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38e7d19dd5
We need to do it in various places, but we shouldn't do it lightly: the primitives are there to help us get overflow handling correct. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
1760 lines
51 KiB
C
1760 lines
51 KiB
C
#include "routing.h"
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#include <bitcoin/block.h>
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#include <bitcoin/script.h>
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#include <ccan/array_size/array_size.h>
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#include <ccan/endian/endian.h>
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#include <ccan/mem/mem.h>
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#include <ccan/tal/str/str.h>
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#include <common/features.h>
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#include <common/memleak.h>
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#include <common/pseudorand.h>
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#include <common/status.h>
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#include <common/type_to_string.h>
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#include <common/wire_error.h>
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#include <common/wireaddr.h>
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#include <gossipd/gen_gossip_peerd_wire.h>
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#include <gossipd/gen_gossip_wire.h>
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#include <inttypes.h>
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#include <wire/gen_peer_wire.h>
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#ifndef SUPERVERBOSE
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#define SUPERVERBOSE(...)
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#endif
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/* 365.25 * 24 * 60 / 10 */
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#define BLOCKS_PER_YEAR 52596
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/* We've unpacked and checked its signatures, now we wait for master to tell
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* us the txout to check */
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struct pending_cannouncement {
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/* Off routing_state->pending_cannouncement */
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struct list_node list;
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/* Unpacked fields here */
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struct short_channel_id short_channel_id;
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struct pubkey node_id_1;
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struct pubkey node_id_2;
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struct pubkey bitcoin_key_1;
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struct pubkey bitcoin_key_2;
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/* The raw bits */
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const u8 *announce;
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/* Deferred updates, if we received them while waiting for
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* this (one for each direction) */
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const u8 *updates[2];
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/* Only ever replace with newer updates */
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u32 update_timestamps[2];
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};
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struct pending_node_announce {
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struct pubkey nodeid;
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u8 *node_announcement;
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u32 timestamp;
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};
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static const struct pubkey *
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pending_node_announce_keyof(const struct pending_node_announce *a)
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{
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return &a->nodeid;
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}
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static bool pending_node_announce_eq(const struct pending_node_announce *pna,
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const struct pubkey *key)
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{
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return pubkey_eq(&pna->nodeid, key);
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}
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HTABLE_DEFINE_TYPE(struct pending_node_announce, pending_node_announce_keyof,
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node_map_hash_key, pending_node_announce_eq,
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pending_node_map);
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static struct node_map *empty_node_map(const tal_t *ctx)
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{
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struct node_map *map = tal(ctx, struct node_map);
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node_map_init(map);
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tal_add_destructor(map, node_map_clear);
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return map;
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}
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struct routing_state *new_routing_state(const tal_t *ctx,
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const struct chainparams *chainparams,
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const struct pubkey *local_id,
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u32 prune_timeout)
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{
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struct routing_state *rstate = tal(ctx, struct routing_state);
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rstate->nodes = empty_node_map(rstate);
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rstate->broadcasts = new_broadcast_state(rstate);
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rstate->chainparams = chainparams;
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rstate->local_id = *local_id;
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rstate->prune_timeout = prune_timeout;
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rstate->store = gossip_store_new(rstate, rstate, rstate->broadcasts);
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rstate->local_channel_announced = false;
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list_head_init(&rstate->pending_cannouncement);
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uintmap_init(&rstate->chanmap);
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rstate->pending_node_map = tal(ctx, struct pending_node_map);
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pending_node_map_init(rstate->pending_node_map);
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return rstate;
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}
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const struct pubkey *node_map_keyof_node(const struct node *n)
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{
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return &n->id;
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}
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size_t node_map_hash_key(const struct pubkey *key)
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{
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return siphash24(siphash_seed(), key, sizeof(*key));
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}
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bool node_map_node_eq(const struct node *n, const struct pubkey *key)
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{
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return pubkey_eq(&n->id, key);
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}
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static void destroy_node(struct node *node, struct routing_state *rstate)
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{
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node_map_del(rstate->nodes, node);
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/* These remove themselves from the array. */
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while (tal_count(node->chans))
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tal_free(node->chans[0]);
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}
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struct node *get_node(struct routing_state *rstate, const struct pubkey *id)
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{
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return node_map_get(rstate->nodes, id);
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}
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static struct node *new_node(struct routing_state *rstate,
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const struct pubkey *id)
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{
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struct node *n;
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assert(!get_node(rstate, id));
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n = tal(rstate, struct node);
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n->id = *id;
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n->chans = tal_arr(n, struct chan *, 0);
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n->globalfeatures = NULL;
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n->node_announcement = NULL;
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n->node_announcement_index = 0;
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n->last_timestamp = -1;
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n->addresses = tal_arr(n, struct wireaddr, 0);
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node_map_add(rstate->nodes, n);
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tal_add_destructor2(n, destroy_node, rstate);
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return n;
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}
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/* We've received a channel_announce for a channel attached to this node */
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static bool node_has_public_channels(struct node *node)
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{
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for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(node->chans); i++)
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if (is_chan_public(node->chans[i]))
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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/* We can *send* a channel_announce for a channel attached to this node:
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* we only send once we have a channel_update. */
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static bool node_has_broadcastable_channels(struct node *node)
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{
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for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(node->chans); i++) {
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if (!is_chan_public(node->chans[i]))
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continue;
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if (is_halfchan_defined(&node->chans[i]->half[0])
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|| is_halfchan_defined(&node->chans[i]->half[1]))
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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static bool remove_channel_from_array(struct chan ***chans, const struct chan *c)
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{
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size_t i, n;
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n = tal_count(*chans);
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for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
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if ((*chans)[i] != c)
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continue;
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n--;
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memmove(*chans + i, *chans + i + 1, sizeof(**chans) * (n - i));
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tal_resize(chans, n);
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return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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static bool node_announce_predates_channels(const struct node *node)
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{
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for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(node->chans); i++) {
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if (!is_chan_announced(node->chans[i]))
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continue;
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if (node->chans[i]->channel_announcement_index
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< node->node_announcement_index)
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static u64 persistent_broadcast(struct routing_state *rstate, const u8 *msg, u32 timestamp)
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{
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u64 index = insert_broadcast(rstate->broadcasts, msg, timestamp);
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if (index)
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gossip_store_add(rstate->store, msg);
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return index;
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}
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static void remove_chan_from_node(struct routing_state *rstate,
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struct node *node, const struct chan *chan)
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{
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if (!remove_channel_from_array(&node->chans, chan))
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abort();
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/* Last channel? Simply delete node (and associated announce) */
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if (tal_count(node->chans) == 0) {
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tal_free(node);
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return;
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}
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if (!node->node_announcement_index)
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return;
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/* Removed only public channel? Remove node announcement. */
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if (!node_has_broadcastable_channels(node)) {
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broadcast_del(rstate->broadcasts, node->node_announcement_index,
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node->node_announcement);
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node->node_announcement_index = 0;
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} else if (node_announce_predates_channels(node)) {
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/* node announcement predates all channel announcements?
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* Move to end (we could, in theory, move to just past next
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* channel_announce, but we don't care that much about spurious
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* retransmissions in this corner case */
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broadcast_del(rstate->broadcasts, node->node_announcement_index,
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node->node_announcement);
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node->node_announcement_index = persistent_broadcast(
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rstate, node->node_announcement, node->last_timestamp);
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}
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}
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static void destroy_chan(struct chan *chan, struct routing_state *rstate)
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{
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remove_chan_from_node(rstate, chan->nodes[0], chan);
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remove_chan_from_node(rstate, chan->nodes[1], chan);
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uintmap_del(&rstate->chanmap, chan->scid.u64);
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}
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static void init_half_chan(struct routing_state *rstate,
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struct chan *chan,
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int channel_idx)
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{
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struct half_chan *c = &chan->half[channel_idx];
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c->channel_update = NULL;
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/* Set the channel direction */
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c->channel_flags = channel_idx;
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// TODO: wireup message_flags
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c->message_flags = 0;
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/* We haven't seen channel_update: make it halfway to prune time,
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* which should be older than any update we'd see. */
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c->last_timestamp = time_now().ts.tv_sec - rstate->prune_timeout/2;
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}
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static void bad_gossip_order(const u8 *msg, const char *source,
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const char *details)
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{
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status_trace("Bad gossip order from %s: %s before announcement %s",
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source, wire_type_name(fromwire_peektype(msg)),
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details);
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}
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struct chan *new_chan(struct routing_state *rstate,
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const struct short_channel_id *scid,
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const struct pubkey *id1,
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const struct pubkey *id2,
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struct amount_sat satoshis)
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{
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struct chan *chan = tal(rstate, struct chan);
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int n1idx = pubkey_idx(id1, id2);
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struct node *n1, *n2;
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/* We should never add a channel twice */
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assert(!uintmap_get(&rstate->chanmap, scid->u64));
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/* Create nodes on demand */
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n1 = get_node(rstate, id1);
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if (!n1)
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n1 = new_node(rstate, id1);
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n2 = get_node(rstate, id2);
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if (!n2)
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n2 = new_node(rstate, id2);
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chan->scid = *scid;
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chan->nodes[n1idx] = n1;
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chan->nodes[!n1idx] = n2;
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chan->txout_script = NULL;
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chan->channel_announce = NULL;
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chan->channel_announcement_index = 0;
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chan->sat = satoshis;
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chan->local_disabled = false;
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tal_arr_expand(&n2->chans, chan);
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tal_arr_expand(&n1->chans, chan);
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/* Populate with (inactive) connections */
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init_half_chan(rstate, chan, n1idx);
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init_half_chan(rstate, chan, !n1idx);
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uintmap_add(&rstate->chanmap, scid->u64, chan);
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tal_add_destructor2(chan, destroy_chan, rstate);
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return chan;
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}
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/* Too big to reach, but don't overflow if added. */
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#define INFINITE AMOUNT_MSAT(0x3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL)
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static void clear_bfg(struct node_map *nodes)
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{
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struct node *n;
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struct node_map_iter it;
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for (n = node_map_first(nodes, &it); n; n = node_map_next(nodes, &it)) {
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size_t i;
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for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(n->bfg); i++) {
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n->bfg[i].total = INFINITE;
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n->bfg[i].risk = AMOUNT_MSAT(0);
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}
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}
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}
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/* Risk of passing through this channel. We insert a tiny constant here
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* in order to prefer shorter routes, all things equal. */
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static WARN_UNUSED_RESULT bool risk_add_fee(struct amount_msat *risk,
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struct amount_msat msat,
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u32 delay, double riskfactor)
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{
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double r;
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/* Won't overflow on add, just lose precision */
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r = 1.0 + riskfactor * delay * msat.millisatoshis + risk->millisatoshis; /* Raw: to double */
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if (r > UINT64_MAX)
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return false;
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risk->millisatoshis = r; /* Raw: from double */
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return true;
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}
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/* Check that we can fit through this channel's indicated
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* maximum_ and minimum_msat requirements.
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*/
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static bool hc_can_carry(const struct half_chan *hc,
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struct amount_msat requiredcap)
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{
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return amount_msat_greater_eq(hc->htlc_maximum, requiredcap) &&
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amount_msat_less_eq(hc->htlc_minimum, requiredcap);
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}
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/* Theoretically, this could overflow. */
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static bool fuzz_fee(u64 *fee, double fee_scale)
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{
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u64 fuzzed_fee = *fee * fee_scale;
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if (fee_scale > 1.0 && fuzzed_fee < *fee)
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return false;
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*fee = fuzzed_fee;
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return true;
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}
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/* We track totals, rather than costs. That's because the fee depends
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* on the current amount passing through. */
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static void bfg_one_edge(struct node *node,
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struct chan *chan, int idx,
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double riskfactor,
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double fuzz, const struct siphash_seed *base_seed,
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size_t max_hops)
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{
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size_t h;
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double fee_scale = 1.0;
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const struct half_chan *c = &chan->half[idx];
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if (fuzz != 0.0) {
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u64 h = siphash24(base_seed, &chan->scid, sizeof(chan->scid));
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/* Scale fees for this channel */
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/* rand = (h / UINT64_MAX) random number between 0.0 -> 1.0
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* 2*fuzz*rand random number between 0.0 -> 2*fuzz
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* 2*fuzz*rand - fuzz random number between -fuzz -> +fuzz
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*/
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fee_scale = 1.0 + (2.0 * fuzz * h / UINT64_MAX) - fuzz;
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}
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for (h = 0; h < max_hops; h++) {
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struct node *src;
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/* FIXME: Bias against smaller channels. */
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struct amount_msat fee, risk, requiredcap,
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this_total, curr_total;
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if (!amount_msat_fee(&fee, node->bfg[h].total,
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c->base_fee, c->proportional_fee))
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continue;
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if (!fuzz_fee(&fee.millisatoshis, fee_scale)) /* Raw: double manipulation */
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continue;
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if (!amount_msat_add(&requiredcap, node->bfg[h].total, fee))
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continue;
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risk = node->bfg[h].risk;
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if (!risk_add_fee(&risk, requiredcap, c->delay, riskfactor))
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continue;
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if (!hc_can_carry(c, requiredcap)) {
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/* Skip a channel if it indicated that it won't route
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* the requested amount. */
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continue;
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}
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if (!amount_msat_add(&this_total, requiredcap, risk))
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continue;
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/* nodes[0] is src for connections[0] */
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src = chan->nodes[idx];
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if (!amount_msat_add(&curr_total,
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src->bfg[h + 1].total,
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src->bfg[h + 1].risk)) {
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/* We just calculated this: shouldn't happen! */
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status_broken("Overflow: total %s + risk %s",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat,
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&src->bfg[h + 1].total),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat,
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&src->bfg[h + 1].risk));
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continue;
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}
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if (amount_msat_less(this_total, curr_total)) {
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SUPERVERBOSE("...%s can reach here hoplen %zu"
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" total %s risk %s",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
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&src->id),
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h,
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat,
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&requiredcap),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat,
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&risk));
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src->bfg[h+1].total = requiredcap;
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src->bfg[h+1].risk = risk;
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src->bfg[h+1].prev = chan;
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}
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}
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}
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/* Determine if the given half_chan is routable */
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static bool hc_is_routable(const struct chan *chan, int idx)
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{
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return !chan->local_disabled
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&& is_halfchan_enabled(&chan->half[idx]);
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}
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/* riskfactor is already scaled to per-block amount */
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static struct chan **
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find_route(const tal_t *ctx, struct routing_state *rstate,
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const struct pubkey *from, const struct pubkey *to,
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struct amount_msat msat,
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double riskfactor,
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double fuzz, const struct siphash_seed *base_seed,
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size_t max_hops,
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struct amount_msat *fee)
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{
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struct chan **route;
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struct node *n, *src, *dst;
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struct node_map_iter it;
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struct amount_msat best_total;
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int runs, i, best;
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/* Note: we map backwards, since we know the amount of satoshi we want
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* at the end, and need to derive how much we need to send. */
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dst = get_node(rstate, from);
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src = get_node(rstate, to);
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if (!src) {
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status_info("find_route: cannot find %s",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, to));
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return NULL;
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} else if (!dst) {
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status_info("find_route: cannot find myself (%s)",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, to));
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return NULL;
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} else if (dst == src) {
|
|
status_info("find_route: this is %s, refusing to create empty route",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, to));
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (max_hops > ROUTING_MAX_HOPS) {
|
|
status_info("find_route: max_hops huge amount %zu > %u",
|
|
max_hops, ROUTING_MAX_HOPS);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Reset all the information. */
|
|
clear_bfg(rstate->nodes);
|
|
|
|
/* Bellman-Ford-Gibson: like Bellman-Ford, but keep values for
|
|
* every path length. */
|
|
src->bfg[0].total = msat;
|
|
src->bfg[0].risk = AMOUNT_MSAT(0);
|
|
|
|
for (runs = 0; runs < max_hops; runs++) {
|
|
SUPERVERBOSE("Run %i", runs);
|
|
/* Run through every edge. */
|
|
for (n = node_map_first(rstate->nodes, &it);
|
|
n;
|
|
n = node_map_next(rstate->nodes, &it)) {
|
|
size_t num_edges = tal_count(n->chans);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_edges; i++) {
|
|
struct chan *chan = n->chans[i];
|
|
int idx = half_chan_to(n, chan);
|
|
|
|
SUPERVERBOSE("Node %s edge %i/%zu",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
|
|
&n->id),
|
|
i, num_edges);
|
|
|
|
if (!hc_is_routable(chan, idx)) {
|
|
SUPERVERBOSE("...unroutable (local_disabled = %i, is_halfchan_enabled = %i, unroutable_until = %i",
|
|
chan->local_disabled,
|
|
is_halfchan_enabled(&chan->half[idx]),
|
|
chan->half[idx].unroutable_until >= now);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
bfg_one_edge(n, chan, idx,
|
|
riskfactor, fuzz, base_seed,
|
|
max_hops);
|
|
SUPERVERBOSE("...done");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
best = 0;
|
|
best_total = INFINITE;
|
|
for (i = 0; i <= max_hops; i++) {
|
|
struct amount_msat total;
|
|
status_trace("%i hop solution: %s + %s",
|
|
i,
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat,
|
|
&dst->bfg[i].total),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat,
|
|
&dst->bfg[i].risk));
|
|
if (!amount_msat_add(&total,
|
|
dst->bfg[i].total, dst->bfg[i].risk))
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (amount_msat_less(total, best_total)) {
|
|
best = i;
|
|
best_total = total;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
status_trace("=> chose %i hop solution", best);
|
|
|
|
/* No route? */
|
|
if (amount_msat_greater_eq(best_total, INFINITE)) {
|
|
status_trace("find_route: No route to %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, to));
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We (dst) don't charge ourselves fees, so skip first hop */
|
|
n = other_node(dst, dst->bfg[best].prev);
|
|
if (!amount_msat_sub(fee, n->bfg[best-1].total, msat)) {
|
|
status_broken("Could not subtract %s - %s for fee",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat,
|
|
&n->bfg[best-1].total),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &msat));
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Lay out route */
|
|
route = tal_arr(ctx, struct chan *, best);
|
|
for (i = 0, n = dst;
|
|
i < best;
|
|
n = other_node(n, n->bfg[best-i].prev), i++) {
|
|
route[i] = n->bfg[best-i].prev;
|
|
}
|
|
assert(n == src);
|
|
|
|
return route;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Verify the signature of a channel_update message */
|
|
static u8 *check_channel_update(const tal_t *ctx,
|
|
const struct pubkey *node_key,
|
|
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *node_sig,
|
|
const u8 *update)
|
|
{
|
|
/* 2 byte msg type + 64 byte signatures */
|
|
int offset = 66;
|
|
struct sha256_double hash;
|
|
sha256_double(&hash, update + offset, tal_count(update) - offset);
|
|
|
|
if (!check_signed_hash(&hash, node_sig, node_key))
|
|
return towire_errorfmt(ctx, NULL,
|
|
"Bad signature for %s hash %s"
|
|
" on channel_update %s",
|
|
type_to_string(ctx,
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature,
|
|
node_sig),
|
|
type_to_string(ctx,
|
|
struct sha256_double,
|
|
&hash),
|
|
tal_hex(ctx, update));
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static u8 *check_channel_announcement(const tal_t *ctx,
|
|
const struct pubkey *node1_key, const struct pubkey *node2_key,
|
|
const struct pubkey *bitcoin1_key, const struct pubkey *bitcoin2_key,
|
|
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *node1_sig,
|
|
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *node2_sig,
|
|
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *bitcoin1_sig,
|
|
const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *bitcoin2_sig, const u8 *announcement)
|
|
{
|
|
/* 2 byte msg type + 256 byte signatures */
|
|
int offset = 258;
|
|
struct sha256_double hash;
|
|
sha256_double(&hash, announcement + offset,
|
|
tal_count(announcement) - offset);
|
|
|
|
if (!check_signed_hash(&hash, node1_sig, node1_key)) {
|
|
return towire_errorfmt(ctx, NULL,
|
|
"Bad node_signature_1 %s hash %s"
|
|
" on node_announcement %s",
|
|
type_to_string(ctx,
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature,
|
|
node1_sig),
|
|
type_to_string(ctx,
|
|
struct sha256_double,
|
|
&hash),
|
|
tal_hex(ctx, announcement));
|
|
}
|
|
if (!check_signed_hash(&hash, node2_sig, node2_key)) {
|
|
return towire_errorfmt(ctx, NULL,
|
|
"Bad node_signature_2 %s hash %s"
|
|
" on node_announcement %s",
|
|
type_to_string(ctx,
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature,
|
|
node2_sig),
|
|
type_to_string(ctx,
|
|
struct sha256_double,
|
|
&hash),
|
|
tal_hex(ctx, announcement));
|
|
}
|
|
if (!check_signed_hash(&hash, bitcoin1_sig, bitcoin1_key)) {
|
|
return towire_errorfmt(ctx, NULL,
|
|
"Bad bitcoin_signature_1 %s hash %s"
|
|
" on node_announcement %s",
|
|
type_to_string(ctx,
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature,
|
|
bitcoin1_sig),
|
|
type_to_string(ctx,
|
|
struct sha256_double,
|
|
&hash),
|
|
tal_hex(ctx, announcement));
|
|
}
|
|
if (!check_signed_hash(&hash, bitcoin2_sig, bitcoin2_key)) {
|
|
return towire_errorfmt(ctx, NULL,
|
|
"Bad bitcoin_signature_2 %s hash %s"
|
|
" on node_announcement %s",
|
|
type_to_string(ctx,
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature,
|
|
bitcoin2_sig),
|
|
type_to_string(ctx,
|
|
struct sha256_double,
|
|
&hash),
|
|
tal_hex(ctx, announcement));
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void add_pending_node_announcement(struct routing_state *rstate, struct pubkey *nodeid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pending_node_announce *pna = tal(rstate, struct pending_node_announce);
|
|
pna->nodeid = *nodeid;
|
|
pna->node_announcement = NULL;
|
|
pna->timestamp = 0;
|
|
pending_node_map_add(rstate->pending_node_map, pna);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void process_pending_node_announcement(struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|
struct pubkey *nodeid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pending_node_announce *pna = pending_node_map_get(rstate->pending_node_map, nodeid);
|
|
if (!pna)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (pna->node_announcement) {
|
|
u8 *err;
|
|
SUPERVERBOSE(
|
|
"Processing deferred node_announcement for node %s",
|
|
type_to_string(pna, struct pubkey, nodeid));
|
|
|
|
/* Should not error, since we processed it before */
|
|
err = handle_node_announcement(rstate, pna->node_announcement);
|
|
if (err)
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"pending node_announcement %s malformed %s?",
|
|
tal_hex(tmpctx, pna->node_announcement),
|
|
sanitize_error(tmpctx, err, NULL));
|
|
}
|
|
pending_node_map_del(rstate->pending_node_map, pna);
|
|
tal_free(pna);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct pending_cannouncement *
|
|
find_pending_cannouncement(struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|
const struct short_channel_id *scid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pending_cannouncement *i;
|
|
|
|
list_for_each(&rstate->pending_cannouncement, i, list) {
|
|
if (short_channel_id_eq(scid, &i->short_channel_id))
|
|
return i;
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void destroy_pending_cannouncement(struct pending_cannouncement *pending,
|
|
struct routing_state *rstate)
|
|
{
|
|
list_del_from(&rstate->pending_cannouncement, &pending->list);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool is_local_channel(const struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|
const struct chan *chan)
|
|
{
|
|
return pubkey_eq(&chan->nodes[0]->id, &rstate->local_id)
|
|
|| pubkey_eq(&chan->nodes[1]->id, &rstate->local_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void add_channel_announce_to_broadcast(struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|
struct chan *chan,
|
|
u32 timestamp)
|
|
{
|
|
chan->channel_announcement_index =
|
|
persistent_broadcast(rstate, chan->channel_announce, timestamp);
|
|
rstate->local_channel_announced |= is_local_channel(rstate, chan);
|
|
|
|
/* If we've been waiting for this, now we can announce node */
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(chan->nodes); i++) {
|
|
struct node *node = chan->nodes[i];
|
|
if (!node->node_announcement)
|
|
continue;
|
|
if (!node->node_announcement_index) {
|
|
node->node_announcement_index = persistent_broadcast(
|
|
rstate, node->node_announcement,
|
|
node->last_timestamp);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool routing_add_channel_announcement(struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|
const u8 *msg TAKES,
|
|
struct amount_sat sat)
|
|
{
|
|
struct chan *chan;
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature node_signature_1, node_signature_2;
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature bitcoin_signature_1, bitcoin_signature_2;
|
|
u8 *features;
|
|
struct bitcoin_blkid chain_hash;
|
|
struct short_channel_id scid;
|
|
struct pubkey node_id_1;
|
|
struct pubkey node_id_2;
|
|
struct pubkey bitcoin_key_1;
|
|
struct pubkey bitcoin_key_2;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_channel_announcement(
|
|
tmpctx, msg, &node_signature_1, &node_signature_2,
|
|
&bitcoin_signature_1, &bitcoin_signature_2, &features, &chain_hash,
|
|
&scid, &node_id_1, &node_id_2, &bitcoin_key_1, &bitcoin_key_2))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
/* The channel may already exist if it was non-public from
|
|
* local_add_channel(); normally we don't accept new
|
|
* channel_announcements. See handle_channel_announcement. */
|
|
chan = get_channel(rstate, &scid);
|
|
if (!chan)
|
|
chan = new_chan(rstate, &scid, &node_id_1, &node_id_2, sat);
|
|
|
|
/* Channel is now public. */
|
|
chan->channel_announce = tal_dup_arr(chan, u8, msg, tal_count(msg), 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Apply any private updates. */
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(chan->half); i++) {
|
|
const u8 *update = chan->half[i].channel_update;
|
|
if (!update)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Remove from channel, otherwise it will be freed! */
|
|
chan->half[i].channel_update = NULL;
|
|
routing_add_channel_update(rstate, take(update));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
u8 *handle_channel_announcement(struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|
const u8 *announce TAKES,
|
|
const struct short_channel_id **scid)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pending_cannouncement *pending;
|
|
struct bitcoin_blkid chain_hash;
|
|
u8 *features, *err;
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature node_signature_1, node_signature_2;
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature bitcoin_signature_1, bitcoin_signature_2;
|
|
struct chan *chan;
|
|
|
|
pending = tal(rstate, struct pending_cannouncement);
|
|
pending->updates[0] = NULL;
|
|
pending->updates[1] = NULL;
|
|
pending->announce = tal_dup_arr(pending, u8,
|
|
announce, tal_count(announce), 0);
|
|
pending->update_timestamps[0] = pending->update_timestamps[1] = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_channel_announcement(pending, pending->announce,
|
|
&node_signature_1,
|
|
&node_signature_2,
|
|
&bitcoin_signature_1,
|
|
&bitcoin_signature_2,
|
|
&features,
|
|
&chain_hash,
|
|
&pending->short_channel_id,
|
|
&pending->node_id_1,
|
|
&pending->node_id_2,
|
|
&pending->bitcoin_key_1,
|
|
&pending->bitcoin_key_2)) {
|
|
err = towire_errorfmt(rstate, NULL,
|
|
"Malformed channel_announcement %s",
|
|
tal_hex(pending, pending->announce));
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check if we know the channel already (no matter in what
|
|
* state, we stop here if yes). */
|
|
chan = get_channel(rstate, &pending->short_channel_id);
|
|
if (chan != NULL && is_chan_public(chan)) {
|
|
SUPERVERBOSE("%s: %s already has public channel",
|
|
__func__,
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id,
|
|
&pending->short_channel_id));
|
|
goto ignored;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We don't replace previous ones, since we might validate that and
|
|
* think this one is OK! */
|
|
if (find_pending_cannouncement(rstate, &pending->short_channel_id)) {
|
|
SUPERVERBOSE("%s: %s already has pending cannouncement",
|
|
__func__,
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id,
|
|
&pending->short_channel_id));
|
|
goto ignored;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: Handle duplicates as per BOLT #7 */
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
*
|
|
* - if `features` field contains _unknown even bits_:
|
|
* - MUST NOT parse the remainder of the message.
|
|
* - MAY discard the message altogether.
|
|
* - SHOULD NOT connect to the node.
|
|
* - MAY forward `node_announcement`s that contain an _unknown_
|
|
* `features` _bit_, regardless of if it has parsed the announcement
|
|
* or not.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!features_supported(features, NULL)) {
|
|
status_trace("Ignoring channel announcement, unsupported features %s.",
|
|
tal_hex(pending, features));
|
|
goto ignored;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
* The receiving node:
|
|
*...
|
|
* - if the specified `chain_hash` is unknown to the receiver:
|
|
* - MUST ignore the message.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!bitcoin_blkid_eq(&chain_hash,
|
|
&rstate->chainparams->genesis_blockhash)) {
|
|
status_trace(
|
|
"Received channel_announcement %s for unknown chain %s",
|
|
type_to_string(pending, struct short_channel_id,
|
|
&pending->short_channel_id),
|
|
type_to_string(pending, struct bitcoin_blkid, &chain_hash));
|
|
goto ignored;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = check_channel_announcement(rstate,
|
|
&pending->node_id_1,
|
|
&pending->node_id_2,
|
|
&pending->bitcoin_key_1,
|
|
&pending->bitcoin_key_2,
|
|
&node_signature_1,
|
|
&node_signature_2,
|
|
&bitcoin_signature_1,
|
|
&bitcoin_signature_2,
|
|
pending->announce);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
*
|
|
* - if `bitcoin_signature_1`, `bitcoin_signature_2`,
|
|
* `node_signature_1` OR `node_signature_2` are invalid OR NOT
|
|
* correct:
|
|
* - SHOULD fail the connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
goto malformed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status_trace("Received channel_announcement for channel %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id,
|
|
&pending->short_channel_id));
|
|
|
|
/* Add both endpoints to the pending_node_map so we can stash
|
|
* node_announcements while we wait for the txout check */
|
|
add_pending_node_announcement(rstate, &pending->node_id_1);
|
|
add_pending_node_announcement(rstate, &pending->node_id_2);
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&rstate->pending_cannouncement, &pending->list);
|
|
tal_add_destructor2(pending, destroy_pending_cannouncement, rstate);
|
|
|
|
/* Success */
|
|
// MSC: Cppcheck 1.86 gets this false positive
|
|
// cppcheck-suppress autoVariables
|
|
*scid = &pending->short_channel_id;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
malformed:
|
|
tal_free(pending);
|
|
*scid = NULL;
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
ignored:
|
|
tal_free(pending);
|
|
*scid = NULL;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void process_pending_channel_update(struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|
const struct short_channel_id *scid,
|
|
const u8 *cupdate)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *err;
|
|
|
|
if (!cupdate)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: We don't remember who sent us updates, so can't error them */
|
|
err = handle_channel_update(rstate, cupdate, "pending update");
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
status_trace("Pending channel_update for %s: %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id, scid),
|
|
sanitize_error(tmpctx, err, NULL));
|
|
tal_free(err);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void handle_pending_cannouncement(struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|
const struct short_channel_id *scid,
|
|
struct amount_sat sat,
|
|
const u8 *outscript)
|
|
{
|
|
const u8 *s;
|
|
struct pending_cannouncement *pending;
|
|
|
|
pending = find_pending_cannouncement(rstate, scid);
|
|
if (!pending)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
*
|
|
* The receiving node:
|
|
*...
|
|
* - if the `short_channel_id`'s output... is spent:
|
|
* - MUST ignore the message.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (tal_count(outscript) == 0) {
|
|
status_trace("channel_announcement: no unspent txout %s",
|
|
type_to_string(pending, struct short_channel_id,
|
|
scid));
|
|
tal_free(pending);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
*
|
|
* The receiving node:
|
|
*...
|
|
* - if the `short_channel_id`'s output does NOT correspond to a P2WSH
|
|
* (using `bitcoin_key_1` and `bitcoin_key_2`, as specified in
|
|
* [BOLT #3](03-transactions.md#funding-transaction-output)) ...
|
|
* - MUST ignore the message.
|
|
*/
|
|
s = scriptpubkey_p2wsh(pending,
|
|
bitcoin_redeem_2of2(pending,
|
|
&pending->bitcoin_key_1,
|
|
&pending->bitcoin_key_2));
|
|
|
|
if (!scripteq(s, outscript)) {
|
|
status_trace("channel_announcement: txout %s expectes %s, got %s",
|
|
type_to_string(pending, struct short_channel_id,
|
|
scid),
|
|
tal_hex(tmpctx, s), tal_hex(tmpctx, outscript));
|
|
tal_free(pending);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!routing_add_channel_announcement(rstate, pending->announce, sat))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Could not add channel_announcement");
|
|
|
|
/* Did we have an update waiting? If so, apply now. */
|
|
process_pending_channel_update(rstate, scid, pending->updates[0]);
|
|
process_pending_channel_update(rstate, scid, pending->updates[1]);
|
|
|
|
process_pending_node_announcement(rstate, &pending->node_id_1);
|
|
process_pending_node_announcement(rstate, &pending->node_id_2);
|
|
|
|
tal_free(pending);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void update_pending(struct pending_cannouncement *pending,
|
|
u32 timestamp, const u8 *update,
|
|
const u8 direction)
|
|
{
|
|
SUPERVERBOSE("Deferring update for pending channel %s/%d",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id,
|
|
&pending->short_channel_id), direction);
|
|
|
|
if (pending->update_timestamps[direction] < timestamp) {
|
|
if (pending->updates[direction]) {
|
|
status_trace("Replacing existing update");
|
|
tal_free(pending->updates[direction]);
|
|
}
|
|
pending->updates[direction] = tal_dup_arr(pending, u8, update, tal_count(update), 0);
|
|
pending->update_timestamps[direction] = timestamp;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void set_connection_values(struct chan *chan,
|
|
int idx,
|
|
u32 base_fee,
|
|
u32 proportional_fee,
|
|
u32 delay,
|
|
u8 message_flags,
|
|
u8 channel_flags,
|
|
u64 timestamp,
|
|
struct amount_msat htlc_minimum,
|
|
struct amount_msat htlc_maximum)
|
|
{
|
|
struct half_chan *c = &chan->half[idx];
|
|
|
|
c->delay = delay;
|
|
c->htlc_minimum = htlc_minimum;
|
|
c->htlc_maximum = htlc_maximum;
|
|
c->base_fee = base_fee;
|
|
c->proportional_fee = proportional_fee;
|
|
c->message_flags = message_flags;
|
|
c->channel_flags = channel_flags;
|
|
c->last_timestamp = timestamp;
|
|
assert((c->channel_flags & ROUTING_FLAGS_DIRECTION) == idx);
|
|
|
|
SUPERVERBOSE("Channel %s/%d was updated.",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id, &chan->scid),
|
|
idx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool routing_add_channel_update(struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|
const u8 *update TAKES)
|
|
{
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature;
|
|
struct short_channel_id short_channel_id;
|
|
u32 timestamp;
|
|
u8 message_flags, channel_flags;
|
|
u16 expiry;
|
|
struct amount_msat htlc_minimum, htlc_maximum;
|
|
u32 fee_base_msat;
|
|
u32 fee_proportional_millionths;
|
|
struct bitcoin_blkid chain_hash;
|
|
struct chan *chan;
|
|
u8 direction;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_channel_update(update, &signature, &chain_hash,
|
|
&short_channel_id, ×tamp,
|
|
&message_flags, &channel_flags,
|
|
&expiry, &htlc_minimum, &fee_base_msat,
|
|
&fee_proportional_millionths))
|
|
return false;
|
|
/* If it's flagged as containing the optional field, reparse for
|
|
* the optional field */
|
|
if ((message_flags & ROUTING_OPT_HTLC_MAX_MSAT) &&
|
|
!fromwire_channel_update_option_channel_htlc_max(
|
|
update, &signature, &chain_hash,
|
|
&short_channel_id, ×tamp,
|
|
&message_flags, &channel_flags,
|
|
&expiry, &htlc_minimum, &fee_base_msat,
|
|
&fee_proportional_millionths,
|
|
&htlc_maximum))
|
|
return false;
|
|
chan = get_channel(rstate, &short_channel_id);
|
|
if (!chan)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
if (message_flags & ROUTING_OPT_HTLC_MAX_MSAT) {
|
|
/* Reject update if the `htlc_maximum_msat` is greater
|
|
* than the total available channel satoshis */
|
|
if (amount_msat_greater_sat(htlc_maximum, chan->sat))
|
|
return false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* If not indicated, set htlc_max_msat to channel capacity */
|
|
if (!amount_sat_to_msat(&htlc_maximum, chan->sat)) {
|
|
status_broken("Channel capacity %s overflows!",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
|
|
&chan->sat));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* FIXME: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/pull/512
|
|
* says we MUST NOT exceed 2^32-1, but c-lightning did, so just trim
|
|
* rather than rejecting. */
|
|
if (amount_msat_greater(htlc_maximum, rstate->chainparams->max_payment))
|
|
htlc_maximum = rstate->chainparams->max_payment;
|
|
|
|
direction = channel_flags & 0x1;
|
|
set_connection_values(chan, direction, fee_base_msat,
|
|
fee_proportional_millionths, expiry,
|
|
message_flags, channel_flags,
|
|
timestamp, htlc_minimum, htlc_maximum);
|
|
|
|
/* Replace any old one. */
|
|
tal_free(chan->half[direction].channel_update);
|
|
chan->half[direction].channel_update
|
|
= tal_dup_arr(chan, u8, update, tal_count(update), 0);
|
|
|
|
/* For private channels, we get updates without an announce: don't
|
|
* broadcast them! */
|
|
if (!chan->channel_announce)
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
* - MUST consider the `timestamp` of the `channel_announcement` to be
|
|
* the `timestamp` of a corresponding `channel_update`.
|
|
* - MUST consider whether to send the `channel_announcement` after
|
|
* receiving the first corresponding `channel_update`.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (chan->channel_announcement_index == 0)
|
|
add_channel_announce_to_broadcast(rstate, chan, timestamp);
|
|
|
|
persistent_broadcast(rstate, chan->half[direction].channel_update,
|
|
timestamp);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
u8 *handle_channel_update(struct routing_state *rstate, const u8 *update TAKES,
|
|
const char *source)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *serialized;
|
|
struct half_chan *c;
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature;
|
|
struct short_channel_id short_channel_id;
|
|
u32 timestamp;
|
|
u8 message_flags, channel_flags;
|
|
u16 expiry;
|
|
struct amount_msat htlc_minimum;
|
|
u32 fee_base_msat;
|
|
u32 fee_proportional_millionths;
|
|
struct bitcoin_blkid chain_hash;
|
|
struct chan *chan;
|
|
u8 direction;
|
|
size_t len = tal_count(update);
|
|
u8 *err;
|
|
|
|
serialized = tal_dup_arr(tmpctx, u8, update, len, 0);
|
|
if (!fromwire_channel_update(serialized, &signature,
|
|
&chain_hash, &short_channel_id,
|
|
×tamp, &message_flags,
|
|
&channel_flags, &expiry,
|
|
&htlc_minimum, &fee_base_msat,
|
|
&fee_proportional_millionths)) {
|
|
err = towire_errorfmt(rstate, NULL,
|
|
"Malformed channel_update %s",
|
|
tal_hex(tmpctx, serialized));
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
direction = channel_flags & 0x1;
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
*
|
|
* The receiving node:
|
|
*...
|
|
* - if the specified `chain_hash` value is unknown (meaning it isn't
|
|
* active on the specified chain):
|
|
* - MUST ignore the channel update.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!bitcoin_blkid_eq(&chain_hash,
|
|
&rstate->chainparams->genesis_blockhash)) {
|
|
status_trace("Received channel_update for unknown chain %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_blkid,
|
|
&chain_hash));
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
chan = get_channel(rstate, &short_channel_id);
|
|
|
|
/* Optimization: only check for pending if not public */
|
|
if (!chan || !is_chan_public(chan)) {
|
|
struct pending_cannouncement *pending;
|
|
|
|
pending = find_pending_cannouncement(rstate, &short_channel_id);
|
|
if (pending) {
|
|
update_pending(pending,
|
|
timestamp, serialized, direction);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!chan) {
|
|
bad_gossip_order(serialized,
|
|
source,
|
|
tal_fmt(tmpctx, "%s(%u)",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx,
|
|
struct short_channel_id,
|
|
&short_channel_id),
|
|
channel_flags));
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
*
|
|
* - if the `timestamp` is unreasonably far in the future:
|
|
* - MAY discard the `channel_update`.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (timestamp > time_now().ts.tv_sec + rstate->prune_timeout) {
|
|
status_debug("Received channel_update for %s with far time %u",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id,
|
|
&short_channel_id),
|
|
timestamp);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Note: we can consider old timestamps a case of "instant prune" too */
|
|
if (timestamp < time_now().ts.tv_sec - rstate->prune_timeout) {
|
|
status_debug("Received channel_update for %s with old time %u",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id,
|
|
&short_channel_id),
|
|
timestamp);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c = &chan->half[direction];
|
|
|
|
if (is_halfchan_defined(c) && timestamp <= c->last_timestamp) {
|
|
/* They're not supposed to do this! */
|
|
if (timestamp == c->last_timestamp
|
|
&& !memeq(c->channel_update, tal_count(c->channel_update),
|
|
serialized, tal_count(serialized))) {
|
|
status_unusual("Bad gossip repeated timestamp for %s(%u): %s then %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx,
|
|
struct short_channel_id,
|
|
&short_channel_id),
|
|
channel_flags,
|
|
tal_hex(tmpctx, c->channel_update),
|
|
tal_hex(tmpctx, serialized));
|
|
}
|
|
SUPERVERBOSE("Ignoring outdated update.");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = check_channel_update(rstate, &chan->nodes[direction]->id,
|
|
&signature, serialized);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
*
|
|
* - if `signature` is not a valid signature, using `node_id`
|
|
* of the double-SHA256 of the entire message following the
|
|
* `signature` field (including unknown fields following
|
|
* `fee_proportional_millionths`):
|
|
* - MUST NOT process the message further.
|
|
* - SHOULD fail the connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status_trace("Received channel_update for channel %s/%d now %s was %s (from %s)",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id,
|
|
&short_channel_id),
|
|
channel_flags & 0x01,
|
|
channel_flags & ROUTING_FLAGS_DISABLED ? "DISABLED" : "ACTIVE",
|
|
is_halfchan_defined(c)
|
|
? (c->channel_flags & ROUTING_FLAGS_DISABLED ? "DISABLED" : "ACTIVE")
|
|
: "UNDEFINED",
|
|
source);
|
|
|
|
if (!routing_add_channel_update(rstate, serialized))
|
|
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
|
"Failed adding channel_update");
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct wireaddr *read_addresses(const tal_t *ctx, const u8 *ser)
|
|
{
|
|
const u8 *cursor = ser;
|
|
size_t len = tal_count(ser);
|
|
struct wireaddr *wireaddrs = tal_arr(ctx, struct wireaddr, 0);
|
|
|
|
while (cursor && len) {
|
|
struct wireaddr wireaddr;
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
*
|
|
* The receiving node:
|
|
*...
|
|
* - SHOULD ignore the first `address descriptor` that does
|
|
* NOT match the types defined above.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!fromwire_wireaddr(&cursor, &len, &wireaddr)) {
|
|
if (!cursor)
|
|
/* Parsing address failed */
|
|
return tal_free(wireaddrs);
|
|
/* Unknown type, stop there. */
|
|
status_trace("read_addresses: unknown address type %u",
|
|
cursor[0]);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tal_arr_expand(&wireaddrs, wireaddr);
|
|
}
|
|
return wireaddrs;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool routing_add_node_announcement(struct routing_state *rstate, const u8 *msg TAKES)
|
|
{
|
|
struct node *node;
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature;
|
|
u32 timestamp;
|
|
struct pubkey node_id;
|
|
u8 rgb_color[3];
|
|
u8 alias[32];
|
|
u8 *features, *addresses;
|
|
struct wireaddr *wireaddrs;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_node_announcement(tmpctx, msg,
|
|
&signature, &features, ×tamp,
|
|
&node_id, rgb_color, alias,
|
|
&addresses))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
node = get_node(rstate, &node_id);
|
|
|
|
/* May happen if we accepted the node_announcement due to a local
|
|
* channel, for which we didn't have the announcement yet. */
|
|
if (node == NULL)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
wireaddrs = read_addresses(tmpctx, addresses);
|
|
tal_free(node->addresses);
|
|
node->addresses = tal_steal(node, wireaddrs);
|
|
|
|
node->last_timestamp = timestamp;
|
|
memcpy(node->rgb_color, rgb_color, ARRAY_SIZE(node->rgb_color));
|
|
memcpy(node->alias, alias, ARRAY_SIZE(node->alias));
|
|
tal_free(node->globalfeatures);
|
|
node->globalfeatures = tal_steal(node, features);
|
|
|
|
tal_free(node->node_announcement);
|
|
node->node_announcement = tal_dup_arr(node, u8, msg, tal_count(msg), 0);
|
|
|
|
/* We might be waiting for channel_announce to be released. */
|
|
if (node_has_broadcastable_channels(node)) {
|
|
node->node_announcement_index = persistent_broadcast(
|
|
rstate, node->node_announcement, timestamp);
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
u8 *handle_node_announcement(struct routing_state *rstate, const u8 *node_ann)
|
|
{
|
|
u8 *serialized;
|
|
struct sha256_double hash;
|
|
struct node *node;
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature signature;
|
|
u32 timestamp;
|
|
struct pubkey node_id;
|
|
u8 rgb_color[3];
|
|
u8 alias[32];
|
|
u8 *features, *addresses;
|
|
struct wireaddr *wireaddrs;
|
|
struct pending_node_announce *pna;
|
|
size_t len = tal_count(node_ann);
|
|
bool applied;
|
|
|
|
serialized = tal_dup_arr(tmpctx, u8, node_ann, len, 0);
|
|
if (!fromwire_node_announcement(tmpctx, serialized,
|
|
&signature, &features, ×tamp,
|
|
&node_id, rgb_color, alias,
|
|
&addresses)) {
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
*
|
|
* - if `node_id` is NOT a valid compressed public key:
|
|
* - SHOULD fail the connection.
|
|
* - MUST NOT process the message further.
|
|
*/
|
|
u8 *err = towire_errorfmt(rstate, NULL,
|
|
"Malformed node_announcement %s",
|
|
tal_hex(tmpctx, node_ann));
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
*
|
|
* The receiving node:
|
|
*...
|
|
* - if `features` field contains _unknown even bits_:
|
|
* - MUST NOT parse the remainder of the message.
|
|
* - MAY discard the message altogether.
|
|
* - SHOULD NOT connect to the node.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!features_supported(features, NULL)) {
|
|
status_trace("Ignoring node announcement for node %s, unsupported features %s.",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &node_id),
|
|
tal_hex(tmpctx, features));
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sha256_double(&hash, serialized + 66, tal_count(serialized) - 66);
|
|
if (!check_signed_hash(&hash, &signature, &node_id)) {
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
*
|
|
* - if `signature` is not a valid signature, using
|
|
* `node_id` of the double-SHA256 of the entire
|
|
* message following the `signature` field
|
|
* (including unknown fields following
|
|
* `fee_proportional_millionths`):
|
|
* - MUST NOT process the message further.
|
|
* - SHOULD fail the connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
u8 *err = towire_errorfmt(rstate, NULL,
|
|
"Bad signature for %s hash %s"
|
|
" on node_announcement %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx,
|
|
secp256k1_ecdsa_signature,
|
|
&signature),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx,
|
|
struct sha256_double,
|
|
&hash),
|
|
tal_hex(tmpctx, node_ann));
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wireaddrs = read_addresses(tmpctx, addresses);
|
|
if (!wireaddrs) {
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
*
|
|
* - if `addrlen` is insufficient to hold the address
|
|
* descriptors of the known types:
|
|
* - SHOULD fail the connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
u8 *err = towire_errorfmt(rstate, NULL,
|
|
"Malformed wireaddrs %s in %s.",
|
|
tal_hex(tmpctx, wireaddrs),
|
|
tal_hex(tmpctx, node_ann));
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Beyond this point it's not malformed, so safe if we make it
|
|
* pending and requeue later. */
|
|
node = get_node(rstate, &node_id);
|
|
|
|
/* BOLT #7:
|
|
*
|
|
* - if `node_id` is NOT previously known from a `channel_announcement`
|
|
* message, OR if `timestamp` is NOT greater than the last-received
|
|
* `node_announcement` from this `node_id`:
|
|
* - SHOULD ignore the message.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!node || !node_has_public_channels(node)) {
|
|
/* Check if we are currently verifying the txout for a
|
|
* matching channel */
|
|
pna = pending_node_map_get(rstate->pending_node_map,
|
|
&node_id);
|
|
if (!pna) {
|
|
bad_gossip_order(serialized, "node_announcement",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
|
|
&node_id));
|
|
} else if (pna->timestamp < timestamp) {
|
|
SUPERVERBOSE(
|
|
"Deferring node_announcement for node %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &node_id));
|
|
pna->timestamp = timestamp;
|
|
tal_free(pna->node_announcement);
|
|
pna->node_announcement = tal_dup_arr(pna, u8, node_ann,
|
|
tal_count(node_ann),
|
|
0);
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (node->last_timestamp >= timestamp) {
|
|
SUPERVERBOSE("Ignoring node announcement, it's outdated.");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status_trace("Received node_announcement for node %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, &node_id));
|
|
|
|
applied = routing_add_node_announcement(rstate, serialized);
|
|
assert(applied);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct route_hop *get_route(const tal_t *ctx, struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|
const struct pubkey *source,
|
|
const struct pubkey *destination,
|
|
struct amount_msat msat, double riskfactor,
|
|
u32 final_cltv,
|
|
double fuzz, u64 seed,
|
|
const struct short_channel_id_dir *excluded,
|
|
size_t max_hops)
|
|
{
|
|
struct chan **route;
|
|
struct amount_msat total_amount;
|
|
unsigned int total_delay;
|
|
struct amount_msat fee;
|
|
struct route_hop *hops;
|
|
struct node *n;
|
|
struct amount_msat *saved_capacity;
|
|
struct siphash_seed base_seed;
|
|
|
|
saved_capacity = tal_arr(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, tal_count(excluded));
|
|
|
|
base_seed.u.u64[0] = base_seed.u.u64[1] = seed;
|
|
|
|
/* Temporarily set excluded channels' capacity to zero. */
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(excluded); i++) {
|
|
struct chan *chan = get_channel(rstate, &excluded[i].scid);
|
|
if (!chan)
|
|
continue;
|
|
saved_capacity[i] = chan->half[excluded[i].dir].htlc_maximum;
|
|
chan->half[excluded[i].dir].htlc_maximum = AMOUNT_MSAT(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
route = find_route(ctx, rstate, source, destination, msat,
|
|
riskfactor / BLOCKS_PER_YEAR / 100,
|
|
fuzz, &base_seed, max_hops, &fee);
|
|
|
|
/* Now restore the capacity. */
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(excluded); i++) {
|
|
struct chan *chan = get_channel(rstate, &excluded[i].scid);
|
|
if (!chan)
|
|
continue;
|
|
chan->half[excluded[i].dir].htlc_maximum = saved_capacity[i];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!route) {
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fees, delays need to be calculated backwards along route. */
|
|
hops = tal_arr(ctx, struct route_hop, tal_count(route));
|
|
total_amount = msat;
|
|
total_delay = final_cltv;
|
|
|
|
/* Start at destination node. */
|
|
n = get_node(rstate, destination);
|
|
for (int i = tal_count(route) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
const struct half_chan *c;
|
|
|
|
int idx = half_chan_to(n, route[i]);
|
|
c = &route[i]->half[idx];
|
|
hops[i].channel_id = route[i]->scid;
|
|
hops[i].nodeid = n->id;
|
|
hops[i].amount = total_amount;
|
|
hops[i].delay = total_delay;
|
|
hops[i].direction = idx;
|
|
|
|
/* Since we calculated this route, it should not overflow! */
|
|
if (!amount_msat_add_fee(&total_amount,
|
|
c->base_fee, c->proportional_fee)) {
|
|
status_broken("Route overflow step %i: %s + %u/%u!?",
|
|
i, type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat,
|
|
&total_amount),
|
|
c->base_fee, c->proportional_fee);
|
|
return tal_free(hops);
|
|
}
|
|
total_delay += c->delay;
|
|
n = other_node(n, route[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
assert(pubkey_eq(&n->id, source));
|
|
|
|
return hops;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void routing_failure(struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|
const struct pubkey *erring_node_pubkey,
|
|
const struct short_channel_id *scid,
|
|
int erring_direction,
|
|
enum onion_type failcode,
|
|
const u8 *channel_update)
|
|
{
|
|
status_trace("Received routing failure 0x%04x (%s), "
|
|
"erring node %s, "
|
|
"channel %s/%u",
|
|
(int) failcode, onion_type_name(failcode),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey, erring_node_pubkey),
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id, scid),
|
|
erring_direction);
|
|
|
|
/* lightningd will only extract this if UPDATE is set. */
|
|
if (channel_update) {
|
|
u8 *err = handle_channel_update(rstate, channel_update, "error");
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
status_unusual("routing_failure: "
|
|
"bad channel_update %s",
|
|
sanitize_error(err, err, NULL));
|
|
tal_free(err);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (failcode & UPDATE) {
|
|
status_unusual("routing_failure: "
|
|
"UPDATE bit set, no channel_update. "
|
|
"failcode: 0x%04x",
|
|
(int) failcode);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We respond to permanent errors, ignore the rest: they're
|
|
* for the pay command to worry about. */
|
|
if (!(failcode & PERM))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (failcode & NODE) {
|
|
struct node *node = get_node(rstate, erring_node_pubkey);
|
|
if (!node) {
|
|
status_unusual("routing_failure: Erring node %s not in map",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
|
|
erring_node_pubkey));
|
|
} else {
|
|
status_trace("Deleting node %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx,
|
|
struct pubkey,
|
|
&node->id));
|
|
for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(node->chans); ++i) {
|
|
/* Set it up to be pruned. */
|
|
tal_steal(tmpctx, node->chans[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct chan *chan = get_channel(rstate, scid);
|
|
|
|
if (!chan)
|
|
status_unusual("routing_failure: "
|
|
"Channel %s unknown",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx,
|
|
struct short_channel_id,
|
|
scid));
|
|
else {
|
|
/* This error can be triggered by sendpay if caller
|
|
* uses the wrong key for dest. */
|
|
if (failcode == WIRE_INVALID_ONION_HMAC
|
|
&& !pubkey_eq(&chan->nodes[!erring_direction]->id,
|
|
erring_node_pubkey))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
status_trace("Deleting channel %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx,
|
|
struct short_channel_id,
|
|
scid));
|
|
/* Set it up to be deleted. */
|
|
tal_steal(tmpctx, chan);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void route_prune(struct routing_state *rstate)
|
|
{
|
|
u64 now = time_now().ts.tv_sec;
|
|
/* Anything below this highwater mark ought to be pruned */
|
|
const s64 highwater = now - rstate->prune_timeout;
|
|
const tal_t *pruned = tal(NULL, char);
|
|
struct chan *chan;
|
|
u64 idx;
|
|
|
|
/* Now iterate through all channels and see if it is still alive */
|
|
for (chan = uintmap_first(&rstate->chanmap, &idx);
|
|
chan;
|
|
chan = uintmap_after(&rstate->chanmap, &idx)) {
|
|
/* Local-only? Don't prune. */
|
|
if (!is_chan_public(chan))
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (chan->half[0].last_timestamp < highwater
|
|
&& chan->half[1].last_timestamp < highwater) {
|
|
status_trace(
|
|
"Pruning channel %s from network view (ages %"PRIu64" and %"PRIu64"s)",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id,
|
|
&chan->scid),
|
|
now - chan->half[0].last_timestamp,
|
|
now - chan->half[1].last_timestamp);
|
|
|
|
/* This may perturb iteration so do outside loop. */
|
|
tal_steal(pruned, chan);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This frees all the chans and maybe even nodes. */
|
|
tal_free(pruned);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if DEVELOPER
|
|
void memleak_remove_routing_tables(struct htable *memtable,
|
|
const struct routing_state *rstate)
|
|
{
|
|
memleak_remove_htable(memtable, &rstate->nodes->raw);
|
|
memleak_remove_htable(memtable, &rstate->pending_node_map->raw);
|
|
memleak_remove_uintmap(memtable, &rstate->broadcasts->broadcasts);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* DEVELOPER */
|
|
|
|
bool handle_local_add_channel(struct routing_state *rstate, const u8 *msg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct short_channel_id scid;
|
|
struct pubkey remote_node_id;
|
|
struct amount_sat sat;
|
|
|
|
if (!fromwire_gossipd_local_add_channel(msg, &scid, &remote_node_id,
|
|
&sat)) {
|
|
status_broken("Unable to parse local_add_channel message: %s",
|
|
tal_hex(msg, msg));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Can happen on channeld restart. */
|
|
if (get_channel(rstate, &scid)) {
|
|
status_trace("Attempted to local_add_channel a known channel");
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
status_trace("local_add_channel %s",
|
|
type_to_string(tmpctx, struct short_channel_id, &scid));
|
|
|
|
/* Create new (unannounced) channel */
|
|
new_chan(rstate, &scid, &rstate->local_id, &remote_node_id, sat);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|