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doc: move dual anchor with escapes to Appendix B.
Draft 0.2; we use a single-sided anchor now, for simplicity. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This commit is contained in:
Rusty Russell
parent
3311580c62
commit
6883d28f6d
3 changed files with 400 additions and 357 deletions
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@ -62,3 +62,8 @@
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urldate = {2015-07-14},
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file = {Alt chains and atomic transfers:/home/rusty/.mozilla/firefox/vfn6if9k.default/zotero/storage/PEHK469N/index.html:text/html}
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}
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@misc{go1111111_single_anchor,
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title = {Idea to improve Lightning Network},
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urldate = {2015-07-24},
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note = {\url{https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1134319.msg11963141#msg11963141}}
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}
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@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
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\begin_body
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\begin_layout Title
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Reaching The Ground With Lightning (draft 0.1)
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Reaching The Ground With Lightning (draft 0.2)
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Author
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@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ key "Poon2015Lightning"
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Abstract
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Keywords: bitcoin, lightning, revocation hash, HTLC
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Keywords: bitcoin, lightning, revocation hash, HTLC, BIP62, BIP65, BIP68
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Section
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@ -777,367 +777,20 @@ The last of these is particularly pernicious, as BIP62 doesn't solve it:
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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For ease of understanding, we develop the protocol in stages.
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Please note that the intermediary proposals are insecure!
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Subsubsection
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Separate Anchor Transactions
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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To avoid the problem of needing all anchor signatures to derive the anchor
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transaction ID to create the commitment transaction input, we split the
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anchor into two transactions; thus A knows its anchor transaction ID, and
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B knows its anchor transaction ID as shown in Figure
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\begin_inset CommandInset ref
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LatexCommand ref
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reference "fig:Simplistic-Dual-Anchor"
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\end_inset
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.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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\align center
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\begin_inset Float figure
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wide false
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sideways false
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status open
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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\align center
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\begin_inset Graphics
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filename dual-anchor-diag1.eps
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scale 50
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\end_inset
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\begin_inset Caption Standard
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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Simplistic Dual Anchor Design
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\begin_inset CommandInset label
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LatexCommand label
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name "fig:Simplistic-Dual-Anchor"
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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This form allows A and B to create commitment transactions which spends
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the anchors outputs by exchanging anchor transaction IDs.
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It has the problem that if the other party does not then broadcast its
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anchor transaction, we cannot spend the commitment transaction, and our
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own anchor funds are stuck.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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Thus we introduce an
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\emph on
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escape
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\emph default
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transaction, which lets us regain our anchor funds in that case, as shown
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in Figure
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\begin_inset CommandInset ref
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LatexCommand ref
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reference "fig:Dual-Anchor2"
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\end_inset
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.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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\begin_inset Float figure
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wide false
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sideways false
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status open
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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\align center
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\begin_inset Graphics
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filename dual-anchor-diag2.eps
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scale 50
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\end_inset
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\begin_inset Caption Standard
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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Dual Anchor With Simple Escape Transactions
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\begin_inset CommandInset label
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LatexCommand label
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name "fig:Dual-Anchor2"
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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However, this escape transaction would let either side remove its funds
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from the channel at any time, which would make the channel insecure.
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Thus, after the commitment transactions have been established, we want
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to revoke the escape transactions.
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We can do the same way we did for the commitment transaction revocation;
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by placing restrictions on the
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\begin_inset Quotes eld
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\end_inset
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to-me
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\begin_inset Quotes erd
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\end_inset
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output.
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In particular, adding a delay if paying back to the anchor owner, and allowing
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it to be spent by the other party immediately if they possess the revocation
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preimage, as shown in Figure
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\begin_inset CommandInset ref
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LatexCommand ref
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reference "fig:Anchor-revoc-escape"
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\end_inset
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.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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\begin_inset Float figure
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wide false
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sideways false
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status open
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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\align center
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\begin_inset Graphics
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filename dual-anchor-diag3.eps
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scale 50
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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\begin_inset Caption Standard
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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Dual Anchors With Revocable Escape Transactions
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\begin_inset CommandInset label
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LatexCommand label
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name "fig:Anchor-revoc-escape"
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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Unfortunately, this revocation is not a complete solution; if B uses its
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escape transaction, A can collect B's anchor funds, but it has no way of
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collecting its own! The commitment transaction cannot be used, as one of
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its inputs has been spent by B's escape transaction.
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A's own escape transaction has been revoked, so B would simply steal the
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funds.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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Thus we need an additional construction, such that using one escape transaction
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immediately unlocks the other anchor funds for its owner.
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To do this, we ensure that the escape transaction is forced to reveal a
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secret, which is a fairly well-established technique
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Our approach is to only have one-sided anchors.
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These can be later balanced by the lightning network itself, or an atomic-swap
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an on-chain bitcoin transaction
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\begin_inset CommandInset citation
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LatexCommand cite
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key "nolan_alt"
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key "go1111111_single_anchor"
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\end_inset
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.
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The anchor transaction is modified to either require both signatures (for
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the commitment transaction), or both signatures and the secret (for the
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escape transaction), as shown in Figure
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\begin_inset CommandInset ref
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LatexCommand ref
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reference "fig:Secret-Revelation-by"
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\end_inset
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.
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Note that this requires the other party to provide an alternate key (denoted
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here using A' and B'), otherwise there is no way to force the escape transactio
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n to provide the secret.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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\begin_inset Float figure
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wide false
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sideways false
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status open
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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\align center
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\begin_inset Graphics
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filename dual-anchor-diag4.eps
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scale 50
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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\begin_inset Caption Standard
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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Secret Revelation by Escape Transactions
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\begin_inset CommandInset label
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LatexCommand label
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name "fig:Secret-Revelation-by"
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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That revealed secret can be used with the other alternative: the
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\emph on
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fast escape transaction.
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\emph default
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This reveals the secret just like the escape transaction, but its output
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is immediately usable if one knows the other side's secret.
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This is shown in Figure
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\begin_inset CommandInset ref
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LatexCommand ref
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reference "fig:Final-Dual-Anchor"
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\end_inset
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.
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Thus, if the B broadcasts its escape transaction after it has been revoked,
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A can (after ensuring escape B is sufficiently deep in the block chain)
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broadcast its fast escape transaction and use B's secret to immediately
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spend the output.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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On the other hand, if B broadcasts its fast escape transaction without knowing
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A's secret, A can simply wait for the timeout and spend the fast escape
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output, then use its own fast escape transaction and B's secret to recover
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its own anchor funds as well.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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\begin_inset Float figure
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wide false
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sideways false
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status open
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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\align center
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\begin_inset Graphics
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filename dual-anchor-final.eps
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scale 50
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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\begin_inset Caption Standard
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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Final Dual Anchor Design
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\begin_inset CommandInset label
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LatexCommand label
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name "fig:Final-Dual-Anchor"
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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The final scripts are shown in
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\begin_inset CommandInset ref
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LatexCommand nameref
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reference "sec:Appendix-A:-Scripts"
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\end_inset
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.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Subsubsection
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Disadvantages of The Dual Anchor Approach
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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Unlike the mutual anchor approach, use of escape transactions is not outsourcabl
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e: you cannot have an untrusted third party which can monitor the network
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for the other sides' revoked escape transaction and respond with your own
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escape transaction.
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If you were to provide a third party with your fast escape transaction,
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you would necessarily provide it with the secret, which it could give to
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B.
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Any bitcoin transaction fees are initially funded by that anchor, but the
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implementation splits fees where possible< and never allows either side
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to spend funds in the channel if they would no longer be able to pay their
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share.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Subsection
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@ -1267,6 +920,14 @@ Acknowlegments
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\begin_layout Standard
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Thanks to mmeijeri on Reddit's r/Bitcoin for pointing out a flaw in escape
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transactions reusing the same A and B keys as the commitment transaction
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in
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\begin_inset CommandInset ref
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LatexCommand ref
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reference "sec:Appendix-B:-Dual"
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\end_inset
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\begin_inset Foot
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status collapsed
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@ -2094,5 +1755,382 @@ If either side publishes a commitment transaction which has been revoked,
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{<HTLC-REDEEMSCRIPT>}
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Section*
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Appendix B: Dual Anchors With Escape Transactions
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\begin_inset CommandInset label
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LatexCommand label
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name "sec:Appendix-B:-Dual"
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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This appendix presents a dual-input anchor solution which doesn't require
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additional bitcoin signature flags.
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It is not being proposed currently, as it seems that a single-sided anchor
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is probably sufficient.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Subsection
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Separate Anchor Transactions
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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To avoid the problem of needing all anchor signatures to derive the anchor
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transaction ID to create the commitment transaction input, we split the
|
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anchor into two transactions; thus A knows its anchor transaction ID, and
|
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B knows its anchor transaction ID as shown in Figure
|
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\begin_inset CommandInset ref
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LatexCommand ref
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reference "fig:Simplistic-Dual-Anchor"
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\end_inset
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.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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\align center
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\begin_inset Float figure
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wide false
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sideways false
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status open
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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\align center
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\begin_inset Graphics
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filename dual-anchor-diag1.eps
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scale 50
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\end_inset
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\begin_inset Caption Standard
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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Simplistic Dual Anchor Design
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\begin_inset CommandInset label
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LatexCommand label
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name "fig:Simplistic-Dual-Anchor"
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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|
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
|
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This form allows A and B to create commitment transactions which spends
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the anchors outputs by exchanging anchor transaction IDs.
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It has the problem that if the other party does not then broadcast its
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anchor transaction, we cannot spend the commitment transaction, and our
|
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own anchor funds are stuck.
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\end_layout
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|
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\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
Thus we introduce an
|
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\emph on
|
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escape
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\emph default
|
||||
transaction, which lets us regain our anchor funds in that case, as shown
|
||||
in Figure
|
||||
\begin_inset CommandInset ref
|
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LatexCommand ref
|
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reference "fig:Dual-Anchor2"
|
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\end_inset
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.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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\begin_inset Float figure
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wide false
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sideways false
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status open
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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\align center
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\begin_inset Graphics
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filename dual-anchor-diag2.eps
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scale 50
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\end_inset
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\begin_inset Caption Standard
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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Dual Anchor With Simple Escape Transactions
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\begin_inset CommandInset label
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LatexCommand label
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name "fig:Dual-Anchor2"
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\end_inset
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|
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|
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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|
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|
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\end_layout
|
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|
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\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
However, this escape transaction would let either side remove its funds
|
||||
from the channel at any time, which would make the channel insecure.
|
||||
Thus, after the commitment transactions have been established, we want
|
||||
to revoke the escape transactions.
|
||||
We can do the same way we did for the commitment transaction revocation;
|
||||
by placing restrictions on the
|
||||
\begin_inset Quotes eld
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
to-me
|
||||
\begin_inset Quotes erd
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
output.
|
||||
In particular, adding a delay if paying back to the anchor owner, and allowing
|
||||
it to be spent by the other party immediately if they possess the revocation
|
||||
preimage, as shown in Figure
|
||||
\begin_inset CommandInset ref
|
||||
LatexCommand ref
|
||||
reference "fig:Anchor-revoc-escape"
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
.
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||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
\begin_inset Float figure
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||||
wide false
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||||
sideways false
|
||||
status open
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Plain Layout
|
||||
\align center
|
||||
\begin_inset Graphics
|
||||
filename dual-anchor-diag3.eps
|
||||
scale 50
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
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||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Plain Layout
|
||||
\begin_inset Caption Standard
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Plain Layout
|
||||
Dual Anchors With Revocable Escape Transactions
|
||||
\begin_inset CommandInset label
|
||||
LatexCommand label
|
||||
name "fig:Anchor-revoc-escape"
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
Unfortunately, this revocation is not a complete solution; if B uses its
|
||||
escape transaction, A can collect B's anchor funds, but it has no way of
|
||||
collecting its own! The commitment transaction cannot be used, as one of
|
||||
its inputs has been spent by B's escape transaction.
|
||||
A's own escape transaction has been revoked, so B would simply steal the
|
||||
funds.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
Thus we need an additional construction, such that using one escape transaction
|
||||
immediately unlocks the other anchor funds for its owner.
|
||||
To do this, we ensure that the escape transaction is forced to reveal a
|
||||
secret, which is a fairly well-established technique
|
||||
\begin_inset CommandInset citation
|
||||
LatexCommand cite
|
||||
key "nolan_alt"
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
.
|
||||
The anchor transaction is modified to either require both signatures (for
|
||||
the commitment transaction), or both signatures and the secret (for the
|
||||
escape transaction), as shown in Figure
|
||||
\begin_inset CommandInset ref
|
||||
LatexCommand ref
|
||||
reference "fig:Secret-Revelation-by"
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
.
|
||||
Note that this requires the other party to provide an alternate key (denoted
|
||||
here using A' and B'), otherwise there is no way to force the escape transactio
|
||||
n to provide the secret.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
\begin_inset Float figure
|
||||
wide false
|
||||
sideways false
|
||||
status open
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Plain Layout
|
||||
\align center
|
||||
\begin_inset Graphics
|
||||
filename dual-anchor-diag4.eps
|
||||
scale 50
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Plain Layout
|
||||
\begin_inset Caption Standard
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Plain Layout
|
||||
Secret Revelation by Escape Transactions
|
||||
\begin_inset CommandInset label
|
||||
LatexCommand label
|
||||
name "fig:Secret-Revelation-by"
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
That revealed secret can be used with the other alternative: the
|
||||
\emph on
|
||||
fast escape transaction.
|
||||
|
||||
\emph default
|
||||
This reveals the secret just like the escape transaction, but its output
|
||||
is immediately usable if one knows the other side's secret.
|
||||
This is shown in Figure
|
||||
\begin_inset CommandInset ref
|
||||
LatexCommand ref
|
||||
reference "fig:Final-Dual-Anchor"
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
.
|
||||
Thus, if the B broadcasts its escape transaction after it has been revoked,
|
||||
A can (after ensuring escape B is sufficiently deep in the block chain)
|
||||
broadcast its fast escape transaction and use B's secret to immediately
|
||||
spend the output.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
On the other hand, if B broadcasts its fast escape transaction without knowing
|
||||
A's secret, A can simply wait for the timeout and spend the fast escape
|
||||
output, then use its own fast escape transaction and B's secret to recover
|
||||
its own anchor funds as well.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
\begin_inset Float figure
|
||||
wide false
|
||||
sideways false
|
||||
status open
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Plain Layout
|
||||
\align center
|
||||
\begin_inset Graphics
|
||||
filename dual-anchor-final.eps
|
||||
scale 50
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Plain Layout
|
||||
\begin_inset Caption Standard
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Plain Layout
|
||||
Final Dual Anchor Design
|
||||
\begin_inset CommandInset label
|
||||
LatexCommand label
|
||||
name "fig:Final-Dual-Anchor"
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
The final scripts are shown in
|
||||
\begin_inset CommandInset ref
|
||||
LatexCommand nameref
|
||||
reference "sec:Appendix-A:-Scripts"
|
||||
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Subsection
|
||||
Disadvantages of The Dual Anchor Approach
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
Unlike the mutual anchor approach, use of escape transactions is not outsourcabl
|
||||
e: you cannot have an untrusted third party which can monitor the network
|
||||
for the other sides' revoked escape transaction and respond with your own
|
||||
escape transaction.
|
||||
If you were to provide a third party with your fast escape transaction,
|
||||
you would necessarily provide it with the secret, which it could give to
|
||||
B.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\end_body
|
||||
\end_document
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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Add table
Reference in a new issue