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libhsmd: Migrate handle_ecdh

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Christian Decker 2021-04-21 18:45:09 +02:00 committed by Rusty Russell
parent d1b3a5b1aa
commit 0e61ed32e3
2 changed files with 31 additions and 32 deletions
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33
hsmd/hsmd.c
View File

@ -763,34 +763,6 @@ static struct io_plan *init_hsm(struct io_conn *conn,
&bolt12)));
}
/*~ The client has asked us to extract the shared secret from an EC Diffie
* Hellman token. This doesn't leak any information, but requires the private
* key, so the hsmd performs it. It's used to set up an encryption key for the
* connection handshaking (BOLT #8) and for the onion wrapping (BOLT #4). */
static struct io_plan *handle_ecdh(struct io_conn *conn,
struct client *c,
const u8 *msg_in)
{
struct privkey privkey;
struct pubkey point;
struct secret ss;
if (!fromwire_hsmd_ecdh_req(msg_in, &point))
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
/*~ We simply use the secp256k1_ecdh function: if privkey.secret.data is invalid,
* we kill them for bad randomness (~1 in 2^127 if privkey.secret.data is random) */
node_key(&privkey, NULL);
if (secp256k1_ecdh(secp256k1_ctx, ss.data, &point.pubkey,
privkey.secret.data, NULL, NULL) != 1) {
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "secp256k1_ecdh fail");
}
/*~ In the normal case, we return the shared secret, and then read
* the next msg. */
return req_reply(conn, c, take(towire_hsmd_ecdh_resp(NULL, &ss)));
}
/*~ The specific routine to sign the channel_announcement message. This is
* defined in BOLT #7, and requires *two* signatures: one from this node's key
* (to prove it's from us), and one from the bitcoin key used to create the
@ -1785,9 +1757,6 @@ static struct io_plan *handle_client(struct io_conn *conn, struct client *c)
case WIRE_HSMD_GET_OUTPUT_SCRIPTPUBKEY:
return handle_get_output_scriptpubkey(conn, c, c->msg_in);
case WIRE_HSMD_ECDH_REQ:
return handle_ecdh(conn, c, c->msg_in);
case WIRE_HSMD_CANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REQ:
return handle_cannouncement_sig(conn, c, c->msg_in);
@ -1835,6 +1804,8 @@ static struct io_plan *handle_client(struct io_conn *conn, struct client *c)
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_INVOICE:
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_MESSAGE:
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_BOLT12:
case WIRE_HSMD_ECDH_REQ:
/* Hand off to libhsmd for processing */
return req_reply(conn, c,
take(hsmd_handle_client_message(

30
hsmd/libhsmd.c
View File

@ -437,6 +437,33 @@ static u8 *handle_get_channel_basepoints(struct hsmd_client *c,
&funding_pubkey);
}
/*~ The client has asked us to extract the shared secret from an EC Diffie
* Hellman token. This doesn't leak any information, but requires the private
* key, so the hsmd performs it. It's used to set up an encryption key for the
* connection handshaking (BOLT #8) and for the onion wrapping (BOLT #4). */
static u8 *handle_ecdh(struct hsmd_client *c, const u8 *msg_in)
{
struct privkey privkey;
struct pubkey point;
struct secret ss;
if (!fromwire_hsmd_ecdh_req(msg_in, &point))
return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);
/*~ We simply use the secp256k1_ecdh function: if privkey.secret.data is invalid,
* we kill them for bad randomness (~1 in 2^127 if privkey.secret.data is random) */
node_key(&privkey, NULL);
if (secp256k1_ecdh(secp256k1_ctx, ss.data, &point.pubkey,
privkey.secret.data, NULL, NULL) != 1) {
return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(c, msg_in,
"secp256k1_ecdh fail");
}
/*~ In the normal case, we return the shared secret, and then read
* the next msg. */
return towire_hsmd_ecdh_resp(NULL, &ss);
}
u8 *hsmd_handle_client_message(const tal_t *ctx, struct hsmd_client *client,
const u8 *msg)
{
@ -464,7 +491,6 @@ u8 *hsmd_handle_client_message(const tal_t *ctx, struct hsmd_client *client,
case WIRE_HSMD_INIT:
case WIRE_HSMD_CLIENT_HSMFD:
case WIRE_HSMD_GET_OUTPUT_SCRIPTPUBKEY:
case WIRE_HSMD_ECDH_REQ:
case WIRE_HSMD_CANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REQ:
case WIRE_HSMD_CUPDATE_SIG_REQ:
case WIRE_HSMD_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REQ:
@ -482,6 +508,8 @@ u8 *hsmd_handle_client_message(const tal_t *ctx, struct hsmd_client *client,
/* Not implemented yet. Should not have been passed here yet. */
return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(client, msg, "Not implemented yet.");
case WIRE_HSMD_ECDH_REQ:
return handle_ecdh(client, msg);
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_INVOICE:
return handle_sign_invoice(client, msg);
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_BOLT12: