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lightning-close -- Command for closing channels with direct peers
=================================================================
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SYNOPSIS
--------
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**close** *id* [*unilateraltimeout*] [*destination*] [*fee_negotiation_step*] [*wrong_funding*] [*force_lease_closed*] [\*feerange\*]
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DESCRIPTION
-----------
The **close** RPC command attempts to close the channel cooperatively
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with the peer, or unilaterally after *unilateraltimeout* , and the
to-local output will be sent to the address specified in *destination* .
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If the given *id* is a peer ID (66 hex digits as a string), then it
applies to the active channel of the direct peer corresponding to the
given peer ID. If the given *id* is a channel ID (64 hex digits as a
string, or the short channel ID *blockheight:txindex:outindex* form),
then it applies to that channel.
If *unilateraltimeout* is not zero, the **close** command will
unilaterally close the channel when that number of seconds is reached.
If *unilateraltimeout* is zero, then the **close** command will wait
indefinitely until the peer is online and can negotiate a mutual close.
The default is 2 days (172800 seconds).
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The *destination* can be of any Bitcoin bech32 type.
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If it isn't specified, the default is a Core Lightning wallet address. If
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the peer hasn't offered the `option_shutdown_anysegwit` feature, then
taproot addresses (or other v1+ segwit) are not allowed. Tell your
friends to upgrade!
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The *fee_negotiation_step* parameter controls how closing fee
negotiation is performed assuming the peer proposes a fee that is
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different than our estimate. (Note that modern peers use the quick-close protocol which does not allow negotiation: see *feerange* instead).
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On every negotiation step we must give up
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some amount from our proposal towards the peer's proposal. This parameter
can be an integer in which case it is interpreted as number of satoshis
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to step at a time. Or it can be an integer followed by "%" to designate
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a percentage of the interval to give up. A few examples, assuming the peer
proposes a closing fee of 3000 satoshi and our estimate shows it must be 4000:
* "10": our next proposal will be 4000-10=3990.
* "10%": our next proposal will be 4000-(10% of (4000-3000))=3900.
* "1": our next proposal will be 3999. This is the most extreme case when we
insist on our fee as much as possible.
* "100%": our next proposal will be 3000. This is the most relaxed case when
we quickly accept the peer's proposal.
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The default is "50%".
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*wrong_funding* can only be specified if both sides have offered
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the "shutdown_wrong_funding" feature (enabled by the
**experimental-shutdown-wrong-funding** option): it must be a
transaction id followed by a colon then the output number. Instead of
negotiating a shutdown to spend the expected funding transaction, the
shutdown transaction will spend this output instead. This is only
allowed if this peer opened the channel and the channel is unused: it
can rescue openings which have been manually miscreated.
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*force_lease_closed* if the channel has funds leased to the peer
(option_will_fund), we prevent initiation of a mutual close
unless this flag is passed in. Defaults to false.
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*feerange* is an optional array [ *min* , *max* ], indicating the
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minimum and maximum feerates to offer: the peer will obey these if it
supports the quick-close protocol. *slow* and *unilateral_close* are
the defaults.
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Rates are one of the strings *urgent* (aim for next block), *normal*
(next 4 blocks or so) or *slow* (next 100 blocks or so) to use
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lightningd's internal estimates, or one of the names from
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lightning-feerates(7). Otherwise, they can be numbers with
an optional suffix: *perkw* means the number is interpreted as
satoshi-per-kilosipa (weight), and *perkb* means it is interpreted
bitcoind-style as satoshi-per-kilobyte. Omitting the suffix is
equivalent to *perkb* .
Note that the maximum fee will be capped at the final commitment
transaction fee (unless the experimental anchor-outputs option is
negotiated).
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The peer needs to be live and connected in order to negotiate a mutual
close. The default of unilaterally closing after 48 hours is usually a
reasonable indication that you can no longer contact the peer.
NOTES
-----
Prior to 0.7.2, **close** took two parameters: *force* and *timeout* .
*timeout* was the number of seconds before *force* took effect (default,
30), and *force* determined whether the result was a unilateral close or
an RPC error (default). Even after the timeout, the channel would be
closed if the peer reconnected.
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NOTIFICATIONS
-------------
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Notifications may be returned indicating what is going on, especially
if the peer is offline and we are waiting.
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RETURN VALUE
------------
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[comment]: # (GENERATE-FROM-SCHEMA-START)
On success, an object is returned, containing:
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- **type** (string): Whether we successfully negotiated a mutual close, closed without them, or discarded not-yet-opened channel (one of "mutual", "unilateral", "unopened")
If **type** is "mutual" or "unilateral":
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- **tx** (hex): the raw bitcoin transaction used to close the channel (if it was open)
- **txid** (txid): the transaction id of the *tx* field
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[comment]: # (GENERATE-FROM-SCHEMA-END)
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A unilateral close may still occur at any time if the peer did not
behave correctly during the close negotiation.
Unilateral closes will return your funds after a delay. The delay will
vary based on the peer *to\_self\_delay* setting, not your own setting.
AUTHOR
------
ZmnSCPxj < < ZmnSCPxj @ protonmail . com > > is mainly responsible.
SEE ALSO
--------
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lightning-disconnect(7), lightning-fundchannel(7), lightningd-config(5).
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RESOURCES
---------
Main web site: < https: / / github . com / ElementsProject / lightning >
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[comment]: # ( SHA256STAMP:6a438338ae697732f0100f9e1566b9b8d189778cdb05681305e060487d68663e)