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doc/deployable-lightning: corrections and fixes.
1) Note incorrect label in txs in Fig1 of LN paper. 2) "an atomic-swap an on-chain.." -> "an atomic-swap *to* an on-chain" 3) "By using a dual anchor and escape transactions" -> "By using a rebalanced single anchor" 4) References to appendices fixed. 5) Move escape transaction scripts out to escape appendix. 6) Fix URL in bibliography (missing comma). Reported-by: John Newbery Closes: #11 Closes: #12 Reported-by: Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This commit is contained in:
Rusty Russell
parent
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commit
2ab9e3bd7f
3 changed files with 295 additions and 286 deletions
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@ -19,15 +19,9 @@
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year={2008}
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}
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@misc{BitcoinChannels,
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title = {{Instant TX for established business relationships (need replacements/nLockTime)}}
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July 04, 2011, 02:16:23 AM
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title = {{Instant TX for established business relationships (need replacements/nLockTime)}},
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urldate = {2011-07-04},
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note = {\url{https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=25786.0;all}}
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}
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@misc{PaymentChannels,
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title = {{Rapidly-adjusted (micro)payments to a pre-determined party}},
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urldate = {2015-07-13},
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note = {\url{https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Contract#Example_7:_Rapidly-adjusted_.28micro.29payments_to_a_pre-determined_party}}
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note = {\url{https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=25786.0}}
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}
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@article{DBLP:journals/corr/DeckerW14,
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author = {Christian Decker and
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@ -65,8 +59,7 @@ July 04, 2011, 02:16:23 AM
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title = {Alt chains and atomic transfers},
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note = {\url{https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=193281.msg2224949#msg2224949}},
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author = {Nolan, Tier},
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urldate = {2015-07-14},
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file = {Alt chains and atomic transfers:/home/rusty/.mozilla/firefox/vfn6if9k.default/zotero/storage/PEHK469N/index.html:text/html}
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urldate = {2015-07-14}
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}
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@misc{go1111111_single_anchor,
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title = {Idea to improve Lightning Network},
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@ -415,6 +415,17 @@ reference "fig:Figure-1-from"
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\end_inset
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\begin_inset Foot
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status collapsed
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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Note: this diagram has been corrected since: Commitment Close Tx 1A (CC1b)
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-- should be CC1a, and vice-versa
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\end_layout
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\end_inset
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.
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\end_layout
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@ -669,8 +680,8 @@ There's a slightly more intuitive and more efficient method than exchanging
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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Instead of using a private key, B uses knowledge of a hash preimage as
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well as its signature to steal funds from a revoked commitment transaction.
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Instead of using a private key, B uses knowledge of a hash preimage as well
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as its signature to steal funds from a revoked commitment transaction.
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Thus, to create a commitment transaction each side provides a hash value;
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to revoke a commitment transaction it provides the prehash image.
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\end_layout
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@ -779,7 +790,7 @@ The last of these is particularly pernicious, as BIP62 doesn't solve it:
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\begin_layout Standard
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Our approach is to only have one-sided anchors.
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These can be later balanced by the lightning network itself, or an atomic-swap
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an on-chain bitcoin transaction
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to an on-chain bitcoin transaction
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\begin_inset CommandInset citation
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LatexCommand cite
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key "go1111111_single_anchor"
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@ -884,7 +895,7 @@ name "fig:HTLC-Using-Revocation"
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\begin_layout Standard
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The scripts for this can be found in
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\begin_inset CommandInset ref
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LatexCommand ref
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LatexCommand nameref
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reference "sec:Appendix-A:-Scripts"
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\end_inset
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@ -909,9 +920,9 @@ The use of script conditionals to enforce timeouts instead of using separate
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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By using a dual anchor and escape transactions, channel establishment can
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also avoid new CHECKSIG flags, though it loses the important ability to
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outsource the enforcement of channel contract terms.
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By using a rebalanced single anchor, channel establishment can also avoid
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new CHECKSIG flags, though it loses the important ability to outsource
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the enforcement of channel contract terms.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Section*
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@ -923,14 +934,14 @@ Thanks to mmeijeri on Reddit's r/Bitcoin for pointing out a flaw in escape
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transactions reusing the same A and B keys as the commitment transaction
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in
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\begin_inset CommandInset ref
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LatexCommand ref
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LatexCommand nameref
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reference "sec:Appendix-B:-Dual"
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\end_inset
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\begin_inset Foot
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status collapsed
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status open
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\begin_layout Plain Layout
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https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3dlxw4/reaching_the_ground_with_lightnin
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@ -940,6 +951,7 @@ g_lightning/ct80xpp
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\end_inset
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.
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Thanks to John Newbery for multiple formatting and typing corrections.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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@ -954,7 +966,7 @@ Thanks to Joseph Poon for designing the escape/fast-escape dual-anchor method,
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\begin_inset CommandInset bibtex
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LatexCommand bibtex
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bibfiles "bitcoin"
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options "plain"
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options "bibtotoc,plain"
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\end_inset
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@ -1062,272 +1074,6 @@ OP_SWAP Put 2 before B's key on the stack.
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OP_CHECKMULTISIG Make sure A and B have signed.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Subsection*
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Escape Transaction
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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The escape transaction for A spends A's anchor output and reveals A's secret.
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Similarly for B.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Subsubsection*
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Escape Input Script
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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The extra 0 at the start is due to the OP_CHECKMULTISIG out-by-one-bug.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Description
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0
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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<SIG-B'>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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<SIG-A>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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<SECRET-A>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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{<ANCHOR-REDEEMSCRIPT>}
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Subsubsection*
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Escape Output Redeemscript
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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This allows two paths: one for the other side to use the revocation image,
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and one for this side to get their funds back after a delay.
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This show's A's script, but B's is the same with A and B exchanged.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Description
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OP_HASH160
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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<RHASH-A>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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OP_EQUAL Check if the top of stack is the revocation image.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Description
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OP_IF
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\end_layout
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\begin_deeper
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\begin_layout Description
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<KEY-B> Funds for B.
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\end_layout
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\end_deeper
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\begin_layout Description
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OP_ELSE It's A getting their funds back
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\end_layout
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\begin_deeper
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\begin_layout Description
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<DELAYTIME>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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OP_DROP Ensure delay.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Description
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<KEY-A> Needs to be signed by A.
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\end_layout
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\end_deeper
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\begin_layout Description
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OP_ENDIF
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Description
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OP_CHECKSIG Make sure it's signed correctly.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Subsubsection*
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Spending The Escape Output
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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Either B using a revocation preimage:
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Description
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<SIG-B>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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<REVOCATION-IMAGE-A>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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{<ESCAPE-REDEEMSCRIPT>}
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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Or A using after a timeout:
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Description
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<SIG-A>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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0
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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{<ESCAPE-REDEEMSCRIPT>}
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Subsection*
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Fast-Escape Transaction
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Subsubsection*
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Fast-Escape Input Script
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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This is identical to the normal escape input script.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Description
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0
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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<SIG-B'>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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<SIG-A>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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<SECRET-A>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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{<ANCHOR-REDEEMSCRIPT>}
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Subsubsection*
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Fast-Escape Output Redeemscript
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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This allows two paths: one for this side to use the other side's secret
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(revealed by them using an escape transaction), and one for the other side
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to claim this side's anchor funds after a delay.
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This show's A's script, but B's is the same with A and B exchanged.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Description
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OP_HASH
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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<SECRET-B-HASH>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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OP_EQUAL If top argument is B's secret
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Description
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OP_IF
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\end_layout
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\begin_deeper
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\begin_layout Description
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<KEY-A> For A
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\end_layout
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\end_deeper
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\begin_layout Description
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OP_ELSE B gets it if A doesn't know the secret.
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\end_layout
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\begin_deeper
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\begin_layout Description
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<DELAYTIME>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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OP_DROP Ensure delay.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Description
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<KEY-B> Needs to be signed by B.
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\end_layout
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\end_deeper
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\begin_layout Description
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OP_ENDIF
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Description
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OP_CHECKSIG Make sure it's signed correctly.
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Subsubsection*
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Spending The Fast-Escape Output
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Standard
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Either A using a B's secret revealed by B using its own escape transaction:
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\end_layout
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\begin_layout Description
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<SIG-A>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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<SECRET-B>
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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{<FAST-ESCAPE-REDEEMSCRIPT>}
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\end_layout
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|
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\begin_layout Standard
|
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Or B using after a timeout:
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\end_layout
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|
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\begin_layout Description
|
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<SIG-B>
|
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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|
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0
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\begin_inset space ~
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\end_inset
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|
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{<FAST-ESCAPE-REDEEMSCRIPT>}
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\end_layout
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|
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\begin_layout Subsection*
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Commitment Transactions For Generalized Channels
|
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\begin_inset CommandInset label
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|
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@ -2133,5 +1879,275 @@ e: you cannot have an untrusted third party which can monitor the network
|
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B.
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\end_layout
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|
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\begin_layout Subsection
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Script Definitions for Escape Transactions
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\end_layout
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|
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\begin_layout Subsection*
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Escape Transaction
|
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\end_layout
|
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|
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\begin_layout Standard
|
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The escape transaction for A spends A's anchor output and reveals A's secret.
|
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Similarly for B.
|
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\end_layout
|
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|
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\begin_layout Subsubsection*
|
||||
Escape Input Script
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
The extra 0 at the start is due to the OP_CHECKMULTISIG out-by-one-bug.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
0
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
<SIG-B'>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
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|
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<SIG-A>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
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|
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<SECRET-A>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
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||||
|
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{<ANCHOR-REDEEMSCRIPT>}
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Subsubsection*
|
||||
Escape Output Redeemscript
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
This allows two paths: one for the other side to use the revocation image,
|
||||
and one for this side to get their funds back after a delay.
|
||||
This show's A's script, but B's is the same with A and B exchanged.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
OP_HASH160
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
<RHASH-A>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
OP_EQUAL Check if the top of stack is the revocation image.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
OP_IF
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_deeper
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
<KEY-B> Funds for B.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\end_deeper
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
OP_ELSE It's A getting their funds back
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_deeper
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
<DELAYTIME>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
OP_DROP Ensure delay.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
<KEY-A> Needs to be signed by A.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\end_deeper
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
OP_ENDIF
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
OP_CHECKSIG Make sure it's signed correctly.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Subsubsection*
|
||||
Spending The Escape Output
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
Either B using a revocation preimage:
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
<SIG-B>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
<REVOCATION-IMAGE-A>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
{<ESCAPE-REDEEMSCRIPT>}
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
Or A using after a timeout:
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
<SIG-A>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
0
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
{<ESCAPE-REDEEMSCRIPT>}
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Subsection*
|
||||
Fast-Escape Transaction
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Subsubsection*
|
||||
Fast-Escape Input Script
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
This is identical to the normal escape input script.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
0
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
<SIG-B'>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
<SIG-A>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
<SECRET-A>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
{<ANCHOR-REDEEMSCRIPT>}
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Subsubsection*
|
||||
Fast-Escape Output Redeemscript
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
This allows two paths: one for this side to use the other side's secret
|
||||
(revealed by them using an escape transaction), and one for the other side
|
||||
to claim this side's anchor funds after a delay.
|
||||
This show's A's script, but B's is the same with A and B exchanged.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
OP_HASH
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
<SECRET-B-HASH>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
OP_EQUAL If top argument is B's secret
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
OP_IF
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_deeper
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
<KEY-A> For A
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\end_deeper
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
OP_ELSE B gets it if A doesn't know the secret.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_deeper
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
<DELAYTIME>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
OP_DROP Ensure delay.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
<KEY-B> Needs to be signed by B.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\end_deeper
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
OP_ENDIF
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
OP_CHECKSIG Make sure it's signed correctly.
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Subsubsection*
|
||||
Spending The Fast-Escape Output
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
Either A using a B's secret revealed by B using its own escape transaction:
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
<SIG-A>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
<SECRET-B>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
{<FAST-ESCAPE-REDEEMSCRIPT>}
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Standard
|
||||
Or B using after a timeout:
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\begin_layout Description
|
||||
<SIG-B>
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
0
|
||||
\begin_inset space ~
|
||||
\end_inset
|
||||
|
||||
{<FAST-ESCAPE-REDEEMSCRIPT>}
|
||||
\end_layout
|
||||
|
||||
\end_body
|
||||
\end_document
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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Add table
Reference in a new issue