2019-05-17 19:46:10 +02:00
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<pre>
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2020-01-24 01:51:50 +01:00
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BIP: 119
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2019-05-17 19:46:10 +02:00
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Layer: Consensus (soft fork)
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Title: CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY
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Author: Jeremy Rubin <j@rubin.io>
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2020-01-24 01:51:50 +01:00
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Comments-URI: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/wiki/Comments:BIP-0119
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2019-05-17 19:46:10 +02:00
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Status: Draft
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Type: Standards Track
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Created: 2020-01-06
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License: BSD-3-Clause
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</pre>
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==Abstract==
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This BIP proposes a new opcode, OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, to be activated
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as a change to the semantics of OP_NOP4.
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The new opcode has applications for transaction congestion control and payment
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channel instantiation, among others, which are described in the Motivation
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section of this BIP.
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==Summary==
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OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY uses opcode OP_NOP4 (0xb3) as a soft fork upgrade.
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OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY does the following:
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* There is at least one element on the stack, fail otherwise
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* The element on the stack is 32 bytes long, NOP otherwise
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* The StandardTemplateHash of the transaction at the current input index is equal to the element on the stack, fail otherwise
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The StandardTemplateHash commits to the serialized version, locktime, scriptSigs hash (if any
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non-null scriptSigs), number of inputs, sequences hash, number of outputs, outputs hash, and
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currently executing input index.
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The recommended standardness rules additionally:
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* Reject non-32 byte as SCRIPT_ERR_DISCOURAGE_UPGRADABLE_NOPS.
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==Motivation==
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Covenants are restrictions on how a coin may be spent beyond key ownership. Covenants can be useful
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to construct smart contracts. As covenants are complex to implement and risk of introducing
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fungibility discriminants they have not been seriously considered for inclusion in Bitcoin.
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This BIP introduces a simple covenant called a *template* which enables a limited set of highly
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valuable use cases without significant risk.
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A few examples are described below, which should be the subject of future non-consensus
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standardization efforts.
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===Congestion Controlled Transactions===
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When there is a high demand for blockspace it becomes very expensive to make transactions. A large
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volume payment processor may aggregate all their payments into a single O(1) transaction commitment
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for purposes of confirmation using CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY. Then, some time later, the payments can
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be expanded out of that UTXO when the demand for blockspace is decreased. These payments can be
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structured in a tree-like fashion to reduce individual costs of redemption.
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The below chart showcases the structure of these transactions in comparison to
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normal transactions and batched transactions.
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2020-01-24 01:56:03 +01:00
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<img src="bip-0119/states.svg" align="middle"></img>
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2019-05-17 19:46:10 +02:00
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A simulation is shown below of what impact this could have on mempool backlog
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given 5% network adoption, and 50% network adoption. The code for the simulation
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is provided in this BIP's subdirectory.
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2020-01-24 01:56:03 +01:00
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<img src="bip-0119/five.png" align="middle"></img>
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<img src="bip-0119/fifty.png" align="middle"></img>
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2019-05-17 19:46:10 +02:00
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===Payment Channels===
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There are numerous payment channel related uses.
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====Channel Factories====
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Using CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY for Channel Factories is similar to the use for Congestion Control,
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except the leaf node transactions are channels instead of plain payments. The channel can be between
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the sender and recipient or a target of recipient's choice. Using an CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, the
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recipient may give the sender an address which makes a tree of channels unbeknownst to them.
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These channels are time insensitive for setup, as all punishments are relative timelocked to the
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penultimate transaction node.
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Thus, coins sent using a congestion controlled transaction can still enjoy instant liquidity.
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====Non-Interactive Channels====
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When opening a traditional payment channel, both parties to the channel must participate. This is
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because the channel uses pre-signed multi-sig transactions to ensure that a channel can always be
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exited by either party, before entering.
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With CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, it’s possible for a single party to construct a channel which either
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party can exit from without requiring signatures from both parties.
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These payment channels can operate in one direction, paying to the channel "listener" without need
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for their private key to be online.
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2020-01-24 01:56:03 +01:00
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<img src="bip-0119/nic.svg" align="middle"></img>
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2019-05-17 19:46:10 +02:00
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====Increased Channel Routes====
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In the Lightning Network protocol, Hashed Time Locked Contracts (HTLCS) are used in the construction
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of channels. A new HTLC is required per route that the channel is serving in.
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In BOLT #2, this maximum number of HTLCs in a channel is hard limited to 483 as the maximum safe
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size to prevent the transaction from being too large to be valid. In common software implementations
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such as LND, this limit is set much lower to 12 HTLCS. This is because accepting a larger number of
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HTLCS makes it more difficult for transactions to confirm during congested periods as they must pay
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2020-02-01 21:25:27 +01:00
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higher fees.
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2019-05-17 19:46:10 +02:00
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Therefore, similarly to how congestion control is handled for normal transaction, lightning channel
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updates can be done across an CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY tree, allowing nodes to safely use many more
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HTLCS.
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Because each HTLC can have its own relative time lock in the tree, this also improves the latency
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sensitivity of the lightning protocol on contested channel close.
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===Wallet Vaults===
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When greater security is required for cold storage solutions, there can be
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default script paths that move funds from one target to another target.
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For example, a cold wallet can be set up where one customer support desk can,
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without further authorization, move a portion of the funds (using multiple
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pre-set amounts) into a lukewarm wallet operated by an isolated support desk.
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The support desk can then issue some funds to a hot wallet, and send the
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remainder back to cold storage with a similar withdrawal mechanism in place.
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This is all possible without CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, but CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY
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eliminates the need for coordination and online signers, as well as reducing the
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ability for a support desk to improperly move funds.
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Furthermore, all such designs can be combined with relative time locks to give
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time for compliance and risk desks to intervene.
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2020-01-24 01:56:03 +01:00
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<img src="bip-0119/vaults.svg" align="middle"></img>
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2019-05-17 19:46:10 +02:00
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===CoinJoin===
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CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY makes it much easier to set up trustless CoinJoins than previously because
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participants agree on a single output which pays all participants, which will be lower fee than
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before. Further Each participant doesn't need to know the totality of the outputs committed to by
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that output, they only have to verify their own sub-tree will pay them.
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==Detailed Specification==
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The below code is the main logic for verifying CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, and is the canonical
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specification for the semantics of OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY.
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case OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY:
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{
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// if flags not enabled; treat as a NOP4
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if (!(flags & SCRIPT_VERIFY_STANDARD_TEMPLATE)) break;
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if (stack.size() < 1)
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return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_INVALID_STACK_OPERATION);
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// If the argument was not 32 bytes, treat as OP_NOP4:
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switch (stack.back().size()) {
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case 32:
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if (!checker.CheckStandardTemplateHash(stack.back())) {
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return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_TEMPLATE_MISMATCH);
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}
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break;
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default:
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// future upgrade can add semantics for this opcode with different length args
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// so discourage use when applicable
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if (flags & SCRIPT_VERIFY_DISCOURAGE_UPGRADABLE_NOPS) {
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return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_DISCOURAGE_UPGRADABLE_NOPS);
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}
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}
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}
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break;
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The hash is computed as follows:
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uint256 GetStandardTemplateHash(const CTransaction& tx, uint32_t input_index) {
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return GetStandardTemplateHash(tx, GetOutputsSHA256(tx), GetSequenceSHA256(tx), input_index);
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}
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uint256 GetStandardTemplateHash(const CTransaction& tx, const uint256& outputs_hash, const uint256& sequences_hash,
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const uint32_t input_index) {
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bool skip_scriptSigs = std::find_if(tx.vin.begin(), tx.vin.end(),
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[](const CTxIn& c) { return c.scriptSig != CScript(); }) == tx.vin.end();
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return skip_scriptSigs ? GetStandardTemplateHashEmptyScript(tx, outputs_hash, sequences_hash, input_index) :
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GetStandardTemplateHashWithScript(tx, outputs_hash, sequences_hash, GetScriptSigsSHA256(tx), input_index);
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}
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uint256 GetStandardTemplateHashWithScript(const CTransaction& tx, const uint256& outputs_hash, const uint256& sequences_hash,
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const uint256& scriptSig_hash, const uint32_t input_index) {
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auto h = CHashWriter(SER_GETHASH, 0)
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<< tx.nVersion
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<< tx.nLockTime
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<< scriptSig_hash
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<< uint32_t(tx.vin.size())
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<< sequences_hash
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<< uint32_t(tx.vout.size())
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<< outputs_hash
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<< input_index;
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return h.GetSHA256();
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}
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uint256 GetStandardTemplateHashEmptyScript(const CTransaction& tx, const uint256& outputs_hash, const uint256& sequences_hash,
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const uint32_t input_index) {
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auto h = CHashWriter(SER_GETHASH, 0)
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<< tx.nVersion
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<< tx.nLockTime
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<< uint32_t(tx.vin.size())
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<< sequences_hash
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<< uint32_t(tx.vout.size())
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<< outputs_hash
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<< input_index;
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return h.GetSHA256();
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}
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A PayToBasicStandardTemplate output matches the following template:
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bool CScript::IsPayToBasicStandardTemplate() const
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{
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// Extra-fast test for pay-to-basic-standard-template CScripts:
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return (this->size() == 34 &&
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(*this)[0] == 0x20 &&
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(*this)[33] == OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY);
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}
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==Deployment==
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Deployment should be done via BIP 9 VersionBits.
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The start time and bit in the implementation are currently set to bit 5 and
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March 1st, 2020, but this is subject to change while the BIP is a draft.
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For the avoidance of unclarity, the parameters are:
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consensus.vDeployments[Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY].bit = 5;
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consensus.vDeployments[Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY].nStartTime = 1583020800; // March 1, 2020
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consensus.vDeployments[Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY].nTimeout = 1614556800; // March 1, 2021
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In order to facilitate using CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, the common case of a PayToBasicStandardTemplate
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with no scriptSig data shall be made standard to permit relaying. Future template types may be
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standardized later as policy changes.
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2020-01-21 05:15:23 +01:00
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==Reference Implementation==
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2019-05-17 19:46:10 +02:00
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2020-01-21 05:15:23 +01:00
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A reference implementation and tests are available here:
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2019-05-17 19:46:10 +02:00
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https://github.com/JeremyRubin/bitcoin/tree/checktemplateverify.
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==Rationale==
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The goal of CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY is to be minimal impact on the existing codebase -- in the
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future, as we become aware of more complex but shown to be safe use cases new template types can be added.
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Below we'll discuss the rules one-by-one:
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====The StandardTemplateHash of the transaction at the current input index matches the top of the stack====
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The set of data committed to is a superset of data which can impact the TXID of the transaction,
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other than the inputs. This ensures that for a given known input, the TXIDs can also be known ahead
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of time. Otherwise, CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY would not be usable for Channel Factory type constructions
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as the redemption TXID could be malleated and pre-signed transactions invalidated.
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=====Committing to the version and locktime=====
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Were these values not committed, it would be possible to delay the spending of
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an output arbitrarily as well as possible to change the TXID.
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Committing these values, rather than restricting them to specific values, is
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more flexible as it permits users of CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY the set the version and
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locktime as they please.
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=====Committing to the ScriptSigs Hash=====
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The scriptsig in a segwit transaction must be exactly empty, unless it is a P2SH
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segwit transaction in which case it must be only the exact redeemscript. P2SH is incompatible
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(unless the P2SH hash is broken) with CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY because the template hash must commit
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to the ScriptSig, which must contain the redeemscript, which is a hash cycle.
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2020-08-25 18:34:33 +02:00
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To prevent malleability when not using a segwit input, we also commit to the
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2019-05-17 19:46:10 +02:00
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scriptsig. This makes it possible to use a 2 input CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY with a legacy pre-signed
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spend, as long as the exact scriptsig for the legacy output is committed. This is more robust than
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simply disallowing any scriptSig to be set with CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY.
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If no scriptSigs are set in the transaction, there is no purpose in hashing the data or including it
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in the StandardTemplateHash, so we elide it. It is expected to be common that no scriptSigs will be
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set as segwit mandates that the scriptSig must be empty (to avoid malleability).
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We commit to the hash rather than the values themselves as this is already
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precomputed for each transaction to optimize SIGHASH_ALL signatures.
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Committing to the hash additionally makes it simpler to construct StandardTemplateHashes safely and unambiguously from
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script.
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=====Committing to the number of inputs=====
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If we allow more than one input to be spent in the transaction then it would be
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possible for two outputs to request payment to the same set of outputs,
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resulting in half the intended payments being discarded, the "half-spend" problem.
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Furthermore, the restriction on which inputs can be co-spent is critical for
|
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|
|
payments-channel constructs where a stable TXID is a requirement (updates would
|
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|
|
need to be signed on all combinations of inputs).
|
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|
|
However, there are legitimate use cases for allowing multiple inputs. For
|
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|
|
example:
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|
|
Script paths:
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|
Path A: <+24 hours> OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY <Pay Alice 1 Bitcoin (1 input) nLockTime for +24 hours>
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|
Path B: OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY <Pay Bob 2 Bitcoin (2 inputs)>
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In this case, there are 24 hours for the output to, with the addition of a
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|
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second output, pay Bob 2 BTC. If 24 hours lapses, then Alice may redeem her 1
|
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|
|
BTC from the contract. Both input UTXOs may have the exact same Path B, or only one.
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The issue with these constructs is that there are N! orders that the inputs can
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|
be ordered in and it's not generally possible to restrict the ordering.
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CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY allows for users to guarantee the exact number of inputs being
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spent. In general, using CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY with more than one input is difficult
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|
and exposes subtle issues, so multiple inputs should not be used except in
|
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|
|
specific applications.
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In principal, committing to the Sequences Hash (below) implicitly commits to the number of inputs,
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making this field strictly redundant. However, separately committing to this number makes it easier
|
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|
to construct StandardTemplateHashes from script.
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We treat the number of inputs as a `uint32_t` because signature checking code expects nIn to be an
|
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`unsigned int`, even though in principal a transaction can encode more than a `uint32_t`'s worth of
|
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inputs.
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=====Committing to the Sequences Hash=====
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If we don't commit to the sequences, then the TXID can be malleated. This also allows us to enforce
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|
a relative sequence lock without an OP_CSV. It is insufficient to just pair CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY
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with OP_CSV because OP_CSV enforces a minimum nSequence value, not a literal value.
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We commit to the hash rather than the values themselves as this is already
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precomputed for each transaction to optimize SIGHASH_ALL signatures.
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Committing to the hash additionally makes it simpler to construct StandardTemplateHashes safely and unambiguously from
|
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|
script.
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|
=====Committing to the Number of Outputs=====
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In principal, committing to the Outputs Hash (below) implicitly commits to the number of outputs,
|
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|
|
making this field strictly redundant. However, separately committing to this number makes it easier
|
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|
|
|
to construct StandardTemplateHashes from script.
|
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|
We treat the number of outputs as a `uint32_t` because a `COutpoint` index is a `uint32_t`, even
|
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|
|
though in principal a transaction could encode more outputs.
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=====Committing to the outputs hash=====
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This ensures that spending the UTXO is guaranteed to create the exact outputs
|
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|
requested.
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We commit to the hash rather than the values themselves as this is already
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|
precomputed for each transaction to optimize SIGHASH_ALL signatures.
|
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|
Committing to the hash additionally makes it simpler to construct StandardTemplateHashes safely and unambiguously from
|
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|
|
script.
|
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|
|
|
|
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|
=====Committing to the current input's index=====
|
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|
Committing to the currently executing input's index is not strictly needed for anti-malleability,
|
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|
however it does restrict the input orderings eliminating a source of malleability for protocol
|
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designers.
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However, committing to the index eliminates key-reuse vulnerability to the half-spend problem.
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|
As CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY scripts commit to being spent at particular index, reused instances of these
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|
|
scripts cannot be spent at the same index, which implies that they cannot be spent in the same transaction.
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|
|
This makes it safer to design wallet vault contracts without half-spend vulnerabilities.
|
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|
Committing to the current index doesn't prevent one from expressing a CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY which can
|
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|
|
be spent at multiple indicies. In current script, the CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY operation can be wrapped
|
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|
|
in an OP_IF for each index (or Tapscript branches in the future). If OP_CAT or OP_SHA256STREAM are
|
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|
|
added to Bitcoin, the index may simply be passed in by the witness before hashing.
|
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|
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|
|
=====Committing to Values by Hash=====
|
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|
|
Committing to values by hash makes it easier and more efficient to construct a StandardTemplateHash
|
|
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|
|
from script. Fields which are not intended to be set may be committed to by hash without incurring
|
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|
|
O(n) overhead to re-hash.
|
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|
|
Furthermore, if OP_SHA256STREAM is added in the future, it may be possible to write a script which
|
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|
|
allows adding a single output to a list of outputs without incurring O(n) overhead by committing to
|
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|
|
a hash midstate in the script.
|
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|
|
=====The Ordering of Fields=====
|
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|
|
Strictly speaking, the ordering of fields is insignificant. However, with a carefully selected
|
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|
|
order, the efficiency of future scripts (e.g., those using a OP_CAT or OP_SHA256STREAM) may be
|
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|
|
improved.
|
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|
In particular, the order is selected in order of least likely to change to most.
|
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|
|
#nVersion
|
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|
|
#nLockTime
|
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|
|
#scriptSig hash (maybe!)
|
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|
|
#input count
|
|
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|
|
#sequences hash
|
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|
|
#output count
|
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|
|
#outputs hash
|
|
|
|
|
#input index
|
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|
|
Several fields are infrequently modified. nVersion should change infrequently. nLockTime should
|
|
|
|
|
generally be fixed to 0 (in the case of a payment tree, only the *first* lock time is needed to
|
|
|
|
|
prevent fee-sniping the root). scriptSig hash should generally not be set at all.
|
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|
|
Since there are many possible sequences hash for a given input count, the input count comes before
|
|
|
|
|
the sequences hash.
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Since there are many possible outputs hashes for a given out count, the output count comes before
|
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|
|
|
the outputs hash.
|
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|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
Since we're generally using a single input to many output design, we're more likely to modify the
|
|
|
|
|
outputs hash than the inputs hash.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
We usually have just a single input on a CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY script, which would suggest that it
|
|
|
|
|
does not make sense for input index to be the last field. However, given the desirability of being
|
|
|
|
|
able to express a "don't care" index easily (e.g., for decentralized kickstarter-type transactions),
|
|
|
|
|
this value is placed last.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As an example, the following code checks an input index argument and concatenates it to the template and
|
|
|
|
|
checks the template matches the transaction.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OP_SIZE 4 OP_EQUALVERIF
|
|
|
|
|
<nVersion || nLockTime || input count || sequences hash || output count || outputs hash>
|
|
|
|
|
OP_SWAP OP_CAT OP_SHA256 OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
===Design Tradeoffs and Risks===
|
|
|
|
|
Covenants have historically been controversial given their potential for fungibility risks -- coins
|
|
|
|
|
could be minted which have a permanent restriction on how they may or may not be spent or required
|
|
|
|
|
to propagate metadata.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In the CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY approach, the covenants are severely restricted to simple templates. The
|
|
|
|
|
structure of CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY template is such that the outputs must be known exactly at the
|
|
|
|
|
time of construction. Based on a destructuring argument, it is only possible to create templates
|
|
|
|
|
which expand in a finite number of steps. Thus templated transactions are in theory as safe as
|
|
|
|
|
transactions which create all the inputs directly in this regard.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Furthermore, templates are restricted to be spendable as a known number of inputs only, preventing
|
|
|
|
|
unintentional introduction of the 'half spend' problem.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Templates, as restricted as they are, bear some risks.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
====Permanently Unspendable Outputs====
|
|
|
|
|
The preimage argument passed to CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY may be unknown or otherwise unsatisfiable.
|
|
|
|
|
However, requiring knowledge that an address is spendable from is incompatible with sender's ability
|
|
|
|
|
to spend to any address (especially, OP_RETURN). If a sender needs to know the template can be spent
|
|
|
|
|
from before sending, they may request a signature of an provably non-transaction challenge string
|
|
|
|
|
from the leafs of the CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY tree.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
====Forwarding Addresses====
|
|
|
|
|
Key-reuse with CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY may be used as a form of "forwarding address contract".
|
|
|
|
|
A forwarding address is an address which can automatically execute in a predefined way.
|
|
|
|
|
For example, a exchange's hot wallet might use an address which can automatically be moved to a cold
|
|
|
|
|
storage address after a relative timeout.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The issue is that reusing addresses in this way can lead to loss of funds.
|
|
|
|
|
Suppose one creates an template address which forwards 1 BTC to cold storage.
|
|
|
|
|
Creating an output to this address with less than 1 BTC will be frozen permanently.
|
|
|
|
|
Paying more than 1 BTC will lead to the funds in excess of 1BTC to be paid as a large miner fee.
|
|
|
|
|
CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY could commit to the exact amount of bitcoin provided by the inputs/amount of fee
|
|
|
|
|
paid, but as this is a user error and not a malleability issue this is not done.
|
|
|
|
|
Future soft-forks could introduce opcodes which allow conditionalizing which template or script
|
|
|
|
|
branches may be used based on inspecting the amount of funds available in a transaction
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As a general best practice, it is incumbent on Bitcoin users to not reuse any address unless you are
|
|
|
|
|
certain that the address is acceptable for the payment attempted. This limitation and risk is not
|
|
|
|
|
unique to CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY. For example, atomic swap scripts are single use once the hash is
|
|
|
|
|
revealed. Future Taproot scripts may contain many logical branches that would be unsafe for being
|
|
|
|
|
spent to multiple times (e.g., a Hash Time Lock branch should be instantiated with unique hashes
|
|
|
|
|
each time it is used). Keys which have signed a SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT transaction can similarly become
|
|
|
|
|
reuse-unsafe.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Because CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY commits to the input index currently being spent, reused-keys are
|
|
|
|
|
guaranteed to execute in separate transactions which reduces the risk of "half-spend" type issues.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
====NOP-Default and Standardness Rules====
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the argument length is not exactly 32, CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY treats it as a NOP.
|
|
|
|
|
Many OP_NOP upgrades prefer to fail in such circumstances. In particular, for
|
|
|
|
|
CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, making an invalid argument a NOP permits future soft-forks to upgrade the
|
|
|
|
|
semantics or loosed restrictions around the value being previously pushed only.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The standardness rules may lead an unscrupulous script developer to accidentally rely on the
|
|
|
|
|
stricter standardness rules to be enforced during consensus. Should that developer submit a
|
|
|
|
|
transaction directly to the network relying on standardness rejection, an standardness-invalid but
|
|
|
|
|
consensus-valid transaction may be caused, leading to a potential loss of funds.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
====Feature Redundancy====
|
|
|
|
|
CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY templates are substantially less risky than other covenant systems. If
|
|
|
|
|
implemented, other covenant systems could make the CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY's functionality redundant.
|
|
|
|
|
However, given CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY's simple semantics and low on chain cost it's likely that it
|
|
|
|
|
would continue to be favored even if redundant with other capabilities.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
More powerful covenants like those proposed by MES16, would also bring some benefits in terms of
|
|
|
|
|
improving the ability to adjust for things like fees rather than relying on child-pays-for-parent or
|
|
|
|
|
other mechanisms. However, these features come at substantially increased complexity and room for
|
|
|
|
|
unintended behavior.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Alternatively, SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT based covenant designs can implement
|
|
|
|
|
something similar to templates, via a scriptPubKey like:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<sig of desired TX with PK and fixed nonce R || SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT <PK with public SK> OP_CHECKSIG
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT bears additional technical and implementation risks that may preclude
|
|
|
|
|
its viability for inclusion in Bitcoin, but the capabilities above are similar to what
|
|
|
|
|
CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY offers. However, CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY has benefits in terms of verification
|
|
|
|
|
speed, as it requires only hash computation rather than signature operations. This can be
|
|
|
|
|
significant when constructing large payment trees or programmatic compilations. CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY
|
|
|
|
|
also has a feature-wise benefit in that it provides a robust pathway for future template upgrades.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CHECKSIGFROMSTACK along with OP_CAT may also be used to emulate CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY. However such
|
|
|
|
|
constructions are more complicated to use than CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, and encumbers additional
|
|
|
|
|
verification overhead absent from CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY. These types of covenants also bear similar
|
|
|
|
|
potential recursion issues to OP_COV which make it unlikely for inclusion in Bitcoin.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Given the simplicity of this approach to implement and analyze, and the benefits realizable by user
|
|
|
|
|
applications, CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY's template based approach is proposed in lieu of more complete
|
|
|
|
|
covenants system.
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-21 05:15:23 +01:00
|
|
|
|
== Backwards Compatibility ==
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY replaces a OP_NOP4 with stricter verification semantics. Therefore, scripts
|
|
|
|
|
which previously were valid will cease to be valid with this change. Stricter verification semantics
|
|
|
|
|
for an OP_NOP are a soft fork, so existing software will be fully functional without upgrade except
|
|
|
|
|
for mining and block validation. Similar soft forks for OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY and OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY
|
|
|
|
|
(see BIP-0065 and BIP-0112) have similarly changed OP_NOP semantics without introducing compatibility issues.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Older wallet software will be able to accept spends from OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY outputs, but will
|
|
|
|
|
require an upgrade in order to treat PayToBasicStandardTemplate chains with a confirmed ancestor as
|
|
|
|
|
being "trusted" (i.e., eligible for spending before the transaction is confirmed).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Backports of OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY can be trivially prepared (see the reference implementation)
|
|
|
|
|
for older node versions that can be patched but not upgraded to a newer major release.
|
2019-05-17 19:46:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
== References ==
|
2020-01-25 18:10:07 +01:00
|
|
|
|
*[https://utxos.org utxos.org informational site]
|
|
|
|
|
*[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxsjdIl0034&t=2451 Scaling Bitcoin Presentation]
|
|
|
|
|
*[https://bitcoinops.org/en/newsletters/2019/05/29/ Optech Newsletter Covering OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY]
|
|
|
|
|
*[https://cyber.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj9936/f/jeremyrubin.pdf Structuring Multi Transaction Contracts in Bitcoin]
|
|
|
|
|
*[https://github.com/jeremyrubin/lazuli Lazuli Notes (ECDSA based N-of-N Signatures for Certified Post-Dated UTXOs)]
|
|
|
|
|
*[https://fc16.ifca.ai/bitcoin/papers/MES16.pdf Bitcoin Covenants]
|
|
|
|
|
*[https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=278122.0 CoinCovenants using SCIP signatures, an amusingly bad idea.]
|
|
|
|
|
*[https://fc17.ifca.ai/bitcoin/papers/bitcoin17-final28.pdf Enhancing Bitcoin Transactions with Covenants]
|
2019-05-17 19:46:10 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
===Note on Similar Alternatives===
|
|
|
|
|
An earlier version of CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY, CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY, is withdrawn
|
|
|
|
|
in favor of CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY. CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY did not commit to the
|
|
|
|
|
version or lock time and was thus insecure.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY could also be implemented as an extension to Taproot, and was
|
|
|
|
|
proposed this way earlier. However, given that CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY has no dependency
|
|
|
|
|
on Taproot, it is preferable to deploy it independently.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY has also been previously referred to as OP_SECURETHEBAG, which is mentioned here
|
|
|
|
|
to aid in searching and referencing discussion on this BIP.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
==Copyright==
|
|
|
|
|
This document is licensed under the 3-clause BSD license.
|