raw_payload));
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return;
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}
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if (rs->nextcase == ONION_END) {
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struct pubkey *reply_blinding, *first_node_id, me, alias;
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const struct onionmsg_path **reply_path;
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struct secret *self_id;
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u8 *omsg;
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if (!pubkey_from_node_id(&me, &daemon->id)) {
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status_broken("Failed to convert own id");
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return;
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}
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/* Final enctlv is actually optional */
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if (!om->enctlv) {
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alias = me;
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self_id = NULL;
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} else if (!decrypt_obs2_final_enctlv(tmpctx, &blinding, &ss,
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om->enctlv, &me, &alias,
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&self_id)) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id,
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"onion msg: failed to decrypt enctlv"
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" %s", tal_hex(tmpctx, om->enctlv));
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return;
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}
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if (om->reply_path) {
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first_node_id = &om->reply_path->first_node_id;
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reply_blinding = &om->reply_path->blinding;
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reply_path = cast_const2(const struct onionmsg_path **,
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om->reply_path->path);
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} else {
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first_node_id = NULL;
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reply_blinding = NULL;
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reply_path = NULL;
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}
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/* We re-marshall here by policy, before handing to lightningd */
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omsg = tal_arr(tmpctx, u8, 0);
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towire_tlvstream_raw(&omsg, om->fields);
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daemon_conn_send(daemon->master,
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take(towire_connectd_got_onionmsg_to_us(NULL,
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true, /* obs2 */
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&alias, self_id,
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reply_blinding,
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first_node_id,
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reply_path,
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omsg)));
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} else {
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struct pubkey next_node, next_blinding;
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struct peer *next_peer;
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struct node_id next_node_id;
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/* This fails as expected if no enctlv. */
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if (!decrypt_obs2_enctlv(&blinding, &ss, om->enctlv, &next_node,
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&next_blinding)) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id,
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"onion msg: invalid enctlv %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, om->enctlv));
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return;
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}
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/* Even though lightningd checks for valid ids, there's a race
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* where it might vanish before we read this command. */
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node_id_from_pubkey(&next_node_id, &next_node);
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next_peer = peer_htable_get(&daemon->peers, &next_node_id);
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if (!next_peer) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id,
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"onion msg: unknown next peer %s",
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type_to_string(tmpctx,
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struct pubkey,
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&next_node));
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return;
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}
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inject_peer_msg(next_peer,
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take(towire_obs2_onion_message(NULL,
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&next_blinding,
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serialize_onionpacket(tmpctx, rs->next))));
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}
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}
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void onionmsg_req(struct daemon *daemon, const u8 *msg)
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{
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struct node_id id;
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u8 *onionmsg;
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struct pubkey blinding;
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struct peer *peer;
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bool obs2;
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if (!fromwire_connectd_send_onionmsg(msg, msg, &obs2, &id, &onionmsg, &blinding))
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master_badmsg(WIRE_CONNECTD_SEND_ONIONMSG, msg);
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/* Even though lightningd checks for valid ids, there's a race
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* where it might vanish before we read this command. */
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peer = peer_htable_get(&daemon->peers, &id);
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if (peer) {
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u8 *omsg;
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if (obs2)
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omsg = towire_obs2_onion_message(NULL, &blinding, onionmsg);
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else
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omsg = towire_onion_message(NULL, &blinding, onionmsg);
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inject_peer_msg(peer, take(omsg));
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}
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}
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/* Peer sends an onion msg. */
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void handle_onion_message(struct daemon *daemon,
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struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
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{
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enum onion_wire badreason;
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struct onionpacket *op;
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struct pubkey blinding, ephemeral;
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struct route_step *rs;
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u8 *onion;
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struct tlv_onionmsg_payload *om;
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struct secret ss, onion_ss;
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const u8 *cursor;
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size_t max, maxlen;
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/* Ignore unless explicitly turned on. */
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if (!feature_offered(daemon->our_features->bits[NODE_ANNOUNCE_FEATURE],
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OPT_ONION_MESSAGES))
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return;
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/* FIXME: ratelimit! */
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if (!fromwire_onion_message(msg, msg, &blinding, &onion)) {
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inject_peer_msg(peer,
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towire_warningfmt(NULL, NULL,
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"Bad onion_message"));
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return;
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}
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/* We unwrap the onion now. */
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op = parse_onionpacket(tmpctx, onion, tal_bytelen(onion), &badreason);
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if (!op) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id, "onion msg: can't parse onionpacket: %s",
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onion_wire_name(badreason));
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return;
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}
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ephemeral = op->ephemeralkey;
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if (!unblind_onion(&blinding, ecdh, &ephemeral, &ss)) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id, "onion msg: can't unblind onionpacket");
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return;
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}
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/* Now get onion shared secret and parse it. */
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ecdh(&ephemeral, &onion_ss);
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rs = process_onionpacket(tmpctx, op, &onion_ss, NULL, 0, false);
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if (!rs) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id,
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"onion msg: can't process onionpacket ss=%s",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct secret, &onion_ss));
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return;
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}
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/* The raw payload is prepended with length in the modern onion. */
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cursor = rs->raw_payload;
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max = tal_bytelen(rs->raw_payload);
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maxlen = fromwire_bigsize(&cursor, &max);
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if (!cursor) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id, "onion msg: Invalid hop payload %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, rs->raw_payload));
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return;
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}
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if (maxlen > max) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id, "onion msg: overlong hop payload %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, rs->raw_payload));
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return;
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}
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om = fromwire_tlv_onionmsg_payload(msg, &cursor, &maxlen);
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if (!om) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id, "onion msg: invalid onionmsg_payload %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, rs->raw_payload));
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return;
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}
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if (rs->nextcase == ONION_END) {
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struct pubkey *reply_blinding, *first_node_id, me, alias;
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const struct onionmsg_path **reply_path;
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struct secret *self_id;
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u8 *omsg;
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if (!pubkey_from_node_id(&me, &daemon->id)) {
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status_broken("Failed to convert own id");
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return;
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}
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/* Final enctlv is actually optional */
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if (!om->encrypted_data_tlv) {
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alias = me;
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self_id = NULL;
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} else if (!decrypt_final_enctlv(tmpctx, &blinding, &ss,
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om->encrypted_data_tlv, &me, &alias,
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&self_id)) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id,
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"onion msg: failed to decrypt enctlv"
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" %s", tal_hex(tmpctx, om->encrypted_data_tlv));
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return;
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}
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if (om->reply_path) {
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first_node_id = &om->reply_path->first_node_id;
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reply_blinding = &om->reply_path->blinding;
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reply_path = cast_const2(const struct onionmsg_path **,
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om->reply_path->path);
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} else {
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first_node_id = NULL;
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reply_blinding = NULL;
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reply_path = NULL;
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}
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/* We re-marshall here by policy, before handing to lightningd */
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omsg = tal_arr(tmpctx, u8, 0);
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towire_tlvstream_raw(&omsg, om->fields);
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daemon_conn_send(daemon->master,
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take(towire_connectd_got_onionmsg_to_us(NULL,
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false, /* !obs2 */
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&alias, self_id,
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reply_blinding,
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first_node_id,
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reply_path,
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omsg)));
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} else {
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struct pubkey next_node, next_blinding;
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struct peer *next_peer;
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struct node_id next_node_id;
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/* This fails as expected if no enctlv. */
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if (!decrypt_enctlv(&blinding, &ss, om->encrypted_data_tlv, &next_node,
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&next_blinding)) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id,
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"onion msg: invalid enctlv %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, om->encrypted_data_tlv));
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return;
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}
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/* FIXME: Handle short_channel_id! */
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node_id_from_pubkey(&next_node_id, &next_node);
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next_peer = peer_htable_get(&daemon->peers, &next_node_id);
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if (!next_peer) {
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status_peer_debug(&peer->id,
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"onion msg: unknown next peer %s",
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type_to_string(tmpctx,
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struct pubkey,
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&next_node));
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return;
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}
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inject_peer_msg(next_peer,
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take(towire_onion_message(NULL,
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&next_blinding,
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serialize_onionpacket(tmpctx, rs->next))));
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}
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}
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