global: fix up quotes which are now in the master branch.

1. onion-message
2. blinded-payments
3. route-blinding
4. channel-type
5. warnings.

Now they'll be checked correctly, and if the spec changes, we'll know
to reexamine this code.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

common/blindedpath.c

@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static u8 *decrypt_encmsg_raw(const tal_t *ctx,
 	 */
 	subkey_from_hmac("rho", ss, &rho);
 
-	/* BOLT-onion-message #4:
+	/* BOLT #4:
 	 *- If the `encrypted_data` field is missing or cannot
 	 *  be decrypted:
 	 *   - MUST return an error
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ struct tlv_encrypted_data_tlv *decrypt_encrypted_data(const tal_t *ctx,
 	const u8 *cursor = decrypt_encmsg_raw(tmpctx, blinding, ss, enctlv);
 	size_t maxlen = tal_bytelen(cursor);
 
-	/* BOLT-onion-message #4:
+	/* BOLT #4:
 	 *
 	 * - MUST return an error if `encrypted_recipient_data` does not decrypt
 	 *   using the blinding point as described in

common/blindedpay.c

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ u8 **blinded_onion_hops(const tal_t *ctx,
 		bool first = (i == 0);
 		bool final = (i == tal_count(onions) - 1);
 
-		/* BOLT-blinded-payments #4:
+		/* BOLT #4:
 		 * - For every node inside a blinded route:
 		 *   - MUST include the `encrypted_recipient_data` provided by the
 		 *     recipient
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ u8 **blinded_onion_hops(const tal_t *ctx,
 		 *       recipient in `current_blinding_point`
 		 *   - If it is the final node:
 		 *     - MUST include `amt_to_forward`, `outgoing_cltv_value` and `total_amount_msat`.
+		 *...
 		 *   - MUST NOT include any other tlv field.
 		 */
 		onions[i] = onion_blinded_hop(onions,

common/gossip_constants.h

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  * only onion tlv payloads. */
 #define ROUTING_MAX_HOPS 20
 
-/* BOLT-f3a9f7f4e9e7a5a2997f3129e13d94090091846a #7:
+/* BOLT #7:
  *
  * The `channel_flags` bitfield...individual bits:
  *...

common/onion_message_parse.c

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static bool decrypt_forwarding_onionmsg(const struct pubkey *blinding,
 	if (!encmsg)
 		return false;
 
-	/* BOLT-onion-message #4:
+	/* BOLT #4:
 	 *  - if it is not the final node according to the onion encryption:
 	 *...
 	 *    - if the `encrypted_data_tlv` contains `path_id`:
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static bool decrypt_forwarding_onionmsg(const struct pubkey *blinding,
 	if (encmsg->path_id)
 		return false;
 
-	/* BOLT-onion-message #4:
+	/* BOLT #4:
 	 * - SHOULD forward the message using `onion_message` to the next peer
 	 *   indicated by `next_node_id`.
 	 */
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ bool onion_message_parse(const tal_t *ctx,
 
 		*final_om = NULL;
 
-		/* BOLT-onion-message #4:
+		/* BOLT #4:
 		 * - if it is not the final node according to the onion encryption:
 		 *   - if the `onionmsg_tlv` contains other tlv fields than `encrypted_recipient_data`:
 		 *     - MUST ignore the message.

common/test/run-onion-message-test.c

@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	/* Make it use our session key! */
 	sphinx_path->session_key = &session_key;
 
-	/* BOLT-onion-message #4:
+	/* BOLT #4:
 	 * - SHOULD set `onion_message_packet` `len` to 1366 or 32834.
 	 */
 	op = create_onionpacket(tmpctx, sphinx_path, ROUTING_INFO_SIZE,

common/wireaddr.h

@@ -23,11 +23,8 @@ struct sockaddr_un;
  *       * version 3 ([prop224](https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt))
  *         onion service addresses; Encodes:
  *            `[32:32_byte_ed25519_pubkey] || [2:checksum] || [1:version]`,
- *             where `checksum = sha3(".onion checksum" || pubkey || version)[:2]`
+ *             where `checksum = sha3(".onion checksum" || pubkey || version)[:2]`.
- */
+ *   * `5`: DNS hostname; data = `[1:hostname_len][hostname_len:hostname][2:port]` (length up to 258)
-
-/* BOLT-hostnames #7:
- *   * `5`: DNS hostname; data = `[byte:len][len*byte:hostname][u16:port]` (length up to 258)
  */
 
 #define	TOR_V2_ADDRLEN 10

lightningd/options.c

@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ static char *opt_add_addr_withtype(const char *arg,
 					       arg + strlen("dns:"),
 					       arg);
 			}
-			/* BOLT-hostnames #7:
+			/* BOLT #7:
 			 * The origin node:
 			 * ...
 			 *   - MUST NOT announce more than one `type 5` DNS hostname.

lightningd/peer_htlcs.c

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static bool htlc_out_update_state(struct channel *channel,
 	return true;
 }
 
-/* BOLT-route-blinding #4:
+/* BOLT #4:
  *   - if `blinding_point` is set in the incoming `update_add_htlc`:
  *     - MUST return an `invalid_onion_blinding` error.
  *   - if `current_blinding_point` is set in the onion payload and it is not the

lightningd/routehint.c

@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ routehint_candidates(const tal_t *ctx,
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		/* BOLT-channel-type #2:
+		/* BOLT #2:
 		 *   - if `channel_type` has `option_scid_alias` set:
 		 *       - MUST NOT use the real `short_channel_id` in
 		 *         BOLT 11 `r` fields.

wire/peer_wire.c

@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ bool extract_channel_id(const u8 *in_pkt, struct channel_id *channel_id)
 		 */
 		/* fall thru */
 	case WIRE_WARNING:
-		/* BOLT-warning #1:
+		/* BOLT #1:
 		 * 1. type: 1 (`warning`)
 		 * 2. data:
 		 *    * [`channel_id`:`channel_id`]