#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef SUPERVERBOSE #define SUPERVERBOSE(...) #endif static bool state_update_ok(struct channel *channel, enum htlc_state oldstate, enum htlc_state newstate, u64 htlc_id, const char *dir) { enum htlc_state expected = oldstate + 1; /* We never get told about RCVD_REMOVE_HTLC, so skip over that * (we initialize in SENT_ADD_HTLC / RCVD_ADD_COMMIT, so those * work). */ if (expected == RCVD_REMOVE_HTLC) expected = RCVD_REMOVE_COMMIT; if (newstate != expected) { channel_internal_error(channel, "HTLC %s %"PRIu64" invalid update %s->%s", dir, htlc_id, htlc_state_name(oldstate), htlc_state_name(newstate)); return false; } log_debug(channel->log, "HTLC %s %"PRIu64" %s->%s", dir, htlc_id, htlc_state_name(oldstate), htlc_state_name(newstate)); return true; } static bool htlc_in_update_state(struct channel *channel, struct htlc_in *hin, enum htlc_state newstate) { if (!state_update_ok(channel, hin->hstate, newstate, hin->key.id, "in")) return false; wallet_htlc_update(channel->peer->ld->wallet, hin->dbid, newstate, hin->preimage, hin->badonion, hin->failonion, NULL, hin->we_filled); hin->hstate = newstate; return true; } static bool htlc_out_update_state(struct channel *channel, struct htlc_out *hout, enum htlc_state newstate) { if (!state_update_ok(channel, hout->hstate, newstate, hout->key.id, "out")) return false; bool we_filled = false; wallet_htlc_update(channel->peer->ld->wallet, hout->dbid, newstate, hout->preimage, 0, hout->failonion, hout->failmsg, &we_filled); hout->hstate = newstate; return true; } static struct failed_htlc *mk_failed_htlc_badonion(const tal_t *ctx, const struct htlc_in *hin, enum onion_wire badonion) { struct failed_htlc *f = tal(ctx, struct failed_htlc); f->id = hin->key.id; f->onion = NULL; f->badonion = badonion; f->sha256_of_onion = tal(f, struct sha256); sha256(f->sha256_of_onion, hin->onion_routing_packet, sizeof(hin->onion_routing_packet)); return f; } static struct failed_htlc *mk_failed_htlc(const tal_t *ctx, const struct htlc_in *hin, const struct onionreply *failonion) { struct failed_htlc *f = tal(ctx, struct failed_htlc); f->id = hin->key.id; f->sha256_of_onion = NULL; f->badonion = 0; /* Wrap onion error */ f->onion = wrap_onionreply(f, hin->shared_secret, failonion); return f; } static void tell_channeld_htlc_failed(const struct htlc_in *hin, const struct failed_htlc *failed_htlc) { /* Tell peer, if we can. */ if (!hin->key.channel->owner) return; /* onchaind doesn't care, it can't do anything but wait */ if (channel_on_chain(hin->key.channel)) return; subd_send_msg(hin->key.channel->owner, take(towire_channeld_fail_htlc(NULL, failed_htlc))); } struct failmsg_update_cbdata { struct htlc_in *hin; const u8 *failmsg_needs_update; }; static void failmsg_update_reply(struct subd *gossipd, const u8 *msg, const int *unused, struct failmsg_update_cbdata *cbdata) { u8 *failmsg; u8 *stripped_update; struct failed_htlc *failed_htlc; /* This can happen because channel never got properly announced.*/ if (!fromwire_gossipd_get_stripped_cupdate_reply(msg, msg, &stripped_update) || !tal_count(stripped_update)) { failmsg = towire_temporary_node_failure(NULL); } else { /* End of failmsg is two zero bytes (empty update). */ assert(tal_count(cbdata->failmsg_needs_update) >= 2); failmsg = tal_dup_arr(msg, u8, cbdata->failmsg_needs_update, tal_count(cbdata->failmsg_needs_update)-2, 0); towire_u16(&failmsg, tal_count(stripped_update)); towire_u8_array(&failmsg, stripped_update, tal_count(stripped_update)); } /* Now we replace dummy failonion with this real one */ tal_free(cbdata->hin->failonion); cbdata->hin->failonion = create_onionreply(cbdata->hin, cbdata->hin->shared_secret, failmsg); bool we_filled = false; wallet_htlc_update(gossipd->ld->wallet, cbdata->hin->dbid, cbdata->hin->hstate, cbdata->hin->preimage, cbdata->hin->badonion, cbdata->hin->failonion, NULL, &we_filled); failed_htlc = mk_failed_htlc(tmpctx, cbdata->hin, cbdata->hin->failonion); tell_channeld_htlc_failed(cbdata->hin, failed_htlc); } static void fail_in_htlc(struct htlc_in *hin, const struct onionreply *failonion TAKES) { struct failed_htlc *failed_htlc; assert(!hin->preimage); hin->failonion = dup_onionreply(hin, failonion); /* We update state now to signal it's in progress, for persistence. */ htlc_in_update_state(hin->key.channel, hin, SENT_REMOVE_HTLC); htlc_in_check(hin, __func__); #if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES /* In a blinded path, all failures become invalid_onion_blinding */ if (hin->blinding) { failed_htlc = mk_failed_htlc_badonion(tmpctx, hin, WIRE_INVALID_ONION_BLINDING); } else #endif failed_htlc = mk_failed_htlc(tmpctx, hin, hin->failonion); tell_channeld_htlc_failed(hin, failed_htlc); } /* Immediately fail HTLC with a BADONION code */ static void local_fail_in_htlc_badonion(struct htlc_in *hin, enum onion_wire badonion) { struct failed_htlc *failed_htlc; assert(!hin->preimage); assert(badonion & BADONION); hin->badonion = badonion; /* We update state now to signal it's in progress, for persistence. */ htlc_in_update_state(hin->key.channel, hin, SENT_REMOVE_HTLC); htlc_in_check(hin, __func__); failed_htlc = mk_failed_htlc_badonion(tmpctx, hin, badonion); tell_channeld_htlc_failed(hin, failed_htlc); } /* This is used for cases where we can immediately fail the HTLC. */ void local_fail_in_htlc(struct htlc_in *hin, const u8 *failmsg TAKES) { struct onionreply *failonion = create_onionreply(NULL, hin->shared_secret, failmsg); if (taken(failmsg)) tal_free(failmsg); fail_in_htlc(hin, take(failonion)); } /* This is used for cases where we can immediately fail the HTLC, but * need to append a channel_update. */ void local_fail_in_htlc_needs_update(struct htlc_in *hin, const u8 *failmsg_needs_update TAKES, const struct short_channel_id *failmsg_scid) { struct failmsg_update_cbdata *cbdata; /* To avoid the state where we have no failonion, we use a temporary * one, and update once we get the reply from gossipd. */ assert(!hin->preimage); hin->failonion = create_onionreply(hin, hin->shared_secret, towire_temporary_node_failure(tmpctx)); /* We update state now to signal it's in progress, for persistence. */ htlc_in_update_state(hin->key.channel, hin, SENT_REMOVE_HTLC); htlc_in_check(hin, __func__); cbdata = tal(hin, struct failmsg_update_cbdata); cbdata->hin = hin; cbdata->failmsg_needs_update = tal_dup_talarr(cbdata, u8, failmsg_needs_update); subd_req(cbdata, hin->key.channel->peer->ld->gossip, take(towire_gossipd_get_stripped_cupdate(NULL, failmsg_scid)), -1, 0, failmsg_update_reply, cbdata); } /* Helper to create (common) WIRE_INCORRECT_OR_UNKNOWN_PAYMENT_DETAILS */ const u8 *failmsg_incorrect_or_unknown_(const tal_t *ctx, struct lightningd *ld, const struct htlc_in *hin, const char *file, int line) { log_debug(ld->log, "WIRE_INCORRECT_OR_UNKNOWN_PAYMENT_DETAILS: %s:%u", file, line); return towire_incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details( ctx, hin->msat, get_block_height(ld->topology)); } /* localfail are for handing to the local payer if it's local. */ static void fail_out_htlc(struct htlc_out *hout, const char *localfail, const u8 *failmsg_needs_update TAKES) { htlc_out_check(hout, __func__); assert(hout->failmsg || hout->failonion); if (hout->am_origin) { payment_failed(hout->key.channel->peer->ld, hout, localfail, failmsg_needs_update); if (taken(failmsg_needs_update)) tal_free(failmsg_needs_update); } else if (hout->in) { if (failmsg_needs_update) { local_fail_in_htlc_needs_update(hout->in, failmsg_needs_update, hout->key.channel->scid); } else { const struct onionreply *failonion; /* If we have an onion, simply copy it. */ if (hout->failonion) failonion = hout->failonion; /* Otherwise, we need to onionize this local error. */ else failonion = create_onionreply(hout, hout->in->shared_secret, hout->failmsg); fail_in_htlc(hout->in, failonion); } } } /* BOLT #4: * * * `amt_to_forward`: The amount, in millisatoshis, to forward to the next * receiving peer specified within the routing information. * * For non-final nodes, this value amount MUST include the origin node's computed _fee_ for the * receiving peer. When processing an incoming Sphinx packet and the HTLC * message that it is encapsulated within, if the following inequality * doesn't hold, then the HTLC should be rejected as it would indicate that * a prior hop has deviated from the specified parameters: * * incoming_htlc_amt - fee >= amt_to_forward * * Where `fee` is calculated according to the receiving peer's * advertised fee schema (as described in [BOLT * #7](07-routing-gossip.md#htlc-fees)). */ static bool check_fwd_amount(struct htlc_in *hin, struct amount_msat amt_to_forward, struct amount_msat amt_in_htlc, struct amount_msat fee) { struct amount_msat fwd; if (amount_msat_sub(&fwd, amt_in_htlc, fee) && amount_msat_greater_eq(fwd, amt_to_forward)) return true; log_debug(hin->key.channel->log, "HTLC %"PRIu64" incorrect amount:" " %s in, %s out, fee reqd %s", hin->key.id, type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &amt_in_htlc), type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &amt_to_forward), type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &fee)); return false; } /* BOLT #4: * * * `outgoing_cltv_value`: The CLTV value that the _outgoing_ HTLC carrying * the packet should have. * * cltv_expiry - cltv_expiry_delta >= outgoing_cltv_value * * Inclusion of this field allows a hop to both authenticate the * information specified by the origin node, and the parameters of the * HTLC forwarded, and ensure the origin node is using the current * `cltv_expiry_delta` value. If there is no next hop, * `cltv_expiry_delta` is 0. If the values don't correspond, then the * HTLC should be failed and rejected, as this indicates that either a * forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or that the * origin node has an obsolete `cltv_expiry_delta` value. The hop MUST be * consistent in responding to an unexpected `outgoing_cltv_value`, * whether it is the final node or not, to avoid leaking its position in * the route. */ static bool check_cltv(struct htlc_in *hin, u32 cltv_expiry, u32 outgoing_cltv_value, u32 delta) { if (delta < cltv_expiry && cltv_expiry - delta >= outgoing_cltv_value) return true; log_debug(hin->key.channel->log, "HTLC %"PRIu64" incorrect CLTV:" " %u in, %u out, delta reqd %u", hin->key.id, cltv_expiry, outgoing_cltv_value, delta); return false; } void fulfill_htlc(struct htlc_in *hin, const struct preimage *preimage) { u8 *msg; struct channel *channel = hin->key.channel; struct wallet *wallet = channel->peer->ld->wallet; if (hin->hstate != RCVD_ADD_ACK_REVOCATION) { log_debug(channel->log, "HTLC fulfilled, but not ready any more (%s).", htlc_state_name(hin->hstate)); return; } hin->preimage = tal_dup(hin, struct preimage, preimage); /* We update state now to signal it's in progress, for persistence. */ htlc_in_update_state(channel, hin, SENT_REMOVE_HTLC); htlc_in_check(hin, __func__); /* Update channel stats */ wallet_channel_stats_incr_in_fulfilled(wallet, channel->dbid, hin->msat); /* No owner? We'll either send to channeld in peer_htlcs, or * onchaind in onchaind_tell_fulfill. */ if (!channel->owner) { log_debug(channel->log, "HTLC fulfilled, but no owner."); return; } if (channel_on_chain(channel)) { msg = towire_onchaind_known_preimage(hin, preimage, false); } else { struct fulfilled_htlc fulfilled_htlc; fulfilled_htlc.id = hin->key.id; fulfilled_htlc.payment_preimage = *preimage; msg = towire_channeld_fulfill_htlc(hin, &fulfilled_htlc); } subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg)); } static void handle_localpay(struct htlc_in *hin, struct amount_msat amt_to_forward, u32 outgoing_cltv_value, struct amount_msat total_msat, const struct secret *payment_secret) { const u8 *failmsg; struct lightningd *ld = hin->key.channel->peer->ld; /* BOLT #4: * * For the final node, this value MUST be exactly equal to the * incoming htlc amount, otherwise the HTLC should be rejected. */ if (!amount_msat_eq(amt_to_forward, hin->msat)) { log_debug(hin->key.channel->log, "HTLC %"PRIu64" final incorrect amount:" " %s in, %s expected", hin->key.id, type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &hin->msat), type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &amt_to_forward)); /* BOLT #4: * * 1. type: 19 (`final_incorrect_htlc_amount`) * 2. data: * * [`u64`:`incoming_htlc_amt`] * * The amount in the HTLC doesn't match the value in the onion. */ failmsg = towire_final_incorrect_htlc_amount(NULL, hin->msat); goto fail; } /* BOLT #4: * * 1. type: 18 (`final_incorrect_cltv_expiry`) * 2. data: * * [`u32`:`cltv_expiry`] * * The CLTV expiry in the HTLC doesn't match the value in the onion. */ if (!check_cltv(hin, hin->cltv_expiry, outgoing_cltv_value, 0)) { failmsg = towire_final_incorrect_cltv_expiry(NULL, hin->cltv_expiry); goto fail; } /* BOLT #4: * * - if the `cltv_expiry` value is unreasonably near the present: * - MUST fail the HTLC. * - MUST return an `incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details` error. */ if (get_block_height(ld->topology) + ld->config.cltv_final > hin->cltv_expiry) { log_debug(hin->key.channel->log, "Expiry cltv too soon %u < %u + %u", hin->cltv_expiry, get_block_height(ld->topology), ld->config.cltv_final); failmsg = failmsg_incorrect_or_unknown(NULL, ld, hin); goto fail; } htlc_set_add(ld, hin, total_msat, payment_secret); return; fail: local_fail_in_htlc(hin, take(failmsg)); } /* * A catchall in case outgoing peer disconnects before getting fwd. * * We could queue this and wait for it to come back, but this is simple. */ static void destroy_hout_subd_died(struct htlc_out *hout) { log_debug(hout->key.channel->log, "Failing HTLC %"PRIu64" due to peer death", hout->key.id); /* This isn't really used, except as sanity check */ hout->failmsg = towire_temporary_node_failure(hout); /* Assign a temporary state (we're about to free it!) so checks * are happy that it has a failure message */ assert(hout->hstate == SENT_ADD_HTLC); hout->hstate = RCVD_REMOVE_HTLC; fail_out_htlc(hout, "Outgoing subdaemon died", take(towire_temporary_channel_failure(NULL, NULL))); } /* This is where channeld gives us the HTLC id, and also reports if it * failed immediately. */ static void rcvd_htlc_reply(struct subd *subd, const u8 *msg, const int *fds UNUSED, struct htlc_out *hout) { u8 *failmsg; char *failurestr; struct lightningd *ld = subd->ld; if (!fromwire_channeld_offer_htlc_reply(msg, msg, &hout->key.id, &failmsg, &failurestr)) { channel_internal_error(subd->channel, "Bad channel_offer_htlc_reply"); tal_free(hout); return; } if (tal_count(failmsg)) { hout->failmsg = tal_steal(hout, failmsg); if (hout->am_origin) { char *localfail = tal_fmt(msg, "%s: %s", onion_wire_name(fromwire_peektype(failmsg)), failurestr); payment_failed(ld, hout, localfail, NULL); } else if (hout->in) { struct onionreply *failonion; failonion = create_onionreply(hout, hout->in->shared_secret, hout->failmsg); fail_in_htlc(hout->in, failonion); /* here we haven't called connect_htlc_out(), * so set htlc field with NULL */ wallet_forwarded_payment_add(ld->wallet, hout->in, NULL, NULL, FORWARD_LOCAL_FAILED, fromwire_peektype(hout->failmsg)); } /* Prevent hout from being failed twice. */ tal_del_destructor(hout, destroy_hout_subd_died); tal_free(hout); return; } if (find_htlc_out(&subd->ld->htlcs_out, hout->key.channel, hout->key.id) || hout->key.id == HTLC_INVALID_ID) { channel_internal_error(subd->channel, "Bad offer_htlc_reply HTLC id %"PRIu64 " is a duplicate", hout->key.id); tal_free(hout); return; } /* Add it to lookup table now we know id. */ connect_htlc_out(&subd->ld->htlcs_out, hout); /* When channeld includes it in commitment, we'll make it persistent. */ } static void htlc_offer_timeout(struct channel *channel) { /* Unset this in case we reconnect and start again. */ channel->htlc_timeout = NULL; /* If owner died, we should already be taken care of. */ if (!channel->owner || channel->state != CHANNELD_NORMAL) return; log_unusual(channel->owner->log, "Adding HTLC too slow: killing connection"); tal_free(channel->owner); channel_set_billboard(channel, false, "Adding HTLC timed out: killed connection"); } /* Returns failmsg, or NULL on success. */ const u8 *send_htlc_out(const tal_t *ctx, struct channel *out, struct amount_msat amount, u32 cltv, const struct sha256 *payment_hash, const struct pubkey *blinding, u64 partid, const u8 *onion_routing_packet, struct htlc_in *in, struct htlc_out **houtp, bool *needs_update_appended) { u8 *msg; *houtp = NULL; *needs_update_appended = false; if (!channel_can_add_htlc(out)) { log_info(out->log, "Attempt to send HTLC but not ready (%s)", channel_state_name(out)); return towire_unknown_next_peer(ctx); } if (!out->owner) { log_info(out->log, "Attempt to send HTLC but unowned (%s)", channel_state_name(out)); *needs_update_appended = true; return towire_temporary_channel_failure(ctx, NULL); } if (!topology_synced(out->peer->ld->topology)) { log_info(out->log, "Attempt to send HTLC but still syncing" " with bitcoin network"); return towire_temporary_node_failure(ctx); } /* Make peer's daemon own it, catch if it dies. */ *houtp = new_htlc_out(out->owner, out, amount, cltv, payment_hash, onion_routing_packet, blinding, in == NULL, partid, in); tal_add_destructor(*houtp, destroy_hout_subd_died); /* Give channel 30 seconds to commit (first) htlc. */ if (!out->htlc_timeout && !IFDEV(out->peer->ld->dev_no_htlc_timeout, 0)) out->htlc_timeout = new_reltimer(out->peer->ld->timers, out, time_from_sec(30), htlc_offer_timeout, out); msg = towire_channeld_offer_htlc(out, amount, cltv, payment_hash, onion_routing_packet, blinding); subd_req(out->peer->ld, out->owner, take(msg), -1, 0, rcvd_htlc_reply, *houtp); return NULL; } static void forward_htlc(struct htlc_in *hin, u32 cltv_expiry, struct amount_msat amt_to_forward, u32 outgoing_cltv_value, const struct short_channel_id *scid, const u8 next_onion[TOTAL_PACKET_SIZE], const struct pubkey *next_blinding) { const u8 *failmsg; struct amount_msat fee; struct lightningd *ld = hin->key.channel->peer->ld; struct channel *next = active_channel_by_scid(ld, scid); struct htlc_out *hout = NULL; bool needs_update_appended; /* Unknown peer, or peer not ready. */ if (!next || !next->scid) { local_fail_in_htlc(hin, take(towire_unknown_next_peer(NULL))); wallet_forwarded_payment_add(hin->key.channel->peer->ld->wallet, hin, next ? next->scid : NULL, NULL, FORWARD_LOCAL_FAILED, WIRE_UNKNOWN_NEXT_PEER); return; } /* BOLT #7: * * The origin node: * - SHOULD accept HTLCs that pay a fee equal to or greater than: * - fee_base_msat + ( amount_to_forward * fee_proportional_millionths / 1000000 ) */ if (!amount_msat_fee(&fee, amt_to_forward, next->feerate_base, next->feerate_ppm)) { log_broken(ld->log, "Fee overflow forwarding %s!", type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &amt_to_forward)); needs_update_appended = true; failmsg = towire_fee_insufficient(tmpctx, hin->msat, NULL); goto fail; } if (!check_fwd_amount(hin, amt_to_forward, hin->msat, fee)) { needs_update_appended = true; failmsg = towire_fee_insufficient(tmpctx, hin->msat, NULL); goto fail; } if (!check_cltv(hin, cltv_expiry, outgoing_cltv_value, ld->config.cltv_expiry_delta)) { needs_update_appended = true; failmsg = towire_incorrect_cltv_expiry(tmpctx, cltv_expiry, NULL); goto fail; } if (amount_msat_greater(amt_to_forward, chainparams->max_payment)) { /* ENOWUMBO! */ needs_update_appended = false; failmsg = towire_required_channel_feature_missing(tmpctx); goto fail; } /* BOLT #2: * * An offering node: * - MUST estimate a timeout deadline for each HTLC it offers. * - MUST NOT offer an HTLC with a timeout deadline before its * `cltv_expiry`. */ /* In our case, G = 1, so we need to expire it one after it's expiration. * But never offer an expired HTLC; that's dumb. */ if (get_block_height(ld->topology) >= outgoing_cltv_value) { log_debug(hin->key.channel->log, "Expiry cltv %u too close to current %u", outgoing_cltv_value, get_block_height(ld->topology)); needs_update_appended = true; failmsg = towire_expiry_too_soon(tmpctx, NULL); goto fail; } /* BOLT #4: * * - if the `cltv_expiry` is unreasonably far in the future: * - return an `expiry_too_far` error. */ if (get_block_height(ld->topology) + ld->config.locktime_max < outgoing_cltv_value) { log_debug(hin->key.channel->log, "Expiry cltv %u too far from current %u + max %u", outgoing_cltv_value, get_block_height(ld->topology), ld->config.locktime_max); needs_update_appended = false; failmsg = towire_expiry_too_far(tmpctx); goto fail; } failmsg = send_htlc_out(tmpctx, next, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &hin->payment_hash, next_blinding, 0, next_onion, hin, &hout, &needs_update_appended); if (!failmsg) return; fail: if (needs_update_appended) local_fail_in_htlc_needs_update(hin, failmsg, next->scid); else local_fail_in_htlc(hin, failmsg); wallet_forwarded_payment_add(ld->wallet, hin, next->scid, hout, FORWARD_LOCAL_FAILED, fromwire_peektype(failmsg)); } /** * Data passed to the plugin, and as the context for the hook callback */ struct htlc_accepted_hook_payload { struct route_step *route_step; /* NULL if it couldn't be parsed! */ struct onion_payload *payload; struct htlc_in *hin; struct channel *channel; struct lightningd *ld; struct pubkey *next_blinding; u8 *next_onion; u64 failtlvtype; size_t failtlvpos; }; /* We only handle the simplest cases here */ static u8 *convert_failcode(const tal_t *ctx, struct lightningd *ld, unsigned int failure_code) { switch (failure_code) { case WIRE_INVALID_REALM: return towire_invalid_realm(ctx); case WIRE_TEMPORARY_NODE_FAILURE: return towire_temporary_node_failure(ctx); case WIRE_PERMANENT_NODE_FAILURE: return towire_permanent_node_failure(ctx); case WIRE_REQUIRED_NODE_FEATURE_MISSING: return towire_required_node_feature_missing(ctx); case WIRE_CHANNEL_DISABLED: return towire_channel_disabled(ctx); case WIRE_PERMANENT_CHANNEL_FAILURE: return towire_permanent_channel_failure(ctx); case WIRE_REQUIRED_CHANNEL_FEATURE_MISSING: return towire_required_channel_feature_missing(ctx); case WIRE_UNKNOWN_NEXT_PEER: return towire_unknown_next_peer(ctx); default: log_broken(ld->log, "htlc_accepted_hook plugin returned failure_code %u," " turning to WIRE_TEMPORARY_NODE_FAILURE", failure_code); return towire_temporary_node_failure(ctx); } } static void htlc_accepted_hook_try_resolve(struct htlc_accepted_hook_payload *request, struct preimage *payment_preimage) { struct sha256 payment_hash; struct htlc_in *hin = request->hin; u8 *unknown_details; /* Verify that the provided secret hashes to what we need. */ sha256(&payment_hash, payment_preimage, sizeof(struct preimage)); if (!sha256_eq(&payment_hash, &hin->payment_hash)) { log_broken( request->channel->log, "Plugin returned a preimage (sha256(%s) = %s) that doesn't " "match the HTLC hash (%s) it tries to resolve.", type_to_string(tmpctx, struct preimage, payment_preimage), type_to_string(tmpctx, struct sha256, &payment_hash), type_to_string(tmpctx, struct sha256, &hin->payment_hash)); unknown_details = tal_arr(NULL, u8, 0); towire_u16(&unknown_details, 0x400f); local_fail_in_htlc(hin, take(unknown_details)); } else { hin->we_filled = tal(hin, bool); *hin->we_filled = true; fulfill_htlc(hin, payment_preimage); } } static u8 *prepend_length(const tal_t *ctx, const u8 *payload TAKES) { u8 buf[BIGSIZE_MAX_LEN], *ret; size_t len; len = bigsize_put(buf, tal_bytelen(payload)); ret = tal_arr(ctx, u8, len + tal_bytelen(payload)); memcpy(ret, buf, len); memcpy(ret + len, payload, tal_bytelen(payload)); if (taken(payload)) tal_free(payload); return ret; } /** * Callback when a plugin answers to the htlc_accepted hook */ static bool htlc_accepted_hook_deserialize(struct htlc_accepted_hook_payload *request, const char *buffer, const jsmntok_t *toks) { struct route_step *rs = request->route_step; struct htlc_in *hin = request->hin; struct lightningd *ld = request->ld; struct preimage payment_preimage; const jsmntok_t *resulttok, *paykeytok, *payloadtok; u8 *payload; if (!toks || !buffer) return true; resulttok = json_get_member(buffer, toks, "result"); /* If the result is "continue" we can just return NULL since * this is the default behavior for this hook anyway */ if (!resulttok) { fatal("Plugin return value does not contain 'result' key %s", json_strdup(tmpctx, buffer, toks)); } payloadtok = json_get_member(buffer, toks, "payload"); if (payloadtok) { payload = json_tok_bin_from_hex(rs, buffer, payloadtok); if (!payload) fatal("Bad payload for htlc_accepted" " hook: %.*s", payloadtok->end - payloadtok->start, buffer + payloadtok->start); tal_free(request->payload); tal_free(rs->raw_payload); rs->raw_payload = prepend_length(rs, take(payload)); request->payload = onion_decode(request, rs, hin->blinding, &hin->blinding_ss, &request->failtlvtype, &request->failtlvpos); } else payload = NULL; if (json_tok_streq(buffer, resulttok, "continue")) { return true; } if (json_tok_streq(buffer, resulttok, "fail")) { u8 *failmsg; const jsmntok_t *failmsgtok, *failcodetok; failmsgtok = json_get_member(buffer, toks, "failure_message"); if (failmsgtok) { failmsg = json_tok_bin_from_hex(NULL, buffer, failmsgtok); if (!failmsg) fatal("Bad failure_message for htlc_accepted" " hook: %.*s", failmsgtok->end - failmsgtok->start, buffer + failmsgtok->start); } else if (deprecated_apis && (failcodetok = json_get_member(buffer, toks, "failure_code"))) { unsigned int failcode; if (!json_to_number(buffer, failcodetok, &failcode)) fatal("Bad failure_code for htlc_accepted" " hook: %.*s", failcodetok->end - failcodetok->start, buffer + failcodetok->start); failmsg = convert_failcode(NULL, ld, failcode); } else failmsg = towire_temporary_node_failure(NULL); local_fail_in_htlc(hin, take(failmsg)); return false; } else if (json_tok_streq(buffer, resulttok, "resolve")) { paykeytok = json_get_member(buffer, toks, "payment_key"); if (!paykeytok) fatal( "Plugin did not specify a 'payment_key' in return " "value to the htlc_accepted hook: %s", json_strdup(tmpctx, buffer, resulttok)); if (!json_to_preimage(buffer, paykeytok, &payment_preimage)) fatal("Plugin specified an invalid 'payment_key': %s", json_tok_full(buffer, resulttok)); htlc_accepted_hook_try_resolve(request, &payment_preimage); return false; } else { fatal("Plugin responded with an unknown result to the " "htlc_accepted hook: %s", json_strdup(tmpctx, buffer, resulttok)); } } static void htlc_accepted_hook_serialize(struct htlc_accepted_hook_payload *p, struct json_stream *s) { const struct route_step *rs = p->route_step; const struct htlc_in *hin = p->hin; s32 expiry = hin->cltv_expiry, blockheight = p->ld->topology->tip->height; json_object_start(s, "onion"); json_add_hex_talarr(s, "payload", rs->raw_payload); if (p->payload) { switch (p->payload->type) { case ONION_V0_PAYLOAD: if (deprecated_apis) { json_object_start(s, "per_hop_v0"); json_add_string(s, "realm", "00"); json_add_short_channel_id(s, "short_channel_id", p->payload->forward_channel); json_add_amount_msat_only(s, "forward_amount", p->payload->amt_to_forward); json_add_u64(s, "outgoing_cltv_value", p->payload->outgoing_cltv); json_object_end(s); } json_add_string(s, "type", "legacy"); break; case ONION_TLV_PAYLOAD: json_add_string(s, "type", "tlv"); break; } if (p->payload->forward_channel) json_add_short_channel_id(s, "short_channel_id", p->payload->forward_channel); json_add_amount_msat_only(s, "forward_amount", p->payload->amt_to_forward); json_add_u32(s, "outgoing_cltv_value", p->payload->outgoing_cltv); /* These are specified together in TLV, so only print total_msat * if payment_secret set (ie. modern, and final hop) */ if (p->payload->payment_secret) { json_add_amount_msat_only(s, "total_msat", *p->payload->total_msat); json_add_secret(s, "payment_secret", p->payload->payment_secret); } } json_add_hex_talarr(s, "next_onion", p->next_onion); json_add_secret(s, "shared_secret", hin->shared_secret); json_object_end(s); json_object_start(s, "htlc"); json_add_amount_msat_only(s, "amount", hin->msat); json_add_u32(s, "cltv_expiry", expiry); json_add_s32(s, "cltv_expiry_relative", expiry - blockheight); json_add_sha256(s, "payment_hash", &hin->payment_hash); json_object_end(s); } /** * Callback when a plugin answers to the htlc_accepted hook */ static void htlc_accepted_hook_final(struct htlc_accepted_hook_payload *request STEALS) { struct route_step *rs = request->route_step; struct htlc_in *hin = request->hin; struct channel *channel = request->channel; /* *Now* we barf if it failed to decode */ if (!request->payload) { log_debug(channel->log, "Failing HTLC because of an invalid payload"); local_fail_in_htlc(hin, take(towire_invalid_onion_payload( NULL, request->failtlvtype, request->failtlvpos))); } else if (rs->nextcase == ONION_FORWARD) { forward_htlc(hin, hin->cltv_expiry, request->payload->amt_to_forward, request->payload->outgoing_cltv, request->payload->forward_channel, serialize_onionpacket(tmpctx, rs->next), request->next_blinding); } else handle_localpay(hin, request->payload->amt_to_forward, request->payload->outgoing_cltv, *request->payload->total_msat, request->payload->payment_secret); tal_free(request); } REGISTER_PLUGIN_HOOK(htlc_accepted, htlc_accepted_hook_deserialize, htlc_accepted_hook_final, htlc_accepted_hook_serialize, struct htlc_accepted_hook_payload *); /* Apply tweak to ephemeral key if blinding is non-NULL, then do ECDH */ static bool ecdh_maybe_blinding(const struct pubkey *ephemeral_key, const struct pubkey *blinding, const struct secret *blinding_ss, struct secret *ss) { struct pubkey point = *ephemeral_key; #if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES if (blinding) { struct secret hmac; /* b(i) = HMAC256("blinded_node_id", ss(i)) * k(i) */ subkey_from_hmac("blinded_node_id", blinding_ss, &hmac); /* We instead tweak the *ephemeral* key from the onion and use * our normal privkey: since hsmd knows only how to ECDH with * our real key */ if (secp256k1_ec_pubkey_tweak_mul(secp256k1_ctx, &point.pubkey, hmac.data) != 1) { return false; } } #endif /* EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES */ ecdh(&point, ss); return true; } /** * Everyone is committed to this htlc of theirs * * @param ctx: context for failmsg, if any. * @param channel: The channel this HTLC was accepted from. * @param id: the ID of the HTLC we accepted * @param replay: Are we loading from the database and therefore should not * perform the transition to RCVD_ADD_ACK_REVOCATION? * @param[out] badonion: Set non-zero if the onion was bad. * @param[out] failmsg: If there was some other error. * * If this returns false, exactly one of @badonion or @failmsg is set. */ static bool peer_accepted_htlc(const tal_t *ctx, struct channel *channel, u64 id, bool replay, enum onion_wire *badonion, u8 **failmsg) { struct htlc_in *hin; struct route_step *rs; struct onionpacket op; struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; struct htlc_accepted_hook_payload *hook_payload; *failmsg = NULL; *badonion = 0; hin = find_htlc_in(&ld->htlcs_in, channel, id); if (!hin) { channel_internal_error(channel, "peer_got_revoke unknown htlc %"PRIu64, id); *failmsg = towire_temporary_node_failure(ctx); goto fail; } if (!replay && !htlc_in_update_state(channel, hin, RCVD_ADD_ACK_REVOCATION)) { *failmsg = towire_temporary_node_failure(ctx); goto fail; } htlc_in_check(hin, __func__); #if DEVELOPER if (channel->peer->ignore_htlcs) { log_debug(channel->log, "their htlc %"PRIu64" dev_ignore_htlcs", id); return true; } #endif /* BOLT #2: * * - SHOULD fail to route any HTLC added after it has sent `shutdown`. */ if (channel->state == CHANNELD_SHUTTING_DOWN) { *failmsg = towire_permanent_channel_failure(ctx); log_debug(channel->log, "Rejecting their htlc %"PRIu64 " since we're shutting down", id); goto fail; } /* BOLT #2: * * A fulfilling node: * - for each HTLC it is attempting to fulfill: * - MUST estimate a fulfillment deadline. * - MUST fail (and not forward) an HTLC whose fulfillment deadline is * already past. */ /* Our deadline is half the cltv_delta we insist on, so this check is * a subset of the cltv check done in handle_localpay and * forward_htlc. */ *badonion = parse_onionpacket(hin->onion_routing_packet, sizeof(hin->onion_routing_packet), &op); if (*badonion) { log_debug(channel->log, "Rejecting their htlc %"PRIu64 " since onion is unparsable %s", id, onion_wire_name(*badonion)); /* Now we can fail it. */ goto fail; } rs = process_onionpacket(tmpctx, &op, hin->shared_secret, hin->payment_hash.u.u8, sizeof(hin->payment_hash), true); if (!rs) { *badonion = WIRE_INVALID_ONION_HMAC; log_debug(channel->log, "Rejecting their htlc %"PRIu64 " since onion is unprocessable %s ss=%s", id, onion_wire_name(*badonion), type_to_string(tmpctx, struct secret, hin->shared_secret)); goto fail; } hook_payload = tal(NULL, struct htlc_accepted_hook_payload); hook_payload->route_step = tal_steal(hook_payload, rs); hook_payload->payload = onion_decode(hook_payload, rs, hin->blinding, &hin->blinding_ss, &hook_payload->failtlvtype, &hook_payload->failtlvpos); hook_payload->ld = ld; hook_payload->hin = hin; hook_payload->channel = channel; hook_payload->next_onion = serialize_onionpacket(hook_payload, rs->next); #if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES /* We could have blinding from hin or from inside onion. */ if (hook_payload->payload && hook_payload->payload->blinding) { struct sha256 sha; blinding_hash_e_and_ss(hook_payload->payload->blinding, &hook_payload->payload->blinding_ss, &sha); hook_payload->next_blinding = tal(hook_payload, struct pubkey); blinding_next_pubkey(hook_payload->payload->blinding, &sha, hook_payload->next_blinding); } else #endif hook_payload->next_blinding = NULL; plugin_hook_call_htlc_accepted(ld, hook_payload); /* Falling through here is ok, after all the HTLC locked */ return true; fail: #if EXPERIMENTAL_FEATURES /* In a blinded path, *all* failures are "invalid_onion_blinding" */ if (hin->blinding) { *failmsg = tal_free(*failmsg); *badonion = WIRE_INVALID_ONION_BLINDING; } #endif return false; } static void fulfill_our_htlc_out(struct channel *channel, struct htlc_out *hout, const struct preimage *preimage) { struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; bool we_filled = false; assert(!hout->preimage); hout->preimage = tal_dup(hout, struct preimage, preimage); htlc_out_check(hout, __func__); wallet_htlc_update(ld->wallet, hout->dbid, hout->hstate, hout->preimage, 0, hout->failonion, hout->failmsg, &we_filled); /* Update channel stats */ wallet_channel_stats_incr_out_fulfilled(ld->wallet, channel->dbid, hout->msat); if (hout->am_origin) payment_succeeded(ld, hout, preimage); else if (hout->in) { fulfill_htlc(hout->in, preimage); wallet_forwarded_payment_add(ld->wallet, hout->in, hout->key.channel->scid, hout, FORWARD_SETTLED, 0); } } static bool peer_fulfilled_our_htlc(struct channel *channel, const struct fulfilled_htlc *fulfilled) { struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; struct htlc_out *hout; hout = find_htlc_out(&ld->htlcs_out, channel, fulfilled->id); if (!hout) { channel_internal_error(channel, "fulfilled_our_htlc unknown htlc %"PRIu64, fulfilled->id); return false; } if (!htlc_out_update_state(channel, hout, RCVD_REMOVE_COMMIT)) return false; fulfill_our_htlc_out(channel, hout, &fulfilled->payment_preimage); return true; } void onchain_fulfilled_htlc(struct channel *channel, const struct preimage *preimage) { struct htlc_out_map_iter outi; struct htlc_out *hout; struct sha256 payment_hash; struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; sha256(&payment_hash, preimage, sizeof(*preimage)); /* FIXME: use db to look this up! */ for (hout = htlc_out_map_first(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi); hout; hout = htlc_out_map_next(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi)) { if (hout->key.channel != channel) continue; /* It's possible that we failed some and succeeded one, * if we got multiple errors. */ if (hout->failmsg || hout->failonion) continue; if (!sha256_eq(&hout->payment_hash, &payment_hash)) continue; /* We may have already fulfilled before going onchain, or * we can fulfill onchain multiple times. */ if (!hout->preimage) { /* Force state to something which allows a preimage */ hout->hstate = RCVD_REMOVE_HTLC; fulfill_our_htlc_out(channel, hout, preimage); } /* We keep going: this is something of a leak, but onchain * we have no real way of distinguishing HTLCs anyway */ } } static bool peer_failed_our_htlc(struct channel *channel, const struct failed_htlc *failed) { struct htlc_out *hout; struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; hout = find_htlc_out(&ld->htlcs_out, channel, failed->id); if (!hout) { channel_internal_error(channel, "failed_our_htlc unknown htlc %"PRIu64, failed->id); return false; } if (!htlc_out_update_state(channel, hout, RCVD_REMOVE_COMMIT)) return false; if (failed->sha256_of_onion) { struct sha256 our_sha256_of_onion; u8 *failmsg; /* BOLT #2: * * - if the `sha256_of_onion` in `update_fail_malformed_htlc` * doesn't match the onion it sent: * - MAY retry or choose an alternate error response. */ sha256(&our_sha256_of_onion, hout->onion_routing_packet, sizeof(hout->onion_routing_packet)); if (!sha256_eq(failed->sha256_of_onion, &our_sha256_of_onion)) log_unusual(channel->log, "update_fail_malformed_htlc for bad onion" " for htlc with id %"PRIu64".", hout->key.id); /* BOLT #2: * * - otherwise, a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC * canceled by `update_fail_malformed_htlc`: * * - MUST return an error in the `update_fail_htlc` * sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the * `failure_code` given and setting the data to * `sha256_of_onion`. */ /* All badonion codes are the same form, so we make them * manually, which covers any unknown cases too. Grep fodder: * towire_invalid_onion_version, towire_invalid_onion_hmac, * towire_invalid_onion_key. */ failmsg = tal_arr(hout, u8, 0); towire_u16(&failmsg, failed->badonion); towire_sha256(&failmsg, failed->sha256_of_onion); hout->failmsg = failmsg; } else { hout->failonion = dup_onionreply(hout, failed->onion); } log_debug(channel->log, "Our HTLC %"PRIu64" failed (%u)", failed->id, fromwire_peektype(hout->failmsg)); htlc_out_check(hout, __func__); if (hout->in) wallet_forwarded_payment_add(ld->wallet, hout->in, channel->scid, hout, FORWARD_FAILED, hout->failmsg ? fromwire_peektype(hout->failmsg) : 0); return true; } void onchain_failed_our_htlc(const struct channel *channel, const struct htlc_stub *htlc, const char *why) { struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; struct htlc_out *hout; hout = find_htlc_out(&ld->htlcs_out, channel, htlc->id); if (!hout) return; /* Don't fail twice (or if already succeeded)! */ if (hout->failonion || hout->failmsg || hout->preimage) return; hout->failmsg = towire_permanent_channel_failure(hout); /* Force state to something which expects a failure, and save to db */ hout->hstate = RCVD_REMOVE_HTLC; htlc_out_check(hout, __func__); bool we_filled = false; wallet_htlc_update(ld->wallet, hout->dbid, hout->hstate, hout->preimage, 0, hout->failonion, hout->failmsg, &we_filled); if (hout->am_origin) { assert(why != NULL); char *localfail = tal_fmt(channel, "%s: %s", onion_wire_name(WIRE_PERMANENT_CHANNEL_FAILURE), why); payment_failed(ld, hout, localfail, NULL); tal_free(localfail); } else if (hout->in) { local_fail_in_htlc(hout->in, take(towire_permanent_channel_failure(NULL))); wallet_forwarded_payment_add(hout->key.channel->peer->ld->wallet, hout->in, channel->scid, hout, FORWARD_LOCAL_FAILED, hout->failmsg ? fromwire_peektype(hout->failmsg) : 0); } } static void remove_htlc_in(struct channel *channel, struct htlc_in *hin) { htlc_in_check(hin, __func__); assert(hin->failonion || hin->preimage || hin->badonion); log_debug(channel->log, "Removing in HTLC %"PRIu64" state %s %s", hin->key.id, htlc_state_name(hin->hstate), hin->preimage ? "FULFILLED" : hin->badonion ? onion_wire_name(hin->badonion) : "REMOTEFAIL"); /* If we fulfilled their HTLC, credit us. */ if (hin->preimage) { struct amount_msat oldamt = channel->our_msat; const struct channel_coin_mvt *mvt; if (!amount_msat_add(&channel->our_msat, channel->our_msat, hin->msat)) { channel_internal_error(channel, "Overflow our_msat %s + HTLC %s", type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &channel->our_msat), type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &hin->msat)); } log_debug(channel->log, "Balance %s -> %s", type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &oldamt), type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &channel->our_msat)); if (amount_msat_greater(channel->our_msat, channel->msat_to_us_max)) channel->msat_to_us_max = channel->our_msat; /* Coins have definitively moved, log a movement */ if (hin->we_filled) mvt = new_channel_mvt_invoice_hin(hin, hin, channel); else mvt = new_channel_mvt_routed_hin(hin, hin, channel); notify_channel_mvt(channel->peer->ld, mvt); } tal_free(hin); } static void remove_htlc_out(struct channel *channel, struct htlc_out *hout) { htlc_out_check(hout, __func__); assert(hout->failonion || hout->preimage || hout->failmsg); log_debug(channel->log, "Removing out HTLC %"PRIu64" state %s %s", hout->key.id, htlc_state_name(hout->hstate), hout->preimage ? "FULFILLED" : hout->failmsg ? onion_wire_name(fromwire_peektype(hout->failmsg)) : "REMOTEFAIL"); /* If it's failed, now we can forward since it's completely locked-in */ if (!hout->preimage) { fail_out_htlc(hout, NULL, NULL); } else { const struct channel_coin_mvt *mvt; struct amount_msat oldamt = channel->our_msat; /* We paid for this HTLC, so deduct balance. */ if (!amount_msat_sub(&channel->our_msat, channel->our_msat, hout->msat)) { channel_internal_error(channel, "Underflow our_msat %s - HTLC %s", type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &channel->our_msat), type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &hout->msat)); } log_debug(channel->log, "Balance %s -> %s", type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &oldamt), type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &channel->our_msat)); if (amount_msat_less(channel->our_msat, channel->msat_to_us_min)) channel->msat_to_us_min = channel->our_msat; /* Coins have definitively moved, log a movement */ if (hout->am_origin) mvt = new_channel_mvt_invoice_hout(hout, hout, channel); else mvt = new_channel_mvt_routed_hout(hout, hout, channel); notify_channel_mvt(channel->peer->ld, mvt); } tal_free(hout); } static bool update_in_htlc(struct channel *channel, u64 id, enum htlc_state newstate) { struct htlc_in *hin; struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; hin = find_htlc_in(&ld->htlcs_in, channel, id); if (!hin) { channel_internal_error(channel, "Can't find in HTLC %"PRIu64, id); return false; } if (!htlc_in_update_state(channel, hin, newstate)) return false; htlc_in_check(hin, __func__); if (newstate == SENT_REMOVE_ACK_REVOCATION) remove_htlc_in(channel, hin); return true; } static bool update_out_htlc(struct channel *channel, u64 id, enum htlc_state newstate) { struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; struct htlc_out *hout; struct wallet_payment *payment; hout = find_htlc_out(&ld->htlcs_out, channel, id); if (!hout) { channel_internal_error(channel, "Can't find out HTLC %"PRIu64, id); return false; } if (!hout->dbid) { wallet_htlc_save_out(ld->wallet, channel, hout); /* Update channel stats */ wallet_channel_stats_incr_out_offered(ld->wallet, channel->dbid, hout->msat); if (hout->in) { wallet_forwarded_payment_add(ld->wallet, hout->in, channel->scid, hout, FORWARD_OFFERED, 0); } /* For our own HTLCs, we commit payment to db lazily */ if (hout->am_origin) { payment = wallet_payment_by_hash(tmpctx, ld->wallet, &hout->payment_hash, hout->partid); assert(payment); payment_store(ld, take(payment)); } } if (!htlc_out_update_state(channel, hout, newstate)) return false; /* First transition into commitment; now it outlives peer. */ if (newstate == SENT_ADD_COMMIT) { tal_del_destructor(hout, destroy_hout_subd_died); tal_steal(ld, hout); } else if (newstate == RCVD_REMOVE_ACK_REVOCATION) { remove_htlc_out(channel, hout); } return true; } static bool changed_htlc(struct channel *channel, const struct changed_htlc *changed) { if (htlc_state_owner(changed->newstate) == LOCAL) return update_out_htlc(channel, changed->id, changed->newstate); else return update_in_htlc(channel, changed->id, changed->newstate); } /* FIXME: This should be a complete check, not just a sanity check. * Perhaps that means we need a cookie from the HSM? */ static bool valid_commitment_tx(struct channel *channel, const struct bitcoin_tx *tx) { /* We've had past issues where all outputs are trimmed. */ if (tx->wtx->num_outputs == 0) { channel_internal_error(channel, "channel_got_commitsig: zero output tx! %s", type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, tx)); return false; } return true; } static bool peer_save_commitsig_received(struct channel *channel, u64 commitnum, struct bitcoin_tx *tx, const struct bitcoin_signature *commit_sig) { if (commitnum != channel->next_index[LOCAL]) { channel_internal_error(channel, "channel_got_commitsig: expected commitnum %"PRIu64 " got %"PRIu64, channel->next_index[LOCAL], commitnum); return false; } /* Basic sanity check */ if (!valid_commitment_tx(channel, tx)) return false; channel->next_index[LOCAL]++; /* Update channel->last_sig and channel->last_tx before saving to db */ channel_set_last_tx(channel, tx, commit_sig, TX_CHANNEL_UNILATERAL); return true; } static bool peer_save_commitsig_sent(struct channel *channel, u64 commitnum) { struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; if (commitnum != channel->next_index[REMOTE]) { channel_internal_error(channel, "channel_sent_commitsig: expected commitnum %"PRIu64 " got %"PRIu64, channel->next_index[REMOTE], commitnum); return false; } channel->next_index[REMOTE]++; /* FIXME: Save to database, with sig and HTLCs. */ wallet_channel_save(ld->wallet, channel); return true; } static void adjust_channel_feerate_bounds(struct channel *channel, u32 feerate) { if (feerate > channel->max_possible_feerate) channel->max_possible_feerate = feerate; if (feerate < channel->min_possible_feerate) channel->min_possible_feerate = feerate; } void peer_sending_commitsig(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg) { u64 commitnum; struct fee_states *fee_states; struct changed_htlc *changed_htlcs; size_t i, maxid = 0, num_local_added = 0; struct bitcoin_signature commit_sig; struct bitcoin_signature *htlc_sigs; struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; struct penalty_base *pbase; channel->htlc_timeout = tal_free(channel->htlc_timeout); if (!fromwire_channeld_sending_commitsig(msg, msg, &commitnum, &pbase, &fee_states, &changed_htlcs, &commit_sig, &htlc_sigs) || !fee_states_valid(fee_states, channel->opener)) { channel_internal_error(channel, "bad channel_sending_commitsig %s", tal_hex(channel, msg)); return; } for (i = 0; i < tal_count(changed_htlcs); i++) { if (!changed_htlc(channel, changed_htlcs + i)) { channel_internal_error(channel, "channel_sending_commitsig: update failed"); return; } /* While we're here, sanity check added ones are in * ascending order. */ if (changed_htlcs[i].newstate == SENT_ADD_COMMIT) { num_local_added++; if (changed_htlcs[i].id > maxid) maxid = changed_htlcs[i].id; } } if (num_local_added != 0) { if (maxid != channel->next_htlc_id + num_local_added - 1) { channel_internal_error(channel, "channel_sending_commitsig:" " Added %"PRIu64", maxid now %"PRIu64 " from %"PRIu64, num_local_added, maxid, channel->next_htlc_id); return; } channel->next_htlc_id += num_local_added; } /* FIXME: We could detect if this changed, and adjust bounds and write * it to db iff it has. */ tal_free(channel->channel_info.fee_states); channel->channel_info.fee_states = tal_steal(channel, fee_states); adjust_channel_feerate_bounds(channel, get_feerate(fee_states, channel->opener, REMOTE)); if (!peer_save_commitsig_sent(channel, commitnum)) return; /* Last was commit. */ channel->last_was_revoke = false; tal_free(channel->last_sent_commit); channel->last_sent_commit = tal_steal(channel, changed_htlcs); wallet_channel_save(ld->wallet, channel); if (pbase) wallet_penalty_base_add(ld->wallet, channel->dbid, pbase); /* Tell it we've got it, and to go ahead with commitment_signed. */ subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(towire_channeld_sending_commitsig_reply(msg))); } static bool channel_added_their_htlc(struct channel *channel, const struct added_htlc *added) { struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; struct htlc_in *hin; struct secret shared_secret; struct onionpacket op; enum onion_wire failcode; /* BOLT #2: * * - receiving an `amount_msat` equal to 0, OR less than its own `htlc_minimum_msat`: * - SHOULD fail the channel. */ if (amount_msat_eq(added->amount, AMOUNT_MSAT(0)) || amount_msat_less(added->amount, channel->our_config.htlc_minimum)) { channel_internal_error(channel, "trying to add HTLC amount %s" " but minimum is %s", type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &added->amount), type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &channel->our_config.htlc_minimum)); return false; } /* Do the work of extracting shared secret now if possible. */ /* FIXME: We do this *again* in peer_accepted_htlc! */ failcode = parse_onionpacket(added->onion_routing_packet, sizeof(added->onion_routing_packet), &op); if (!failcode) { if (!ecdh_maybe_blinding(&op.ephemeralkey, added->blinding, &added->blinding_ss, &shared_secret)) { log_debug(channel->log, "htlc %"PRIu64 ": can't tweak pubkey", added->id); return false; } } /* This stays around even if we fail it immediately: it *is* * part of the current commitment. */ hin = new_htlc_in(channel, channel, added->id, added->amount, added->cltv_expiry, &added->payment_hash, failcode ? NULL : &shared_secret, added->blinding, &added->blinding_ss, added->onion_routing_packet); /* Save an incoming htlc to the wallet */ wallet_htlc_save_in(ld->wallet, channel, hin); /* Update channel stats */ wallet_channel_stats_incr_in_offered(ld->wallet, channel->dbid, added->amount); log_debug(channel->log, "Adding their HTLC %"PRIu64, added->id); connect_htlc_in(&channel->peer->ld->htlcs_in, hin); return true; } /* The peer doesn't tell us this separately, but logically it's a separate * step to receiving commitsig */ static bool peer_sending_revocation(struct channel *channel, struct added_htlc *added, struct fulfilled_htlc *fulfilled, struct failed_htlc **failed, struct changed_htlc *changed) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < tal_count(added); i++) { if (!update_in_htlc(channel, added[i].id, SENT_ADD_REVOCATION)) return false; } for (i = 0; i < tal_count(fulfilled); i++) { if (!update_out_htlc(channel, fulfilled[i].id, SENT_REMOVE_REVOCATION)) return false; } for (i = 0; i < tal_count(failed); i++) { if (!update_out_htlc(channel, failed[i]->id, SENT_REMOVE_REVOCATION)) return false; } for (i = 0; i < tal_count(changed); i++) { if (changed[i].newstate == RCVD_ADD_ACK_COMMIT) { if (!update_out_htlc(channel, changed[i].id, SENT_ADD_ACK_REVOCATION)) return false; } else { if (!update_in_htlc(channel, changed[i].id, SENT_REMOVE_ACK_REVOCATION)) return false; } } channel->last_was_revoke = true; return true; } struct deferred_commitsig { struct channel *channel; const u8 *msg; }; static void retry_deferred_commitsig(struct chain_topology *topo, struct deferred_commitsig *d) { peer_got_commitsig(d->channel, d->msg); tal_free(d); } /* This also implies we're sending revocation */ void peer_got_commitsig(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg) { u64 commitnum; struct fee_states *fee_states; struct bitcoin_signature commit_sig, *htlc_sigs; struct added_htlc *added; struct fulfilled_htlc *fulfilled; struct failed_htlc **failed; struct changed_htlc *changed; struct bitcoin_tx *tx; size_t i; struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; if (!fromwire_channeld_got_commitsig(msg, msg, &commitnum, &fee_states, &commit_sig, &htlc_sigs, &added, &fulfilled, &failed, &changed, &tx) || !fee_states_valid(fee_states, channel->opener)) { channel_internal_error(channel, "bad fromwire_channeld_got_commitsig %s", tal_hex(channel, msg)); return; } /* If we're not synced with bitcoin network, we can't accept * any new HTLCs. We stall at this point, in the hope that it * won't take long! */ if (added && !topology_synced(ld->topology)) { struct deferred_commitsig *d; log_unusual(channel->log, "Deferring incoming commit until we sync"); /* If subdaemon dies, we want to forget this. */ d = tal(channel->owner, struct deferred_commitsig); d->channel = channel; d->msg = tal_dup_talarr(d, u8, msg); topology_add_sync_waiter(d, ld->topology, retry_deferred_commitsig, d); return; } tx->chainparams = chainparams; log_debug(channel->log, "got commitsig %"PRIu64 ": feerate %u, %zu added, %zu fulfilled, %zu failed, %zu changed", commitnum, get_feerate(fee_states, channel->opener, LOCAL), tal_count(added), tal_count(fulfilled), tal_count(failed), tal_count(changed)); /* New HTLCs */ for (i = 0; i < tal_count(added); i++) { if (!channel_added_their_htlc(channel, &added[i])) return; } /* Save information now for fulfilled & failed HTLCs */ for (i = 0; i < tal_count(fulfilled); i++) { if (!peer_fulfilled_our_htlc(channel, &fulfilled[i])) return; } for (i = 0; i < tal_count(failed); i++) { if (!peer_failed_our_htlc(channel, failed[i])) return; } for (i = 0; i < tal_count(changed); i++) { if (!changed_htlc(channel, &changed[i])) { channel_internal_error(channel, "got_commitsig: update failed"); return; } } tal_free(channel->channel_info.fee_states); channel->channel_info.fee_states = tal_steal(channel, fee_states); adjust_channel_feerate_bounds(channel, get_feerate(fee_states, channel->opener, LOCAL)); /* Since we're about to send revoke, bump state again. */ if (!peer_sending_revocation(channel, added, fulfilled, failed, changed)) return; if (!peer_save_commitsig_received(channel, commitnum, tx, &commit_sig)) return; wallet_channel_save(ld->wallet, channel); tal_free(channel->last_htlc_sigs); channel->last_htlc_sigs = tal_steal(channel, htlc_sigs); wallet_htlc_sigs_save(ld->wallet, channel->dbid, channel->last_htlc_sigs); /* Tell it we've committed, and to go ahead with revoke. */ msg = towire_channeld_got_commitsig_reply(msg); subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg)); } /* Shuffle them over, forgetting the ancient one. */ void update_per_commit_point(struct channel *channel, const struct pubkey *per_commitment_point) { struct channel_info *ci = &channel->channel_info; ci->old_remote_per_commit = ci->remote_per_commit; ci->remote_per_commit = *per_commitment_point; } struct commitment_revocation_payload { struct bitcoin_txid commitment_txid; const struct bitcoin_tx *penalty_tx; struct wallet *wallet; u64 channel_id; u64 commitnum; }; static void commitment_revocation_hook_serialize( struct commitment_revocation_payload *payload, struct json_stream *stream) { json_add_txid(stream, "commitment_txid", &payload->commitment_txid); json_add_tx(stream, "penalty_tx", payload->penalty_tx); } static void commitment_revocation_hook_cb(struct commitment_revocation_payload *p STEALS){ wallet_penalty_base_delete(p->wallet, p->channel_id, p->commitnum); } static bool commitment_revocation_hook_deserialize(struct commitment_revocation_payload *p, const char *buffer, const jsmntok_t *toks) { return true; } REGISTER_PLUGIN_HOOK(commitment_revocation, commitment_revocation_hook_deserialize, commitment_revocation_hook_cb, commitment_revocation_hook_serialize, struct commitment_revocation_payload *); void peer_got_revoke(struct channel *channel, const u8 *msg) { u64 revokenum; struct secret per_commitment_secret; struct pubkey next_per_commitment_point; struct changed_htlc *changed; enum onion_wire *badonions; u8 **failmsgs; size_t i; struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; struct fee_states *fee_states; struct penalty_base *pbase; struct commitment_revocation_payload *payload; struct bitcoin_tx *penalty_tx; if (!fromwire_channeld_got_revoke(msg, msg, &revokenum, &per_commitment_secret, &next_per_commitment_point, &fee_states, &changed, &pbase, &penalty_tx) || !fee_states_valid(fee_states, channel->opener)) { channel_internal_error(channel, "bad fromwire_channeld_got_revoke %s", tal_hex(channel, msg)); return; } log_debug(channel->log, "got revoke %"PRIu64": %zu changed", revokenum, tal_count(changed)); /* Save any immediate failures for after we reply. */ badonions = tal_arrz(msg, enum onion_wire, tal_count(changed)); failmsgs = tal_arrz(msg, u8 *, tal_count(changed)); for (i = 0; i < tal_count(changed); i++) { /* If we're doing final accept, we need to forward */ if (changed[i].newstate == RCVD_ADD_ACK_REVOCATION) { peer_accepted_htlc(failmsgs, channel, changed[i].id, false, &badonions[i], &failmsgs[i]); } else { if (!changed_htlc(channel, &changed[i])) { channel_internal_error(channel, "got_revoke: update failed"); return; } } } if (revokenum >= (1ULL << 48)) { channel_internal_error(channel, "got_revoke: too many txs %"PRIu64, revokenum); return; } if (revokenum != revocations_received(&channel->their_shachain.chain)) { channel_internal_error(channel, "got_revoke: expected %"PRIu64 " got %"PRIu64, revocations_received(&channel->their_shachain.chain), revokenum); return; } /* BOLT #2: * * - if the `per_commitment_secret` was not generated by the protocol * in [BOLT #3](03-transactions.md#per-commitment-secret-requirements): * - MAY fail the channel. */ if (!wallet_shachain_add_hash(ld->wallet, &channel->their_shachain, shachain_index(revokenum), &per_commitment_secret)) { channel_fail_permanent(channel, "Bad per_commitment_secret %s for %"PRIu64, type_to_string(msg, struct secret, &per_commitment_secret), revokenum); return; } tal_free(channel->channel_info.fee_states); channel->channel_info.fee_states = tal_steal(channel, fee_states); /* FIXME: Check per_commitment_secret -> per_commit_point */ update_per_commit_point(channel, &next_per_commitment_point); /* Tell it we've committed, and to go ahead with revoke. */ msg = towire_channeld_got_revoke_reply(msg); subd_send_msg(channel->owner, take(msg)); /* Now, any HTLCs we need to immediately fail? */ for (i = 0; i < tal_count(changed); i++) { struct htlc_in *hin; if (badonions[i]) { hin = find_htlc_in(&ld->htlcs_in, channel, changed[i].id); local_fail_in_htlc_badonion(hin, badonions[i]); } else if (failmsgs[i]) { hin = find_htlc_in(&ld->htlcs_in, channel, changed[i].id); local_fail_in_htlc(hin, failmsgs[i]); } else continue; // in fact, now we don't know if this htlc is a forward or localpay! wallet_forwarded_payment_add(ld->wallet, hin, NULL, NULL, FORWARD_LOCAL_FAILED, badonions[i] ? badonions[i] : fromwire_peektype(failmsgs[i])); } wallet_channel_save(ld->wallet, channel); if (penalty_tx == NULL) return; payload = tal(tmpctx, struct commitment_revocation_payload); payload->commitment_txid = pbase->txid; payload->penalty_tx = tal_steal(payload, penalty_tx); payload->wallet = ld->wallet; payload->channel_id = channel->dbid; payload->commitnum = pbase->commitment_num; plugin_hook_call_commitment_revocation(ld, payload); } /* FIXME: Load direct from db. */ const struct existing_htlc **peer_htlcs(const tal_t *ctx, const struct channel *channel) { struct existing_htlc **htlcs; struct htlc_in_map_iter ini; struct htlc_out_map_iter outi; struct htlc_in *hin; struct htlc_out *hout; struct lightningd *ld = channel->peer->ld; htlcs = tal_arr(ctx, struct existing_htlc *, 0); for (hin = htlc_in_map_first(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini); hin; hin = htlc_in_map_next(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini)) { struct failed_htlc *f; struct existing_htlc *existing; if (hin->key.channel != channel) continue; if (hin->badonion) f = take(mk_failed_htlc_badonion(NULL, hin, hin->badonion)); else if (hin->failonion) f = take(mk_failed_htlc(NULL, hin, hin->failonion)); else f = NULL; existing = new_existing_htlc(htlcs, hin->key.id, hin->hstate, hin->msat, &hin->payment_hash, hin->cltv_expiry, hin->onion_routing_packet, hin->blinding, hin->preimage, f); tal_arr_expand(&htlcs, existing); } for (hout = htlc_out_map_first(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi); hout; hout = htlc_out_map_next(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi)) { struct failed_htlc *f; struct existing_htlc *existing; if (hout->key.channel != channel) continue; /* Note that channeld doesn't actually care *why* outgoing * HTLCs failed, so just use a dummy here. */ if (hout->failonion || hout->failmsg) { f = take(tal(NULL, struct failed_htlc)); f->id = hout->key.id; f->sha256_of_onion = tal(f, struct sha256); memset(f->sha256_of_onion, 0, sizeof(*f->sha256_of_onion)); f->badonion = BADONION; f->onion = NULL; } else f = NULL; existing = new_existing_htlc(htlcs, hout->key.id, hout->hstate, hout->msat, &hout->payment_hash, hout->cltv_expiry, hout->onion_routing_packet, hout->blinding, hout->preimage, f); tal_arr_expand(&htlcs, existing); } return cast_const2(const struct existing_htlc **, htlcs); } /* If channel is NULL, free them all (for shutdown) */ void free_htlcs(struct lightningd *ld, const struct channel *channel) { struct htlc_out_map_iter outi; struct htlc_out *hout; struct htlc_in_map_iter ini; struct htlc_in *hin; bool deleted; /* FIXME: Implement check_htlcs to ensure no dangling hout->in ptrs! */ do { deleted = false; for (hout = htlc_out_map_first(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi); hout; hout = htlc_out_map_next(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi)) { if (channel && hout->key.channel != channel) continue; tal_free(hout); deleted = true; } for (hin = htlc_in_map_first(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini); hin; hin = htlc_in_map_next(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini)) { if (channel && hin->key.channel != channel) continue; tal_free(hin); deleted = true; } /* Can skip over elements due to iterating while deleting. */ } while (deleted); } /* BOLT #2: * * 2. the deadline for offered HTLCs: the deadline after which the channel has * to be failed and timed out on-chain. This is `G` blocks after the HTLC's * `cltv_expiry`: 1 or 2 blocks is reasonable. */ static u32 htlc_out_deadline(const struct htlc_out *hout) { return hout->cltv_expiry + 1; } /* BOLT #2: * * 3. the deadline for received HTLCs this node has fulfilled: the deadline * after which the channel has to be failed and the HTLC fulfilled on-chain * before its `cltv_expiry`. See steps 4-7 above, which imply a deadline of * `2R+G+S` blocks before `cltv_expiry`: 18 blocks is reasonable. */ /* We approximate this, by using half the cltv_expiry_delta (3R+2G+2S), * rounded up. */ static u32 htlc_in_deadline(const struct lightningd *ld, const struct htlc_in *hin) { return hin->cltv_expiry - (ld->config.cltv_expiry_delta + 1)/2; } void htlcs_notify_new_block(struct lightningd *ld, u32 height) { bool removed; /* BOLT #2: * * - if an HTLC which it offered is in either node's current * commitment transaction, AND is past this timeout deadline: * - MUST fail the channel. */ /* FIXME: use db to look this up in one go (earliest deadline per-peer) */ do { struct htlc_out *hout; struct htlc_out_map_iter outi; removed = false; for (hout = htlc_out_map_first(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi); hout; hout = htlc_out_map_next(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi)) { /* Not timed out yet? */ if (height < htlc_out_deadline(hout)) continue; /* Peer on chain already? */ if (channel_on_chain(hout->key.channel)) continue; /* Peer already failed, or we hit it? */ if (hout->key.channel->error) continue; channel_fail_permanent(hout->key.channel, "Offered HTLC %"PRIu64 " %s cltv %u hit deadline", hout->key.id, htlc_state_name(hout->hstate), hout->cltv_expiry); removed = true; } /* Iteration while removing is safe, but can skip entries! */ } while (removed); /* BOLT #2: * * - for each HTLC it is attempting to fulfill: * - MUST estimate a fulfillment deadline. *... * - if an HTLC it has fulfilled is in either node's current commitment * transaction, AND is past this fulfillment deadline: * - MUST fail the channel. */ do { struct htlc_in *hin; struct htlc_in_map_iter ini; removed = false; for (hin = htlc_in_map_first(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini); hin; hin = htlc_in_map_next(&ld->htlcs_in, &ini)) { struct channel *channel = hin->key.channel; /* Not fulfilled? If overdue, that's their problem... */ if (!hin->preimage) continue; /* Not timed out yet? */ if (height < htlc_in_deadline(ld, hin)) continue; /* Peer on chain already? */ if (channel_on_chain(channel)) continue; /* Peer already failed, or we hit it? */ if (channel->error) continue; channel_fail_permanent(channel, "Fulfilled HTLC %"PRIu64 " %s cltv %u hit deadline", hin->key.id, htlc_state_name(hin->hstate), hin->cltv_expiry); removed = true; } /* Iteration while removing is safe, but can skip entries! */ } while (removed); } #ifdef COMPAT_V061 static void fixup_hout(struct lightningd *ld, struct htlc_out *hout) { const char *fix; /* We didn't save HTLC failure information to the database. So when * busy nodes restarted (y'know, our most important users!) they would * find themselves with missing fields. * * Fortunately, most of the network is honest: re-sending an old HTLC * just causes failure (though we assert() when we try to push the * failure to the incoming HTLC which has already succeeded!). */ /* We care about HTLCs being removed only, not those being added. */ if (hout->hstate < RCVD_REMOVE_HTLC) return; /* Successful ones are fine. */ if (hout->preimage) return; /* Failed ones (only happens after db fixed!) OK. */ if (hout->failmsg || hout->failonion) return; /* payment_preimage for HTLC in *was* stored, so look for that. */ if (hout->in && hout->in->preimage) { hout->preimage = tal_dup(hout, struct preimage, hout->in->preimage); fix = "restoring preimage from incoming HTLC"; } else { hout->failmsg = towire_temporary_node_failure(hout); fix = "subsituting temporary node failure"; } log_broken(ld->log, "HTLC #%"PRIu64" (%s) " " for amount %s" " to %s" " is missing a resolution: %s.", hout->key.id, htlc_state_name(hout->hstate), type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_msat, &hout->msat), type_to_string(tmpctx, struct node_id, &hout->key.channel->peer->id), fix); } void fixup_htlcs_out(struct lightningd *ld) { struct htlc_out_map_iter outi; struct htlc_out *hout; for (hout = htlc_out_map_first(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi); hout; hout = htlc_out_map_next(&ld->htlcs_out, &outi)) { if (!hout->am_origin) fixup_hout(ld, hout); } } #endif /* COMPAT_V061 */ void htlcs_resubmit(struct lightningd *ld, struct htlc_in_map *unconnected_htlcs_in) { struct htlc_in *hin; struct htlc_in_map_iter ini; enum onion_wire badonion COMPILER_WANTS_INIT("gcc7.4.0 bad, 8.3 OK"); u8 *failmsg; /* Now retry any which were stuck. */ for (hin = htlc_in_map_first(unconnected_htlcs_in, &ini); hin; hin = htlc_in_map_next(unconnected_htlcs_in, &ini)) { if (hin->hstate != RCVD_ADD_ACK_REVOCATION) continue; log_unusual(hin->key.channel->log, "Replaying old unprocessed HTLC #%"PRIu64, hin->key.id); if (!peer_accepted_htlc(tmpctx, hin->key.channel, hin->key.id, true, &badonion, &failmsg)) { if (failmsg) local_fail_in_htlc(hin, failmsg); else local_fail_in_htlc_badonion(hin, badonion); } } /* Don't leak memory! */ htlc_in_map_clear(unconnected_htlcs_in); tal_free(unconnected_htlcs_in); } #if DEVELOPER static struct command_result *json_dev_ignore_htlcs(struct command *cmd, const char *buffer, const jsmntok_t *obj UNNEEDED, const jsmntok_t *params) { struct node_id *peerid; struct peer *peer; bool *ignore; if (!param(cmd, buffer, params, p_req("id", param_node_id, &peerid), p_req("ignore", param_bool, &ignore), NULL)) return command_param_failed(); peer = peer_by_id(cmd->ld, peerid); if (!peer) { return command_fail(cmd, LIGHTNINGD, "Could not find channel with that peer"); } peer->ignore_htlcs = *ignore; return command_success(cmd, json_stream_success(cmd)); } static const struct json_command dev_ignore_htlcs = { "dev-ignore-htlcs", "developer", json_dev_ignore_htlcs, "Set ignoring incoming HTLCs for peer {id} to {ignore}", false, "Set/unset ignoring of all incoming HTLCs. For testing only." }; AUTODATA(json_command, &dev_ignore_htlcs); #endif /* DEVELOPER */ /* Warp this process to ensure the consistent json object structure * between 'listforwards' API and 'forward_event' notification. */ void json_format_forwarding_object(struct json_stream *response, const char *fieldname, const struct forwarding *cur) { json_object_start(response, fieldname); /* See 6d333f16cc0f3aac7097269bf0985b5fa06d59b4: we may have deleted HTLC. */ if (cur->payment_hash) json_add_sha256(response, "payment_hash", cur->payment_hash); json_add_short_channel_id(response, "in_channel", &cur->channel_in); /* This can be unknown if we failed before channel lookup */ if (cur->channel_out.u64 != 0) json_add_short_channel_id(response, "out_channel", &cur->channel_out); json_add_amount_msat_compat(response, cur->msat_in, "in_msatoshi", "in_msat"); /* These can be unset (aka zero) if we failed before channel lookup */ if (cur->channel_out.u64 != 0) { json_add_amount_msat_compat(response, cur->msat_out, "out_msatoshi", "out_msat"); json_add_amount_msat_compat(response, cur->fee, "fee", "fee_msat"); } json_add_string(response, "status", forward_status_name(cur->status)); if (cur->failcode != 0) { json_add_num(response, "failcode", cur->failcode); json_add_string(response, "failreason", onion_wire_name(cur->failcode)); } #ifdef COMPAT_V070 /* If a forwarding doesn't have received_time it was created * before we added the tracking, do not include it here. */ if (cur->received_time.ts.tv_sec) { json_add_timeabs(response, "received_time", cur->received_time); if (cur->resolved_time) json_add_timeabs(response, "resolved_time", *cur->resolved_time); } #else json_add_timeabs(response, "received_time", cur->received_time); if (cur->resolved_time) json_add_timeabs(response, "resolved_time", *cur->resolved_time); #endif json_object_end(response); } static void listforwardings_add_forwardings(struct json_stream *response, struct wallet *wallet) { const struct forwarding *forwardings; forwardings = wallet_forwarded_payments_get(wallet, tmpctx); json_array_start(response, "forwards"); for (size_t i=0; ild->wallet); return command_success(cmd, response); } static const struct json_command listforwards_command = { "listforwards", "channels", json_listforwards, "List all forwarded payments and their information", false, "List all forwarded payments and their information" }; AUTODATA(json_command, &listforwards_command);