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bolt: Updated the BOLT specification to a07dc3df3b4611989e3359f28f96c574f7822850
This is mainly just copying over the copy-editing from the lightning-rfc repository. [ Split to just perform changes prior to the UNKNOWN_PAYMENT_HASH change --RR ] Signed-off-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com> Reported-by: Rusty Russell <@rustyrussell>
This commit is contained in:
Christian Decker
Rusty Russell
parent
0d5f0d79da
commit
65054ae72e
11 changed files with 97 additions and 113 deletions
2
Makefile
2
Makefile
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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ CCANDIR := ccan
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# Where we keep the BOLT RFCs
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BOLTDIR := ../lightning-rfc/
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BOLTVERSION := bca814e270dcbee2fea51c0a26ca99efef261f2b
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BOLTVERSION := a07dc3df3b4611989e3359f28f96c574f7822850
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-include config.vars
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@ -425,12 +425,10 @@ static void channel_announcement_negotiate(struct peer *peer)
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/* BOLT #7:
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*
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* A node:
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* - if the `open_channel` message has the `announce_channel` bit set
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* AND a `shutdown` message has not been sent:
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* - if the `open_channel` message has the `announce_channel` bit set AND a `shutdown` message has not been sent:
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* - MUST send the `announcement_signatures` message.
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* - MUST NOT send `announcement_signatures` messages until
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* `funding_locked` has been sent AND the funding transaction has
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* at least six confirmations.
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* - MUST NOT send `announcement_signatures` messages until `funding_locked`
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* has been sent and received AND the funding transaction has at least six confirmations.
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* - otherwise:
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* - MUST NOT send the `announcement_signatures` message.
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*/
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@ -439,10 +437,9 @@ static void channel_announcement_negotiate(struct peer *peer)
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/* BOLT #7:
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*
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* - MUST NOT send `announcement_signatures` messages until
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* `funding_locked` has been sent AND the funding transaction has
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* at least six confirmations.
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*/
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* - MUST NOT send `announcement_signatures` messages until `funding_locked`
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* has been sent and received AND the funding transaction has at least six confirmations.
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*/
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if (peer->announce_depth_reached && !peer->have_sigs[LOCAL]) {
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send_announcement_signatures(peer);
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peer->have_sigs[LOCAL] = true;
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@ -268,8 +268,7 @@ struct bitcoin_tx *commit_tx(const tal_t *ctx,
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* * locktime: upper 8 bits are 0x20, lower 24 bits are the lower
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* 24 bits of the obscured commitment transaction number
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* * locktime: upper 8 bits are 0x20, lower 24 bits are the lower 24 bits of the obscured commitment number
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*/
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tx->lock_time
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= (0x20000000 | (obscured_commitment_number & 0xFFFFFF));
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@ -285,8 +284,7 @@ struct bitcoin_tx *commit_tx(const tal_t *ctx,
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* * `txin[0]` sequence: upper 8 bits are 0x80, lower 24 bits are
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* upper 24 bits of the obscured commitment transaction number
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* * `txin[0]` sequence: upper 8 bits are 0x80, lower 24 bits are upper 24 bits of the obscured commitment number
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*/
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tx->input[0].sequence_number
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= (0x80000000 | ((obscured_commitment_number>>24) & 0xFFFFFF));
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@ -497,25 +497,25 @@ int main(void)
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* <!-- The test vector values are derived, as per Key Derivation,
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* though it's not required for this test. They're included here
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* for completeness and in case someone wants to reproduce the
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* test vectors themselves:
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*
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* INTERNAL: remote_funding_privkey: 1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e130101
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* INTERNAL: local_payment_basepoint_secret: 111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111101
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* INTERNAL: remote_revocation_basepoint_secret: 222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222201
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* INTERNAL: local_delayed_payment_basepoint_secret: 333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333301
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* INTERNAL: remote_payment_basepoint_secret: 444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444401
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* x_local_per_commitment_secret: 1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a0908070605040302010001
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* # From remote_revocation_basepoint_secret
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* INTERNAL: remote_revocation_basepoint: 02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27
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* # From local_delayed_payment_basepoint_secret
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* INTERNAL: local_delayed_payment_basepoint: 023c72addb4fdf09af94f0c94d7fe92a386a7e70cf8a1d85916386bb2535c7b1b1
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* INTERNAL: local_per_commitment_point: 025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486
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* INTERNAL: remote_privkey: 8deba327a7cc6d638ab0eb025770400a6184afcba6713c210d8d10e199ff2fda01
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* # From local_delayed_payment_basepoint_secret, local_per_commitment_point and local_delayed_payment_basepoint
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* INTERNAL: local_delayed_privkey: adf3464ce9c2f230fd2582fda4c6965e4993ca5524e8c9580e3df0cf226981ad01
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* <!-- The test vector values are derived, as per Key Derivation, though it's not
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* required for this test. They're included here for completeness and
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* in case someone wants to reproduce the test vectors themselves:
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*
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* INTERNAL: remote_funding_privkey: 1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e1301
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* INTERNAL: local_payment_basepoint_secret: 111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111101
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* INTERNAL: remote_revocation_basepoint_secret: 222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222201
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* INTERNAL: local_delayed_payment_basepoint_secret: 333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333301
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* INTERNAL: remote_payment_basepoint_secret: 444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444401
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* x_local_per_commitment_secret: 1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a0908070605040302010001
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* # From remote_revocation_basepoint_secret
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* INTERNAL: remote_revocation_basepoint: 02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27
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* # From local_delayed_payment_basepoint_secret
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* INTERNAL: local_delayed_payment_basepoint: 023c72addb4fdf09af94f0c94d7fe92a386a7e70cf8a1d85916386bb2535c7b1b1
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* INTERNAL: local_per_commitment_point: 025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486
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* INTERNAL: remote_privkey: 8deba327a7cc6d638ab0eb025770400a6184afcba6713c210d8d10e199ff2fda01
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* # From local_delayed_payment_basepoint_secret, local_per_commitment_point and local_delayed_payment_basepoint
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* INTERNAL: local_delayed_privkey: adf3464ce9c2f230fd2582fda4c6965e4993ca5524e8c9580e3df0cf226981ad01
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* -->
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*/
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local_funding_privkey.secret = secret_from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f374901");
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x_remote_funding_privkey.secret = secret_from_hex("1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e1301");
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@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ int main(void)
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*
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* local_payment_basepoint: 034f355bdcb7cc0af728ef3cceb9615d90684bb5b2ca5f859ab0f0b704075871aa
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* remote_payment_basepoint: 032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991
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* # obscured commitment transaction number = 0x2bb038521914 ^ 42
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* # obscured commitment number = 0x2bb038521914 ^ 42
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*/
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localbase.payment = pubkey_from_hex("034f355bdcb7cc0af728ef3cceb9615d90684bb5b2ca5f859ab0f0b704075871aa");
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remotebase.payment = pubkey_from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991");
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@ -10,8 +10,7 @@
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* The 48-bit commitment transaction number is obscured by `XOR` with
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* the lower 48 bits of:
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* The 48-bit commitment number is obscured by `XOR` with the lower 48 bits of:
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*
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* SHA256(payment_basepoint from open_channel || payment_basepoint from accept_channel)
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*/
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@ -206,8 +205,8 @@ struct bitcoin_tx *initial_commit_tx(const tal_t *ctx,
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* * locktime: upper 8 bits are 0x20, lower 24 bits are the lower
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* 24 bits of the obscured commitment transaction number
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* * locktime: upper 8 bits are 0x20, lower 24 bits are the
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* lower 24 bits of the obscured commitment number
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*/
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tx->lock_time
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= (0x20000000 | (obscured_commitment_number & 0xFFFFFF));
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@ -223,8 +222,7 @@ struct bitcoin_tx *initial_commit_tx(const tal_t *ctx,
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/* BOLT #3:
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*
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* * `txin[0]` sequence: upper 8 bits are 0x80, lower 24 bits are
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* upper 24 bits of the obscured commitment transaction number
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* * `txin[0]` sequence: upper 8 bits are 0x80, lower 24 bits are upper 24 bits of the obscured commitment number
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*/
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tx->input[0].sequence_number
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= (0x80000000 | ((obscured_commitment_number>>24) & 0xFFFFFF));
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@ -138,21 +138,21 @@ struct keypair {
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* Throughout the handshake process, each side maintains these variables:
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*
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* * `ck`: the **chaining key**. This value is the accumulated hash of all
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* previous ECDH outputs. At the end of the handshake, `ck` is used to
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* derive the encryption keys for Lightning messages.
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* previous ECDH outputs. At the end of the handshake, `ck` is used to derive
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* the encryption keys for Lightning messages.
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*
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* * `h`: the **handshake hash**. This value is the accumulated hash of _all_
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* handshake data that has been sent and received so far during the
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* handshake process.
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* handshake data that has been sent and received so far during the handshake
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* process.
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*
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* * `temp_k1`, `temp_k2`, `temp_k3`: the **intermediate keys**. These are used to
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* encrypt and decrypt the zero-length AEAD payloads at the end of each
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* handshake message.
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* * `temp_k1`, `temp_k2`, `temp_k3`: the **intermediate keys**. These are used to
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* encrypt and decrypt the zero-length AEAD payloads at the end of each handshake
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* message.
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*
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* * `e`: a party's **ephemeral keypair**. For each session, a node MUST
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* generate a new ephemeral key with strong cryptographic randomness.
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* * `e`: a party's **ephemeral keypair**. For each session, a node MUST generate a
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* new ephemeral key with strong cryptographic randomness.
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*
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* * `s`: a party's **static public key** (`ls` for local, `rs` for remote)
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* * `s`: a party's **static keypair** (`ls` for local, `rs` for remote)
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*/
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struct handshake {
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struct secret ck;
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@ -469,9 +469,8 @@ static struct io_plan *act_three_initiator(struct io_conn *conn,
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/* BOLT #8:
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*
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* 3. `ss = ECDH(re, s.priv)`
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* 3. `se = ECDH(s.priv, re)`
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* * where `re` is the ephemeral public key of the responder
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*
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*/
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h->ss = hsm_do_ecdh(h, &h->re);
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if (!h->ss)
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@ -481,9 +480,8 @@ static struct io_plan *act_three_initiator(struct io_conn *conn,
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/* BOLT #8:
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*
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* 4. `ck, temp_k3 = HKDF(ck, ss)`
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* * The final intermediate shared secret is mixed into the running
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* chaining key.
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* 4. `ck, temp_k3 = HKDF(ck, se)`
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* * The final intermediate shared secret is mixed into the running chaining key.
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*/
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hkdf_two_keys(&h->ck, &h->temp_k, &h->ck, h->ss, sizeof(*h->ss));
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SUPERVERBOSE("# ck,temp_k3=0x%s,0x%s",
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@ -547,8 +545,7 @@ static struct io_plan *act_two_initiator2(struct io_conn *conn,
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/* BOLT #8:
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*
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* 5. `ss = ECDH(re, e.priv)`
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* * where `re` is the responder's ephemeral public key
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* 5. `es = ECDH(s.priv, re)`
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*/
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if (!secp256k1_ecdh(secp256k1_ctx, h->ss->data, &h->re.pubkey,
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h->e.priv.secret.data))
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@ -558,9 +555,9 @@ static struct io_plan *act_two_initiator2(struct io_conn *conn,
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/* BOLT #8:
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*
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* 6. `ck, temp_k2 = HKDF(ck, ss)`
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* * A new temporary encryption key is generated, which is
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* used to generate the authenticating MAC.
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* 6. `ck, temp_k2 = HKDF(ck, ee)`
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* * A new temporary encryption key is generated, which is
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* used to generate the authenticating MAC.
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*/
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hkdf_two_keys(&h->ck, &h->temp_k, &h->ck, h->ss, sizeof(*h->ss));
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SUPERVERBOSE("# ck,temp_k2=0x%s,0x%s",
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@ -636,9 +633,9 @@ static struct io_plan *act_one_initiator(struct io_conn *conn,
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/* BOLT #8:
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*
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* 3. `ss = ECDH(rs, e.priv)`
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* * The initiator performs an ECDH between its newly generated
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* ephemeral key and the remote node's static public key.
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* 3. `es = ECDH(e.priv, rs)`
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* * The initiator performs an ECDH between its newly generated ephemeral
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* key and the remote node's static public key.
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*/
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h->ss = tal(h, struct secret);
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if (!secp256k1_ecdh(secp256k1_ctx, h->ss->data,
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@ -649,9 +646,9 @@ static struct io_plan *act_one_initiator(struct io_conn *conn,
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/* BOLT #8:
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*
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* 4. `ck, temp_k1 = HKDF(ck, ss)`
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* * A new temporary encryption key is generated, which is
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* used to generate the authenticating MAC.
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* 4. `ck, temp_k1 = HKDF(ck, es)`
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* * A new temporary encryption key is generated, which is
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* used to generate the authenticating MAC.
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*/
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hkdf_two_keys(&h->ck, &h->temp_k, &h->ck, h->ss, sizeof(*h->ss));
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SUPERVERBOSE("# ck,temp_k1=0x%s,0x%s",
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@ -739,7 +736,7 @@ static struct io_plan *act_three_responder2(struct io_conn *conn,
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/* BOLT #8:
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*
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* 6. `ss = ECDH(rs, e.priv)`
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* 6. `se = ECDH(e.priv, rs)`
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* * where `e` is the responder's original ephemeral key
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*/
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if (!secp256k1_ecdh(secp256k1_ctx, h->ss->data, &h->their_id.pubkey,
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@ -749,7 +746,7 @@ static struct io_plan *act_three_responder2(struct io_conn *conn,
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SUPERVERBOSE("# ss=0x%s", tal_hexstr(tmpctx, h->ss, sizeof(*h->ss)));
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/* BOLT #8:
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* 7. `ck, temp_k3 = HKDF(ck, ss)`
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* 7. `ck, temp_k3 = HKDF(ck, se)`
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*/
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hkdf_two_keys(&h->ck, &h->temp_k, &h->ck, h->ss, sizeof(*h->ss));
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SUPERVERBOSE("# ck,temp_k3=0x%s,0x%s",
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@ -813,9 +810,9 @@ static struct io_plan *act_two_responder(struct io_conn *conn,
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/* BOLT #8:
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*
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* 3. `ss = ECDH(re, e.priv)`
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* * where `re` is the ephemeral key of the initiator, which was
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* received during Act One
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* 3. `ee = ECDH(e.priv, re)`
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* * where `re` is the ephemeral key of the initiator, which was received
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* during Act One
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*/
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if (!secp256k1_ecdh(secp256k1_ctx, h->ss->data, &h->re.pubkey,
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h->e.priv.secret.data))
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@ -824,8 +821,8 @@ static struct io_plan *act_two_responder(struct io_conn *conn,
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/* BOLT #8:
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*
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* 4. `ck, temp_k2 = HKDF(ck, ss)`
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* * A new temporary encryption key is generated, which is
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* 4. `ck, temp_k2 = HKDF(ck, ee)`
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* * A new temporary encryption key is generated, which is
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* used to generate the authenticating MAC.
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*/
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hkdf_two_keys(&h->ck, &h->temp_k, &h->ck, h->ss, sizeof(*h->ss));
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@ -879,8 +876,9 @@ static struct io_plan *act_one_responder2(struct io_conn *conn,
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return handshake_failed(conn, h);
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/* BOLT #8:
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*
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* * The raw bytes of the remote party's ephemeral public key
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* (`e`) are to be deserialized into a point on the curve using
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* (`re`) are to be deserialized into a point on the curve using
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* affine coordinates as encoded by the key's serialized
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* composed format.
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*/
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@ -900,7 +898,8 @@ static struct io_plan *act_one_responder2(struct io_conn *conn,
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SUPERVERBOSE("# h=0x%s", tal_hexstr(tmpctx, &h->h, sizeof(h->h)));
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/* BOLT #8:
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* 5. `ss = ECDH(re, s.priv)`
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*
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* 5. `es = ECDH(s.priv, re)`
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* * The responder performs an ECDH between its static private key and
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* the initiator's ephemeral public key.
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*/
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@ -912,9 +911,9 @@ static struct io_plan *act_one_responder2(struct io_conn *conn,
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/* BOLT #8:
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*
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* 6. `ck, temp_k1 = HKDF(ck, ss)`
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* * A new temporary encryption key is generated, which will
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* shortly be used to check the authenticating MAC.
|
||||
* 6. `ck, temp_k1 = HKDF(ck, es)`
|
||||
* * A new temporary encryption key is generated, which will
|
||||
* shortly be used to check the authenticating MAC.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
hkdf_two_keys(&h->ck, &h->temp_k, &h->ck, h->ss, sizeof(*h->ss));
|
||||
SUPERVERBOSE("# ck,temp_k1=0x%s,0x%s",
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ check_length:
|
|||
|
||||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* An endpoint node:
|
||||
* A node:
|
||||
* - if the `gossip_queries` feature is negotiated:
|
||||
* - MUST NOT relay any gossip messages unless explicitly requested.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
@ -570,8 +570,8 @@ static const u8 *handle_query_short_channel_ids(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg
|
|||
|
||||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - MUST respond to each known `short_channel_id` with a
|
||||
* `channel_announcement` and the latest `channel_update`s for each end
|
||||
* - MUST respond to each known `short_channel_id` with a `channel_announcement`
|
||||
* and the latest `channel_update` for each end
|
||||
* - SHOULD NOT wait for the next outgoing gossip flush to send
|
||||
* these.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
@ -1002,8 +1002,7 @@ static void maybe_create_next_scid_reply(struct peer *peer)
|
|||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - MUST respond to each known `short_channel_id` with a
|
||||
* `channel_announcement` and the latest `channel_update`s for
|
||||
* each end
|
||||
* `channel_announcement` and the latest `channel_update` for each end
|
||||
* - SHOULD NOT wait for the next outgoing gossip flush
|
||||
* to send these.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
@ -1116,7 +1115,7 @@ static void maybe_queue_gossip(struct peer *peer)
|
|||
|
||||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* An endpoint node:
|
||||
* A node:
|
||||
*...
|
||||
* - SHOULD flush outgoing gossip messages once every 60 seconds,
|
||||
* independently of the arrival times of the messages.
|
||||
|
|
@ -1238,9 +1237,9 @@ static void update_local_channel(struct daemon *daemon,
|
|||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The origin node:
|
||||
* - MAY create a `channel_update` to communicate the channel
|
||||
* parameters to the final node, even though the channel has not yet
|
||||
* been announced
|
||||
* - MAY create a `channel_update` to communicate the channel parameters to the
|
||||
* channel peer, even though the channel has not yet been announced (i.e. the
|
||||
* `announce_channel` bit was not set).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!is_chan_public(chan)) {
|
||||
/* handle_channel_update will not put private updates in the
|
||||
|
|
@ -1749,7 +1748,7 @@ static void gossip_send_keepalive_update(struct daemon *daemon,
|
|||
|
||||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* An endpoint node:
|
||||
* A node:
|
||||
* - if a channel's latest `channel_update`s `timestamp` is older than two weeks
|
||||
* (1209600 seconds):
|
||||
* - MAY prune the channel.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -844,8 +844,7 @@ u8 *handle_channel_announcement(struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The final node:
|
||||
* The receiving node:
|
||||
*...
|
||||
* - if the specified `chain_hash` is unknown to the receiver:
|
||||
* - MUST ignore the message.
|
||||
|
|
@ -941,7 +940,7 @@ void handle_pending_cannouncement(struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|||
|
||||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The final node:
|
||||
* The receiving node:
|
||||
*...
|
||||
* - if the `short_channel_id`'s output... is spent:
|
||||
* - MUST ignore the message.
|
||||
|
|
@ -956,7 +955,7 @@ void handle_pending_cannouncement(struct routing_state *rstate,
|
|||
|
||||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The final node:
|
||||
* The receiving node:
|
||||
*...
|
||||
* - if the `short_channel_id`'s output does NOT correspond to a P2WSH
|
||||
* (using `bitcoin_key_1` and `bitcoin_key_2`, as specified in
|
||||
|
|
@ -1169,7 +1168,7 @@ u8 *handle_channel_update(struct routing_state *rstate, const u8 *update TAKES,
|
|||
|
||||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The final node:
|
||||
* The receiving node:
|
||||
*...
|
||||
* - if the specified `chain_hash` value is unknown (meaning it isn't
|
||||
* active on the specified chain):
|
||||
|
|
@ -1292,7 +1291,7 @@ static struct wireaddr *read_addresses(const tal_t *ctx, const u8 *ser)
|
|||
|
||||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The final node:
|
||||
* The receiving node:
|
||||
*...
|
||||
* - SHOULD ignore the first `address descriptor` that does
|
||||
* NOT match the types defined above.
|
||||
|
|
@ -1392,7 +1391,7 @@ u8 *handle_node_announcement(struct routing_state *rstate, const u8 *node_ann)
|
|||
|
||||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The final node:
|
||||
* The receiving node:
|
||||
*...
|
||||
* - if `features` field contains _unknown even bits_:
|
||||
* - MUST NOT parse the remainder of the message.
|
||||
|
|
@ -1410,12 +1409,13 @@ u8 *handle_node_announcement(struct routing_state *rstate, const u8 *node_ann)
|
|||
if (!check_signed_hash(&hash, &signature, &node_id)) {
|
||||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - if `signature` is NOT a valid signature (using `node_id`
|
||||
* of the double-SHA256 of the entire message following the
|
||||
* `signature` field, including unknown fields following
|
||||
* `alias`):
|
||||
* - SHOULD fail the connection.
|
||||
* - if `signature` is not a valid signature, using
|
||||
* `node_id` of the double-SHA256 of the entire
|
||||
* message following the `signature` field
|
||||
* (including unknown fields following
|
||||
* `fee_proportional_millionths`):
|
||||
* - MUST NOT process the message further.
|
||||
* - SHOULD fail the connection.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
u8 *err = towire_errorfmt(rstate, NULL,
|
||||
"Bad signature for %s hash %s"
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -550,12 +550,10 @@ static enum watch_result funding_lockin_cb(struct lightningd *ld,
|
|||
/* BOLT #7:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A node:
|
||||
* - if the `open_channel` message has the `announce_channel` bit set
|
||||
* AND a `shutdown` message has not been sent:
|
||||
* - if the `open_channel` message has the `announce_channel` bit set AND a `shutdown` message has not been sent:
|
||||
* - MUST send the `announcement_signatures` message.
|
||||
* - MUST NOT send `announcement_signatures` messages until
|
||||
* `funding_locked` has been sent AND the funding transaction has
|
||||
* at least six confirmations.
|
||||
* - MUST NOT send `announcement_signatures` messages until `funding_locked`
|
||||
* has been sent and received AND the funding transaction has at least six confirmations.
|
||||
* - otherwise:
|
||||
* - MUST NOT send the `announcement_signatures` message.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -613,20 +613,15 @@ static u64 unmask_commit_number(const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
|
|||
|
||||
/* BOLT #3:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The 48-bit commitment transaction number is obscured by
|
||||
* `XOR` with the lower 48 bits of...
|
||||
* The 48-bit commitment number is obscured by `XOR` with the lower 48 bits of...
|
||||
*/
|
||||
obscurer = commit_number_obscurer(keys[funder], keys[!funder]);
|
||||
|
||||
/* BOLT #3:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* * locktime: upper 8 bits are 0x20, lower 24 bits are the
|
||||
* lower 24 bits of the obscured commitment transaction
|
||||
* number
|
||||
* * locktime: upper 8 bits are 0x20, lower 24 bits are the lower 24 bits of the obscured commitment number
|
||||
*...
|
||||
* * `txin[0]` sequence: upper 8 bits are 0x80, lower 24 bits
|
||||
* are upper 24 bits of the obscured commitment
|
||||
* transaction number
|
||||
* * `txin[0]` sequence: upper 8 bits are 0x80, lower 24 bits are upper 24 bits of the obscured commitment number
|
||||
*/
|
||||
return ((tx->lock_time & 0x00FFFFFF)
|
||||
| (tx->input[0].sequence_number & (u64)0x00FFFFFF) << 24)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue