core-lightning/onchaind/onchain.c

#include <bitcoin/script.h>
#include <ccan/crypto/shachain/shachain.h>
#include <ccan/mem/mem.h>
#include <ccan/structeq/structeq.h>
#include <ccan/tal/str/str.h>
#include <common/derive_basepoints.h>
#include <common/htlc_tx.h>
#include <common/initial_commit_tx.h>
#include <common/key_derive.h>
#include <common/keyset.h>
#include <common/peer_billboard.h>
#include <common/status.h>
#include <common/subdaemon.h>
#include <common/type_to_string.h>
#include <common/utils.h>
#include <common/version.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <lightningd/channel_state.h>
#include <onchaind/gen_onchain_wire.h>
#include <onchaind/onchain_types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <wire/wire_sync.h>
  #include "gen_onchain_types_names.h"

/* stdin == requests */
#define REQ_FD STDIN_FILENO

/* Required in various places: keys for commitment transaction. */
static const struct keyset *keyset;

/* The feerate to use when we generate transactions. */
static u32 feerate_per_kw;

/* Min and max feerates we ever used */
static u32 min_possible_feerate, max_possible_feerate;

/* The dust limit to use when we generate transactions. */
static u64 dust_limit_satoshis;

/* The CSV delays for each side. */
static u32 to_self_delay[NUM_SIDES];

/* Where we send money to (our wallet) */
static struct pubkey our_wallet_pubkey;

/* Private keys for spending HTLC outputs via HTLC txs, delayed, and directly. */
static struct privkey htlc_privkey, delayed_payment_privkey, payment_privkey;

/* Private keys for spending HTLC for penalty (only if they cheated). */
static struct privkey *revocation_privkey;

/* one value is useful for a few witness scripts */
static const u8 ONE = 0x1;

/* When to tell master about HTLCs which are missing/timed out */
static u32 reasonable_depth;

/* The messages to send at that depth. */
static u8 **missing_htlc_msgs;

/* If we broadcast a tx, or need a delay to resolve the output. */
struct proposed_resolution {
	/* This can be NULL if our proposal is to simply ignore it after depth */
	const struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
	/* Non-zero if this is CSV-delayed. */
	u32 depth_required;
	enum tx_type tx_type;
};

/* How it actually got resolved. */
struct resolution {
	struct bitcoin_txid txid;
	unsigned int depth;
	enum tx_type tx_type;
};

struct tracked_output {
	enum tx_type tx_type;
	struct bitcoin_txid txid;
	u32 tx_blockheight;
	/* FIXME: Convert all depths to blocknums, then just get new blk msgs */
	u32 depth;
	u32 outnum;
	u64 satoshi;
	enum output_type output_type;

	/* If it is an HTLC, these are non-NULL */
	const struct htlc_stub *htlc;
	const u8 *wscript;

	/* If it's an HTLC off our unilateral, this is their sig for htlc_tx */
	const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *remote_htlc_sig;

	/* Our proposed solution (if any) */
	struct proposed_resolution *proposal;

	/* If it is resolved. */
	struct resolution *resolved;
};

/* We vary feerate until signature they offered matches. */
static u64 grind_htlc_tx_fee(struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
			     const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *remotesig,
			     const u8 *wscript,
			     u64 multiplier)
{
	u64 prev_fee = UINT64_MAX;
	u64 input_amount = *tx->input[0].amount;

	for (u64 i = min_possible_feerate; i <= max_possible_feerate; i++) {
		u64 fee = i * multiplier / 1000;

		if (fee > input_amount)
			break;

		/* Minor optimization: don't check same fee twice */
		if (fee == prev_fee)
			continue;

		prev_fee = fee;
		tx->output[0].amount = input_amount - fee;
		if (!check_tx_sig(tx, 0, NULL, wscript,
				  &keyset->other_htlc_key, remotesig))
			continue;

		return fee;
	}
	status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
		      "grind_fee failed from %u - %u"
		      " for tx %s, inputamount %"PRIu64", signature %s, wscript %s, multiplier %"PRIu64,
		      min_possible_feerate, max_possible_feerate,
		      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, tx),
		      input_amount,
		      type_to_string(tmpctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature, remotesig),
		      tal_hex(tmpctx, wscript),
		      multiplier);
}

static void set_htlc_timeout_fee(struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
				 const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *remotesig,
				 const u8 *wscript)
{
	static u64 fee = UINT64_MAX;

	/* BOLT #3:
	 *
	 * The fee for an HTLC-timeout transaction:
	 *  - MUST BE calculated to match:
	 *    1. Multiply `feerate_per_kw` by 663 and divide by 1000 (rounding
	 *    down).
	 */
	if (fee == UINT64_MAX) {
		fee = grind_htlc_tx_fee(tx, remotesig, wscript, 663);
		return;
	}

	tx->output[0].amount = *tx->input[0].amount - fee;
	if (check_tx_sig(tx, 0, NULL, wscript,
			 &keyset->other_htlc_key, remotesig))
		return;

	status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
		      "htlc_timeout_fee %"PRIu64" failed sigcheck "
		      " for tx %s, signature %s, wscript %s",
		      fee,
		      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, tx),
		      type_to_string(tmpctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature, remotesig),
		      tal_hex(tmpctx, wscript));
}

static void set_htlc_success_fee(struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
				 const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *remotesig,
				 const u8 *wscript)
{
	static u64 fee = UINT64_MAX;

	/* BOLT #3:
	 *
	 * The fee for an HTLC-success transaction:
	 *  - MUST BE calculated to match:
	 *    1. Multiply `feerate_per_kw` by 703 and divide by 1000
	 *    (rounding down).
	 */
	if (fee == UINT64_MAX) {
		fee = grind_htlc_tx_fee(tx, remotesig, wscript, 703);
		return;
	}

	tx->output[0].amount = *tx->input[0].amount - fee;
	if (check_tx_sig(tx, 0, NULL, wscript,
			 &keyset->other_htlc_key, remotesig))
		return;

	status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
		      "htlc_success_fee %"PRIu64" failed sigcheck "
		      " for tx %s, signature %s, wscript %s",
		      fee,
		      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, tx),
		      type_to_string(tmpctx, secp256k1_ecdsa_signature, remotesig),
		      tal_hex(tmpctx, wscript));
}

static const char *tx_type_name(enum tx_type tx_type)
{
	size_t i;

	for (i = 0; enum_tx_type_names[i].name; i++)
		if (enum_tx_type_names[i].v == tx_type)
			return enum_tx_type_names[i].name;
	return "unknown";
}

static const char *output_type_name(enum output_type output_type)
{
	size_t i;

	for (i = 0; enum_output_type_names[i].name; i++)
		if (enum_output_type_names[i].v == output_type)
			return enum_output_type_names[i].name;
	return "unknown";
}

/*
 * This covers:
 * 1. to-us output spend (`<local_delayedsig> 0`)
 * 2. the their-commitment, our HTLC timeout case (`<remotehtlcsig> 0`),
 * 3. the their-commitment, our HTLC redeem case (`<remotehtlcsig> <payment_preimage>`)
 * 4. the their-revoked-commitment, to-local (`<revocation_sig> 1`)
 * 5. the their-revoked-commitment, htlc (`<revocation_sig> <revocationkey>`)
 *
 * Overrides *tx_type if it all turns to dust.
 */
static struct bitcoin_tx *tx_to_us(const tal_t *ctx,
				   struct tracked_output *out,
				   u32 to_self_delay,
				   u32 locktime,
				   const void *elem, size_t elemsize,
				   const u8 *wscript,
				   const struct privkey *privkey,
				   const struct pubkey *pubkey,
				   enum tx_type *tx_type)
{
	struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
	u64 fee;
	secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig;

	tx = bitcoin_tx(ctx, 1, 1);
	tx->lock_time = locktime;
	tx->input[0].sequence_number = to_self_delay;
	tx->input[0].txid = out->txid;
	tx->input[0].index = out->outnum;
	tx->input[0].amount = tal_dup(tx->input, u64, &out->satoshi);

	tx->output[0].amount = out->satoshi;
	tx->output[0].script = scriptpubkey_p2wpkh(tx->output,
						   &our_wallet_pubkey);

	/* Worst-case sig is 73 bytes */
	fee = feerate_per_kw * (measure_tx_weight(tx)
			 + 1 + 3 + 73 + 0 + tal_len(wscript))
		/ 1000;

	/* Result is trivial?  Spent to OP_RETURN to avoid leaving dust. */
	if (tx->output[0].amount < dust_limit_satoshis + fee) {
		tx->output[0].amount = 0;
		tx->output[0].script = scriptpubkey_opreturn(tx->output);
		*tx_type = DONATING_TO_MINERS;
	} else
		tx->output[0].amount -= fee;

	sign_tx_input(tx, 0, NULL, wscript, privkey, pubkey, &sig);
	tx->input[0].witness = bitcoin_witness_sig_and_element(tx->input,
							       &sig,
							       elem, elemsize,
							       wscript);
	return tx;
}

static struct tracked_output *
	new_tracked_output(struct tracked_output ***outs,
			   const struct bitcoin_txid *txid,
			   u32 tx_blockheight,
			   enum tx_type tx_type,
			   u32 outnum,
			   u64 satoshi,
			   enum output_type output_type,
			   const struct htlc_stub *htlc,
			   const u8 *wscript,
			   const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *remote_htlc_sig)
{
	size_t n = tal_count(*outs);
	struct tracked_output *out = tal(*outs, struct tracked_output);

	status_trace("Tracking output %u of %s: %s/%s",
		     outnum,
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid, txid),
		     tx_type_name(tx_type),
		     output_type_name(output_type));

	out->tx_type = tx_type;
	out->txid = *txid;
	out->tx_blockheight = tx_blockheight;
	out->depth = 0;
	out->outnum = outnum;
	out->satoshi = satoshi;
	out->output_type = output_type;
	out->proposal = NULL;
	out->resolved = NULL;
	out->htlc = htlc;
	out->wscript = wscript;
	out->remote_htlc_sig = remote_htlc_sig;

	tal_resize(outs, n+1);
	(*outs)[n] = out;

	return out;
}

static void ignore_output(struct tracked_output *out)
{
	status_trace("Ignoring output %u of %s: %s/%s",
		     out->outnum,
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid, &out->txid),
		     tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
		     output_type_name(out->output_type));

	out->resolved = tal(out, struct resolution);
	out->resolved->txid = out->txid;
	out->resolved->depth = 0;
	out->resolved->tx_type = SELF;
}

static void proposal_meets_depth(struct tracked_output *out)
{
	/* If we simply wanted to ignore it after some depth */
	if (!out->proposal->tx) {
		ignore_output(out);
		return;
	}

	status_trace("Broadcasting %s (%s) to resolve %s/%s",
		     tx_type_name(out->proposal->tx_type),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, out->proposal->tx),
		     tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
		     output_type_name(out->output_type));

	wire_sync_write(REQ_FD,
			take(towire_onchain_broadcast_tx(NULL,
							 out->proposal->tx)));
	/* We will get a callback when it's in a block. */
}

static void propose_resolution(struct tracked_output *out,
			       const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
			       unsigned int depth_required,
			       enum tx_type tx_type)
{
	status_trace("Propose handling %s/%s by %s (%s) after %u blocks",
		     tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
		     output_type_name(out->output_type),
		     tx_type_name(tx_type),
		     tx ? type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, tx):"IGNORING",
		     depth_required);

	out->proposal = tal(out, struct proposed_resolution);
	out->proposal->tx = tal_steal(out->proposal, tx);
	out->proposal->depth_required = depth_required;
	out->proposal->tx_type = tx_type;

	if (depth_required == 0)
		proposal_meets_depth(out);
}

static void propose_resolution_at_block(struct tracked_output *out,
					const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
					unsigned int block_required,
					enum tx_type tx_type)
{
	u32 depth;

	/* Expiry could be in the past! */
	if (block_required < out->tx_blockheight)
		depth = 0;
	else /* Note that out->tx_blockheight is already at depth 1 */
		depth = block_required - out->tx_blockheight + 1;
	propose_resolution(out, tx, depth, tx_type);
}

static bool is_valid_sig(const u8 *e)
{
	secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig;
	size_t len = tal_len(e);

	/* Last byte is sighash flags */
	if (len < 1)
		return false;

	return signature_from_der(e, len-1, &sig);
}

/* We ignore things which look like signatures. */
static bool input_similar(const struct bitcoin_tx_input *i1,
			  const struct bitcoin_tx_input *i2)
{
	if (!structeq(&i1->txid, &i2->txid))
		return false;

	if (i1->index != i2->index)
		return false;

	if (!scripteq(i1->script, i2->script))
		return false;

	if (i1->sequence_number != i2->sequence_number)
		return false;

	if (tal_count(i1->witness) != tal_count(i2->witness))
		return false;

	for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(i1->witness); i++) {
		if (scripteq(i1->witness[i], i2->witness[i]))
			continue;

		if (is_valid_sig(i1->witness[i]) && is_valid_sig(i2->witness[i]))
			continue;
		return false;
	}

	return true;
}

/* This simple case: true if this was resolved by our proposal. */
static bool resolved_by_proposal(struct tracked_output *out,
				 const struct bitcoin_tx *tx)
{
	/* If there's no TX associated, it's not us. */
	if (!out->proposal->tx)
		return false;

	out->resolved = tal(out, struct resolution);

	/* Our proposal can change as feerates change.  Input
	 * comparison (ignoring signatures) works pretty well.
	 *
	 * FIXME: Better would be to compare outputs, but they weren't
	 * saved to db correctly until now. (COMPAT_V052)
	 */
	if (tal_count(tx->input) != tal_count(out->proposal->tx->input))
		return false;

	for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(tx->input); i++) {
		if (!input_similar(tx->input + i, out->proposal->tx->input + i))
			return false;
	}

	bitcoin_txid(tx, &out->resolved->txid);
	status_trace("Resolved %s/%s by our proposal %s (%s)",
		     tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
		     output_type_name(out->output_type),
		     tx_type_name(out->proposal->tx_type),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid,
				    &out->resolved->txid));

	out->resolved->depth = 0;
	out->resolved->tx_type = out->proposal->tx_type;

	/* Don't need proposal any more */
	out->proposal = tal_free(out->proposal);
	return true;
}

/* Otherwise, we figure out what happened and then call this. */
static void resolved_by_other(struct tracked_output *out,
			      const struct bitcoin_txid *txid,
			      enum tx_type tx_type)
{
	out->resolved = tal(out, struct resolution);
	out->resolved->txid = *txid;
	out->resolved->depth = 0;
	out->resolved->tx_type = tx_type;

	status_trace("Resolved %s/%s by %s (%s)",
		     tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
		     output_type_name(out->output_type),
		     tx_type_name(tx_type),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid, txid));
}

static void unknown_spend(struct tracked_output *out,
			  const struct bitcoin_tx *tx)
{
	out->resolved = tal(out, struct resolution);
	bitcoin_txid(tx, &out->resolved->txid);
	out->resolved->depth = 0;
	out->resolved->tx_type = UNKNOWN_TXTYPE;

	/* FIXME: we need a louder warning! */
	status_trace("Unknown spend of %s/%s by %s",
		     tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
		     output_type_name(out->output_type),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx, tx));
}

static u64 unmask_commit_number(const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
				enum side funder,
				const struct pubkey *local_payment_basepoint,
				const struct pubkey *remote_payment_basepoint)
{
	u64 obscurer;
	const struct pubkey *keys[NUM_SIDES];
	keys[LOCAL] = local_payment_basepoint;
	keys[REMOTE] = remote_payment_basepoint;

	/* BOLT #3:
	 *
	 * The 48-bit commitment transaction number is obscured by
	 * `XOR` with the lower 48 bits of...
	 */
	obscurer = commit_number_obscurer(keys[funder], keys[!funder]);

	/* BOLT #3:
	 *
	 * * locktime: upper 8 bits are 0x20, lower 24 bits are the
	 *             lower 24 bits of the obscured commitment transaction
	 *             number.
	 *...
	 * * `txin[0]` sequence: upper 8 bits are 0x80, lower 24 bits
	 *                are upper 24 bits of the obscured commitment
	 *                transaction number.
	 */
	return ((tx->lock_time & 0x00FFFFFF)
		| (tx->input[0].sequence_number & (u64)0x00FFFFFF) << 24)
		^ obscurer;
}

static bool is_mutual_close(const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
			    const u8 *local_scriptpubkey,
			    const u8 *remote_scriptpubkey)
{
	size_t i;
	bool local_matched = false, remote_matched = false;

	for (i = 0; i < tal_count(tx->output); i++) {
		/* To be paranoid, we only let each one match once. */
		if (scripteq(tx->output[i].script, local_scriptpubkey)
		    && !local_matched)
			local_matched = true;
		else if (scripteq(tx->output[i].script, remote_scriptpubkey)
			 && !remote_matched)
			remote_matched = true;
		else
			return false;
	}

	return true;
}

/* We only ever send out one, so matching it is easy. */
static bool is_local_commitment(const struct bitcoin_txid *txid,
				const struct bitcoin_txid *our_broadcast_txid)
{
	return structeq(txid, our_broadcast_txid);
}

/* BOLT #5:
 *
 * Outputs which are *resolved* are considered *irrevocably resolved*
 * once their *resolving* transaction is included in a block at least 100
 * deep on the most-work blockchain.
 */
static size_t num_not_irrevocably_resolved(struct tracked_output **outs)
{
	size_t i, num = 0;

	for (i = 0; i < tal_count(outs); i++) {
		if (!outs[i]->resolved || outs[i]->resolved->depth < 100)
			num++;
	}
	return num;
}

static u32 prop_blockheight(const struct tracked_output *out)
{
	return out->tx_blockheight + out->proposal->depth_required;
}

static void billboard_update(struct tracked_output **outs)
{
	const struct tracked_output *best = NULL;

	/* Highest priority is to report on proposals we have */
	for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(outs); i++) {
		if (!outs[i]->proposal)
			continue;
		if (!best || prop_blockheight(outs[i]) < prop_blockheight(best))
			best = outs[i];
	}

	if (best) {
		/* If we've broadcast and not seen yet, this happens */
		if (best->proposal->depth_required <= best->depth) {
			peer_billboard(false,
				       "%u outputs unresolved: waiting confirmation that we spent %s (%s:%u) using %s",
				       num_not_irrevocably_resolved(outs),
				       output_type_name(best->output_type),
				       type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid,
						      &best->txid),
				       best->outnum,
				       tx_type_name(best->proposal->tx_type));
		} else {
			peer_billboard(false,
				       "%u outputs unresolved: in %u blocks will spend %s (%s:%u) using %s",
				       num_not_irrevocably_resolved(outs),
				       best->proposal->depth_required - best->depth,
				       output_type_name(best->output_type),
				       type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid,
						      &best->txid),
				       best->outnum,
				       tx_type_name(best->proposal->tx_type));
		}
		return;
	}

	/* Now, just report on the last thing we're waiting out. */
	for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(outs); i++) {
		/* FIXME: Can this happen?  No proposal, no resolution? */
		if (!outs[i]->resolved)
			continue;
		if (!best || outs[i]->resolved->depth < best->resolved->depth)
			best = outs[i];
	}

	if (best) {
		peer_billboard(false,
			       "All outputs resolved:"
			       " waiting %u more blocks before forgetting"
			       " channel",
			       best->resolved->depth < 100
			       ? 100 - best->resolved->depth : 0);
		return;
	}

	/* Not sure this can happen, but take last one (there must be one!) */
	best = outs[tal_count(outs)-1];
	peer_billboard(false, "%u outputs unresolved: %s is one (depth %u)",
		       num_not_irrevocably_resolved(outs),
		       output_type_name(best->output_type), best->depth);
}

static void unwatch_tx(const struct bitcoin_tx *tx)
{
	u8 *msg;
	struct bitcoin_txid txid;

	bitcoin_txid(tx, &txid);

	msg = towire_onchain_unwatch_tx(tx, &txid);
	wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(msg));
}

static void handle_htlc_onchain_fulfill(struct tracked_output *out,
					const struct bitcoin_tx *tx)
{
	const u8 *witness_preimage;
	struct preimage preimage;
	struct sha256 sha;
	struct ripemd160 ripemd;

	/* Our HTLC, they filled (must be an HTLC-success tx). */
	if (out->tx_type == THEIR_UNILATERAL) {
		/* BOLT #3:
		 *
		 * ## HTLC-Timeout and HTLC-Success Transactions
		 *
		 * ...  `txin[0]` witness stack: `0 <remotehtlcsig> <localhtlcsig>
		 * <payment_preimage>` for HTLC-Success
		 */
		if (tal_count(tx->input[0].witness) != 5) /* +1 for wscript */
			status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
				      "%s/%s spent with weird witness %zu",
				      tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
				      output_type_name(out->output_type),
				      tal_count(tx->input[0].witness));

		witness_preimage = tx->input[0].witness[3];
	} else if (out->tx_type == OUR_UNILATERAL) {
		/* BOLT #3:
		 *
		 * The remote node can redeem the HTLC with the witness:
		 *
		 *    <remotehtlcsig> <payment_preimage>
		 */
		if (tal_count(tx->input[0].witness) != 3) /* +1 for wscript */
			status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
				      "%s/%s spent with weird witness %zu",
				      tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
				      output_type_name(out->output_type),
				      tal_count(tx->input[0].witness));

		witness_preimage = tx->input[0].witness[1];
	} else
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "onchain_fulfill for %s/%s?",
			      tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
			      output_type_name(out->output_type));

	if (tal_len(witness_preimage) != sizeof(preimage))
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "%s/%s spent with bad witness length %zu",
			      tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
			      output_type_name(out->output_type),
			      tal_len(witness_preimage));
	memcpy(&preimage, witness_preimage, sizeof(preimage));
	sha256(&sha, &preimage, sizeof(preimage));
	ripemd160(&ripemd, &sha, sizeof(sha));

	if (!structeq(&ripemd, &out->htlc->ripemd))
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "%s/%s spent with bad preimage %s (ripemd not %s)",
			      tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
			      output_type_name(out->output_type),
			      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct preimage, &preimage),
			      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct ripemd160,
					     &out->htlc->ripemd));

	/* Tell master we found a preimage. */
	status_trace("%s/%s gave us preimage %s",
		     tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
		     output_type_name(out->output_type),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct preimage, &preimage));
	wire_sync_write(REQ_FD,
			take(towire_onchain_extracted_preimage(NULL,
							       &preimage)));
}

static void resolve_htlc_tx(struct tracked_output ***outs,
			    size_t out_index,
			    const struct bitcoin_tx *htlc_tx,
			    const struct bitcoin_txid *htlc_txid,
			    u32 tx_blockheight)
{
	struct tracked_output *out;
	struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
	enum tx_type tx_type = OUR_DELAYED_RETURN_TO_WALLET;
	u8 *wscript = bitcoin_wscript_htlc_tx(htlc_tx, to_self_delay[LOCAL],
					      &keyset->self_revocation_key,
					      &keyset->self_delayed_payment_key);


	/* BOLT #5:
	 *
	 * A node SHOULD resolve its own HTLC transaction output by spending
	 * it to a convenient address.  A node MUST wait until the
	 * `OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY` delay has passed (as specified by the
	 * other node's `open_channel` `to_self_delay` field) before spending
	 * the output.
	 */
	out = new_tracked_output(outs, htlc_txid, tx_blockheight,
				 (*outs)[out_index]->resolved->tx_type,
				 0, htlc_tx->output[0].amount,
				 DELAYED_OUTPUT_TO_US,
				 NULL, NULL, NULL);

	/* BOLT #3:
	 *
	 * ## HTLC-Timeout and HTLC-Success Transactions
	 *
	 * These HTLC transactions are almost identical, except the
	 * HTLC-Timeout transaction is timelocked.
	 *
	 * ... to collect the output the local node uses an input with
	 * nSequence `to_self_delay` and a witness stack `<local_delayedsig>
	 * 0`
	 */
	tx = tx_to_us(*outs, out, to_self_delay[LOCAL], 0, NULL, 0,
		      wscript,
		      &delayed_payment_privkey,
		      &keyset->self_delayed_payment_key,
		      &tx_type);

	propose_resolution(out, tx, to_self_delay[LOCAL], tx_type);
}

/* BOLT #5:
 *
 * 5. _B's HTLC-timeout transaction_: The node MUST *resolve* this by
 *    spending using the revocation key.
 */
/* BOLT #5:
 *
 * 6. _B's HTLC-success transaction_: The node MUST *resolve* this by
 *    spending using the revocation key.  The node SHOULD extract
 *    the payment preimage from the transaction input witness if not
 *    already known.
 */
static void steal_htlc_tx(struct tracked_output *out)
{
	struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
	enum tx_type tx_type = OUR_PENALTY_TX;

	/* BOLT #3:
	 *
	 * To spend this via penalty, the remote node uses a witness stack
	 * `<revocationsig> 1`
	 */
	tx = tx_to_us(out, out, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0,
		      &ONE, sizeof(ONE),
		      out->wscript,
		      revocation_privkey,
		      &keyset->self_revocation_key,
		      &tx_type);
	propose_resolution(out, tx, 0, tx_type);
}

/* An output has been spent: see if it resolves something we care about. */
static void output_spent(struct tracked_output ***outs,
			 const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
			 u32 input_num,
			 u32 tx_blockheight)
{
	struct bitcoin_txid txid;

	bitcoin_txid(tx, &txid);

	for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(*outs); i++) {
		struct tracked_output *out = (*outs)[i];
		if (out->resolved)
			continue;

		if (tx->input[input_num].index != out->outnum)
			continue;
		if (!structeq(&tx->input[input_num].txid, &out->txid))
			continue;

		/* Was this our resolution? */
		if (resolved_by_proposal(out, tx)) {
			/* If it's our htlc tx, we need to resolve that, too. */
			if (out->resolved->tx_type == OUR_HTLC_SUCCESS_TX
			    || out->resolved->tx_type == OUR_HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX)
				resolve_htlc_tx(outs, i, tx, &txid,
						tx_blockheight);
			return;
		}

		switch (out->output_type) {
		case OUTPUT_TO_US:
		case DELAYED_OUTPUT_TO_US:
			unknown_spend(out, tx);
			break;

		case THEIR_HTLC:
			if (out->tx_type == THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL) {
				steal_htlc_tx(out);
			} else {
				/* We ignore this timeout tx, since we should
				 * resolve by ignoring once we reach depth. */
			}
			break;

		case OUR_HTLC:
			/* The only way	they can spend this: fulfill; even
			 * if it's revoked: */
			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * 6. _B's HTLC-success transaction_: ...  The node
			 * SHOULD extract the payment preimage from the
			 * transaction input witness if not already known.
			 */
			handle_htlc_onchain_fulfill(out, tx);
			if (out->tx_type == THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL)
				steal_htlc_tx(out);
			else {
				/* BOLT #5:
				 *
				 * If the HTLC output is spent using the
				 * payment preimage, the HTLC output is
				 * considered *irrevocably resolved*, and the
				 * node MUST extract the payment preimage from
				 * the transaction input witness.
				 */
				ignore_output(out);
			}
			break;

		case FUNDING_OUTPUT:
			/* Master should be restarting us, as this implies
			 * that our old tx was unspent. */
			status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
				      "Funding output spent again!");

		/* Um, we don't track these! */
		case OUTPUT_TO_THEM:
		case DELAYED_OUTPUT_TO_THEM:
			status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
				      "Tracked spend of %s/%s?",
				      tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
				      output_type_name(out->output_type));
		}
		return;
	}

	/* Not interesting to us, so unwatch the tx and all its outputs */
	status_trace("Notified about tx %s output %u spend, but we don't care",
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_txid,
				    &tx->input[input_num].txid),
		     tx->input[input_num].index);
	unwatch_tx(tx);
}

static void update_resolution_depth(struct tracked_output *out, u32 depth)
{
	bool reached_reasonable_depth;

	status_trace("%s/%s->%s depth %u",
		     tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
		     output_type_name(out->output_type),
		     tx_type_name(out->resolved->tx_type),
		     depth);

	/* We only set this once. */
	reached_reasonable_depth = (out->resolved->depth < reasonable_depth
				    && depth >= reasonable_depth);

	/* BOLT #5:
	 *
	 * If the HTLC output has *timed out* and not been *resolved*,
	 * the node MUST *resolve* the output and MUST fail the
	 * corresponding incoming HTLC (if any) once the resolving
	 * transaction has reached reasonable depth. */
	if ((out->resolved->tx_type == OUR_HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX
	     || out->resolved->tx_type == OUR_HTLC_TIMEOUT_TO_US)
	    && reached_reasonable_depth) {
		u8 *msg;
		status_trace("%s/%s reached reasonable depth %u",
			     tx_type_name(out->tx_type),
			     output_type_name(out->output_type),
			     depth);
		msg = towire_onchain_htlc_timeout(out, out->htlc);
		wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(msg));
	}
	out->resolved->depth = depth;
}

static void tx_new_depth(struct tracked_output **outs,
			 const struct bitcoin_txid *txid, u32 depth)
{
	size_t i;

	/* Special handling for commitment tx reaching depth */
	if (structeq(&outs[0]->resolved->txid, txid)
	    && depth >= reasonable_depth
	    && missing_htlc_msgs) {
		status_trace("Sending %zu missing htlc messages",
			     tal_count(missing_htlc_msgs));
		for (i = 0; i < tal_count(missing_htlc_msgs); i++)
			wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, missing_htlc_msgs[i]);
		/* Don't do it again. */
		missing_htlc_msgs = tal_free(missing_htlc_msgs);
	}

	for (i = 0; i < tal_count(outs); i++) {
		/* Update output depth. */
		if (structeq(&outs[i]->txid, txid))
			outs[i]->depth = depth;

		/* Is this tx resolving an output? */
		if (outs[i]->resolved) {
			if (structeq(&outs[i]->resolved->txid, txid)) {
				update_resolution_depth(outs[i], depth);
			}
			continue;
		}

		/* Otherwise, is this something we have a pending
		 * resolution for? */
		if (outs[i]->proposal
		    && structeq(&outs[i]->txid, txid)
		    && depth >= outs[i]->proposal->depth_required) {
			proposal_meets_depth(outs[i]);
		}
	}
}

/* BOLT #5:
 *
 * If the node receives (or already knows) a payment preimage for an
 * unresolved HTLC output it was offered for which it has committed to an
 * outgoing HTLC, it MUST *resolve* the output by spending it.  Otherwise, if
 * the other node is not irrevocably committed to the HTLC, it MUST NOT
 * *resolve* the output by spending it.
 */
/* Master makes sure we only get told preimages once other node is committed. */
static void handle_preimage(struct tracked_output **outs,
			    const struct preimage *preimage)
{
	size_t i;
	struct sha256 sha;
	struct ripemd160 ripemd;

	sha256(&sha, preimage, sizeof(*preimage));
	ripemd160(&ripemd, &sha, sizeof(sha));

	for (i = 0; i < tal_count(outs); i++) {
		struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
		secp256k1_ecdsa_signature sig;

		if (outs[i]->output_type != THEIR_HTLC)
			continue;

		if (!structeq(&outs[i]->htlc->ripemd, &ripemd))
			continue;

		/* Too late? */
		if (outs[i]->resolved) {
			/* FIXME: We need a better warning method! */
			status_trace("WARNING: HTLC already resolved by %s"
				     " when we found preimage",
				     tx_type_name(outs[i]->resolved->tx_type));
			return;
		}

		/* Discard any previous resolution.  Could be a timeout,
		 * could be due to multiple identical rhashes in tx. */
		outs[i]->proposal = tal_free(outs[i]->proposal);

		/* BOLT #5:
		 *
		 * To spend an offered HTLC output: if the transaction is the
		 * node's own commitment transaction, then it MUST use the
		 * HTLC-success transaction, and the HTLC-success transaction
		 * output MUST be *resolved* as described in "On-chain HTLC
		 * Transaction Handling"
		 */
		if (outs[i]->remote_htlc_sig) {
			tx = htlc_success_tx(outs[i], &outs[i]->txid,
					     outs[i]->outnum,
					     outs[i]->satoshi * 1000,
					     to_self_delay[LOCAL],
					     0,
					     keyset);
			set_htlc_success_fee(tx, outs[i]->remote_htlc_sig,
					     outs[i]->wscript);
			sign_tx_input(tx, 0, NULL, outs[i]->wscript,
				      &htlc_privkey,
				      &keyset->self_htlc_key,
				      &sig);
			tx->input[0].witness
				= bitcoin_witness_htlc_success_tx(tx->input,
								  &sig,
								  outs[i]->remote_htlc_sig,
								  preimage,
								  outs[i]->wscript);
			propose_resolution(outs[i], tx, 0, OUR_HTLC_SUCCESS_TX);
		} else {
			enum tx_type tx_type = THEIR_HTLC_FULFILL_TO_US;

			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * otherwise, it MUST spend the output to a convenient
			 * address.
			 */
			tx = tx_to_us(outs[i], outs[i], 0, 0,
				      preimage, sizeof(*preimage),
				      outs[i]->wscript,
				      &htlc_privkey,
				      &keyset->other_htlc_key,
				      &tx_type);
			propose_resolution(outs[i], tx, 0, tx_type);
		}
	}
}

/* BOLT #5:
 *
 * Once a node has broadcast a funding transaction or sent a commitment
 * signature for a commitment transaction which contains an HTLC output,
 * it MUST monitor the blockchain for transactions which spend any output
 * which is not *irrevocably resolved* until all outputs are *irrevocably
 * resolved*.
 */
static void wait_for_resolved(struct tracked_output **outs)
{
	billboard_update(outs);

	while (num_not_irrevocably_resolved(outs) != 0) {
		u8 *msg = wire_sync_read(outs, REQ_FD);
		struct bitcoin_txid txid;
		struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
		u32 input_num, depth, tx_blockheight;
		struct preimage preimage;

		status_trace("Got new message %s",
			     onchain_wire_type_name(fromwire_peektype(msg)));

		if (fromwire_onchain_depth(msg, &txid, &depth))
			tx_new_depth(outs, &txid, depth);
		else if (fromwire_onchain_spent(msg, msg, &tx, &input_num,
						&tx_blockheight))
			output_spent(&outs, tx, input_num, tx_blockheight);
		else if (fromwire_onchain_known_preimage(msg, &preimage))
			handle_preimage(outs, &preimage);
		else
			master_badmsg(-1, msg);

		billboard_update(outs);
		tal_free(msg);
		clean_tmpctx();
	}

	wire_sync_write(REQ_FD,
			take(towire_onchain_all_irrevocably_resolved(outs)));
}

static void init_reply(const char *what)
{
	/* Send init_reply first, so billboard gets credited to ONCHAIND */
	wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(towire_onchain_init_reply(NULL)));
	peer_billboard(true, what);
}

static void handle_mutual_close(const struct bitcoin_txid *txid,
				struct tracked_output **outs)
{
	init_reply("Tracking mutual close transaction");

	/* BOLT #5:
	 *
	 * A mutual close transaction *resolves* the funding transaction output.
	 *
	 * A node doesn't need to do anything else as it has already agreed to
	 * the output, which is sent to its specified `scriptpubkey`
	 */
	resolved_by_other(outs[0], txid, MUTUAL_CLOSE);

	wait_for_resolved(outs);
}

static u8 **derive_htlc_scripts(const struct htlc_stub *htlcs, enum side side)
{
	size_t i;
	u8 **htlc_scripts = tal_arr(htlcs, u8 *, tal_count(htlcs));

	for (i = 0; i < tal_count(htlcs); i++) {
		if (htlcs[i].owner == side)
			htlc_scripts[i] = htlc_offered_wscript(htlc_scripts,
							       &htlcs[i].ripemd,
							       keyset);
		else {
			/* FIXME: remove abs_locktime */
			struct abs_locktime ltime;
			if (!blocks_to_abs_locktime(htlcs[i].cltv_expiry,
						    &ltime))
				status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
					      "Could not convert cltv_expiry %u to locktime",
					      htlcs[i].cltv_expiry);
			htlc_scripts[i] = htlc_received_wscript(htlc_scripts,
								&htlcs[i].ripemd,
								&ltime,
								keyset);
		}
	}
	return htlc_scripts;
}

static void resolve_our_htlc_ourcommit(struct tracked_output *out)
{
	struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
	secp256k1_ecdsa_signature localsig;

	/* BOLT #5:
	 *
	 * # On-chain HTLC Output Handling: Our Offers
	 * ...
	 *
	 * If the HTLC output has *timed out* and not been *resolved*, the
	 * node MUST *resolve* the output and MUST fail the corresponding
	 * incoming HTLC (if any) once the resolving transaction has reached
	 * reasonable depth.  If the transaction is the node's
	 * own commitment transaction, it MUST *resolve* the output by
	 * spending it using the HTLC-timeout transaction, and the
	 * HTLC-timeout transaction output MUST be *resolved* as described in
	 * "On-chain HTLC Transaction Handling".
	 */
	tx = htlc_timeout_tx(out, &out->txid, out->outnum, out->satoshi * 1000,
			     out->htlc->cltv_expiry,
			     to_self_delay[LOCAL], 0, keyset);

	set_htlc_timeout_fee(tx, out->remote_htlc_sig, out->wscript);

	sign_tx_input(tx, 0, NULL, out->wscript, &htlc_privkey,
		      &keyset->self_htlc_key, &localsig);

	tx->input[0].witness
		= bitcoin_witness_htlc_timeout_tx(tx->input,
						  &localsig,
						  out->remote_htlc_sig,
						  out->wscript);

	propose_resolution_at_block(out, tx, out->htlc->cltv_expiry,
				    OUR_HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX);
}

static void resolve_our_htlc_theircommit(struct tracked_output *out)
{
	struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
	enum tx_type tx_type = OUR_HTLC_TIMEOUT_TO_US;

	/* BOLT #5:
	 *
	 * # On-chain HTLC Output Handling: Our Offers
	 * ...
	 *
	 * If the HTLC output has *timed out* and not been *resolved*, the
	 * node MUST *resolve* the output and MUST fail the corresponding
	 * incoming HTLC (if any) once the resolving transaction has reached
	 * reasonable depth.  If the transaction is the node's own commitment
	 * transaction, .... Otherwise it MUST resolve the output by spending
	 * it to a convenient address.
	 */
	tx = tx_to_us(out, out, 0, out->htlc->cltv_expiry, NULL, 0,
		      out->wscript,
		      &htlc_privkey,
		      &keyset->other_htlc_key,
		      &tx_type);

	propose_resolution_at_block(out, tx, out->htlc->cltv_expiry, tx_type);
}

static void resolve_their_htlc(struct tracked_output *out)
{
	/* BOLT #5:
	 *
	 * # On-chain HTLC Output Handling: Their Offers
	 *
	 *...
	 * ## Requirements
	 *...
	 * If not otherwise resolved, once the HTLC output has expired, it is
	 * considered *irrevocably resolved*.
	 */
	/* If we hit timeout depth, resolve by ignoring. */
	propose_resolution_at_block(out, NULL, out->htlc->cltv_expiry,
				    THEIR_HTLC_TIMEOUT_TO_THEM);
}

static int match_htlc_output(const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
			     unsigned int outnum,
			     u8 **htlc_scripts)
{
	/* Must be a p2wsh output */
	if (!is_p2wsh(tx->output[outnum].script, NULL))
		return -1;

	for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(htlc_scripts); i++) {
		struct sha256 sha;
		if (!htlc_scripts[i])
			continue;

		sha256(&sha, htlc_scripts[i], tal_len(htlc_scripts[i]));
		if (memeq(tx->output[outnum].script + 2,
			  tal_len(tx->output[outnum].script) - 2,
			  &sha, sizeof(sha)))
			return i;
	}
	return -1;
}

/* Tell master about any we didn't use, if it wants to know. */
static void note_missing_htlcs(u8 **htlc_scripts,
			       const struct htlc_stub *htlcs,
			       const bool *tell_if_missing,
			       const bool *tell_immediately)
{
	for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(htlcs); i++) {
		u8 *msg;

		/* Used. */
		if (!htlc_scripts[i])
			continue;

		/* Doesn't care. */
		if (!tell_if_missing[i])
			continue;

		msg = towire_onchain_missing_htlc_output(missing_htlc_msgs,
							 &htlcs[i]);
		if (tell_immediately[i])
			wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, take(msg));
		else {
			size_t n = tal_count(missing_htlc_msgs);
			tal_resize(&missing_htlc_msgs, n+1);
			missing_htlc_msgs[n] = msg;
		}
	}
}

static void handle_our_unilateral(const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
				  u32 tx_blockheight,
				  const struct bitcoin_txid *txid,
				  const struct secrets *secrets,
				  const struct sha256 *shaseed,
				  const struct pubkey *remote_revocation_basepoint,
				  const struct pubkey *remote_payment_basepoint,
				  const struct pubkey *local_payment_basepoint,
				  const struct pubkey *remote_htlc_basepoint,
				  const struct pubkey *local_htlc_basepoint,
				  const struct pubkey *local_delayed_payment_basepoint,
				  u64 commit_num,
				  const struct htlc_stub *htlcs,
				  const bool *tell_if_missing,
				  const bool *tell_immediately,
				  const secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *remote_htlc_sigs,
				  struct tracked_output **outs)
{
	u8 **htlc_scripts;
	u8 *local_wscript, *script[NUM_SIDES];
	struct pubkey local_per_commitment_point;
	struct keyset *ks;
	size_t i;

	init_reply("Tracking our own unilateral close");

	/* BOLT #5:
	 *
	 * There are two cases to consider here: in the first case, node A
	 * sees its own *commitment transaction*, in the second, it sees the
	 * node B's unrevoked *commitment transaction*.
	 *
	 * Either transaction *resolves* the funding transaction output.
	 */
	resolved_by_other(outs[0], txid, OUR_UNILATERAL);

	/* Figure out what delayed to-us output looks like */
	if (!per_commit_point(shaseed, &local_per_commitment_point, commit_num))
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "Deriving local_per_commit_point for %"PRIu64,
			      commit_num);

	/* keyset is const, we need a non-const ptr to set it up */
	keyset = ks = tal(tx, struct keyset);
	if (!derive_keyset(&local_per_commitment_point,
			   local_payment_basepoint,
			   remote_payment_basepoint,
			   local_htlc_basepoint,
			   remote_htlc_basepoint,
			   local_delayed_payment_basepoint,
			   remote_revocation_basepoint,
			   ks))
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "Deriving keyset for %"PRIu64, commit_num);

	status_trace("Deconstructing unilateral tx: %"PRIu64
		     " using keyset: "
		     " self_revocation_key: %s"
		     " self_delayed_payment_key: %s"
		     " self_payment_key: %s"
		     " other_payment_key: %s"
		     " self_htlc_key: %s"
		     " other_htlc_key: %s",
		     commit_num,
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->self_revocation_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->self_delayed_payment_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->self_payment_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->other_payment_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->self_htlc_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->other_htlc_key));

	if (!derive_simple_privkey(&secrets->delayed_payment_basepoint_secret,
				   local_delayed_payment_basepoint,
				   &local_per_commitment_point,
				   &delayed_payment_privkey))
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "Deriving delayed_payment_privkey for %"PRIu64,
			      commit_num);

	if (!derive_simple_privkey(&secrets->payment_basepoint_secret,
				   local_payment_basepoint,
				   &local_per_commitment_point,
				   &payment_privkey))
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "Deriving payment_privkey for %"PRIu64,
			      commit_num);

	if (!derive_simple_privkey(&secrets->htlc_basepoint_secret,
				   local_htlc_basepoint,
				   &local_per_commitment_point,
				   &htlc_privkey))
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "Deriving htlc_privkey for %"PRIu64,
			      commit_num);

	local_wscript = to_self_wscript(tmpctx, to_self_delay[LOCAL], keyset);

	/* Figure out what to-us output looks like. */
	script[LOCAL] = scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tmpctx, local_wscript);

	/* Figure out what direct to-them output looks like. */
	script[REMOTE] = scriptpubkey_p2wpkh(tmpctx, &keyset->other_payment_key);

	/* Calculate all the HTLC scripts so we can match them */
	htlc_scripts = derive_htlc_scripts(htlcs, LOCAL);

	status_trace("Script to-me: %u: %s (%s)",
		     to_self_delay[LOCAL],
		     tal_hex(tmpctx, script[LOCAL]),
		     tal_hex(tmpctx, local_wscript));
	status_trace("Script to-them: %s",
		     tal_hex(tmpctx, script[REMOTE]));

	for (i = 0; i < tal_count(tx->output); i++) {
		status_trace("Output %zu: %s",
			     i, tal_hex(tmpctx, tx->output[i].script));
	}

	/* BOLT #5:
	 *
	 * When node A sees its own *commitment transaction*:
	 *
	 * 1. _A's main output_:...
	 * 2. _B's main output_:...
	 * 3. _A's offered HTLCs_:...
	 * 4. _B's offered HTLCs_:...
	 */
	for (i = 0; i < tal_count(tx->output); i++) {
		struct tracked_output *out;
		int j;

		if (script[LOCAL]
		    && scripteq(tx->output[i].script, script[LOCAL])) {
			struct bitcoin_tx *to_us;
			enum tx_type tx_type = OUR_DELAYED_RETURN_TO_WALLET;

			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * 1. _A's main output_: A node SHOULD spend this
			 *    output to a convenient address.
			 */
			out = new_tracked_output(&outs, txid, tx_blockheight,
						 OUR_UNILATERAL, i,
						 tx->output[i].amount,
						 DELAYED_OUTPUT_TO_US,
						 NULL, NULL, NULL);
			/* BOLT #3:
			 *
			 * It is spent by a transaction with `nSequence` field
			 * set to `to_self_delay` (which can only be valid
			 * after that duration has passed), and witness:
			 *
			 *	<local_delayedsig> 0
			 */
			to_us = tx_to_us(out, out, to_self_delay[LOCAL], 0,
					 NULL, 0,
					 local_wscript,
					 &delayed_payment_privkey,
					 &keyset->self_delayed_payment_key,
					 &tx_type);

			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * If the output is spent (as recommended), the output
			 * is *resolved* by the spending transaction */
			propose_resolution(out, to_us, to_self_delay[LOCAL],
					   tx_type);

			script[LOCAL] = NULL;
			continue;
		}
		if (script[REMOTE]
		    && scripteq(tx->output[i].script, script[REMOTE])) {
			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * 2. _B's main output_: No action required, this
			 *    output is considered *resolved* by the
			 *    *commitment transaction* itself. */
			out = new_tracked_output(&outs, txid, tx_blockheight,
						 OUR_UNILATERAL, i,
						 tx->output[i].amount,
						 OUTPUT_TO_THEM,
						 NULL, NULL, NULL);
			ignore_output(out);
			script[REMOTE] = NULL;
			continue;
		}

		/* FIXME: limp along when this happens! */
		j = match_htlc_output(tx, i, htlc_scripts);
		if (j == -1)
			status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
				      "Could not find resolution for output %zu",
				      i);

		if (htlcs[j].owner == LOCAL) {
			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * 3. _A's offered HTLCs_: See "On-chain HTLC
			 *    Output Handling: Our Offers" below. */
			out = new_tracked_output(&outs, txid,
						 tx_blockheight,
						 OUR_UNILATERAL, i,
						 tx->output[i].amount,
						 OUR_HTLC,
						 &htlcs[j], htlc_scripts[j],
						 remote_htlc_sigs);
			resolve_our_htlc_ourcommit(out);
		} else {
			out = new_tracked_output(&outs, txid,
						 tx_blockheight,
						 OUR_UNILATERAL, i,
						 tx->output[i].amount,
						 THEIR_HTLC,
						 &htlcs[j],
						 htlc_scripts[j],
						 remote_htlc_sigs);
			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * 4. _B's offered HTLCs_: See "On-chain HTLC
			 *    Output Handling: Their Offers" below. */
			resolve_their_htlc(out);
		}

		/* Each of these consumes one HTLC signature */
		remote_htlc_sigs++;
		/* We've matched this HTLC, can't do again. */
		htlc_scripts[j] = NULL;

	}

	note_missing_htlcs(htlc_scripts, htlcs,
			   tell_if_missing, tell_immediately);
	wait_for_resolved(outs);
}

/* We produce individual penalty txs.  It's less efficient, but avoids them
 * using HTLC txs to block our penalties for long enough to pass the CSV
 * delay */
static void steal_to_them_output(struct tracked_output *out)
{
	u8 *wscript;
	struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
	enum tx_type tx_type = OUR_PENALTY_TX;

	/* BOLT #3:
	 *
	 * If a revoked commitment transaction is published, the other party
	 * can spend this output immediately with the following witness:
	 *
	 *    <revocation_sig> 1
	 */
	wscript = bitcoin_wscript_to_local(tmpctx, to_self_delay[REMOTE],
					   &keyset->self_revocation_key,
					   &keyset->self_delayed_payment_key);

	tx = tx_to_us(tmpctx, out, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0,
		      &ONE, sizeof(ONE),
		      wscript,
		      revocation_privkey,
		      &keyset->self_revocation_key,
		      &tx_type);

	propose_resolution(out, tx, 0, tx_type);
}

static void steal_htlc(struct tracked_output *out)
{
	struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
	enum tx_type tx_type = OUR_PENALTY_TX;
	u8 der[PUBKEY_DER_LEN];

	/* BOLT #3:
	 *
	 * If a revoked commitment transaction is published, the remote node
	 * can spend this output immediately with the following witness:
	 *
	 *     <revocation_sig> <revocationkey>
	 */
	pubkey_to_der(der, &keyset->self_revocation_key);
	tx = tx_to_us(out, out, 0xFFFFFFFF, 0,
		      der, sizeof(der),
		      out->wscript,
		      revocation_privkey,
		      &keyset->self_revocation_key,
		      &tx_type);

	propose_resolution(out, tx, 0, tx_type);
}

/* BOLT #5:
 *
 * If a node tries to broadcast old state, we can use the revocation key to
 * claim all the funds.
 */
static void handle_their_cheat(const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
			       const struct bitcoin_txid *txid,
			       u32 tx_blockheight,
			       const struct sha256 *revocation_preimage,
			       const struct secrets *secrets,
			       const struct pubkey *local_revocation_basepoint,
			       const struct pubkey *local_payment_basepoint,
			       const struct pubkey *remote_payment_basepoint,
			       const struct pubkey *remote_htlc_basepoint,
			       const struct pubkey *local_htlc_basepoint,
			       const struct pubkey *remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
			       u64 commit_num,
			       const struct htlc_stub *htlcs,
			       const bool *tell_if_missing,
			       const bool *tell_immediately,
			       struct tracked_output **outs)
{
	u8 **htlc_scripts;
	u8 *remote_wscript, *script[NUM_SIDES];
	struct keyset *ks;
	size_t i;
	struct secret per_commitment_secret;
	struct privkey per_commitment_privkey;
	struct pubkey per_commitment_point;

	init_reply("Tracking their illegal close: taking all funds");

	/* BOLT #5:
	 *
	 * If a node sees a *commitment transaction* for which it has a
	 * revocation key, that *resolves* the funding transaction output.
	 */
	resolved_by_other(outs[0], txid, THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL);

	/* FIXME: Types. */
	BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(per_commitment_secret)
		     == sizeof(*revocation_preimage));
	memcpy(&per_commitment_secret, revocation_preimage,
	       sizeof(per_commitment_secret));
	BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(per_commitment_privkey)
		     == sizeof(*revocation_preimage));
	memcpy(&per_commitment_privkey, revocation_preimage,
	       sizeof(per_commitment_privkey));
	if (!pubkey_from_privkey(&per_commitment_privkey, &per_commitment_point))
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "Failed derive from per_commitment_secret %s",
			      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct privkey,
					     &per_commitment_privkey));

	status_trace("Deriving keyset %"PRIu64
		     ": per_commit_point=%s"
		     " self_payment_basepoint=%s"
		     " other_payment_basepoint=%s"
		     " self_htlc_basepoint=%s"
		     " other_htlc_basepoint=%s"
		     " self_delayed_basepoint=%s"
		     " other_revocation_basepoint=%s",
		     commit_num,
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &per_commitment_point),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    remote_payment_basepoint),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    local_payment_basepoint),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    remote_htlc_basepoint),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    local_htlc_basepoint),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    remote_delayed_payment_basepoint),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    local_revocation_basepoint));

	/* keyset is const, we need a non-const ptr to set it up */
	keyset = ks = tal(tx, struct keyset);
	if (!derive_keyset(&per_commitment_point,
			   remote_payment_basepoint,
			   local_payment_basepoint,
			   local_htlc_basepoint,
			   remote_htlc_basepoint,
			   remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
			   local_revocation_basepoint,
			   ks))
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "Deriving keyset for %"PRIu64, commit_num);

	status_trace("Deconstructing revoked unilateral tx: %"PRIu64
		     " using keyset: "
		     " self_revocation_key: %s"
		     " self_delayed_payment_key: %s"
		     " self_payment_key: %s"
		     " other_payment_key: %s"
		     " self_htlc_key: %s"
		     " other_htlc_key: %s",
		     commit_num,
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->self_revocation_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->self_delayed_payment_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->self_payment_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->other_payment_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->self_htlc_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->other_htlc_key));

	revocation_privkey = tal(tx, struct privkey);
	if (!derive_revocation_privkey(&secrets->revocation_basepoint_secret,
				       &per_commitment_secret,
				       local_revocation_basepoint,
				       &per_commitment_point,
				       revocation_privkey))
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "Deriving revocation_privkey for %"PRIu64,
			      commit_num);

	remote_wscript = to_self_wscript(tmpctx, to_self_delay[REMOTE], keyset);

	/* Figure out what to-them output looks like. */
	script[REMOTE] = scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tmpctx, remote_wscript);

	/* Figure out what direct to-us output looks like. */
	script[LOCAL] = scriptpubkey_p2wpkh(tmpctx, &keyset->other_payment_key);

	/* Calculate all the HTLC scripts so we can match them */
	htlc_scripts = derive_htlc_scripts(htlcs, REMOTE);

	status_trace("Script to-them: %u: %s (%s)",
		     to_self_delay[REMOTE],
		     tal_hex(tmpctx, script[REMOTE]),
		     tal_hex(tmpctx, remote_wscript));
	status_trace("Script to-me: %s",
		     tal_hex(tmpctx, script[LOCAL]));

	for (i = 0; i < tal_count(tx->output); i++) {
		status_trace("Output %zu: %s",
			     i, tal_hex(tmpctx, tx->output[i].script));
	}

	/* BOLT #5:
	 *
	 * A node MUST resolve all unresolved outputs as follows:
	 *
	 * 1. _A's main output_: No action is required; this is a simple
	 *    P2WPKH output.  This output is considered *resolved* by the
	 *    *commitment transaction*.
	 *
	 * 2. _B's main output_: The node MUST *resolve* this by spending
	 *    using the revocation key.
	 *
	 * 3. _A's offered HTLCs_: The node MUST *resolve* this in one of three
	 *     ways by spending:
	 *   * the *commitment tx* using the payment revocation
	 *   * the *commitment tx* using the payment preimage if known
	 *   * the *HTLC-timeout tx* if B publishes them
	 *
	 * 4. _B's offered HTLCs_: The node MUST *resolve* this in one of two
	 *     ways by spending:
	 *   * the *commitment tx* using the payment revocation
	 *   * the *commitment tx* once the HTLC timeout has passed.
	 *
	 * 5. _B's HTLC-timeout transaction_: The node MUST *resolve* this by
	 *    spending using the revocation key.
	 *
	 * 6. _B's HTLC-success transaction_: The node MUST *resolve* this by
	 *    spending using the revocation key.  The node SHOULD extract
	 *    the payment preimage from the transaction input witness if not
	 *    already known.
	 */
	for (i = 0; i < tal_count(tx->output); i++) {
		struct tracked_output *out;
		int j;

		if (script[LOCAL]
		    && scripteq(tx->output[i].script, script[LOCAL])) {
			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * 1. _A's main output_: No action is required; this
			 *    is a simple P2WPKH output.  This output is
			 *    considered *resolved* by the *commitment
			 *    transaction* itself.
			 */
			out = new_tracked_output(&outs, txid, tx_blockheight,
						 THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL,
						 i, tx->output[i].amount,
						 OUTPUT_TO_US, NULL, NULL, NULL);
			ignore_output(out);
			script[LOCAL] = NULL;
			continue;
		}
		if (script[REMOTE]
		    && scripteq(tx->output[i].script, script[REMOTE])) {
			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * 2. _B's main output_: The node MUST *resolve* this
			 *    by spending using the revocation key. */
			out = new_tracked_output(&outs, txid, tx_blockheight,
						 THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL, i,
						 tx->output[i].amount,
						 DELAYED_OUTPUT_TO_THEM,
						 NULL, NULL, NULL);
			steal_to_them_output(out);
			script[REMOTE] = NULL;
			continue;
		}

		j = match_htlc_output(tx, i, htlc_scripts);
		if (j == -1)
			status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
				      "Could not find resolution for output %zu",
				      i);

		if (htlcs[j].owner == LOCAL) {
			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * 3. _A's offered HTLCs_: The node MUST *resolve* this
			 *   in one of three ways by spending:
			 *   * the *commitment tx* using the payment revocation
			 *   * the *commitment tx* using the payment preimage if
			 *      known
			 *   * the *HTLC-timeout tx* if B publishes them
			 */
			out = new_tracked_output(&outs, txid,
						 tx_blockheight,
						 THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL, i,
						 tx->output[i].amount,
						 OUR_HTLC,
						 &htlcs[j], htlc_scripts[j],
						 NULL);
			steal_htlc(out);
		} else {
			out = new_tracked_output(&outs, txid,
						 tx_blockheight,
						 THEIR_REVOKED_UNILATERAL, i,
						 tx->output[i].amount,
						 THEIR_HTLC,
						 &htlcs[j], htlc_scripts[j],
						 NULL);
			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * 4. _B's offered HTLCs_: The node MUST *resolve*
			 *     this in one of two ways by spending:
			 *
			 *   * the *commitment tx* using the payment revocation
			 *   * the *commitment tx* once the HTLC timeout has
			 *     passed.
			 */
			steal_htlc(out);
		}
		htlc_scripts[j] = NULL;
	}

	note_missing_htlcs(htlc_scripts, htlcs,
			   tell_if_missing, tell_immediately);
	wait_for_resolved(outs);
}

static void handle_their_unilateral(const struct bitcoin_tx *tx,
				    u32 tx_blockheight,
				    const struct bitcoin_txid *txid,
				    const struct secrets *secrets,
				    const struct pubkey *remote_per_commitment_point,
				    const struct pubkey *local_revocation_basepoint,
				    const struct pubkey *local_payment_basepoint,
				    const struct pubkey *remote_payment_basepoint,
				    const struct pubkey *remote_htlc_basepoint,
				    const struct pubkey *local_htlc_basepoint,
				    const struct pubkey *remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
				    u64 commit_num,
				    const struct htlc_stub *htlcs,
				    const bool *tell_if_missing,
				    const bool *tell_immediately,
				    struct tracked_output **outs)
{
	u8 **htlc_scripts;
	u8 *remote_wscript, *script[NUM_SIDES];
	struct keyset *ks;
	size_t i;

	init_reply("Tracking their unilateral close");

	/* BOLT #5:
	 *
	 * There are two cases to consider here: in the first case, node A
	 * sees its own *commitment transaction*, in the second, it sees the
	 * node B's unrevoked *commitment transaction*.
	 *
	 * Either transaction *resolves* the funding transaction output.
	 */
	resolved_by_other(outs[0], txid, THEIR_UNILATERAL);

	status_trace("Deriving keyset %"PRIu64
		     ": per_commit_point=%s"
		     " self_payment_basepoint=%s"
		     " other_payment_basepoint=%s"
		     " self_htlc_basepoint=%s"
		     " other_htlc_basepoint=%s"
		     " self_delayed_basepoint=%s"
		     " other_revocation_basepoint=%s",
		     commit_num,
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    remote_per_commitment_point),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    remote_payment_basepoint),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    local_payment_basepoint),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    remote_htlc_basepoint),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    local_htlc_basepoint),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    remote_delayed_payment_basepoint),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    local_revocation_basepoint));

	/* keyset is const, we need a non-const ptr to set it up */
	keyset = ks = tal(tx, struct keyset);
	if (!derive_keyset(remote_per_commitment_point,
			   remote_payment_basepoint,
			   local_payment_basepoint,
			   remote_htlc_basepoint,
			   local_htlc_basepoint,
			   remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
			   local_revocation_basepoint,
			   ks))
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "Deriving keyset for %"PRIu64, commit_num);

	status_trace("Deconstructing unilateral tx: %"PRIu64
		     " using keyset: "
		     " self_revocation_key: %s"
		     " self_delayed_payment_key: %s"
		     " self_payment_key: %s"
		     " other_payment_key: %s"
		     " self_htlc_key: %s"
		     " other_htlc_key: %s",
		     commit_num,
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->self_revocation_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->self_delayed_payment_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->self_payment_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->other_payment_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->self_htlc_key),
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &keyset->other_htlc_key));

	if (!derive_simple_privkey(&secrets->payment_basepoint_secret,
				   local_payment_basepoint,
				   remote_per_commitment_point,
				   &payment_privkey))
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "Deriving local_delayeprivkey for %"PRIu64,
			      commit_num);

	if (!derive_simple_privkey(&secrets->htlc_basepoint_secret,
				   local_htlc_basepoint,
				   remote_per_commitment_point,
				   &htlc_privkey))
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "Deriving htlc_privkey for %"PRIu64,
			      commit_num);

	remote_wscript = to_self_wscript(tmpctx, to_self_delay[REMOTE], keyset);

	/* Figure out what to-them output looks like. */
	script[REMOTE] = scriptpubkey_p2wsh(tmpctx, remote_wscript);

	/* Figure out what direct to-us output looks like. */
	script[LOCAL] = scriptpubkey_p2wpkh(tmpctx, &keyset->other_payment_key);

	/* Calculate all the HTLC scripts so we can match them */
	htlc_scripts = derive_htlc_scripts(htlcs, REMOTE);

	status_trace("Script to-them: %u: %s (%s)",
		     to_self_delay[REMOTE],
		     tal_hex(tmpctx, script[REMOTE]),
		     tal_hex(tmpctx, remote_wscript));
	status_trace("Script to-me: %s",
		     tal_hex(tmpctx, script[LOCAL]));

	for (i = 0; i < tal_count(tx->output); i++) {
		status_trace("Output %zu: %s",
			     i, tal_hex(tmpctx, tx->output[i].script));
	}

	/* BOLT #5:
	 *
	 * Similarly, when node A sees a *commitment transaction* from B:
	 *
	 * 1. _A's main output_:...
	 * 2. _B's main output_:...
	 * 3. _A's offered HTLCs_:...
	 * 4. _B's offered HTLCs_:...
	 */
	for (i = 0; i < tal_count(tx->output); i++) {
		struct tracked_output *out;
		int j;

		if (script[LOCAL]
		    && scripteq(tx->output[i].script, script[LOCAL])) {
			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * 1. _A's main output_: No action is required; this
			 *    is a simple P2WPKH output.  This output is
			 *    considered *resolved* by the *commitment
			 *    transaction* itself.
			 */
			out = new_tracked_output(&outs, txid, tx_blockheight,
						 THEIR_UNILATERAL,
						 i, tx->output[i].amount,
						 OUTPUT_TO_US, NULL, NULL, NULL);
			ignore_output(out);
			script[LOCAL] = NULL;

			/* Tell the master that it will want to add
			 * this UTXO to its outputs */
			wire_sync_write(REQ_FD, towire_onchain_add_utxo(
						    tmpctx, txid, i,
						    remote_per_commitment_point,
						    tx->output[i].amount,
						    tx_blockheight));
			continue;
		}
		if (script[REMOTE]
		    && scripteq(tx->output[i].script, script[REMOTE])) {
			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * 2. _B's main output_: No action required, this
			 *    output is considered *resolved* by the
			 *    *commitment transaction* itself. */
			out = new_tracked_output(&outs, txid, tx_blockheight,
						 THEIR_UNILATERAL, i,
						 tx->output[i].amount,
						 DELAYED_OUTPUT_TO_THEM,
						 NULL, NULL, NULL);
			ignore_output(out);
			continue;
		}

		j = match_htlc_output(tx, i, htlc_scripts);
		if (j == -1)
			status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
				      "Could not find resolution for output %zu",
				      i);
		if (htlcs[j].owner == LOCAL) {
			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * 3. _A's offered HTLCs_: See "On-chain HTLC Output
			 *    Handling: Our Offers" below. */
			out = new_tracked_output(&outs, txid,
						 tx_blockheight,
						 THEIR_UNILATERAL, i,
						 tx->output[i].amount,
						 OUR_HTLC,
						 &htlcs[j], htlc_scripts[j],
						 NULL);
			resolve_our_htlc_theircommit(out);
		} else {
			out = new_tracked_output(&outs, txid,
						 tx_blockheight,
						 THEIR_UNILATERAL, i,
						 tx->output[i].amount,
						 THEIR_HTLC,
						 &htlcs[j], htlc_scripts[j],
						 NULL);
			/* BOLT #5:
			 *
			 * 4. _B's offered HTLCs_: See "On-chain HTLC Output
			 *    Handling: Their Offers" below. */
			resolve_their_htlc(out);
		}
		htlc_scripts[j] = NULL;
	}

	note_missing_htlcs(htlc_scripts, htlcs,
			   tell_if_missing, tell_immediately);
	wait_for_resolved(outs);
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	const tal_t *ctx = tal(NULL, char);
	u8 *msg;
	struct privkey seed;
	struct pubkey remote_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,
		remote_per_commit_point, old_remote_per_commit_point,
		remote_revocation_basepoint, remote_delayed_payment_basepoint;
	enum side funder;
	struct basepoints basepoints;
	struct shachain shachain;
	struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
	struct secrets secrets;
	struct sha256 shaseed;
	struct tracked_output **outs;
	struct bitcoin_txid our_broadcast_txid, txid;
	secp256k1_ecdsa_signature *remote_htlc_sigs;
	u64 funding_amount_satoshi, num_htlcs;
	u8 *scriptpubkey[NUM_SIDES];
	struct htlc_stub *htlcs;
	bool *tell_if_missing, *tell_immediately;
	u32 tx_blockheight;

	subdaemon_setup(argc, argv);

	status_setup_sync(REQ_FD);

	missing_htlc_msgs = tal_arr(ctx, u8 *, 0);

	msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, REQ_FD);
	if (!fromwire_onchain_init(ctx, msg,
				   &seed, &shachain,
				   &funding_amount_satoshi,
				   &old_remote_per_commit_point,
				   &remote_per_commit_point,
				   &to_self_delay[LOCAL],
				   &to_self_delay[REMOTE],
				   &feerate_per_kw,
				   &dust_limit_satoshis,
				   &remote_revocation_basepoint,
				   &our_broadcast_txid,
				   &scriptpubkey[LOCAL],
				   &scriptpubkey[REMOTE],
				   &our_wallet_pubkey,
				   &funder,
				   &remote_payment_basepoint,
				   &remote_htlc_basepoint,
				   &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
				   &tx,
				   &tx_blockheight,
				   &reasonable_depth,
				   &remote_htlc_sigs,
				   &num_htlcs,
				   &min_possible_feerate,
				   &max_possible_feerate)) {
		master_badmsg(WIRE_ONCHAIN_INIT, msg);
	}

	derive_basepoints(&seed, NULL, &basepoints, &secrets, &shaseed);
	bitcoin_txid(tx, &txid);

	/* FIXME: Filter as we go, don't load them all into mem! */
	htlcs = tal_arr(ctx, struct htlc_stub, num_htlcs);
	tell_if_missing = tal_arr(ctx, bool, num_htlcs);
	tell_immediately = tal_arr(ctx, bool, num_htlcs);
	if (!htlcs || !tell_if_missing || !tell_immediately)
		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
			      "Can't allocate %"PRIu64" htlcs", num_htlcs);

	for (u64 i = 0; i < num_htlcs; i++) {
		msg = wire_sync_read(tmpctx, REQ_FD);
		if (!fromwire_onchain_htlc(msg, &htlcs[i],
					   &tell_if_missing[i],
					   &tell_immediately[i]))
			master_badmsg(WIRE_ONCHAIN_HTLC, msg);
	}

	outs = tal_arr(ctx, struct tracked_output *, 0);
	new_tracked_output(&outs, &tx->input[0].txid,
			   0, /* We don't care about funding blockheight */
			   FUNDING_TRANSACTION,
			   tx->input[0].index,
			   funding_amount_satoshi,
			   FUNDING_OUTPUT, NULL, NULL, NULL);

	status_trace("Remote per-commit point: %s",
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &remote_per_commit_point));
	status_trace("Old remote per-commit point: %s",
		     type_to_string(tmpctx, struct pubkey,
				    &old_remote_per_commit_point));

	/* BOLT #5:
	 *
	 * There are three ways a channel can end:
	 *
	 * 1. The good way (*mutual close*): at some point A and B agree on
	 *    closing the channel, they generate a *closing transaction*
	 *    (which is similar to a *commitment transaction* without any
	 *    pending payments), and publish it on the blockchain (see [BOLT
	 *    #2: Channel Close](02-peer-protocol.md#channel-close)).
	 */
	if (is_mutual_close(tx, scriptpubkey[LOCAL], scriptpubkey[REMOTE]))
		handle_mutual_close(&txid, outs);
	else {
		/* BOLT #5:
		 *
		 * 2. The bad way (*unilateral close*): something goes wrong,
		 *    without necessarily any evil intent on either side
		 *    (maybe one party crashed, for instance). Anyway, one
		 *    side publishes its latest *commitment transaction*.
		 */
		struct sha256 revocation_preimage;
		u64 commit_num = unmask_commit_number(tx, funder,
						      &basepoints.payment,
						      &remote_payment_basepoint);

		status_trace("commitnum = %"PRIu64
			     ", revocations_received = %"PRIu64,
			     commit_num, revocations_received(&shachain));

		if (is_local_commitment(&txid, &our_broadcast_txid))
			handle_our_unilateral(tx, tx_blockheight, &txid,
					      &secrets,
					      &shaseed,
					      &remote_revocation_basepoint,
					      &remote_payment_basepoint,
					      &basepoints.payment,
					      &remote_htlc_basepoint,
					      &basepoints.htlc,
					      &basepoints.delayed_payment,
					      commit_num,
					      htlcs,
					      tell_if_missing, tell_immediately,
					      remote_htlc_sigs,
					      outs);
		/* BOLT #5:
		 *
		 * 3. The ugly way (*revoked transaction close*): one of the
		 *    parties deliberately tries to cheat by publishing an
		 *    outdated version of its *commitment transaction*
		 *    (presumably one that was more in her favor).
		 */
		else if (shachain_get_hash(&shachain,
					   shachain_index(commit_num),
					   &revocation_preimage)) {
			handle_their_cheat(tx, &txid,
					   tx_blockheight,
					   &revocation_preimage,
					   &secrets,
					   &basepoints.revocation,
					   &basepoints.payment,
					   &remote_payment_basepoint,
					   &basepoints.htlc,
					   &remote_htlc_basepoint,
					   &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
					   commit_num,
					   htlcs,
					   tell_if_missing, tell_immediately,
					   outs);
		/* BOLT #5:
		 *
		 * Note that there can be more than one valid,
		 * unrevoked *commitment transaction* after a
		 * signature has been received via `commitment_signed`
		 * and before the corresponding `revoke_and_ack`.
		 * Either commitment can serve as B's *commitment
		 * transaction*, hence the requirement to handle both.
		 */
		} else if (commit_num == revocations_received(&shachain)) {
			status_trace("Their unilateral tx, old commit point");
			handle_their_unilateral(tx, tx_blockheight,
						&txid, &secrets,
						&old_remote_per_commit_point,
						&basepoints.revocation,
						&basepoints.payment,
						&remote_payment_basepoint,
						&remote_htlc_basepoint,
						&basepoints.htlc,
						&remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
						commit_num,
						htlcs,
						tell_if_missing,
						tell_immediately,
						outs);
		} else if (commit_num == revocations_received(&shachain) + 1) {
			status_trace("Their unilateral tx, new commit point");
			handle_their_unilateral(tx, tx_blockheight,
						&txid, &secrets,
						&remote_per_commit_point,
						&basepoints.revocation,
						&basepoints.payment,
						&remote_payment_basepoint,
						&remote_htlc_basepoint,
						&basepoints.htlc,
						&remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
						commit_num,
						htlcs,
						tell_if_missing,
						tell_immediately,
						outs);
		} else
			status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
				      "Unknown commitment index %"PRIu64
				      " for tx %s",
				      commit_num,
				      type_to_string(tmpctx, struct bitcoin_tx,
						     tx));
	}

	/* We're done! */
	tal_free(ctx);
	daemon_shutdown();

	return 0;
}