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bip-0327: Remove obsolete paragraph

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Tim Ruffing 2024-06-13 20:54:57 +02:00 committed by GitHub
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@ -190,9 +190,6 @@ The aggregate public key can be ''tweaked'', which modifies the key as defined i
In order to apply a tweak, the KeyAgg Context output by ''KeyAgg'' is provided to the ''ApplyTweak'' algorithm with the ''is_xonly_t'' argument set to false for plain tweaking and true for X-only tweaking.
The resulting KeyAgg Context can be used to apply another tweak with ''ApplyTweak'' or obtain the aggregate public key with ''GetXonlyPubkey'' or ''GetPlainPubkey''.
In addition to individual public keys, the ''KeyAgg'' algorithm accepts tweaks, which modify the aggregate public key as defined in the [[#tweaking-definition|Tweaking Definition]] subsection.
For example, if ''KeyAgg'' is run with ''v = 2'', ''is_xonly_t<sub>1</sub> = false'', ''is_xonly_t<sub>2</sub> = true'', then the aggregate key is first plain tweaked with ''tweak<sub>1</sub>'' and then X-only tweaked with ''tweak<sub>2</sub>''.
The purpose of supporting tweaking is to ensure compatibility with existing uses of tweaking, i.e., that the result of signing is a valid signature for the tweaked public key.
The MuSig2 algorithms take arbitrary tweaks as input but accepting arbitrary tweaks may negatively affect the security of the scheme.<ref>It is an open question whether allowing arbitrary tweaks from an adversary affects the unforgeability of MuSig2.</ref>
Instead, signers should obtain the tweaks according to other specifications.