core-lightning/hsmd/libhsmd.c

#include <bitcoin/script.h>
#include <ccan/crypto/hkdf_sha256/hkdf_sha256.h>
#include <common/bolt12_merkle.h>
#include <common/hash_u5.h>
#include <common/key_derive.h>
#include <hsmd/capabilities.h>
#include <hsmd/libhsmd.h>
#include <wire/peer_wire.h>

/* Version codes for BIP32 extended keys in libwally-core.
 * It's not suitable to add this struct into client struct,
 * so set it static.*/
struct  bip32_key_version  bip32_key_version;

#if DEVELOPER
/* If they specify --dev-force-privkey it ends up in here. */
struct privkey *dev_force_privkey;
/* If they specify --dev-force-bip32-seed it ends up in here. */
struct secret *dev_force_bip32_seed;
#endif

/* Have we initialized the secretstuff? */
bool initialized = false;

struct hsmd_client *hsmd_client_new_main(const tal_t *ctx, u64 capabilities,
					 void *extra)
{
	struct hsmd_client *c = tal(ctx, struct hsmd_client);
	c->dbid = 0;
	c->capabilities = capabilities;
	c->extra = extra;
	return c;
}

struct hsmd_client *hsmd_client_new_peer(const tal_t *ctx, u64 capabilities,
					 u64 dbid,
					 const struct node_id *peer_id,
					 void *extra)
{
	struct hsmd_client *c = tal(ctx, struct hsmd_client);
	c->dbid = dbid;
	c->capabilities = capabilities;
	c->id = *peer_id;
	c->extra = extra;
	return c;
}

/*~ This routine checks that a client is allowed to call the handler. */
bool check_client_capabilities(struct hsmd_client *client, enum hsmd_wire t)
{
	/*~ Here's a useful trick: enums in C are not real types, they're
	 * semantic sugar sprinkled over an int, bascally (in fact, older
	 * versions of gcc used to convert the values ints in the parser!).
	 *
	 * But GCC will do one thing for us: if we have a switch statement
	 * with a controlling expression which is an enum, it will warn us
	 * if a declared enum value is *not* handled in the switch, eg:
	 *     enumeration value ‘FOOBAR’ not handled in switch [-Werror=switch]
	 *
	 * This only works if there's no 'default' label, which is sometimes
	 * hard, as we *can* have non-enum values in our enum.  But the tradeoff
	 * is worth it so the compiler tells us everywhere we have to fix when
	 * we add a new enum identifier!
	 */
	switch (t) {
	case WIRE_HSMD_ECDH_REQ:
		return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_ECDH) != 0;

	case WIRE_HSMD_CANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REQ:
	case WIRE_HSMD_CUPDATE_SIG_REQ:
	case WIRE_HSMD_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REQ:
		return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_SIGN_GOSSIP) != 0;

	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_DELAYED_PAYMENT_TO_US:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_REMOTE_HTLC_TO_US:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_PENALTY_TO_US:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_LOCAL_HTLC_TX:
		return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_SIGN_ONCHAIN_TX) != 0;

	case WIRE_HSMD_GET_PER_COMMITMENT_POINT:
	case WIRE_HSMD_CHECK_FUTURE_SECRET:
		return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_COMMITMENT_POINT) != 0;

	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_REMOTE_COMMITMENT_TX:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_REMOTE_HTLC_TX:
		return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_SIGN_REMOTE_TX) != 0;

	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_MUTUAL_CLOSE_TX:
		return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_SIGN_CLOSING_TX) != 0;

	case WIRE_HSMD_INIT:
	case WIRE_HSMD_CLIENT_HSMFD:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_WITHDRAWAL:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_INVOICE:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_COMMITMENT_TX:
	case WIRE_HSMD_GET_CHANNEL_BASEPOINTS:
	case WIRE_HSMD_DEV_MEMLEAK:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_MESSAGE:
	case WIRE_HSMD_GET_OUTPUT_SCRIPTPUBKEY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_BOLT12:
		return (client->capabilities & HSM_CAP_MASTER) != 0;

	/*~ These are messages sent by the HSM so we should never receive them. */
	/* FIXME: Since we autogenerate these, we should really generate separate
	 * enums for replies to avoid this kind of clutter! */
	case WIRE_HSMD_ECDH_RESP:
	case WIRE_HSMD_CANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_CUPDATE_SIG_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_CLIENT_HSMFD_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_WITHDRAWAL_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_INVOICE_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_INIT_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMSTATUS_CLIENT_BAD_REQUEST:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_COMMITMENT_TX_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_TX_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_GET_PER_COMMITMENT_POINT_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_CHECK_FUTURE_SECRET_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_GET_CHANNEL_BASEPOINTS_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_DEV_MEMLEAK_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_MESSAGE_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_GET_OUTPUT_SCRIPTPUBKEY_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_BOLT12_REPLY:
		break;
	}
	return false;
}

/*~ ccan/compiler.h defines PRINTF_FMT as the gcc compiler hint so it will
 * check that fmt and other trailing arguments really are the correct type.
 */
/* This function is used to format an error message before passing it
 * to the library user specified hsmd_status_bad_request */
static u8 *hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(struct hsmd_client *client,
				       const u8 *msg, const char *fmt, ...)
    PRINTF_FMT(3, 4);

static u8 *hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(struct hsmd_client *client,
				       const u8 *msg, const char *fmt, ...)
{
	va_list ap;
	char *str;

	va_start(ap, fmt);
	str = tal_fmt(tmpctx, fmt, ap);
	va_end(ap);
	return hsmd_status_bad_request(client, msg, str);
}

/* Convenience wrapper for when we simply can't parse. */
static u8 *hsmd_status_malformed_request(struct hsmd_client *c, const u8 *msg_in)
{
	return hsmd_status_bad_request(c, msg_in, "could not parse request");
}

/*~ This returns the secret and/or public key for this node. */
static void node_key(struct privkey *node_privkey, struct pubkey *node_id)
{
	u32 salt = 0;
	struct privkey unused_s;
	struct pubkey unused_k;

	/* If caller specifies NULL, they don't want the results. */
	if (node_privkey == NULL)
		node_privkey = &unused_s;
	if (node_id == NULL)
		node_id = &unused_k;

	/*~ So, there is apparently a 1 in 2^127 chance that a random value is
	 * not a valid private key, so this never actually loops. */
	do {
		/*~ ccan/crypto/hkdf_sha256 implements RFC5869 "Hardened Key
		 * Derivation Functions".  That means that if a derived key
		 * leaks somehow, the other keys are not compromised. */
		hkdf_sha256(node_privkey, sizeof(*node_privkey),
			    &salt, sizeof(salt),
			    &secretstuff.hsm_secret,
			    sizeof(secretstuff.hsm_secret),
			    "nodeid", 6);
		salt++;
	} while (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_ctx, &node_id->pubkey,
					     node_privkey->secret.data));

#if DEVELOPER
	/* In DEVELOPER mode, we can override with --dev-force-privkey */
	if (dev_force_privkey) {
		*node_privkey = *dev_force_privkey;
		if (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_ctx, &node_id->pubkey,
						node_privkey->secret.data))
			hsmd_status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
				      "Failed to derive pubkey for dev_force_privkey");
	}
#endif
}

/*~ This returns the secret and/or public x-only key for this node. */
static void node_schnorrkey(secp256k1_keypair *node_keypair,
			    struct pubkey32 *node_id32)
{
	secp256k1_keypair unused_kp;
	struct privkey node_privkey;

	if (!node_keypair)
		node_keypair = &unused_kp;

	node_key(&node_privkey, NULL);
	if (secp256k1_keypair_create(secp256k1_ctx, node_keypair,
				     node_privkey.secret.data) != 1)
		hsmd_status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
				   "Failed to derive keypair");

	if (node_id32) {
		if (secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(secp256k1_ctx,
						&node_id32->pubkey,
						NULL, node_keypair) != 1)
			hsmd_status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
					   "Failed to derive xonly pub");
	}
}

/*~ This secret is the basis for all per-channel secrets: the per-channel seeds
 * will be generated by mixing in the dbid and the peer node_id. */
static void hsm_channel_secret_base(struct secret *channel_seed_base)
{
	hkdf_sha256(channel_seed_base, sizeof(struct secret), NULL, 0,
		    &secretstuff.hsm_secret, sizeof(secretstuff.hsm_secret),
		    /*~ Initially, we didn't support multiple channels per
		     * peer at all: a channel had to be completely forgotten
		     * before another could exist.  That was slightly relaxed,
		     * but the phrase "peer seed" is wired into the seed
		     * generation here, so we need to keep it that way for
		     * existing clients, rather than using "channel seed". */
		    "peer seed", strlen("peer seed"));
}

/*~ This gets the seed for this particular channel. */
static void get_channel_seed(const struct node_id *peer_id, u64 dbid,
			     struct secret *channel_seed)
{
	struct secret channel_base;
	u8 input[sizeof(peer_id->k) + sizeof(dbid)];
	/*~ Again, "per-peer" should be "per-channel", but Hysterical Raisins */
	const char *info = "per-peer seed";

	/*~ We use the DER encoding of the pubkey, because it's platform
	 * independent.  Since the dbid is unique, however, it's completely
	 * unnecessary, but again, existing users can't be broken. */
	/* FIXME: lnd has a nicer BIP32 method for deriving secrets which we
	 * should migrate to. */
	hsm_channel_secret_base(&channel_base);
	memcpy(input, peer_id->k, sizeof(peer_id->k));
	BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(peer_id->k) == PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN);
	/*~ For all that talk about platform-independence, note that this
	 * field is endian-dependent!  But let's face it, little-endian won.
	 * In related news, we don't support EBCDIC or middle-endian. */
	memcpy(input + PUBKEY_CMPR_LEN, &dbid, sizeof(dbid));

	hkdf_sha256(channel_seed, sizeof(*channel_seed),
		    input, sizeof(input),
		    &channel_base, sizeof(channel_base),
		    info, strlen(info));
}

/*~ For almost every wallet tx we use the BIP32 seed, but not for onchain
 * unilateral closes from a peer: they (may) have an output to us using a
 * public key based on the channel basepoints.  It's a bit spammy to spend
 * those immediately just to make the wallet simpler, and we didn't appreciate
 * the problem when we designed the protocol for commitment transaction keys.
 *
 * So we store just enough about the channel it came from (which may be
 * long-gone) to regenerate the keys here.  That has the added advantage that
 * the secrets themselves stay within the HSM. */
static void hsm_unilateral_close_privkey(struct privkey *dst,
					 struct unilateral_close_info *info)
{
	struct secret channel_seed;
	struct basepoints basepoints;
	struct secrets secrets;

	get_channel_seed(&info->peer_id, info->channel_id, &channel_seed);
	derive_basepoints(&channel_seed, NULL, &basepoints, &secrets, NULL);

	/* BOLT #3:
	 *
	 * If `option_static_remotekey` or `option_anchor_outputs` is
	 * negotiated, the `remotepubkey` is simply the remote node's
	 * `payment_basepoint`, otherwise it is calculated as above using the
	 * remote node's `payment_basepoint`.
	 */
	/* In our UTXO representation, this is indicated by a NULL
	 * commitment_point. */
	if (!info->commitment_point)
		dst->secret = secrets.payment_basepoint_secret;
	else if (!derive_simple_privkey(&secrets.payment_basepoint_secret,
					&basepoints.payment,
					info->commitment_point,
					dst)) {
		hsmd_status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
				   "Deriving unilateral_close_privkey");
	}
}

/*~ lightningd asks us to sign a message.  I tweeted the spec
 * in https://twitter.com/rusty_twit/status/1182102005914800128:
 *
 * @roasbeef & @bitconner point out that #lnd algo is:
 *    zbase32(SigRec(SHA256(SHA256("Lightning Signed Message:" + msg)))).
 * zbase32 from https://philzimmermann.com/docs/human-oriented-base-32-encoding.txt
 * and SigRec has first byte 31 + recovery id, followed by 64 byte sig.  #specinatweet
 */
static u8 *handle_sign_message(struct hsmd_client *c, const u8 *msg_in)
{
	u8 *msg;
	struct sha256_ctx sctx = SHA256_INIT;
	struct sha256_double shad;
	secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig;
	struct privkey node_pkey;

	if (!fromwire_hsmd_sign_message(tmpctx, msg_in, &msg))
		return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);

	/* Prefixing by a known string means we'll never be convinced
	 * to sign some gossip message, etc. */
	sha256_update(&sctx, "Lightning Signed Message:",
		      strlen("Lightning Signed Message:"));
	sha256_update(&sctx, msg, tal_count(msg));
	sha256_double_done(&sctx, &shad);

	node_key(&node_pkey, NULL);
	/*~ By no small coincidence, this libsecp routine uses the exact
	 * recovery signature format mandated by BOLT 11. */
	if (!secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(secp256k1_ctx, &rsig,
                                              shad.sha.u.u8,
                                              node_pkey.secret.data,
                                              NULL, NULL)) {
		return hsmd_status_bad_request(c, msg_in, "Failed to sign message");
	}

	return towire_hsmd_sign_message_reply(NULL, &rsig);
}

/*~ lightningd asks us to sign a bolt12 (e.g. offer). */
static u8 *handle_sign_bolt12(struct hsmd_client *c, const u8 *msg_in)
{
	char *messagename, *fieldname;
	struct sha256 merkle, sha;
	struct bip340sig sig;
	secp256k1_keypair kp;
	u8 *publictweak;

	if (!fromwire_hsmd_sign_bolt12(tmpctx, msg_in,
				       &messagename, &fieldname, &merkle,
				       &publictweak))
		return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);

	sighash_from_merkle(messagename, fieldname, &merkle, &sha);

	if (!publictweak) {
		node_schnorrkey(&kp, NULL);
	} else {
		/* If we're tweaking key, we use bolt12 key */
		struct pubkey32 bolt12;
		struct sha256 tweak;

		if (secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(secp256k1_ctx,
						&bolt12.pubkey, NULL,
						&secretstuff.bolt12) != 1)
			hsmd_status_failed(
			    STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			    "Could not derive bolt12 public key.");
		payer_key_tweak(&bolt12, publictweak, tal_bytelen(publictweak),
				&tweak);

		kp = secretstuff.bolt12;

		if (secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(secp256k1_ctx,
						      &kp,
						      tweak.u.u8) != 1) {
			return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(
			    c, msg_in, "Failed to get tweak key");
		}
	}

	if (!secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(secp256k1_ctx, sig.u8,
				       sha.u.u8,
				       &kp,
				       NULL, NULL)) {
		return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(c, msg_in,
						   "Failed to sign bolt12");
	}

	return towire_hsmd_sign_bolt12_reply(NULL, &sig);
}

/*~ Lightning invoices, defined by BOLT 11, are signed.  This has been
 * surprisingly controversial; it means a node needs to be online to create
 * invoices.  However, it seems clear to me that in a world without
 * intermedaries you need proof that you have received an offer (the
 * signature), as well as proof that you've paid it (the preimage). */
static u8 *handle_sign_invoice(struct hsmd_client *c, const u8 *msg_in)
{
	/*~ We make up a 'u5' type to represent BOLT11's 5-bits-per-byte
	 * format: it's only for human consumption, as typedefs are almost
	 * entirely transparent to the C compiler. */
	u5 *u5bytes;
	u8 *hrpu8;
	char *hrp;
	struct sha256 sha;
        secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature rsig;
	struct hash_u5 hu5;
	struct privkey node_pkey;

	if (!fromwire_hsmd_sign_invoice(tmpctx, msg_in, &u5bytes, &hrpu8))
		return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);

	/* BOLT #11:
	 *
	 * A writer... MUST set `signature` to a valid 512-bit
	 * secp256k1 signature of the SHA2 256-bit hash of the
	 * human-readable part, represented as UTF-8 bytes,
	 * concatenated with the data part (excluding the signature)
	 * with 0 bits appended to pad the data to the next byte
	 * boundary, with a trailing byte containing the recovery ID
	 * (0, 1, 2, or 3).
	 */

	/* FIXME: Check invoice! */

	/*~ tal_dup_arr() does what you'd expect: allocate an array by copying
	 * another; the cast is needed because the hrp is a 'char' array, not
	 * a 'u8' (unsigned char) as it's the "human readable" part.
	 *
	 * The final arg of tal_dup_arr() is how many extra bytes to allocate:
	 * it's so often zero that I've thought about dropping the argument, but
	 * in cases like this (adding a NUL terminator) it's perfect. */
	hrp = tal_dup_arr(tmpctx, char, (char *)hrpu8, tal_count(hrpu8), 1);
	hrp[tal_count(hrpu8)] = '\0';

	hash_u5_init(&hu5, hrp);
	hash_u5(&hu5, u5bytes, tal_count(u5bytes));
	hash_u5_done(&hu5, &sha);

	node_key(&node_pkey, NULL);
	/*~ By no small coincidence, this libsecp routine uses the exact
	 * recovery signature format mandated by BOLT 11. */
	if (!secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable(secp256k1_ctx, &rsig,
                                              (const u8 *)&sha,
                                              node_pkey.secret.data,
                                              NULL, NULL)) {
		return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(c, msg_in,
						   "Failed to sign invoice");
	}

	return towire_hsmd_sign_invoice_reply(NULL, &rsig);
}

/*~ This gets the basepoints for a channel; it's not private information really
 * (we tell the peer this to establish a channel, as it sets up the keys used
 * for each transaction).
 *
 * Note that this is asked by lightningd, so it tells us what channels it wants.
 */
static u8 *handle_get_channel_basepoints(struct hsmd_client *c,
					 const u8 *msg_in)
{
	struct node_id peer_id;
	u64 dbid;
	struct secret seed;
	struct basepoints basepoints;
	struct pubkey funding_pubkey;

	if (!fromwire_hsmd_get_channel_basepoints(msg_in, &peer_id, &dbid))
		return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);

	get_channel_seed(&peer_id, dbid, &seed);
	derive_basepoints(&seed, &funding_pubkey, &basepoints, NULL, NULL);

	return towire_hsmd_get_channel_basepoints_reply(NULL, &basepoints,
							&funding_pubkey);
}

/*~ The client has asked us to extract the shared secret from an EC Diffie
 * Hellman token.  This doesn't leak any information, but requires the private
 * key, so the hsmd performs it.  It's used to set up an encryption key for the
 * connection handshaking (BOLT #8) and for the onion wrapping (BOLT #4). */
static u8 *handle_ecdh(struct hsmd_client *c, const u8 *msg_in)
{
	struct privkey privkey;
	struct pubkey point;
	struct secret ss;

	if (!fromwire_hsmd_ecdh_req(msg_in, &point))
		return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);

	/*~ We simply use the secp256k1_ecdh function: if privkey.secret.data is invalid,
	 * we kill them for bad randomness (~1 in 2^127 if privkey.secret.data is random) */
	node_key(&privkey, NULL);
	if (secp256k1_ecdh(secp256k1_ctx, ss.data, &point.pubkey,
			   privkey.secret.data, NULL, NULL) != 1) {
		return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(c, msg_in,
						   "secp256k1_ecdh fail");
	}

	/*~ In the normal case, we return the shared secret, and then read
	 * the next msg. */
	return towire_hsmd_ecdh_resp(NULL, &ss);
}

/*~ This is used when the remote peer claims to have knowledge of future
 * commitment states (option_data_loss_protect in the spec) which means we've
 * been restored from backup or something, and may have already revealed
 * secrets.  We carefully check that this is true, here. */
static u8 *handle_check_future_secret(struct hsmd_client *c, const u8 *msg_in)
{
	struct secret channel_seed;
	struct sha256 shaseed;
	u64 n;
	struct secret secret, suggested;

	if (!fromwire_hsmd_check_future_secret(msg_in, &n, &suggested))
		return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);

	get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
	if (!derive_shaseed(&channel_seed, &shaseed))
		return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(c, msg_in,
						   "bad derive_shaseed");

	if (!per_commit_secret(&shaseed, &secret, n))
		return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(
		    c, msg_in, "bad commit secret #%" PRIu64, n);

	/*~ Note the special secret_eq_consttime: we generate foo_eq for many
	 * types using ccan/structeq, but not 'struct secret' because any
	 * comparison risks leaking information about the secret if it is
	 * timing dependent. */
	return towire_hsmd_check_future_secret_reply(
	    NULL, secret_eq_consttime(&secret, &suggested));
}

static u8 *handle_get_output_scriptpubkey(struct hsmd_client *c,
					  const u8 *msg_in)
{
	struct pubkey pubkey;
	struct privkey privkey;
	struct unilateral_close_info info;
	u8 *scriptPubkey;

	info.commitment_point = NULL;
	if (!fromwire_hsmd_get_output_scriptpubkey(tmpctx, msg_in,
						  &info.channel_id,
						  &info.peer_id,
						  &info.commitment_point))
		return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);

	hsm_unilateral_close_privkey(&privkey, &info);
	pubkey_from_privkey(&privkey, &pubkey);
	scriptPubkey = scriptpubkey_p2wpkh(tmpctx, &pubkey);

	return towire_hsmd_get_output_scriptpubkey_reply(NULL,
								       scriptPubkey);
}

/*~ The specific routine to sign the channel_announcement message.  This is
 * defined in BOLT #7, and requires *two* signatures: one from this node's key
 * (to prove it's from us), and one from the bitcoin key used to create the
 * funding transaction (to prove we own the output). */
static u8 *handle_cannouncement_sig(struct hsmd_client *c, const u8 *msg_in)
{
	/*~ Our autogeneration code doesn't define field offsets, so we just
	 * copy this from the spec itself.
	 *
	 * Note that 'check-source' will actually find and check this quote
	 * against the spec (if available); whitespace is ignored and
	 * "..." means some content is skipped, but it works remarkably well to
	 * track spec changes. */

	/* BOLT #7:
	 *
	 * - MUST compute the double-SHA256 hash `h` of the message, beginning
	 *   at offset 256, up to the end of the message.
	 *     - Note: the hash skips the 4 signatures but hashes the rest of the
	 *       message, including any future fields appended to the end.
	 */
	/* First type bytes are the msg type */
	size_t offset = 2 + 256;
	struct privkey node_pkey;
	secp256k1_ecdsa_signature node_sig, bitcoin_sig;
	struct sha256_double hash;
	u8 *reply;
	u8 *ca;
	struct pubkey funding_pubkey;
	struct privkey funding_privkey;
	struct secret channel_seed;

	/*~ You'll find FIXMEs like this scattered through the code.
	 * Sometimes they suggest simple improvements which someone like
	 * yourself should go ahead an implement.  Sometimes they're deceptive
	 * quagmires which will cause you nothing but grief.  You decide! */

	/*~ Christian uses TODO(cdecker) or FIXME(cdecker), but I'm sure he won't
	 * mind if you fix this for him! */

	/* FIXME: We should cache these. */
	get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
	derive_funding_key(&channel_seed, &funding_pubkey, &funding_privkey);

	/*~ fromwire_ routines which need to do allocation take a tal context
	 * as their first field; tmpctx is good here since we won't need it
	 * after this function. */
	if (!fromwire_hsmd_cannouncement_sig_req(tmpctx, msg_in, &ca))
		return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);

	if (tal_count(ca) < offset)
		return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(
		    c, msg_in, "bad cannounce length %zu", tal_count(ca));

	if (fromwire_peektype(ca) != WIRE_CHANNEL_ANNOUNCEMENT)
		return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(
		    c, msg_in, "Invalid channel announcement");

	node_key(&node_pkey, NULL);
	sha256_double(&hash, ca + offset, tal_count(ca) - offset);

	sign_hash(&node_pkey, &hash, &node_sig);
	sign_hash(&funding_privkey, &hash, &bitcoin_sig);

	reply = towire_hsmd_cannouncement_sig_reply(NULL, &node_sig,
						   &bitcoin_sig);
	return reply;
}

/*~ It's optional for nodes to send node_announcement, but it lets us set our
 * favourite color and cool alias!  Plus other minor details like how to
 * connect to us. */
static u8 *handle_sign_node_announcement(struct hsmd_client *c,
					 const u8 *msg_in)
{
	/* BOLT #7:
	 *
	 * The origin node:
	 *...
	 * - MUST set `signature` to the signature of the double-SHA256 of the
	 *   entire remaining packet after `signature` (using the key given by
	 *   `node_id`).
	 */
	/* 2 bytes msg type + 64 bytes signature */
	size_t offset = 66;
	struct sha256_double hash;
	struct privkey node_pkey;
	secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig;
	u8 *reply;
	u8 *ann;

	if (!fromwire_hsmd_node_announcement_sig_req(tmpctx, msg_in, &ann))
		return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);

	if (tal_count(ann) < offset)
		return hsmd_status_bad_request(c, msg_in,
					       "Node announcement too short");

	if (fromwire_peektype(ann) != WIRE_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT)
		return hsmd_status_bad_request(c, msg_in,
					       "Invalid announcement");

	node_key(&node_pkey, NULL);
	sha256_double(&hash, ann + offset, tal_count(ann) - offset);

	sign_hash(&node_pkey, &hash, &sig);

	reply = towire_hsmd_node_announcement_sig_reply(NULL, &sig);
	return reply;
}

/*~ The specific routine to sign the channel_update message. */
static u8 *handle_channel_update_sig(struct hsmd_client *c, const u8 *msg_in)
{
	/* BOLT #7:
	 *
	 * - MUST set `signature` to the signature of the double-SHA256 of the
	 *   entire remaining packet after `signature`, using its own
	 *   `node_id`.
	 */
	/* 2 bytes msg type + 64 bytes signature */
	size_t offset = 66;
	struct privkey node_pkey;
	struct sha256_double hash;
	secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig;
	struct short_channel_id scid;
	u32 timestamp, fee_base_msat, fee_proportional_mill;
	struct amount_msat htlc_minimum, htlc_maximum;
	u8 message_flags, channel_flags;
	u16 cltv_expiry_delta;
	struct bitcoin_blkid chain_hash;
	u8 *cu;

	if (!fromwire_hsmd_cupdate_sig_req(tmpctx, msg_in, &cu))
		return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);

	if (!fromwire_channel_update_option_channel_htlc_max(cu, &sig,
			&chain_hash, &scid, &timestamp, &message_flags,
			&channel_flags, &cltv_expiry_delta,
			&htlc_minimum, &fee_base_msat,
			&fee_proportional_mill, &htlc_maximum)) {
		return hsmd_status_bad_request(c, msg_in,
					       "Bad inner channel_update");
	}
	if (tal_count(cu) < offset)
		return hsmd_status_bad_request(
		    c, msg_in, "inner channel_update too short");

	node_key(&node_pkey, NULL);
	sha256_double(&hash, cu + offset, tal_count(cu) - offset);

	sign_hash(&node_pkey, &hash, &sig);

	cu = towire_channel_update_option_channel_htlc_max(tmpctx, &sig, &chain_hash,
				   &scid, timestamp, message_flags, channel_flags,
				   cltv_expiry_delta, htlc_minimum,
				   fee_base_msat, fee_proportional_mill,
				   htlc_maximum);
	return towire_hsmd_cupdate_sig_reply(NULL, cu);
}

/*~ This get the Nth a per-commitment point, and for N > 2, returns the
 * grandparent per-commitment secret.  This pattern is because after
 * negotiating commitment N-1, we send them the next per-commitment point,
 * and reveal the previous per-commitment secret as a promise not to spend
 * the previous commitment transaction. */
static u8 *handle_get_per_commitment_point(struct hsmd_client *c, const u8 *msg_in)
{
	struct secret channel_seed;
	struct sha256 shaseed;
	struct pubkey per_commitment_point;
	u64 n;
	struct secret *old_secret;

	if (!fromwire_hsmd_get_per_commitment_point(msg_in, &n))
		return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);

	get_channel_seed(&c->id, c->dbid, &channel_seed);
	if (!derive_shaseed(&channel_seed, &shaseed))
		return hsmd_status_bad_request(c, msg_in, "bad derive_shaseed");

	if (!per_commit_point(&shaseed, &per_commitment_point, n))
		return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(
		    c, msg_in, "bad per_commit_point %" PRIu64, n);

	if (n >= 2) {
		old_secret = tal(tmpctx, struct secret);
		if (!per_commit_secret(&shaseed, old_secret, n - 2)) {
			return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(
			    c, msg_in, "Cannot derive secret %" PRIu64, n - 2);
		}
	} else
		old_secret = NULL;

	/*~ hsm_client_wire.csv marks the secret field here optional, so it only
	 * gets included if the parameter is non-NULL.  We violate 80 columns
	 * pretty badly here, but it's a recommendation not a religion. */
	return towire_hsmd_get_per_commitment_point_reply(
	    NULL, &per_commitment_point, old_secret);
}

u8 *hsmd_handle_client_message(const tal_t *ctx, struct hsmd_client *client,
			       const u8 *msg)
{
	enum hsmd_wire t = fromwire_peektype(msg);

	hsmd_status_debug("Client: Received message %d from client", t);

	/* Before we do anything else, is this client allowed to do
	 * what he asks for? */
	if (!check_client_capabilities(client, t))
		return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(
		    client, msg, "does not have capability to run %d", t);

	/* If we aren't initialized yet we better get an init message
	 * first. Otherwise we don't load the secret and every
	 * signature we produce is just going to be junk. */
	if (!initialized && t != WIRE_HSMD_INIT)
		hsmd_status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_MASTER_IO,
			      "hsmd was not initialized correctly, expected "
			      "message type %d, got %d",
			      WIRE_HSMD_INIT, t);

	/* Now actually go and do what the client asked for */
	switch (t) {
	case WIRE_HSMD_INIT:
	case WIRE_HSMD_CLIENT_HSMFD:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_WITHDRAWAL:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_COMMITMENT_TX:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_DELAYED_PAYMENT_TO_US:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_REMOTE_HTLC_TO_US:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_PENALTY_TO_US:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_LOCAL_HTLC_TX:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_REMOTE_COMMITMENT_TX:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_REMOTE_HTLC_TX:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_MUTUAL_CLOSE_TX:
		/* Not implemented yet. Should not have been passed here yet. */
		return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(client, msg, "Not implemented yet.");

	case WIRE_HSMD_GET_OUTPUT_SCRIPTPUBKEY:
		return handle_get_output_scriptpubkey(client, msg);
	case WIRE_HSMD_CHECK_FUTURE_SECRET:
		return handle_check_future_secret(client, msg);
	case WIRE_HSMD_ECDH_REQ:
		return handle_ecdh(client, msg);
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_INVOICE:
		return handle_sign_invoice(client, msg);
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_BOLT12:
		return handle_sign_bolt12(client, msg);
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_MESSAGE:
		return handle_sign_message(client, msg);
	case WIRE_HSMD_GET_CHANNEL_BASEPOINTS:
		return handle_get_channel_basepoints(client, msg);
	case WIRE_HSMD_CANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REQ:
		return handle_cannouncement_sig(client, msg);
	case WIRE_HSMD_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REQ:
		return handle_sign_node_announcement(client, msg);
	case WIRE_HSMD_CUPDATE_SIG_REQ:
		return handle_channel_update_sig(client, msg);
	case WIRE_HSMD_GET_PER_COMMITMENT_POINT:
		return handle_get_per_commitment_point(client, msg);

	case WIRE_HSMD_DEV_MEMLEAK:
	case WIRE_HSMD_ECDH_RESP:
	case WIRE_HSMD_CANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_CUPDATE_SIG_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_CLIENT_HSMFD_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_NODE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIG_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_WITHDRAWAL_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_INVOICE_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_INIT_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMSTATUS_CLIENT_BAD_REQUEST:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_COMMITMENT_TX_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_TX_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_GET_PER_COMMITMENT_POINT_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_CHECK_FUTURE_SECRET_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_GET_CHANNEL_BASEPOINTS_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_DEV_MEMLEAK_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_MESSAGE_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_GET_OUTPUT_SCRIPTPUBKEY_REPLY:
	case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_BOLT12_REPLY:
		break;
	}
	return hsmd_status_bad_request(client, msg, "Unknown request");
}