mirror of
https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning.git
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df-rbf: break out opener commitment codepath, use for rbf
This commit is contained in:
parent
63b060066b
commit
b30489310b
@ -1937,6 +1937,233 @@ static void add_funding_output(struct tx_state *tx_state,
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tx_state->funding_serial);
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}
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/* Returns NULL on negotation failure; reason given as *err_reason.
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* If we call negotiation_failed internally, reason will be NULL */
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static u8 *opener_commits(struct state *state,
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struct tx_state *tx_state,
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struct amount_sat total,
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char **err_reason)
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{
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struct channel_id cid;
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struct amount_msat our_msats;
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struct wally_tx_output *direct_outputs[NUM_SIDES];
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struct penalty_base *pbase;
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struct bitcoin_tx *remote_commit, *local_commit;
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struct bitcoin_signature remote_sig, local_sig;
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *htlc_sigs;
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const u8 *wscript;
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u8 *msg;
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char *error;
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wscript = bitcoin_redeem_2of2(tmpctx, &state->our_funding_pubkey,
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&state->their_funding_pubkey);
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psbt_txid(NULL, tx_state->psbt, &tx_state->funding_txid, NULL);
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/* Figure out the txout */
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if (!find_txout(tx_state->psbt, scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tmpctx, wscript),
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&tx_state->funding_txout)) {
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*err_reason = tal_fmt(tmpctx, "Expected output %s not"
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" found on funding tx %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx,
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scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tmpctx,
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wscript)),
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type_to_string(tmpctx,
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struct wally_psbt,
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tx_state->psbt));
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return NULL;
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}
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error = check_balances(tmpctx, state, tx_state,
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tx_state->psbt,
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tx_state->feerate_per_kw_funding);
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if (error) {
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*err_reason = tal_fmt(tmpctx, "Insufficiently funded funding "
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"tx, %s. %s", error,
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type_to_string(tmpctx,
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struct wally_psbt,
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tx_state->psbt));
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return NULL;
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}
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if (!amount_sat_to_msat(&our_msats, tx_state->opener_funding)) {
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
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"Rounding error, can't convert opener_funding %s"
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" to msats",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
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&tx_state->opener_funding));
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return NULL;
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}
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/* Ok, we're mostly good now? Let's do this */
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state->channel = new_initial_channel(state,
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&cid,
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&tx_state->funding_txid,
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tx_state->funding_txout,
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state->minimum_depth,
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total,
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our_msats,
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take(new_fee_states(NULL, LOCAL,
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&state->feerate_per_kw_commitment)),
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&tx_state->localconf,
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&tx_state->remoteconf,
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&state->our_points,
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&state->their_points,
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&state->our_funding_pubkey,
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&state->their_funding_pubkey,
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true, true,
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/* Opener is local */
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LOCAL);
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remote_commit = initial_channel_tx(state, &wscript,
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state->channel,
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&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
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REMOTE, direct_outputs, &error);
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if (!remote_commit) {
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*err_reason = tal_fmt(tmpctx, "Could not meet their fees"
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" and reserve: %s", error);
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return NULL;
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}
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/* We ask the HSM to sign their commitment transaction for us: it knows
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* our funding key, it just needs the remote funding key to create the
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* witness script. It also needs the amount of the funding output,
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* as segwit signatures commit to that as well, even though it doesn't
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* explicitly appear in the transaction itself. */
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msg = towire_hsmd_sign_remote_commitment_tx(NULL,
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remote_commit,
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&state->channel->funding_pubkey[REMOTE],
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&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
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true);
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wire_sync_write(HSM_FD, take(msg));
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msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, HSM_FD);
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if (!fromwire_hsmd_sign_tx_reply(msg, &local_sig))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO, "Bad sign_tx_reply %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
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/* You can tell this has been a problem before, since there's a debug
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* message here: */
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status_debug("signature %s on tx %s using key %s",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_signature, &local_sig),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, remote_commit),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
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&state->our_funding_pubkey));
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assert(local_sig.sighash_type == SIGHASH_ALL);
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msg = towire_commitment_signed(tmpctx, &state->channel_id,
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&local_sig.s,
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NULL);
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sync_crypto_write(state->pps, msg);
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peer_billboard(false, "channel open: commitment sent, waiting for reply");
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/* Wait for the peer to send us our commitment tx signature */
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msg = opening_negotiate_msg(tmpctx, state);
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if (!msg) {
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*err_reason = NULL;
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return NULL;
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}
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remote_sig.sighash_type = SIGHASH_ALL;
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if (!fromwire_commitment_signed(tmpctx, msg, &cid,
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&remote_sig.s,
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&htlc_sigs))
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peer_failed_warn(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
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"Parsing commitment signed %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
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if (htlc_sigs != NULL)
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peer_failed_warn(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
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"Must not send HTLCs with first"
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" commitment. %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
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local_commit = initial_channel_tx(state, &wscript, state->channel,
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&state->first_per_commitment_point[LOCAL],
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LOCAL, NULL, &error);
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/* This shouldn't happen either, AFAICT. */
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if (!local_commit) {
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*err_reason = tal_fmt(tmpctx, "Could not meet our fees"
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" and reserve: %s", error);
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return NULL;
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}
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* The recipient:
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* - if `signature` is incorrect OR non-compliant with LOW-S-standard
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* rule...:
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* - MUST fail the channel.
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*/
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if (!check_tx_sig(local_commit, 0, NULL, wscript,
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&state->their_funding_pubkey,
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&remote_sig)) {
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/* BOLT #1:
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*
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* ### The `error` Message
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*...
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* - when failure was caused by an invalid signature check:
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* - SHOULD include the raw, hex-encoded transaction in reply
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* to a `funding_created`, `funding_signed`,
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* `closing_signed`, or `commitment_signed` message.
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*/
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/*~ This verbosity is not only useful for our own testing, but
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* a courtesy to other implementaters whose brains may be so
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* twisted by coding in Go, Scala and Rust that they can no
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* longer read C code. */
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peer_failed_err(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
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"Bad signature %s on tx %s using key %s "
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"(funding txid %s, psbt %s)",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_signature,
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&remote_sig),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx,
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local_commit),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
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&state->their_funding_pubkey),
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/* This is the first place we'd discover the
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* * funding tx doesn't match up */
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid,
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&tx_state->funding_txid),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct wally_psbt,
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tx_state->psbt));
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}
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if (direct_outputs[LOCAL])
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pbase = penalty_base_new(state, 0, remote_commit,
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direct_outputs[LOCAL]);
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else
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pbase = NULL;
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peer_billboard(false, "channel open: commitment received, "
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"sending to lightningd to save");
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return towire_dualopend_commit_rcvd(state,
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&tx_state->remoteconf,
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local_commit,
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pbase,
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&remote_sig,
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tx_state->psbt,
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&state->channel_id,
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&state->their_points.revocation,
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&state->their_points.payment,
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&state->their_points.htlc,
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&state->their_points.delayed_payment,
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&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
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&state->their_funding_pubkey,
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&tx_state->funding_txid,
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tx_state->funding_txout,
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total,
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tx_state->opener_funding,
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state->channel_flags,
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state->feerate_per_kw_commitment,
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tx_state->localconf.channel_reserve,
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state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL],
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state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE]);
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}
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static void opener_start(struct state *state, u8 *msg)
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{
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struct tlv_opening_tlvs *open_tlv;
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@ -1944,14 +2171,7 @@ static void opener_start(struct state *state, u8 *msg)
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struct channel_id cid;
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char *err_reason;
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struct amount_sat total;
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struct amount_msat our_msats;
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struct sha256 podle;
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struct wally_tx_output *direct_outputs[NUM_SIDES];
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struct penalty_base *pbase;
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const u8 *wscript;
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struct bitcoin_tx *remote_commit, *local_commit;
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struct bitcoin_signature remote_sig, local_sig;
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secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *htlc_sigs;
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u32 feerate_min, feerate_max, feerate_best;
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struct tx_state *tx_state = state->tx_state;
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@ -2170,202 +2390,14 @@ static void opener_start(struct state *state, u8 *msg)
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if (!run_tx_interactive(state, tx_state, &tx_state->psbt, TX_INITIATOR))
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return;
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psbt_txid(NULL, tx_state->psbt, &tx_state->funding_txid, NULL);
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/* Figure out the txout */
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if (!find_txout(tx_state->psbt, scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tmpctx, wscript),
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&tx_state->funding_txout))
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peer_failed_warn(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
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"Expected output %s not found on funding tx %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tmpctx, wscript)),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct wally_psbt,
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tx_state->psbt));
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/* Check tx funds are sane */
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err_reason = check_balances(tmpctx, state, tx_state,
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tx_state->psbt,
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tx_state->feerate_per_kw_funding);
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msg = opener_commits(state, tx_state, total, &err_reason);
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if (!msg) {
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if (err_reason)
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negotiation_failed(state, "Insufficiently funded funding "
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"tx, %s. %s",
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err_reason,
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type_to_string(tmpctx,
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struct wally_psbt,
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tx_state->psbt));
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if (!amount_sat_to_msat(&our_msats, tx_state->opener_funding))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
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"Rounding error, can't convert opener_funding %s"
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" to msats",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct amount_sat,
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&tx_state->opener_funding));
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/* Ok, we're mostly good now? Let's do this */
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state->channel = new_initial_channel(state,
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&cid,
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&tx_state->funding_txid,
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tx_state->funding_txout,
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state->minimum_depth,
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total,
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our_msats,
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take(new_fee_states(NULL, LOCAL,
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&state->feerate_per_kw_commitment)),
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&tx_state->localconf,
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&tx_state->remoteconf,
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&state->our_points,
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&state->their_points,
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&state->our_funding_pubkey,
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&state->their_funding_pubkey,
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true, true,
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/* Opener is local */
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LOCAL);
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remote_commit = initial_channel_tx(state, &wscript,
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state->channel,
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&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
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REMOTE, direct_outputs, &err_reason);
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if (!remote_commit) {
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negotiation_failed(state,
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"Could not meet their fees and reserve: %s",
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err_reason);
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return;
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}
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/* We ask the HSM to sign their commitment transaction for us: it knows
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* our funding key, it just needs the remote funding key to create the
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* witness script. It also needs the amount of the funding output,
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* as segwit signatures commit to that as well, even though it doesn't
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* explicitly appear in the transaction itself. */
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msg = towire_hsmd_sign_remote_commitment_tx(NULL,
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remote_commit,
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&state->channel->funding_pubkey[REMOTE],
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&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
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true);
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wire_sync_write(HSM_FD, take(msg));
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msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, HSM_FD);
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if (!fromwire_hsmd_sign_tx_reply(msg, &local_sig))
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status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_HSM_IO, "Bad sign_tx_reply %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
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/* You can tell this has been a problem before, since there's a debug
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* message here: */
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status_debug("signature %s on tx %s using key %s",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_signature, &local_sig),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, remote_commit),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
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&state->our_funding_pubkey));
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assert(local_sig.sighash_type == SIGHASH_ALL);
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msg = towire_commitment_signed(tmpctx, &state->channel_id,
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&local_sig.s,
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NULL);
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sync_crypto_write(state->pps, msg);
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peer_billboard(false, "channel open: commitment sent, waiting for reply");
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/* Wait for the peer to send us our commitment tx signature */
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msg = opening_negotiate_msg(tmpctx, state);
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if (!msg)
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return;
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remote_sig.sighash_type = SIGHASH_ALL;
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if (!fromwire_commitment_signed(tmpctx, msg, &cid,
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&remote_sig.s,
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&htlc_sigs))
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peer_failed_warn(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
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"Parsing commitment signed %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
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if (htlc_sigs != NULL)
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peer_failed_warn(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
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"Must not send HTLCs with first"
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" commitment. %s",
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tal_hex(tmpctx, msg));
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local_commit = initial_channel_tx(state, &wscript, state->channel,
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&state->first_per_commitment_point[LOCAL],
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LOCAL, NULL, &err_reason);
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/* This shouldn't happen either, AFAICT. */
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if (!local_commit) {
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negotiation_failed(state,
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"Could not meet our fees and reserve: %s",
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err_reason);
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return;
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}
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/* BOLT #2:
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*
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* The recipient:
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* - if `signature` is incorrect OR non-compliant with LOW-S-standard
|
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* rule...:
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* - MUST fail the channel.
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*/
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if (!check_tx_sig(local_commit, 0, NULL, wscript, &state->their_funding_pubkey,
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&remote_sig)) {
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/* BOLT #1:
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*
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* ### The `error` Message
|
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*...
|
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* - when failure was caused by an invalid signature check:
|
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* - SHOULD include the raw, hex-encoded transaction in reply
|
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* to a `funding_created`, `funding_signed`,
|
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* `closing_signed`, or `commitment_signed` message.
|
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*/
|
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/*~ This verbosity is not only useful for our own testing, but
|
||||
* a courtesy to other implementaters whose brains may be so
|
||||
* twisted by coding in Go, Scala and Rust that they can no
|
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* longer read C code. */
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peer_failed_err(state->pps, &state->channel_id,
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"Bad signature %s on tx %s using key %s "
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"(funding txid %s, psbt %s)",
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_signature,
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&remote_sig),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx,
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local_commit),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
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&state->their_funding_pubkey),
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/* This is the first place we'd discover the
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* funding tx doesn't match up */
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid,
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&tx_state->funding_txid),
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type_to_string(tmpctx, struct wally_psbt,
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tx_state->psbt));
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}
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if (direct_outputs[LOCAL])
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pbase = penalty_base_new(state, 0, remote_commit,
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direct_outputs[LOCAL]);
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open_error(state, "%s", err_reason);
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else
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pbase = NULL;
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peer_billboard(false, "channel open: commitment received, "
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"sending to lightningd to save");
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msg = towire_dualopend_commit_rcvd(NULL,
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&tx_state->remoteconf,
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local_commit,
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pbase,
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&remote_sig,
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tx_state->psbt,
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&state->channel_id,
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&state->their_points.revocation,
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&state->their_points.payment,
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&state->their_points.htlc,
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&state->their_points.delayed_payment,
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&state->first_per_commitment_point[REMOTE],
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&state->their_funding_pubkey,
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&tx_state->funding_txid,
|
||||
tx_state->funding_txout,
|
||||
total,
|
||||
tx_state->opener_funding,
|
||||
state->channel_flags,
|
||||
state->feerate_per_kw_commitment,
|
||||
tx_state->localconf.channel_reserve,
|
||||
state->upfront_shutdown_script[LOCAL],
|
||||
state->upfront_shutdown_script[REMOTE]);
|
||||
open_error(state, "%s", "Opener commits failed");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Normally we would end dualopend here (and in fact this
|
||||
* is where openingd ends). However, now we wait for both our peer
|
||||
@ -2563,19 +2595,24 @@ static void rbf_start(struct state *state, const u8 *rbf_msg)
|
||||
/* Find the funding transaction txid */
|
||||
psbt_txid(NULL, tx_state->psbt, &tx_state->funding_txid, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
if (state->our_role == TX_ACCEPTER) {
|
||||
if (state->our_role == TX_ACCEPTER)
|
||||
msg = accepter_commits(state, tx_state, total, &err_reason);
|
||||
else
|
||||
msg = opener_commits(state, tx_state, total, &err_reason);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!msg) {
|
||||
if (err_reason)
|
||||
rbf_failed(state, "%s", err_reason);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
handle_send_tx_sigs(state, msg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (state->our_role == TX_ACCEPTER)
|
||||
handle_send_tx_sigs(state, msg);
|
||||
else
|
||||
wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(msg));
|
||||
|
||||
tal_free(state->tx_state);
|
||||
state->tx_state = tx_state;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// FIXME: opener side!
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static u8 *handle_funding_locked(struct state *state, u8 *msg)
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user